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This study explores how antiracism and empowerment practitioners narrate memories of 
their racialisation, as well as their own experience as participants of empowerment or 
antiracism training. In this thesis, I explore how racialisation can be understood as a form 
of dehumanisation, and examine how de-racialisation can also be understood as a form of 
re-humanisation, by investigating how racial subjectivation is re-written and humanness re-
imagined. 
Predicated on an analysis of qualitative interviews with anti-racism and 
empowerment practitioners, I firstly argue that racialisation processes constitute a type of 
suffering for the subject. This suffering, derived through the process of racialisation, is 
considered a process of dehumanisation for all, White, Black, Indigenous and People of 
Colour. 
In analysing the personal training experiences that anti-racism and empowerment 
practitioners share, I probe, in a particularly condensed form, the development and 
reception of anti-racism and empowerment training in the UK and Germany. Thereafter, I 
examine the notion of (self-)empowerment and (self-)governmentality and argue that the 
cognitive and emotional understanding of individual racialisation processes partially 
liberate the subject. Central to this exploration, is a careful consideration of Nikolas Rose’s 
(1996, 1999) examination of (self-)governmentality connected to psycho-therapeutical 
discourses that are related to concepts of individual betterment and liberation. 
Thirdly, the notion of recognition as conceptualised by Charles Taylor (1994), and 
reflexivity, are analysed through the research participants' descriptions of how after their 
first training as participants they began to re-write their racial subjectivity. 
 Finally, I look into how anti-racism and empowerment practitioners re-imagine 
humanness. I delve into an existential reflection on Fanon’s appeal for a new humanism, 
and delineate the concept of decoloniality. We hereby move away from Western 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
»I find myself one day in the world, and I acknowledge one right for myself: the right to demand human behavior 
from the other. And one duty: the duty never to let my decisions renounce my freedom. [...] I am not a prisoner of 
history. I must not look for the meaning of my destiny in that direction. I must constantly remind myself that the 
real leap consists of introducing invention into life. In the world I am heading for, I am endlessly creating myself« 
(Fanon 1952, p. 163). 
 
Rapper, athlete, good singer, good dancer, criminal, drug dealer, warm-hearted, violent, at 
prayer, honour killer, terrorist, traditional, uncivilised, oppresses women, has something 
against gays and lesbians, unmodern, needs help, wears a headscarf, exotic, sexy, religious, 
does not want to integrate, passionate, spirited, fanatical, fundamentalist, hospitable, 
generous. This is just a small selection of images that Black/Indigenous/People of Colour 
(BIPOC1) in Germany and other European countries are associated with on a daily basis. 
The everyday lives of BIPOC have actually very little to do with these pictures – and yet so 
much. Similarly, these supposed realities seem to have even less to do with White people’s 
everyday lives – yet they greatly inform White lives. 
 These images may appear to be harmless, banal prejudices to those unaffected by 
them, yet they have a long history, a tradition. They are manifested amongst people in 
Germany, but also other societies of the Global North and beyond, and not without reason 
– they have a function. Previously they functioned to justify, to excuse colonialism and the 
 
1 Black/Indigenous/People of Colour (singular: Person of Colour, abbreviated as BIPOC) is a term for people who are 
racialised as not White. It is a political self-designation, Black usually refers to people from Africa or the African diaspora. 
The term Black will be elaborated further in the introduction. Indigenous refers to people who lived in the Americas or 
Australia (and some other regions) before they were colonised by the Europeans. The term »Indigenous« is not 
uncontested though, since it does not reflect the heterogeneity of people who are referred to as indigenous. Person or 
People of Colour is usually adopted by those who are negatively affected by racism, who are not White (Ha et Al. 2007). 
The term »People of Colour« originates from the colonial expression »free people of color«, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, the first mentioning of the term dates to 1781 and was used to identify free BIPOC people, some of them simply 
born and living free, some formerly enslaved then freed, some slave owners themselves. In particular, the existence of 
Black slave owners among the free people of color questions the idea of an inescapable unity of the oppressed and shows 
that simple black and white dichotomies do not suffice to understand complex racial power relations (ibid.). In Germany 
the term has been established mostly in an academic context, and as a self-designation. In recent years, various initiatives 
of racially marginalised people have begun to call themselves BIPOC in order to create an alternative to terms such as 
»foreigner«, »migrant« or »person with migration background« used by dominant German discourse usually to ascribe 
BIPOC (ibid.). During the 1960s the term was politically influenced by the Black Power movement in the US to designate 
the similarities between communities with different cultural and historical backgrounds (ibid.). As a common platform for 
cross-border alliances, this term applies equally to all members of racialised and oppressed communities (ibid.). It connects 
those who are marginalised by the White dominant culture, so as to inspire anti-racist interventions and coalition work. 
Sometimes it does create confusion amongst Whites and BIPOCs alike because it is mistaken for the colonial, derogatory 




enslavement of BIPOC (Banton 1977). The idea of a superior »Race«2 and inferior »Races« 
was necessary for colonialism to function, and these ideas were implemented in the 
beginning of the 16th century by European colonial powers (Banton 1977; Allen 1994). The 
production of images of an inferior Other, who did not fit the Western project of modernity, 
lies at the heart of social/political systems that greatly impacted the lives of millions of 
people over hundreds of years. 
 Contemporary German society remains shaped by the idea of »Race« on a number of 
levels, including in the institutional fields of education, employment, and housing: Two 
school children, for example, one of them White German and the other Turkish German, 
may perform similarly at school, but be treated very differently (Bonefeld & Dickhäuser 
2018). Schoolteachers have grown up with certain representations of Turkish Germans and 
White Germans, as has society at large, and these representations have a history and a 
function. While BIPOC students are perceived through the stencil of these images, White 
students are viewed through the mirror image of this stencil (BIPOC: lively and 
thoughtless/White: calm and rational; BIPOC: uncivilised and violent/White: civilised and 
peaceful; BIPOC: traditional and backward/White: modern and progressive etc.). These 
teachers’ mostly unconscious perception of their pupils influences the assessment process 
(Bonefeld & Dickhäuser 2018, p. 7). Generally, BIPOC students are assumed to be more 
athletic, and technically or artistically gifted. Their academic talent is overlooked, leading 
to BIPOC being underrepresented in universities and disadvantaged in the labour market 
(Koopmans et Al. 2019; Rokitte 2012). Concurrently, White Germans are generally more 
privileged by this (un)conscious perception, and as such the path to higher education is 
easier for them to achieve. Even later, when looking for work in Germany, a White person 
with the same qualifications as a Black/Indigenous/Person of Colour will be privileged by 
the unconscious perceptions of employers, and has a greater chance of being invited to a job 
interview (Koopmans et Al. 2019, p. 241). Research has also found that BIPOC in Germany 
are significantly less successful in getting confirmation for a flat during house-hunting than 
their White counterparts (Müller 2015, p. 40). Again, BIPOC are at a disadvantage. This is, 
 
2 Throughout this thesis »Race« is written with a capital »r« and in inverted commas, to highlight its social constructedness 
and in order to distance it from a biological reading (Zerger 1997, p. 9). 
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in part, one of the functions of racism: structural discrimination. It is significant here that 
not only BIPOC are affected by racism. White people are affected too - they gain advantages 
solely through their appearance and their European-sounding names (Kaas & Manger 2010; 
OECD 2013; Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency 2015). What effect might such an 
dis/advantage have on the mental wellbeing of the disadvantaged and advantaged? This is 
a central question we will return to later. 
 The data seems to indicate that German society is structured racially, alongside other 
patterns. If society is shaped by this idea of »Race«, is our thinking and acting also shaped 
accordingly? In other words, are we all to a certain extent like these teachers, employers, 
and property owners perceiving each other through these racialised narratives? Or is racism 
something that only happens at the fringes of society? I grew up in the same German culture, 
read the same children’s books, sang the same children’s songs, watched the same movies, 
consumed the same media, newspapers and magazines and advertising as most Germans3 
(and also most of my research participants). These movies, books, songs contained 
narratives in which the racial representations illustrated at the beginning of this chapter are 
shown continuously and repeatedly (Jäger & Link 1993; Kempf & Schmidt-Regener 1998; 
Butterwege & Hentges 2006; Ciarlo 2011; Marmer & Sow 2015; Sow 2018, Wigger 2019; Retis 
& Tsagarousianou 2019). Is it possible that we relate to each other through these racialised 
narratives without even being aware of it? Research on implicit racial bias points clearly in 
that direction (Coutts 2020), though the results of Implicit Association Tests (IAT) are not 
unquestioned. As long as we do not become aware of these racialised lenses, they will hold 
great weight in directing our thoughts and actions (Kteily & Richeson 2016). 
 This has different disadvantages for BIPOC, and, for White people. BIPOC are not 
only structurally disadvantaged, but in Germany they grow up in a Eurocentric society that 
measures achievements and development everywhere in the world using a Western model 
 
3 I position myself as an Anatolian German Alevi (cis-)male, as a Person of Colour in Germany. The Alevis are a religious 
or ethnic minority in Turkey, account for 10-20% of the population (the numbers vary strongly) and most likely a higher 
percentage of the Turkish diaspora as they experienced and still experience oppression, pogroms and many structural 
disadvantages in Turkey. The Alevis are famously heterogenic and there are about 5 different understandings of Alevis: 1) 
Alevis are close to Sunni Islam 2) Alevis are an Islamic confession independent from Sunni Islam 3) Alevis are a religious 
group that has nothing to do with Islam or are only superficially influenced by Islam 4) Alevis are a pre-Islamic religious 
group (indigenous to the Dersim region) with elements from Zoroastrianism and Shamanism 5) A rather small groups 
believes that Alevis are part of the Twelver Shia (see also Özmen & Schmidinger 2013). I would position myself somewhere 
between 2) and 5). 
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of historical and civilisational progress (Conrad & Randeria 2002). This perceived lack of 
democratic, enlightened and modern values can then be used by White people to exclude 
BIPOC from societal resources. Although White people have structural advantages, their 
perception of others and of themselves is distorted (Vera et Al. 1995). Repeatedly, in my 
personal experience as an anti-racism practitioner, I have observed exactly what this means 
for White people. The moment in which they become aware of their Whiteness is often very 
painful. On one level, those White people, who suffer from their past racialisation during 
the training, see the world again through children’s eyes, wherein they recognise the 
narratives, images and ideas introduced to them by adults, and their understanding of the 
danger and destructiveness of these representations begins to grow. Children are 
introduced very early to racial thinking, which is generally a thinking of White supremacy 
(Quintana & McKown 2008). Already, pre-schoolers have an idea of which »Race« they and 
others are meant to belong to (ibid.). In particular, White children (though not exclusively) 
hold notions of which »Race« is the supposedly the better one and which is not (Meulenbelt 
1988; Tryna & Hatcher 1992; Zick 1997; Quintana & McKown 2008). Children, less in control 
of what they are exposed to, find it very difficult to protect themselves from racial material 
presented by racially structured societies (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001). And so, as adults, 
there is the opportunity to sharpen their awareness of racist narratives and imagery, and 
their consequences. The question of how this process of gaining awareness of one’s 
racialisation looks like, will follow us throughout this thesis. 
 White supremacist racial identity constructions have a long historical continuity in 
Germany 4  (Hund 2017). Concepts of racial, ethnic and cultural supremacy were also 
employed in the 20th century by the imperial project of Kaiserreich (Olusoga & Erichsen 2010) 
and later of the Third Reich (Lindqvist 2002). However, following the Shoah5 and the violent 
 
4 As early as the 17th century dominant explanations of Europeans as culturally and racially superior, modern and civilised, 
became crucial in the justification of Germany’s brief colonial project of expansion in South-West Africa, a historical chapter 
often forgotten in German history (Sow 2008; see also APuZ 40-42/2019). Unfortunately, the limited scope of this thesis 
does not allow to go much more in-depth about the subject of Germany’s colonial past. However, historian Elisabeth Baer 
wrote in The Genocidal Gaze (2017) about the fascinating and horrifying continuities of German colonial history and the 
Shoah. 
5 The Shoah Memorial in Paris explains »Shoah« as »the Hebrew word for ›catastrophe‹. This term specifically means the 
killing of nearly six million Jews in Europe by Nazi Germany and its collaborators during the Second World War. The 






excesses of racial persecution, along with Germany’s growing democratisation and wealth, 
the Federal Republic was transformed into a country of immigration. Public German 
discourse on migration deemed overt racist expressions to be coming from the margins of 
society, thus displacing the idea that racism might come from the centre (Rommelspacher 
1995). It has been argued, nonetheless, that culturalist, colonial notions, are still vibrant in 
the collective unconscious of German racial subjectivities (Kohn 1988; Linke 1999; Kilomba 
2008, Volkan et Al. 2014). Primordial notions of racial and ethnic identity constructions still 
seem to inform discourses on the »integration« of minorities, most notably of Muslims in 
Germany. Racialised consciousness appears to be expressed in the continuities of (anti-
Islamic) racism (Pinn et al. 1995; Kundnani 2007) and Diasporaphobia (Vertovec 2006). 
 Although some modern geneticists have refuted the idea of biological »Races« 
(Jacquard 1996), the idea of »Race« has historically, socially, and individually settled in our 
minds and thus determines our thoughts, actions and feelings on various levels of 
consciousness (Banton 2014; Dalal 2002). Addressing racism in Germany has often been 
associated with a culture of guilt or shame due to its national-socialist history and its history 
of colonisation (Messerschmidt 2008). The question of guilt is a complex matter, with 
children inheriting these images (and the ideas conveyed therein) unfiltered from adults 
(who themselves were introduced to a world of racial ideas as children) and their young 
peers (Elias 1994; Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001). There is, however, an alternative. There are 
modes of taking responsibility and feeling accountable without focussing on questions of 
innocence or guilt. There is a way to develop a critical consciousness as adults, in looking 
again at these narratives and representations through the eyes of those racialised children, 
and questioning them at the same time, asking what ideology is mediated therewith. As my 
research shows, there are indeed individuals who are critical of their positioning in society 
(structural advantages/disadvantages), and thus hold the potential to promote greater social 
justice6. How this critical consciousness operates in comparison to shame and guilt is central 
to explorations of racism and antiracism here. 
 
6 Martin Albrow and Hakan Seçkinelgin argue that »the capacity of human beings to manage their relations between each 




 The Neue Rechte (New Right) are highlighting symbolically historical continuities in 
general German mainstream culture. The New Right represented through right-wing 
populist parties such as the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland [Alternative for Germany]) 
and right-wing movements such as PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung 
des Abendlandes [Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident]), regurgitate 
völkische ideas from the Weimar Republic (which enabled the National Socialist revolution) 
about the Great Replacement, a White supremacist conspiracy theory (Weiß 2017)7. The rise 
of the New Right highlights growing insecurities amongst large portions of the White 
German population about migration, and increasingly precarious living standards. 
However, racism is still perceived mostly as a problem of the margins, and not so much as 
a phenomenon coming from the centre of society (Löffler 2016). Mainstream media 
discourses in Germany, for example, reflect a selective perception of Muslims that rarely 
moves beyond the oppression of (Muslim) women, the headscarf, femicide 8 , religious 
fundamentalism, and terrorism (Geißler et al. 2006; Attia 2009; Shooman 2014). At the same 
time, modernity, secularism, women’s emancipation, and liberal sexuality, are constructed 
as traditional Western values linked to the European Enlightenment project and are not 
identified with Muslims in Germany and elsewhere (Shooman 2014). As authors such as 
Talal Asad (2003) argue, Enlightenment values are subscribed to the »West«, in order to 
justify the structural disadvantage of Muslims in Europe and beyond (Asad 2003). Anti-
Islamic racist discourses construct Muslims not only as an »ethnicity« that is in opposition 
to the »White/Western/European«, but also as a culture that is not capable of adapting to 
European norms and values9. All these narratives are transported through the racialisation 
of the »Muslim Other«, but also of the »White/Western« identity10. The New Right’s idea 
about the German Volk heavily borrows from National Socialists ideas about racial and 
 
the best we may hope for is that concepts of justice may develop that can persuade enough people to work together to 
arrest a headlong rush to collective self-destruction« (Albrow & Seçkinelgin 2011, p. 6).  
7 The fear of »White extinction« is actually one of the few narratives that unite White supremacist discourses all around 
the globe (Bhatt 2020). 
8 When Muslim men kill their women, German media refers to femicide as »honour killings«, but when White men kill their 
women, the same media refers to this as »relationship dramas« (Jiwani 2014). 
9 These anti-Islamic racist discourses also inform citizenship rights, migration and foreign policies (Asad 2003). 
10 I use »Western« or »Global North« and »Global South« not as a geographic or religious/cultural/ethnic marker but rather 
as a political identity in order to highlight its social constructedness and its historical continuities (see also Bonnett 2004; 
Jackson et Al. 2016). 
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cultural purity (Chin et Al. 2009), which, in their view, seems endangered by the presence 
of Muslim migrants. At the same time, main-stream media’s attempts to sensationalise New 
Right positions, leads to populist right-wing parties such as the AfD gaining a large platform 
for their racist ideas (Hafez 2017). The dominant culture produces its own agents, those 
racialised subjects that uphold the paradigms of a racialised, culturalist11 society. In those 
racist discourses, »Race«, ethnicity and culture often become conflated, which is highlighted 
in anti-Islamic racism. Being a Muslim is neither a »Race« nor an ethnicity, but a religion, 
but anti-Islamic racist discourses tend to construct Muslims as such, using the notion of 
cultural rather than biological inferiority (Attia & Keskinkılıç 2016). Extreme-right 
discourses that become more and more mainstreamed in German mass media highlight the 
notion of the racial or cultural Other, which threatens the purity of the German nature and 
nation (Forchtner 2019, Douglas 2002). 
 Academic research, such as the longitudinal study on group-focussed enmity 
(conducted in eight European countries with a thousand participants in each country from 
2002 to 2012) or with supporters of (left- and) right-wing populist parties, suggests that a 
disillusionment with mainstream politics, fear of losing access to societal resources and 
democratic participation, is on the rise in the centre of German society (Demos 2015, 2017). 
At the same time, classism, (hetero)-sexism and racism (in particular anti-Islamic racism) is 
a growing phenomenon in Europe (Am Orde 2009), especially amongst Germany’s White 
middle classes. The alarming results of these studies highlight a growing phenomenon in 
Germany (and other European countries): the brutalisation of the bourgeoisie (Heitmeyer 
2012). The financial crisis and austerity policies have led to a continuous erosion of the 
middle classes in Germany (Bosch et al. 2016). The fear of social descent, loss of social status, 
and precarity, lead to a decline of liberal and humanist thinking replaced by authoritarian 
and fascist policy stances (ibid.). It seems that the racialisation of the »Other« does not work 
without the dehumanisation of the (White) self. But what are the socio-psychological 
implications of racialisation? 
 Many questions arise here. How can the emotionally charged discourse around 
multiculturalism be defused and led in a more constructive manner? How can taboos 
 
11 I use ›culturalist‹ as essentialising certain groups by using the concept of culture (see also Stolcke 1995). 
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around acknowledging and addressing racism be overcome in Germany? How can 
Germany’s increasingly multicultural society confront the challenges that come with a 
changing demography brought about by migration and settlement? Far from being able to 
address all these questions in this thesis, I have turned my focus on anti-racism and 
empowerment training12. Within this changing social landscape and political climate, anti-
racism work seems to be more important than ever in facilitating social justice and 
empowerment. What is the relationship between racialisation and empowerment? If we de-
racialise our thinking, will it empower us to relate to each other through our humanity? Will 
it re-humanise us? What is the human in humanity? The academic field has long believed in 
the dichotomy of racialisation processes, that it privileges White people and de-privileges 
BIPOC, that it elevates White people and causes BIPOC to suffer; but what if all parties that 
are racialised suffer from it? These are just some of the few questions this study explores. 
 Those promoting multiculturalism in the fields of sociology and political theory 
believe that structural inclusion will positively affect conviviality and ultimately form a 
more humane society (Modood 2007; Gilroy 2004; Ha 2004; Steyerl et Al. 2003; Parekh 2002). 
Whilst there are many different forms and facets of multicultural activism, this study 
focuses on one particular branch of anti-racism: anti-racism and empowerment training. 
Why training and not other forms of racial and social justice activism, such as social 
movements? Coming from the educational sciences, I was always fascinated by the question 
of how anti-racism and empowerment could be taught, learned, mainstreamed and 
sustained in society. The role of anti-racism and empowerment training is thus to sensitise 
individuals to racial equality and multicultural policies, thereby creating the possibility for 
structural change (Knoth 2006, Brown 2004). Applied to the increasingly multiracial and 
multicultural society in Germany, the notion of racial awareness has the potential to 
promote changes that would positively affect the structural inclusion of those groups who 
are structurally disadvantaged. In this context, the role of anti-racism training is to ensure 
that people’s attitudes towards one’s own and other racial, cultural or religious groups 
 
12 In British English, which I consistently use in this thesis, the plural for training is training and not trainings as it is in 
American English https://www.lexico.com/definition/training. 
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uphold those liberal and democratic paradigms necessary to strengthen the multicultural 
project. 
 Anti-racism training was pioneered by Jane Elliott and Judith Katz in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s US (Vaughn 2007, Schlicher 1998). Originating in the American civil rights 
movement, these early training supported the claim for equal opportunities. While the early 
1980s saw racism awareness training (RAT) becoming prominent in the UK, the late 1980s 
brought the anti-racism training (ART) to Germany, conducted by a variety of non-
governmental organisations. As media and academic discourses in the UK and US criticised 
these training for being too confrontational (or not promoting structural change), public 
discourse shifted from a language of racism awareness to one of diversity. Most recently, 
the Unconscious Bias Training (UBT), based on Implicit Association Tests (IAT), have been 
introduced and mainstreamed by major US tech giants such as Google and Microsoft. These 
training attempt to highlight that racism does not always operate on a conscious level and 
may influence our behaviour and our choices in ways we are not aware of. 
 In Germany, a similar discursive shift from anti-racism to diversity came towards the 
end of the 1990s (Bendl 2006). By then, a number of anti-racism training were in operation, 
including the Betzavta-Training,13 which promotes democratisation and inclusion; and the 
controversial Blue-Eyed-Brown-Eyed-Training developed by Jane Elliott (Schlicher 1998, 
Bommes et Al. 2002). A variety of other anti-racism organisations and individuals exist that 
offer training. This study focuses, as a case study, on anti-racism and empowerment training 
offered by the non-governmental organisation Phoenix. 
 Why a case study of Phoenix when a range of training already exist? Three reasons: 
access, training method and proximity. All the research participants are members of this 
particular NGO and so am I, therefore I had access to it. The NGO’s biographical training 
method, which shall be revisited in the methodology chapter and in chapter 4, allows a very 
personal insight into the phenomenon of racialisation. Additionally, active members in 
Phoenix, White and BIPOC, are well practiced in the emotional labour of sharing; working 
through and sometimes also grieving their personal experiences of racialisation in a non-
judgemental and appreciative setting. My proximity to the research subjects enabled them 
 
13 The Betzavta-Training originated in Israel and was adapted to a German setting (Bommes et Al 2002). 
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to share in depth their personal racialisation histories with me, as they would in the 
organisation, in full knowledge that their voices would be used for the creation of a PhD thesis 
at the LSE. The reasons, why I chose Phoenix as a case study, and my position as a deep 
insider, are further discussed in the methodology chapter. 
 
 
Research questions and objectives 
 
 This PhD research project aims to create an illuminating sociology of racialisation in 
Germany through the voices of anti-racism and empowerment practitioners. Taking the 
organisation Phoenix as a case study, this study, informed by the voices of trainers and 
members of Phoenix, analyses how racialisation can be theorised in relation to anti-racism 
and empowerment as practice. The main argument of this study is that racialisation 
constitutes a form of dehumanisation of BIPOC as well as White people. I also argue that if 
anti-racism and empowerment wants to contribute to a valuable change of racialised social 
structures, de-racialisation needs to include a re-conceptualisation of humanness. The study 
is grounded in three main research questions: 
 
How do anti-racism and empowerment practitioners narrate their personal experiences 
of racial subjectivation? 
 
How do anti-racism and empowerment practitioners narrate their personal experiences 
of anti-racism and empowerment training? 
 
What are the new narratives of the self, created by anti-racism and empowerment 
training? How do anti-racism and empowerment practitioners re-write racial 
subjectivation and re-imagine humanness? 
 
The main objectives of this research project are a) to develop an understanding of 
racialisation processes informed by the narratives of anti-racism and empowerment 
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practitioners as the case under study, b) to examine how White people and BIPOC narrate 
anti-racism and empowerment training experiences, and c) to produce ethnographic data 
that provides an account of the ways in which anti-racism and empowerment practitioners 
re-write racial subjectivation, and ask how colonial/racist concepts of who does and who 




Outline of the thesis 
 
Following this outline of this dissertation, I will provide a very short description of some of 
the concepts used in this thesis; a brief history of Phoenix and its founder Austen Peter 
Fagbola Brandt; and some information on how Phoenix is structured. 
After this, the second chapter, the literature review, is divided into four sections, 
applying Ken Plummer’s model of how narratives constitute the self (Plummer 2019, p. 76). 
The first part is dedicated to narratives of collaboration or assimilation, analysing concepts 
of »Race«, racism, Whiteness, subjectivation and racialisation. It begins with a historical 
overview of racial theories and how they effected discourses in different parts of the world 
with a focus on Germany. I then move on to analyse racism as an ideology, and how these 
discourses take their effect on the individual and their racial subjectivity. Thereafter, I take 
a brief look at the concept of Whiteness, which is relevant, since I argue that racialisation is 
the initiation into a racial ideology, which has Whiteness at its centre. Next, I look into the 
concepts of subjectivation and racialisation. The second part addresses remembering 
narratives, which is a prerequisite of negotiating narratives, in which concepts of memory 
and remembering are also crucial, since this research is about how anti-racism and 
empowerment practitioners remember their racial subjectivation, how they remember 
becoming subjected to »Race« in their early years. Afterwards, in the third part about 
negotiating narratives I look briefly into the history of anti-racism training, mainly in the 
UK and Germany, into the concept of governmentality related to the training, and also the 
role of empowerment and emotions in political learning processes. Finally, in the fourth 
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section, I look into narratives of reformation and resistance, where the concept of 
humanness is relevant, since I argue that racialisation constitutes a form of dehumanisation, 
the role of recognition in the process of being regarded as human. From there, I briefly look 
into the concept of decoloniality, the delinking from Western epistemologies, which is 
related to my understanding of empowerment. 
 The third chapter is about the epistemological and methodological issues at stake in 
conducting and writing up this research project as a deep or intimate insider. Whilst 
Phoenix is only used as a case study in this research project, it is also a critical ethnography, 
describing the complex social, emotional, organisational, cultural and philosophical 
elements of Phoenix, of which the research participants are members of, including those 
things that often remain unspoken or are taken for granted (Barker 2002, p. 186). 
 I conducted research in Germany, mostly in the cities of Berlin and Duisburg, 
focusing on a selected group of Phoenix trainers and trainees with whom I share similar and 
collective experiences, and therefore a similar vision. In doing so, I had to consider carefully 
my engagement with the research participants during my fieldwork and how I would 
analyse the interviews and subsequently narrate the research as an insider. Since, as an 
active member of Phoenix, I share the same activist milieu in Germany, an epistemological 
and methodological approach was needed that could address these issues and would make 
the debates – mostly inaccessible to non-Phoenix members – comprehensible and 
transparent. 
 The following sections of the methodology chapter thus discuss the epistemological 
and methodological implications of conducting research as an outsider and insider, and 
illustrate the ways in which lived experiences and positions matter in the production of 
knowledge. Furthermore, I discuss my access to the field, my fieldwork and interview 
experiences, as well as the implications that my methodological approach bears, by 
discussing my own positionality as an insider conducting research in Phoenix. I attempt to 
radically contextualise my own perceptions during the research process. In addition, I 
discuss the epistemological implications of my choice to use (Black) Feminist Standpoint 
theory (Harding 2004). The second part of this chapter is concerned with the advantages of 
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using – besides interviews – multiple methods, such as participant observation, in an 
exploration of racialisation and empowerment in Germany. 
In the fourth chapter I analyse how the individual becomes a racial subject. By 
looking into those sections of the interviews where interviewees talk about their first, either 
personal or discursive, encounters with the racial Other — who, in Germany, are mainly 
Turkish or Kurdish (recently also more Syrian) Germans - I highlight how, through the 
binary opposition of this Other, the self is constructed. Pivotal, here, are anecdotes of how 
some research subjects remember a kind of initiation into a racial culture with Whiteness at 
its centre. BIPOC Interviewees seem to be much more able to remember the moment they 
were initiated into their BIPOCness, mostly through experiences of exclusion and being 
treated differently in kindergarten or school. For the White interviewees, memories of their 
racial subjectivation appear less clear, and some struggle to remember any moments of 
initiation. Those who do remember, recount painful situations they experienced with their 
families, usually in relation to a BIPOC friend or playmate. Some describe how parents or 
siblings openly made racist comments about certain people. All of this had an effect on racial 
subjectivity development. 
 In this chapter, I argue, based on the analysis of interviews with anti-racism and 
empowerment practitioners, that racialisation processes constitute a form of suffering to the 
subject. This suffering is derived through the process of racialisation, which could also be 
considered a process of dehumanisation for BIPOC and White people. The examination of 
racialisation, which is understood as becoming a racial subject, is preceded by the 
exploration of the terms »Race«, racism and subjectivation. Since racialisation is also 
understood as being subjected to a racial culture which has Whiteness at its centre, I will 
also explore the notion of Whiteness. However, the racialisation processes the research 
participants narrate, are based on them remembering situations, moments or phases of 
becoming racialised. Consequently, I shall also examine the concepts of memory and 
remembering. 
The fifth chapter takes a closer look into the training itself. When I started my 
research, the Phoenix trainers insisted that I should not describe the programme of the 
training in-depth, as that would make training for them in the future very difficult or 
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impossible. If the participants of a Phoenix training already knew in detail what was going 
to happen, it would take away the need to embark on the process. Therefore, this chapter is 
going to focus more on how the research participants experienced their first training. It 
analyses the feelings and thoughts that arouse from that training. In the fifth chapter, 
considering that the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners share their personal 
training experiences, I look in a very condensed form into the development of anti-racism 
and empowerment training in the UK and Germany, and into critiques of it. The following 
sections investigate what research participants refer to as »light bulb moments« - in 
particular when they became aware that they were racialised as White people. 
 Some of the research participants who had also been active in other anti-racist activist 
settings realised how White or Eurocentric these settings were. Some of the participants 
expressed how these White anti-racist activist spaces failed to make anti-racism work 
enjoyable and sustainable, as well as difficult and discomforting. Some of the interviewees 
described activist spaces as steeply hierarchical, judgemental, and soaked in a general tone 
of contempt. The members also referred to those White activist spaces as lacking care, love, 
or humanity. Through the training, the interviewees realised the possibility of an alternative 
form of anti-racism or empowerment training that does not reproduce a form of pseudo-
righteous political violence. This violence can also be described as an indicator that being 
racialised into Whiteness is also a form of violence the White subject experiences. I will 
argue that the White subject tries to re-dramatise the violence of racialisation it undergoes 
in not confronting the emotions that accompany being racialised. 
 Another section of this chapter examines emotions such as irritation or disturbance 
that were triggered by the training. Here, the interviewees sometimes describe the resistance 
they felt at certain stages of the training. These moments of resistance could be evoked by 
particular training units or methods that participants found difficult to understand or grasp. 
Sometimes, these resistances were also caused by training situations or hand-outs that 
created moments of strong discomfort, despite the trainers’ attempts to create a trusting 
atmosphere. 
 Throughout this section, I also examine the notion of (self-)empowerment and (self-
)governmentality, since I argue that the cognitive and emotional understanding of 
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individual racialisation processes partially liberates the racialised subject from them. 
Therein, I carefully consider Nikolas Rose’s (1996, 1999) examination of (self-
)governmentality connected to psycho-therapeutical discourses related to concepts of 
individual betterment and liberation. 
The sixth and final empirical chapter analyses the new narratives of the self, inspired 
by anti-racism and empowerment training. In the research participants’ narratives, the 
training confronts the racialised subject with its racialisation. After the training, the 
participants narrate, they understand and feel how they were imprinted with a racial culture 
that has Whiteness at its centre. This imprinting also means they end up functioning as an 
individual in a racially structured society with Whiteness at its centre (meaning it generally 
disadvantages BIPOC and racially advantages White people, whether they intend this or 
not [Rothberg 2019]). The first section of this chapter asks how the anti-racism and 
empowerment practitioners re-write their racial subjectivation as White and BIPOC. 
 In the sixth chapter, the research participants describe how they began to re-write 
their racial subjectivity after their first training. In this process, the notion of recognition (as 
conceptualised by Taylor 1994) and reflexivity are analysed. Finally, I look into how the 
anti-racism and empowerment practitioners re-imagine humanness, delving into an 
existential reflection on Fanon’s appeal for a new humanism. Therein, the concept of 
decoloniality – moving away from Western epistemologies towards an epistemological 
pluriverse – becomes relevant. Additionally, I discuss if racialisation can also be understood 
as a form of dehumanisation, and whether de-racialisation can also be understood as a form 
of re-humanisation. 
The seventh chapter, called Conclusion - Going Beyond »Race«, further discusses the 
research findings. This research project examines how White, Black and People of Colour 
are affected by racialisation and internalised Whiteness, although its implications differ for 
different subjects. For BIPOC, it is not only a matter of rethinking unjustified privileged 
subject positions, but also a matter of survival and sanity. For White people, questions are 
raised around what the price they pay for being racialised as White is. Racism is a structural 
phenomenon that needs to be tackled structurally. A racially structured society is, however, 
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also a reflection of a racially structured psyche. Deconstructing racial structures in our 
psyche could then lead to the deconstruction of racial structures in society. 
 Racial subjectivation is painful, and very often traumatic for 
Black/Indigenous/People of Colour, and White people also suffer. The case study of this 
German anti-racist and empowerment NGO Phoenix and the theoretical framework of their 
training may offer some inspiration as to how we can constructively develop a society where 





In the following paragraph, I will discuss some of the terms relevant to understanding this 
thesis. It is important to emphasise that by attempting to define certain terms, we are not 
talking, in this initial phase, about how right or wrong they are. They are provisional 
working definitions that assist us as Critical »Race« thinkers, sociologists, and 
empowerment/anti-racism practitioners. It is also possible and indeed very likely that their 
meanings and significance will vary in future contexts. In other words, these terms are not 
essential, but they allow us a theoretical and conceptual foundation from and through 
which we can debate and explore. I will not only attempt to conceptualise specific terms 
here, but will also highlight how they stand in relation to each other and what their 
shortcomings are. This conceptual discussion of relevant terms of this thesis, will also be 
revisited and deepened in the literature review. 
 
»Race« 
The French sociologist and feminist Collette Guillaumin wrote about »Race«: »Race does not 
exist. But it does kill people«14 (Guillaumin 2003 [1995], p. 107). In The Racial Order (2015) 
Mustafa Emirbayer and Matthew Desmond define »Race« as »a symbolical category based on 
 
14 Whenever I quote a sentence (or two) from a text in my text body, I use Italics in order to better distinguish it from my 
text. If Italics are used in the original text to emphasis a word or more, I reversed it by not using Italics. 
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phenotype or ancestry and constructed according to specific social and historical contexts, a category 
that is misrecognized as natural« (Emirbayer & Desmond 2015, p. 51). Though this thesis is 
very much related to the concept of »Race«, in the first instance simply because »Race« is 
implicit to »racialisation«, which is the main topic of this thesis, it will focus less on »Race« 
as such, exploring rather how the racial order is imprinted (as conceptualised by Norbert 
Elias 1994) and enacted in Germany, and is thus more about injustice and racialised power 
relations and ways to overcoming these. As already mentioned in a footnote, throughout 
this thesis »Race« is written with a capital »r« and in inverted commas, to highlight its social 
constructedness and in order to distance it from a biological reading (Zerger 1997, p. 9). 
Having said that, using the term »Race« presents a dilemma to me as an academic writer. 
The primordialist notion of »Race«, which understands the term as biological and essential, 
had about 500 years of a head-start to become part of our language and thereby of our 
thinking. Its continuous conflation with ethnicity and culture does not make its use easier. 
By using the term »Race«, how much of its primordialist meanings do I reproduce, even if 
my intention is to deconstruct this word? Or as Charles Gallagher puts it in White (2007): 
 
»The fact that race (and hence whiteness) is now defined by the scientific community as a social 
construction does not, however, change the perception among most individuals that race is 
responsible for traits like intelligence, criminality, motivation, behavior, or athletic prowess. The power 
that white as an identity continues to hold is the fiction that race itself, rather than exploitation, poverty, 
or institutional racism, is responsible for social inequality between races« (Gallagher 2007, p. 13).  
 
Ideally, I would like to get rid of the term, but then I find myself speechless in naming power 
structures related to the notion of »Race«. So far, only the term »racialisation« has given me 
some ease, since it highlights the process of being racialised rather than being of a »Race«. 
 
Ethnicity 
In Ethnic Boundary Making (2013) Andreas Wimmer defines ethnicity as »a subjectively felt 
belonging to a group that is distinguished by shared culture and by a common ancestry« (Wimmer 
2013 p. 7). A similar definition by McGoldrick et Al. (1982) makes ethnicity sound a little 
like biological race: »ethnic group[s] [are] … those who perceive themselves as alike by virtue of 
their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others« (Dwivedi 1996, p. 8). 
The concept of ethnicity is not directly relevant to our explorations here. However, in the 
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rare case that I use the term, it leans on Anthony Giddens’ description in cultural terms of 
ethnicity as »members of ethnic groups who see themselves as culturally distinct from other 
groupings. […] Ethnic differences are wholly learned« (Giddens 1989, pp. 243-244). In 
Germany, the term ethnicity is very often used as a euphemism for »Race« as the German 
word Rasse is heavily loaded with a direct link being made to by the Nazis’ use in justifying 
and carrying out the Shoah. In view of Giddens’ description of ethnicity, I am unsure what 
the term adds to the analysis of racialisation apart from being sometimes used synonymous 
to »Race«. A cultural understanding of ethnicity makes the term almost obsolete, as it can 
easily be replaced by the use of the term culture. 
 
Culture 
However, culture is even more difficult to define then »Race« and ethnicity. According to 
the Dictionary of Race, Ethnicity, and Culture »a more recent definition by Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn (1944), culture is ›an abstraction from concrete behaviour but is not in itself behaviour‹« 
(Bolaffi et Al. 2003, p. 61). After cross-examining the different definitions of »Race«, 
ethnicity, and culture, Dalal concluded that »[t]he point to be underlined from this example is 
that despite the attempt to differentiate the terms, race, ethnicity and culture, we can observe how 
they collapse into each other« (Dalal 2002, p. 30). Or, as Rita Chin et Al. put it in After the Nazi 
Racial State (2009), »[i]n each case, neither the biological nor the cultural is fully absent from 
racialized conceptions of difference« (Chin et Al. 2009, p. 23). It is obvious that the discursive 
conflation of the term culture with the terms »Race« and ethnicity does not make it easier to 
understand what culture actually is. Nevertheless, there is the question of how culture is 
conceptualised. As I already mentioned before, the New Right conceptualises (occidental) 
culture as a closed and essential entity, its purity threatened by migration, leading to a 
bastardisation and therefore weakening of occidental culture. In this New Right’s world 
view, culture is based on essential notions of human nature, »therefore notions of culture within 
this paradigm are characterized by being static, holistic, homogeneous, deterministic and bounded« 
(Nathan 2015, p. 4). This thesis employs a rather open understanding of culture (and this 
also includes racial culture), meaning it is based on the human condition rather than human 
nature, it is understood as non-essential. So here, culture is conceptualised as »dynamic with 
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continuity and change, internally riven, heterogeneous, changeable and with blurred boundaries« 
(Nathan 2015, p. 4).  
 
Whiteness 
DiAngelo describes Whiteness as a »term to capture all the dynamics that go into being defined 
and/or perceived as white in society. Whiteness grants material and psychological advantages (white 
privilege) that are often invisible and taken for granted by whites« (DiAngelo 2012, p. 83). In other 
words, White people have easier access to societal resources due to their Whiteness. Similar 
to DiAngelo’s understanding of racism, I find her conceptualisation of Whiteness equally 
reductionist. Emirbayer and Desmond also wrote »it is incontrovertible that race today has 
certain global systemic features, with Anglo-European whiteness at its dominant pole and people of 
color in its dominated sector« (Emirbayer and Desmond 2015, p. 57). However, this thesis 
attempts to understand privileges or power not so much as something that we possess but 
rather as a kind of relationship we have to each other and to commodities (Gilroy 2015), in 
varying contexts. A Fanonian understanding of Whiteness can be described in the following 
way: 
 
»According to Fanon, Western hegemonic ideologies have constructed whiteness as the symbol par excellence. 
Consequently, ›one is white as one is rich, as one is beautiful, as one is intelligent‹ (Sardar 2008 in Fanon 
1967/2008: xiii—original emphasis). Whiteness is also synonymous with ›morality, humbleness, power, 
goodness, heroism and righteousness‹ (Lawrence 2011, p. 114)« (Ayling 2019, p. 33).  
 
The concept of Whiteness might be confusing, because similarly to the concept of culture, it 
is not understood as essential in this thesis and those referred to as White are also not 
understood as an essential homogenous group. There can be hierarchies within Whiteness, 
people granted Whiteness, others excluded from it at some point in history (Ignatiev 1995). 
Gallagher concludes that Whiteness was and is created in a »socio-historic process that created 
a hierarchical social system based on white supremacy« (Gallagher 2007, p. 9) and it is also 
»relational, socially situated, and inherently [a] political foundation that constructs all racial 
categories (Gallagher 2007, p. 10). The German psychologist Ursula Wachendorfer also 
analyses the invisibility of Whiteness as dominant norm in Germany (Wachendorfer 2001). 
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This thesis attempts to explore the personal experience and sensation of being subjected to 
Whiteness by the research participants.  
 
Black, People/Person of Colour 
It is assumed that it was one of the founders of the Black Consciousness movement, Steve 
Biko (1978), who coined »Black« as a political term. The South African anti-Apartheid 
activist defined »Black« in the following way:  
 
»We have in our policy manifesto defined blacks as those who are by law or tradition politically, economically and 
socially discriminated against as a group in the South African society and identifying themselves as a unit in the 
struggle towards the realisation of their aspirations. This definition illustrates to us a number of things:  
1. Being Black is not a matter of pigmentation – being black is a reflection of a mental attitude. 
2. Secondly, merely by describing yourself as black you have started on a road towards emancipation, you have 
committed yourself to fight against all forces that seek to use your blackness as a stamp that marks you out 
as a subservient being« (Biko 1978, p. 48). 
 
This definition of political Blackness then spread to other countries such as the US, UK, but 
also Germany just to name a few, where Black people fought against racial injustice (Chebu 
2014). Therefore, in some political spaces »Black« was understood as a shared experience, 
for example in the UK being excluded from the housing market, due to skin colour, 
including Asian, African and Caribbean families under the umbrella term (Alemoru 2019). 
However, the Asian American legal scholar Janine Young Kim asks in an article Are Asians 
Black (1999) and concludes, »situating Asian Americans as a buffer between black and white does 
not position Asian Americans outside of the black/white paradigm, but rather in a vulnerable place 
where they can be manipulated to serve the interests of the dominant group« (Kim 1999, p. 2409). 
In an article from 2016 in the British newspaper Guardian, the writer Amrit Wilson, 
university professor Kehinde Andrews and actor and writer Vera Chok are asked Is political 
blackness still relevant today? The article refers to an incident at Kent University, where the 
student union used a picture of the singer Zayn Malik and current London Mayor Sadiq 
Khan during Black History Month, which caused a debate about who is meant with the term 
black in Black History Month. The reactions to this incident and the reflections of the authors 
of the article highlight that Black is mostly understood as being African or from the African 
diaspora. Additionally, the idea of political Blackness is described as outdated and in 
disregard about the differences that exist in the experience of racism in the varying 
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communities disadvantaged by it (Wilson, Andrews & Chok 2016). In this thesis I will 
mainly use the term Black/People of Colour, abbreviated as BIPOC15. As already touched 
upon (in footnote Nr. 1), Black/Indigenous/People or Person of Colour is used to refer 
collectively or individually to all of those racial groups who are not considered White or 
who do not have the same access to societal resources as those who are positioned as White. 
In other words, BIPOC are excluded or experience difficulties in accessing societal resources 
because of their assumed »Race« (DiAngelo 2012, p. 84). Sometimes a person may be 
perceived as White, but her belonging to a certain culture or religion, maybe signified in 
that person’s name et cetera, can also lead to an exclusion from Whiteness. However, the 
past has shown, that this term is very fluid and has fluctuated throughout the course of 
history, therefore it is not always easy to define, who is designated or perceived as a Person 
of Colour and who not. Largely, it is understood as a political self-designation (Ha et Al. 
2007). The term is still not very common in everyday language in Germany but is slowly 
creeping into use by public news broadcasters. Nevertheless, I would still state, that it is 
used mostly in activist or academic spaces in order to refer to the issues of racism or 
racialisation in Germany, as those other mainstreamed terms, such as Menschen mit 
Migrationshintergrund (Person/People with migration background) do not suffice in 
decoding racialised power relations. However, as the term BIPOC comes from an US 
American context, it is still in question whether they will be effective in addressing the issue 
of racialisation in Germany. What is considered BIPOC and therefore a Black/Person of 
Colour in Germany can differ very much from other parts of the world. And even within 
those communities considered BIPOC communities in this thesis, the term might be 
somewhat alien to them, as some Turkish, Kurdish or Arabic Germans prefer to see 
themselves as White rather than a Person of Colour16. Despite these potential objections, I 
will still use to the term BIPOC, as it highlights the structural disadvantage described at the 
beginning of this introduction caused by racism of aforementioned communities. This could 
 
15 My personal understanding of the term People of Colour as political concept, also includes Black people, however, there 
is an interesting discussion around the erasure of experience from Black and Indigenous people in this article from June 
2020 in the New York Times by Sandra E. Garcia »Where did BIPOC come from?« https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-
is-bipoc.html  
16 I find it interesting to note here that the derogatory term »Kanake« became replaced by the term »Muslim« (Kömürcü 
Nobrega 2011, p. 641) 
 
 28 
also be one of the weak points of that concept: is a distinction into those that benefit from 
racism and those that are disadvantaged by it as clear cut, as the term suggests? And what 
about other factors that can contribute to a person’s structural disadvantage such as Gender 
and Class, just to name a few? Nevertheless, I do understand language as dynamic. Indeed, 
when I grew up in 80s, 90s Germany, I was considered an Ausländer, a foreigner, when I 
started studying educational sciences around 2000, I was considered a Migrant, even though 
I had never migrated anywhere in my life at the time, shortly after the term Mensch mit 
Migrationshintergrund appeared, but it was quickly deemed useless in my world of anti-
racism and empowerment activism. Since I discovered the term in the glossary of a German 
translation of bell hooks’ book Black Looks (1992) around 2001, I stuck to POC or BIPOC, but 
I will happily let go of it, once I find another term that fits better into my particular 
experience of racialisation in Germany. 
 
The terms »Race«, ethnicity and culture, but also Whiteness and BIPOC entail many more 
questions. For example, what is racism? What is racialisation? What is empowerment? What 
is memory? What is humanness? And how are these concepts connected to each other? 




The history of Phoenix 
 
Having situated my thesis in the discourses of racism and multiculturalism in Germany, 
and having explored briefly some of the relevant concepts of this thesis, I will now look into 
Phoenix’s history. Beginning with the biography of Fagbola, who founded Phoenix in the 
90s, it progresses from there to the history of the association itself. The third section is about 
Phoenix’s philosophy, about the discourses that are led in the NGO and that explain its 
current structure. Before delving into Phoenix’s history though, I want to explain why I 
chose Phoenix as my case study. In 2008, when I wrote my MA dissertation at Birkbeck 
College for the course Race & Ethnic Relations, I realised that a lot of the thoughts and ideas 
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I was examining, were owed to my work in Phoenix which I had started in 2001. When I 
embarked on the PhD at the Sociology Department of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science in 2009, I was not aware of any other anti-racism and empowerment NGO 
using a personal and biographical approach in its work, despite searching. Only one 
organisation in the UK, RewindUK (http://rewind.org.uk/), seemed to have similar 
approach, but when I tried to get in touch with them at the time, I did not receive a response. 
I did not follow up with my query as I wanted my research to be about Germany. The reason 
for this was that the phenomenon of racialisation seemed to me rather under-researched in 
the Federal Republic and as a result, I did not plan to make a comparison with the UK. 
Furthermore, there was the question of direct access to Phoenix I had/have to Phoenix. 
Through my own engagement at the NGO, I knew that most of the active members, trainees 
and trainers were/are well rehearsed in narrating their personal stories of racialisation. 
Additionally, in contrast to an external researcher, the research participants knew me. They 
knew too that I would listen to their accounts without judgement – as I had done many 
times before in the Phoenix setting (and as any good researcher should do). I knew that my 
unique position as an insider would allow me to hear their personal accounts in a far more 
in-depth way than if I had just been an outsider. Nevertheless, whilst recording the 
interviews, I always made it clear and transparent to the research participants that I was 
interviewing them in the role as a researcher for my PhD at the Sociology Department of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science. In the methodology chapter, I will revisit 
and expand on why I chose Phoenix for my research project. 
 The first Phoenix training was conducted by its British born Afrogerman founder, 
Austen Peter Fagbola Brandt in the late 80s. Inspired by British anti-racist activism Fagbola 
registered Phoenix as an association in 1996. Commissioned by a wide range of people and 
organisations such as local federal integration officers, governmental and non-
governmental educational and social agencies, but also private individuals from various 
social backgrounds, Phoenix has now expanded its reputation as a non-governmental anti-
racism organisation nationally. In 2020 with almost 700 members, Phoenix is one of the 
largest and oldest anti-racist NGOs in Germany. The NGO Phoenix anti-racism and 
empowerment training differs from others in the field of anti-racism because they centre on 
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biographical training methodology, its follow up procedures, as well as its anthropocentric 
ideology and BIPOC leadership. Unlike most other anti-racism and empowerment training 
programmes, Phoenix training invites participants to critically reflect on the processes of 




Fagbola’s biography and the path to Phoenix 
 
Phoenix’s history is very tightly related to its founder and former chair’s intellectual 
biography. But before I embark on the founder’s biography, I want to radically contextualise 
who Fagbola is to me personally. After our fateful encounter in 2001 at my first Phoenix 
anti-racism training (in which I participated as an observer, in a small town outside of 
Berlin), Fagbola and I began to meet at regular intervals. We met either during training, 
where I was trainee, or in Phoenix settings (sometimes privately). In the 19 years in which I 
have come to know Fagbola, he became a second father figure, a mentor, and in some 
respects a role model. Admittedly, in the beginning I was suspicious about his profession 
as a protestant minister and also about the presence of White people in Phoenix. However, 
over the years, this curious and charismatic figure became a dear friend to me, who at times, 
guided me through personal crisis as well as professional hurdles. In one-to-one meetings, 
I experienced the former protestant minister often as a pastoral, sensitive, and wise 
shepherd. In social settings, this man, who was 26 years my senior would mainly bond with 
me but also with others through the male practice of banter. Depending on my emotional 
state, this would either leave me joyful, irritated, or confused. It would also lead to a row of 
Phoenix members who accumulated symbolical power in Phoenix simply by being close to 
the former chair. Unsurprisingly, given the male practice of banter as bonding, these were 
notably and almost all exclusively (and regrettably) men. Indeed, with his charismatic 
leadership style, his warm heart and his amusing sense of self-depreciation, Fagbola’s 
attempt to project an image of a non-threatening, wise, and pastoral patriarch would either 
draw his followers closer to him or scare them away. This was indeed the dismaying case 
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with many BIPOC women. Indeed, Fagbola was not a saint, he had good character traits 
and flaws; this is his legacy of his leadership in Phoenix. In November 2020, during the 
completion of this thesis, Fagbola decided that it was time to step down from leadership 
and leave the position of the chair to Clementine Ewokolo Burnley. Ewokolo, a younger, 
Black woman, a writer and community builder who had migrated from Cameroon to the 
UK, lived in Italy and Germany for a long time, has initiated an exciting new chapter in the 
history of the anti-racism and empowerment NGO; one which has yet to be written. 
 Fagbola, the former chair and founder of Phoenix was born in the early fifties in 
London. His mother was a White German, a nurse who worked in the same hospital as his 
biological father who was a doctor from Nigeria. Fagbola’s biological father did not accept 
paternity until much later when Fagbola was an adult. Fagbola grew up with his mother 
and a White stepfather in Essen, Germany. There were not many Afrogermans living in 
Essen at the time, or in Germany for that matter. Fagbola rarely talks about his childhood 
or his experience of growing up as the only Black person in a predominantly White society. 
In training, however, he sometimes tells the story of how, when he was a child, he once took 
a stone and tried to rub the blackness off his skin. He also mentions his experience of high 
school, which must have been in the late 60s, where his teachers assumed that his 
intellectual skills should be limited; but because of his blackness, that his skills in music and 
dance should be above average, which he often stated, were not so. Also, because of the afro 
hairstyle he was wearing at the time, they assumed that he was a drug dealer and was hiding 
drugs in his hair. Fagbola states in one of his interviews that he went through different 
stages of consciousness in his life, and that there was a period where he was in denial of 
racist experiences: 
 
»There are different phases. In the first phase, I experienced racism but I couldn’t comprehend and express it. Then 
there was a phase in which I tried to run away from the perception of this reality and it was rather embarrassing for 
me, when someone was talking about it. I still remember the fiftieth birthday of the father of a friend with whom I 
was very close. That must have been just about 1970, in the ceremonial address on the occasion of his birthday 
he spoke about family and then he mentioned that he was glad that I was there, that I was celebrating with them 
and that I would suffer greatly in society because of my appearance. On the one side it hit me very deeply, on the 
other hand I was also embarrassed that somebody talked about it. My friend and I brushed it away at the time and 





At some point, Fagbola decided to (unbeknown to him at the time) follow in his paternal 
grandfather’s footsteps and become a protestant minister. So, he began to study theology. 
During his studies, he decided to do an internship in an Anglican church congregation (an 
all-White congregation at the time) and went to live in Beldon, near Bradford and Leeds, for 
a while. During his time there, he discovered some of the writings in Race relations in the 
UK of the late 70s, early 80s, whose equivalents were not yet in existence in Germany: 
 
» I discovered […] a book of Chris Mullard ›Black Britain‹ in a library in Bradford and the book totally fascinated me. 
I still have it today and it was as if he was talking about my own life and therefore to a certain extent it opened a 
more conscious door for me. Full of enthusiasm I showed Richard or someone else this book and I noticed that he 
absolutely couldn’t do anything with it and then I realised how big the gap between my experience and also the 
White experience of England was« (Austen Peter Fagbola Brandt, 19/05/2014-1 #00:05:53). 
 
Fagbola states that he also met Chris Mullard later in his life and describes him as having a 
crucial impact on the early development of Phoenix. 
 After his return to Germany, he met Ulla, a White German theology student, who 
became his wife later. She told him about a Christian missionary academy in Hamburg, 
which he visited and where he met Mushila Ngiamankank, then a theology PhD student, 
who, as Fagbola later explains, was one of the people who introduced him to theories of 
decolonisation and African spirituality that would play an important role in the discourse 
and language used in Phoenix. 
 
»There I met several Black theologians, one from South Africa, two from the Congo and in particular the one from 
Congo totally fascinated me: Mushila Ngiamankank, in the way in which he portrayed African theology. He brought 
in Fanon, Cabral and I said to myself, that’s your life. At the time I had not yet been identifying myself as a Black 
German but as an African, as a descendant of Africa, who experiences Africa in the German context. […] At the 
time the book of John Beatty ›African religion and culture‹ was thus a very, very important book. John Beatty was 
one of the first who highlighted that there are not only singular religions in Africa but that actually religions in the 
so-called sub-Saharan Africa had a lot of common structural features and that was at the same time a protest 
against the white traditions that said that Africa had only animism available« (Austen Peter Fagbola Brandt, 
19/05/2014-1 #00:08:55). 
 
Between September 1977 and April 1978, Fagbola went to the Ecumenical Institute at 
Bossey, Switzerland, where the World Council of Churches is based. Here, he met people 
from all over the world and became friends with some of them. Through them he also 
learned different theological notions and approaches, some of them very different to the 
orthodox White European Christian approach. Despite the very diverse participants that 
came from 36 different countries, many from the Global South, the whole experience and 
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the theology that was taught was very Eurocentric. Through that experience, seeing how 
little value White theology had for some, for example the people from the Pacific Islands, 
he concluded: abstraction is only relevant if we can apply it to our everyday lives. The other 
conclusion that Fagbola made at the Ecumenical Institute through encounters with people 
from very different context and theological traditions was: We can only feel and think in 
bigger contexts if we take the micro-level seriously. These conclusions formed some of the 
practices in Phoenix, which shall be examined later. 
 After his graduation, Fagbola met with Edicio dela Torre, a Filipino peace activist, 
who taught him some of the basics of the decolonisation struggle. Dela Torre explained to 
him that it was important to treat people right. The peace activist said that attacking people 
was counterproductive, and what helped in order to facilitate people to change was rather 
to invite them to choose whether or not they want to follow your thinking. Dela Torre stated 
that it was crucial to win over the silent majority, and that the silent majority would follow 
those who treated them nicely, and who had a good chance of winning or being successful 
in their struggle. Fagbola said that these notions of decolonial struggle he learned from dela 
Torre, had a very strong (often subconscious) impact on his thinking and his actions. 
 Another most important figure in Fagbola’s biography (and the naming of Phoenix), 
was his encounter with Sybil Phoenix in early 80s London. Phoenix was a British community 
worker with roots in British Guiana, who built a home for homeless young women and later 
for foster children in Lewisham, London. She was also co-founder of MELRAW (Methodist 
and Ecumenical Leadership Racism Awareness Workshops), an organisation offering 
Racism Awareness Training programs at that time: 
 
»I called Sybil and said: ›Ma’am, excuse us, we wanted go to Poland but it is not possible anymore, we are a 
group of 10 people who want to come in one and a half weeks to you.‹ She responded: ›When, exactly, yes, I 
am pleased to meet you, come over.‹ 
 I thought that was so fascinating, really, we went there, Sybil made the seminar in her kitchen and for 
me that was really the day, in a way for the first time that various levels of thinking, experiences, possibilities 
were brought together. I was so, so fascinated, impressed by what she told us about racism, also because I felt 
it very, very deeply resonated with my own existence, so that was really an absolutely thrilling... sacred moment. 
I was… so I suddenly saw everything differently from before, my Black Consciousness was completely imprinted 
on me... 
 […] So, Sybil was in any case a very, very important breakthrough for me. I then went in the next few 
years many times to England to Sybil, participated in training. Understood relatively little, but I felt somehow this 
was the call of my life. Joe made quite a lot of photocopies and I got books and essays from Sybil. And then the 
next crucial step was in 1986, when I was there for two weeks and Larry, an employee of Sybil, who was also 
well educationally trained, who explained the systematics of the training from beginning to end, quite exactly. For 




In parallel, in 1984-86 Fagbola began slowly to approach the Initiative Schwarze Menschen 
in Deutschland (ISD – Initiative of Black People in Germany), and the Churches’ 
Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) had asked Sibyl Phoenix and a group of Black 
women to train young Black Germans to become anti-racism coaches and trainers. The 
group was told that it seemed that the subject of racism might become relevant at some 
point in the Federal Republic of Germany. Phoenix mentioned that she had already been 
working with Fagbola for seven years and he was included in the team. Fagbola joined a 
group of Afrogerman women, and together, they were coached on different subjects; and 
there arose the idea to develop anti-racism training. The CCME had the idea that the group 
could start training three months later, but Fagbola refused. For two years they worked and 
studied together with the little literature on anti-racism that was available in Germany at 
the time (Austen Peter Fagbola Brandt, 19/05/2014-2 #00:11:25). However, Fagbola was 
unsatisfied with the training method and a long reflection process began:  
 
»In 1988 we did training that were relatively confrontational at the time and at some point I began to think about 
that there is really something wrong here. Why do we bark at the people in the training with whom I usually get on 
well in my everyday life? And I found this type of training to feel more and more artificial, but also emotionally 
unfinished, emotionally immature. […] Eventually I came to the conclusion that I did not want to continue this type 
of training, because you actually had to reproduce yourself in a way that does not fit to you« (Austen Peter Fagbola 
Brandt, 19/05/2014-2 #00:13:12). 
 
In Germany, Fagbola remained active within the ISD, but started to feel more and more 
alienated there as well. Then he left the ISD and founded Phoenix. 
 
»For me, I then gradually realised that if we want to do something else, we need to actually take Fanon’s vision of 
a new thinking seriously. As long as we think like everyone, as long as we are dependent on power, like all, of the 
cold power, we can actually create nothing new. And this was then the moments of setting the paradigms that 




A brief history of Phoenix 
 
In 1991 Fagbola started facilitating training without the three Black women he had started 
training with. Phoenix as such did not exist, but there was a group of »sympathisers« 
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according to Andreas Mann, Phoenix’s secretary and one of the founding members17. This 
group consisted of people that had done training with Fagbola and were looking for the 
opportunity to continue their anti-racist engagement and support the work he was doing. 
This initial group would help organise training, collect money for books, materials, and cost 
of postage. In 1992 the group also started meeting regularly, not as a registered association 
but with plans to create a more official frame. In 1993 about 20 people met and discussed 
some of the main questions for the general structures of this anti-racist non-governmental 
organisation. 
 Some of the questions raised were about whether there should be a White and a Black 
group and who should be part of it. In this orientation phase people decided which group 
in the organisation they would join. (Some were unable to decide and left). Another key 
question was strategy and pace. Fagbola wanted an organisation that was characterised by 
slowness, by de-acceleration, assuming that a colonial system that had 500 years to 
implement itself would not be changed in a short period of time. This initial group quickly 
found a name in reference to the woman that had influenced and inspired Fagbola and the 
training he facilitated: Phoenix. The name is also a reference to the Egyptian mythological 
bird that would rise from its own ashes, symbolising the cycle of life and death, of birth and 
letting go. Fagbola was chair of this organisation and Tom Hurst became secretary. Andreas 
Mann and Rodin Mushila, son of Mushila Ngianmankank, were trainees. 
 In 1992 many requests for training arrived. Fagbola worked with different methods, 
including a less confrontational, less guilt-inducing approach. There was an attempt in 
Phoenix to not work with guilt and accusations. In fact, they became probably one of the 
first and only organisations that would assume that White people were socialised into a 
racial system that they actually did not necessarily want to be a part of. Other training 
mostly worked with the assumption of the White perpetrator and the Black victim. Phoenix 
became a space where Black, self-empowered, liberated trainers would tell White people 
what the racial culture had done to them, working towards turning un-reflected White 
people into to more reflected White people and allies. For some people, White and Black, 
 
17  This subchapter is mainly based on an interview with Andreas Mann, Phoenix secretary and founding member, 
conducted in July 2012 in Duisburg. 
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this approach was not fitting; for some, Phoenix seemed like a self-help group, promoting 
reconciliation and self-reflection. To assume that White people were somehow »victims« of 
a socialisation into an oppressive system was hard to acknowledge for some, especially 
Black people, but also White. In addition, the slow pace of Phoenix was testing the patience 
of some of its members, who wanted more action, and a few left. 
 Between 1993 and 1996 seven to eight White people and about 10 Black people met 
on a regular basis, sometimes together, sometimes separately, to reflect upon different 
questions. In autumn 1996 Phoenix became a registered association of about 30 active 
people, making donations possible, as they were - and still are - only funded through its 
members and not by government money. 
 All of these 30 members were either atheists or Christians, either White 
Germans/Europeans or people from the African diaspora. In 2002, two new members (my 
brother and I) joined Phoenix. We were the first to not fit into this Black/White dichotomy. 
We were/are (Muslim) Alevi Anatolian Germans. For the White group, this meant exploring 
their racialisation in regard to the »Muslim or Migrant Other« and not only the »Black or 
Native Other«. For the Black group, it was a completely different matter, as some started to 
share incidents of racial abuse and violence they experienced from Turkish Germans. It was 
a new, radical discussion about how to define Whiteness and Blackness and the term 
»People of Colour« (POC) was introduced to Phoenix. It was a significant break in the 
traditional Phoenix discourse, and some people, mostly Black members, left or became less 
active. Those members that left or retired felt that the presence of Turkish Germans was 
equal to the presence of White people, thereby the safe Black space became unsafe to them. 
However, a set of two new trainers joined and new facets of racism were explored, including 
racial discrimination within BIPOC Communities, shadeism and racialisation in non-
European countries. 
 In 2002 the first Phoenix office opened in Duisburg, and in 2005, with the support of 
the Commissioner of Foreigners of Brandenburg, Phoenix was invited to do several anti-
racism and empowerment training. As a result of these training, Phoenix expanded into the 
former GDR. In 2006 Phoenix had about 200 members. 
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 In 2010 Phoenix received the Aix-La-Chapelle Peace Prize, and in 2011 Fagbola 
received the Federal Cross of Merit. By the end of 2020 Phoenix has almost 700 members, 
making it one of the oldest and largest anti-racism NGOs in Germany. Having summarised 
briefly Phoenix’s history, I will now describe how Phoenix is structured. 
 
 
The structure of Phoenix 
 
Phoenix offers two types of training: The anti-racism training for White people and the 
empowerment training for BIPOC18. Most of the trainers have full-time jobs in a wide range 
of fields. Trainers include protestant ministers, psychologists, medical doctors, consultants 
for educational organisations, and freelance diversity trainers. Being a Phoenix trainer is a 
part-time endeavour. The number of training per year varies from 30-40 and more, 
depending on demand and availability of trainers. Training group sizes vary from 8-18 
participants; the training itself is undertaken in 2 to 2 ½ or 3 days. If participants work in an 
educational context, they are asked not to copy or reproduce Phoenix methods in any other 
setting.  
Phoenix does not receive any government funding and is solely funded through 
membership. The income that Phoenix trainers generate is independently from the 
organisation, and can have a variety of sources, including governmental funding. Even if 
training is organised by governmental organisations, the contracts are drawn with the 
individual trainer, not Phoenix. Membership is divided into three groups: active members, 
youth members, and sustaining members. Active membership is only granted to those who 
participated in Phoenix training. In November 2020 Phoenix has about 680 members. About 
140 of those are sponsoring members, the other 540 would be considered active members, 
though a significant number of those might not have been active in Phoenix for years. About 
182 of those active members are on the BIPOC mailing-list and 328 are on the White mailing-
list (these leaves about 30 members out, that might be living abroad and are most likely 
 
18 The costs of an ART are currently (in 2020) in the range of four-figures per trainer, including hand-outs and learning 
materials. Travel and accommodation costs have to be covered by the organisers. The costs of empowerment training 
vary depending on the financial means of those hosting the training. 
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BIPOC). Of those active members approximately 180 are male (about 90 White and 90 
BIPOC), and approximately 310 are female (about 210 White, 100 BIPOC), about 20 or more 
define themselves as non-binary or trans (10 White, 10 BIPOC)19 . The youngest active 
member is about 18 the oldest about 80. 
Active members also get the opportunity to become trainers if they wish to do so20. 
The process of becoming a trainer can take many years, depending on background and 
experience. However, the Phoenix trainer apprenticeship requires active participation in the 
yearly Phoenix meetings, in Train the Trainers Training, and shadowing fully trained 
trainers during anti-racism or empowerment trainings. The Phoenix trainer’s manual is a 
vital resource in the training process. As no unit is stand alone, trainers are advised to use 
Phoenix training methods only for Phoenix anti-racism or empowerment training, as the 
arrangement of units leads participants towards the particular process of understanding 
racialisation. About 40 people are in the trainer and trainee pool. 
Active members have the opportunity to annually meet twice nationally, and twice 
in regional groups. Regional groups have developed in Berlin-Brandenburg, Rhine-Ruhr 
(North Rhine Westphalia, Cologne, Duisburg), North (Hamburg), Munich, Tübingen, Halle 
(Saale), Rhine-Main, and other places. Additionally, depending on the size of the regional 
groups, Phoenix offers two occasions where White or BIPOC members meet separately, to 
discuss certain questions. Phoenix members in Berlin, for example, where separate meetings 
are also offered, have the opportunity to meet up to six times a year. The meetings are 
voluntary. 
 On the Phoenix website (www.phoenix-ev.org), under the subheading Our 
Philosophy the NGO states:  
 
»Firstly, our work is based on the analysis of the experience of PoC in Germany. Secondly, the perspective and 
commitment of White people is essential when it comes to creating well-reflected strategies against racism. We 




19 These are only estimates, some information about the number of people on the email-lists I received from the Phoenix 
office, others I had to piece together. 
20 Phoenix’s work is not solely based on training and the facilitation of meetings and events to continue the process of 
critical reflexivity in relation to racialisation. The organisation is occasionally involved in consulting (for example in cases 
of racism against children in school), or very rarely protest (for example against at ›Africa week‹ in the Zoo of Augsburg in 




The idea behind this approach prevents White saviourism, the notion that White people (or 
culture) can save BIPOC from the oppression they experience, or as Teju Cole put it in his 
essay about The White Savior Industrial Complex (2016) »a nobody from America or Europe can 
go to Africa and become a godlike savior or, at the very least, have his or her emotional needs satisfied« 
(Cole 2016, p. 384). Further, Phoenix assumes that racialisation, which includes the 
subjection of White people to Whiteness, is a form of heteronomy. Therefore, in regard to 
the White Phoenix members, their liberation from their Whiteness is more central as it is 
tied to the liberation of BIPOCs from racial oppression. 
 Phoenix’ mission statement further elaborates: 
 
»In the process of developing strategies to oppose racism it is paramount that White people understand that they 
themselves are victims of the racist system« (https://www.phoenix-ev.org/en/our-philosophy.html). 
 
Here is where I disagree with the Phoenix philosophy. I find the victimisation of White 
people equally questionable as a reduced White perpetrator/BIPOC victim dichotomy. 
Notwithstanding, it is the aim of exploring of how White people and BIPOCs remember and 
view their racialisation processes and the psycho-emotional consequences of that 
racialisation. According to the Phoenix website, viewing themselves as racialised »enables 
[White people] to discover new forms of acting in an anti-racist-discourse« (https://www.phoenix-
ev.org/en/our-philosophy.html). Additionally, the Phoenix website highlights that critical 
reflexivity is an important element in its work, and that White and BIPOC members alike 
are invited »to become aware of their own role in the racist system« (https://www.phoenix-
ev.org/en/our-philosophy.html). 
 After having explored briefly how racism shapes discourses, society and 
subjectivities in Germany, looked at some of the relevant concepts of this thesis, and after a 
brief summary of Phoenix’ history and mission statement, I will examine the literature 
related to exploring the research questions mentioned in this introductory chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
»I know perfectly well, just as well as all those tremendously clever intellectuals, that in the scientific sense there 
is no such thing as race […] I as a politician need a conception which enables the order which has hitherto existed 
on historic bases to be abolished and an entirely new and anti-historic order enforced and given an intellectual 
basis… With the concept of race, National Socialism will carry its revolution abroad and recast the world« Adolf 
Hitler (quoted in Rauschning 1940, p. 232). 
 
The previous chapter shortly glanced at how racism in Germany discursively shapes society 
and subjectivities, briefly skimmed over some of the crucial concepts of this thesis, and 
looked into the history and structure of Phoenix, which I chose as case study for this research 
project. This study explores how anti-racism and empowerment practitioners narrate 
memories of their racialisation and their own experience as training participants, but also 
how they re-write their racial subjectivation and re-imagine humanness. Therefore, in the 
following chapter, I critically engage with the body of literature and the key concepts that 
are relevant to this study. Firstly, I argue, based on the analysis of the anti-racism and 
empowerment practitioners’ narratives, that racialisation processes reflect a form of 
suffering to the subject. This suffering is derived through the process of racialisation, which 
could also be considered a process of dehumanisation for BIPOC and White people. The 
examination of racialisation, which is understood as becoming a racial subject, is preceded 
by the exploration of the terms »Race«, racism and subjectivation. Since racialisation is also 
understood as being subjected to a racial culture which has Whiteness at its centre, I will 
also explore the notion of Whiteness. However, the racialisation processes the research 
participants narrate are based on their recollection of situations, moments, or phases of 
becoming racialised. Consequently, though already touched upon in the introduction I shall 
also examine the concepts of memory and remembering more in-depth. Secondly, 
considering that the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners share their personal 
training experiences, I look in a very condensed form into the development of anti-racism 
and empowerment training and its criticisms in the UK and Germany. I also examine the 
notion of (self-)empowerment and (self-)governmentality, since I argue that the cognitive 
and emotional understanding of individual racialisation processes, partially liberates the 
racialised subject from them. Nonetheless, I also carefully consider Nikolas Rose’s (1996, 
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1999) examination of (self-)governmentality connected to psycho-therapeutic discourses 
related to concepts of individual betterment and liberation. Thirdly, the research 
participants describe, how after their first training, they began to re-write their racial 
subjectivity. In this process the notion of recognition (as conceptualised by Taylor 1994) and 
reflexivity are analysed. Finally, I look into how the anti-racism and empowerment 
practitioners re-imagine humanness, delving into an existential reflection on Fanon’s appeal 
for a new humanism, but also the concept of decoloniality, moving away from Western 
epistemologies towards an epistemological pluriverse. Additionally, I discuss in this thesis, 
if racialisation is also understood as a form of dehumanisation, can de-racialisation also be 
understood as a form of re-humanisation. 
 
 
The dominant narratives of »Race« and the subject’s confirmation of them 
 
Before we look into the concepts relevant to this thesis, the following section delineates the 
concept of the narrative onto which the analysis of racialisation and empowerment in this 
thesis is based on. What is narrative and how does it differ from a story? Some sociologists 
state that narratives are about how we tell a story, whilst a story is about content, about 
what we tell in a story (Plummer 2019, pp. 4-5). One particular model of narratives 
developed by the sociologist Ken Plummer (2019) that describes how a person turns into the 
subject that they are is very useful in the analysis of the research participants’ personal 
accounts. The model describes a first stage as »collaborative narratives«, in which the subject 
conforms and assimilates to dominant meta-narratives (Plummer 2019, p. 76). Within this 
first stage, there are two degrees. The first degree slavishly abides to the norms of the meta-
narrative and the second degree respects the norms and remains colonised by them (ibid.). 
In »negotiated narratives«, the second stage, the subject begins to actively debate meta-
narratives, still dominated by them but assuming forms of resistance which do not challenge 
meta-narratives (ibid.). These forms of resistance can also be described in varying degrees: 
first, through creativity and innovation; second, through attempts to disengage with these 
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meta-narratives; third, through creating distance via rituals and performance; and fourth, 
through amending either the self or attempting to amend the structures without challenging 
the meta-narratives (ibid.). In the third stage, »counter-narratives«, the subject refuses to 
abide to meta-narratives and attempts to change them, either through rebelling and 
challenging them or through overthrowing them (ibid.). Though I would question the 
linear, evolving character of this narrative model and argue for a contradictory simultaneity 
of degrees and stages, through which the subject moves in these meta-narratives, the model 
is still useful in the analysis of how the subject relates to the meta-narratives of »Race« and 
racism. 
The concept of »racialisation« depends on the narrative of »Race«. At the beginning 
of the 17th century, numerous European scholars developed the concept of »Race« as a 
pseudo-scientific category in order to divide populations and groups by random 
physiognomic features 21 . Scholars such as the Swedish physician and natural scientist 
Carolus Linnaeus (1758), German doctor and physiologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach22 
(1776), French aristocrat and novelist Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau (1853), and British 
German political philosopher Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1899), were influential 
theorists on »Race«. In simple terms, humankind was divided into three to four races, with 
the White race (European) on top, followed by the yellow race (Asian) and with the red 
(Native American) and black (African) at the bottom of the racial pyramid (Eigen & 
Larrimore 2006, pp. 103-112). With Charles Darwin (1859) and the idea of natural selection, 
the idea of lower and higher races was placed in a scientific context. Western civilisation 
became the measuring stick with which other cultures were perceived and valued. 
Simultaneously »it was only with the sociogenesis of European modernity that blood, body, and race 
were created as biological entities« (Linke 1999, p. 2). 
However, after 1945 and the violent genocidal excesses of the Nazi racial state, 
hierarchical notions of »Race« were mostly deemed incorrect (for example by the UN), and 
»Race« shifted to be mostly understood as a social construction (Banton 1998, pp. 196-233). 
 
21 Notions of the »racial Other« already existed in the Middle Ages and during the Christian crusades. However, this »racial 
Other« was generally explained theologically and not scientifically (see also Pieterse 2002). 




Notwithstanding, a biological understanding of »Race« continued to exist in a variety of 
sciences and epistemologies of the Global North (Kohn 1988; Malik 2008)23 . Primarily, 
»racial« theories such as those of scholars like Gobineau and Chamberlain propagate the 
superiority of the White »Race«, the inferiority of BIPOC »Races«, and deeply inform 
modern Enlightenment thought. Some of the most important and influential writings on 
»Race« that the European Enlightenment produced, came from very significant thinkers 
such as Friedrich Hegel (1837) and Immanuel Kant (1782). Both Enlightenment thinkers 
argued that White Western men were the pinnacle of humankind and were thereby 
burdened to civilise and humanise the world – since they were the only ones who were fully 
human (Eze 1997). Enlightenment thought employed »Race« theories as a justification for 
the enslavement of African people, imperial expansion, and genocide. As David Theo 
Goldberg states: 
 
»Racial thinking and racist articulation have become increasingly normalized and naturalized throughout 
modernity, but in ways not simply determined (as dependent variables) by social conditions at specified times. 
[…] Liberalism plays a foundational part in this process of normalizing and naturalizing racial dynamics and racist 
exclusions. As modernity’s definitive doctrine of self and society, of morality and politics, liberalism serves to 
legitimate ideologically and to rationalize politico-economically prevailing sets of racialized conditions and racist 
exclusions. […] Hence, also, we must acknowledge the role of philosophical discipline in establishing racialized 
discourse and the culture of racisms« (Goldberg 1993, pp. 1-2). 
 
At the beginning of the 18th century, the European cultures and societies were subjected to 
racial ideologies that were imposed upon the world as pseudo-scientific »Race« theories 
(Banton 1977). Primarily, BIPOC’s lower genetic and cultural status was discursively 
essentialised. Some social scholars assumed that racist ideas suggest that White people’s 
alleged cultural supremacy, the myth of their socio-psychological advantage and mental 
superiority, transformed into tangible economic and political power (DuBois 1996 [1923]). 
Similarly, Edward Said (1978) and Stuart Hall (1997) analyse how cultural myths of the 
inferiority of constructed »Black« and »Oriental« subjects imply the thought of (White) 
Western supremacy. The White subject constructs itself through a psychological process of 
splitting, denying and projecting its own »badness« upon »Blackness« or the racial Other in 
order to construct its own moral superiority and supremacy (Dalal 2002). Furthermore, this 
 
23 Even though both scholars decidedly dismiss the biological notion of »Races«, Malik notes that genetic variation does 
exist amongst populations. However, Malik also highlights these genetic variations only as likeliness and not as essential 
genetic demarcations between »Races« (Malik 2008). Additionally, these demarcations could only be constructed 
arbitrarily as there is no »natural« characteristic that could differentiate people into »Races«. Dividing a population by skin 
colour and nose shape would create a different »Race« pattern than dividing a population by skin colour and height. 
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psychological process of split, denial and projection enables the White self to embark on the 
colonial project, which inevitably leads to a cultural and mental annihilation of the colonial 
Other (Memmi 1957). The binary concept of »White/good – Black/bad« was necessary as 
justification for White colonialisms’ brutal terror and racial exploitation (Loomba 2005). 
With the end of the great colonial empires (even though their influence on their former 
colonies may not have ended yet), overt discourses of White supremacy have shifted and 
become less visible (Gilroy 1992). It is argued, nonetheless, that colonial ideology is still 
vibrant in the collective unconscious of the former colonisers and colonised. In The Racial 
Order (2015), Mustafa Emirbayer and Matthew Desmond conclude »[o]ur thinking, especially 
our taken-for-granted, habitual orientation to the world, is a product of long centuries of (racialized) 
discourses and practices« (Emirbayer & Desmond 2015, p. 22). Furthermore, the sociologists 
state that »Race« »is real because it is socially real, not because it is biological. Indeed, race is 
historically real, in the sense of being a cultural structure historically sedimented in both our social 
institutions and our personal dispositions« (Emirbayer & Desmond 2015, p. 10). Furthermore, 
it can be said that »Race« is relational and temporal (Emirbayer & Desmond 2015, p. 337), 
while I would also add that it is spatial, as well as classed, gendered et cetera. In order to 
demonstrate how society is permeated and shaped by racial cultures, I consider 
racialisation, racial discourses and power structures as a reflection of a racialised 
consciousness in chapter 4. 
 I have often encountered a reductionist definition of »racism as (racial) prejudice plus 
power« (Sow 2008, pp. 84ff.), amongst anti-racism practitioners in Germany as well as in 
other countries. Although this definition may be helpful for introducing people who are 
new to the subject of »Race« relations, it does, however, reduce the complexities of power 
relations. A new creed of writers who have discovered the subject of Critical Whiteness 
similarly simplify racism as »a form of oppression in which one racial group dominates others« 
(DiAngelo 2012, p. 87). Amongst Black feminists there is also the understanding of racism 
as White supremacist patriarchy from a US-American perspective on »Race« relations. How 
much can these US American discourse on Whiteness be transferred to a German context? 
The French feminist and sociologist Collette Guillaumin conceptualises racism in Racism, 




»The ideology of race (racism) is a universe of signs: it is what mediated the specific social practice of western 
society as it became industrialized, and as political activity was taken over by a class which had formerly been 
excluded from it. It is a universe of signs far more extensive than simply the ›theory‹ into which it crystallized in 
the course of the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, the theory stresses human ›differences‹ and inequalities, and affirms the superiority and 
inferiority of groups of people in line with criteria more or less explicitly defined, according to author, but that is all. 
The theory takes race as something irrefutably given, practically as an ›immediate datum of the senses‹; as a 
self-evident truth, rather than a scientific tool or concept« (Guillaumin 1995, pp. 35-36). 
 
Educational scientists also examine how racism is spread through society and state that 
racism as an ideology »is socially reproduced. It is communicated and transmitted through formal 
and informal channels. At the formal level racism is communicated through political discourse, the 
media, and education. The informal is engendered by socialization within the family, talk in the 
neighborhood, among friends, and in other spheres of interaction« (Essed 1996, p. 9). Scientists 
from Social Psychology have also contributed to the conceptualisation of racism as »anything 
– thought feeling or action – that uses the notion of race as an activating or organizing principle. Or 
to put it another way, racism is the manufacture and use of the notion of race. […] Racism is a form 
of organizing peoples, commodities and the relationships between them by making reference to a 
notion of race« (Dalal 2002, p. 27). This definition of racism, as Dalal states himself, closely 
reflects what is also understood as racialisation in this thesis. 
 Another narrative of »Race« ideology, which is critically analysed through Fanonian 
philosophy, includes humanness in its conceptualisation: 
 
»Racism is a global hierarchy of superiority and inferiority along the line of the human that have been politically, 
culturally and economically produced and reproduced for centuries by the institutions of the ›capitalist/patriarchal 
western-centric/Christian-centric modern/colonial world- system‹ (Grosfoguel 2011). The people classified above 
the line of the human are recognized socially in their humanity as human beings and, thus, enjoy access to rights 
(human rights, civil rights, women rights and/or labor rights), material resources, and social recognition to their 
subjectivities, identities, epistemologies and spiritualities. The people below the line of the human are considered 
subhuman or non-human; that is, their humanity is questioned and, as such, negated (Fanon 1967). In the latter 
case, the extension of rights, material resources and the recognition of their subjectivities, identities, spiritualities 
and epistemologies are denied« (Grosfoguel 2016, p. 10).  
 
 This Fanonian conceptualisation of racism, which divides the racialised into human 
and non-human, is very relevant to my question about the effects racialisation has on those 
subjected to a racial culture which has Whiteness at its centre. Paul Gilroy also describes 
»racism as a system assembling races in the world. […] It is not something that grows from racial 
difference. It creates racial difference« (Gilroy 2018, p. 188). Ideologies, which could be 
described as a set of ideas or beliefs, and which are at the core of any political or economic 
system, are also held by a person or a group of persons. In Ideology – A Multidisciplinary 
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Approach (1998) Teun A. van Dijk examines ideology in its different facets and then uses a 
book by a conservative US-American author to show how racism functions as an ideology. 
This analysis of modern racism as a group ideology examines the central beliefs about 
Whiteness and the racial Other included in this ideology, which is employed to justify 
inequalities. I am heavily borrowing from van Dijk’s analysis and transferring it to current 
dominant racial narratives in Germany: 
 
1. Our German/Western culture is better 
2. Racism is natural and sometimes cannot be avoided 
3. Discriminating people may sometimes make sense 
4. Germany is not a multicultural/multiracial society and it should not 
be/multiculturalism has failed 
5. People from different cultures in Germany should assimilate to a Leitkultur, a 
leading German culture 
6. Germany is a tolerant, democratic and modern country 
7. Germans are not a racist/We are not racists/Germany is not a racist society (van 
Dijk 1998, pp. 287-288) 
 
Within this self-representational ideology two adversaries can be identified. First those that 
stand for pluralism and liberal cultural values: 
 
1. They think that all cultures have the same value 
2. They promote multicultural ideas 
3. They think that Western civilisation is bad 
4. They are obsessed with a long-gone history of Nazism, colonialism and racism 
5. They want equal opportunities and representation for ethnic minorities (ibid.) 
 
The second main adversary is the racial Other that is not White and who stands in binary 
opposition to it. The dominant narratives about the racial Other are based on these 
ideological core beliefs: 
 
1. They are uncivilised, barbaric, traditional and backward 
2. Muslims/The racial Other acts different because of his inherent primitive culture 
3. Their culture differs from the norm of modern Western enlightened culture 
4. They do not have any regard for the law or societal rules 
5. They are more criminal than we are, they are violent and dangerous 
6. Their culture has not evolved and cannot evolve because it is stuck in its traditions 
7. They take advantage of the welfare system and constantly expect hand-outs 
8. They are passive and have never significantly contributed anything noteworthy to 
our society or human history 
9. They are sexual predators 
10. They are substandard, and they will bring us down; they cannot improve 
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11. They use racism as an apology for their own shortcomings (ibid.) 
 
These narratives always seem to return to one of the first core beliefs, which is the 
superiority of modern Western culture and thereby of White people. Wolfgang Hund, who 
with Wie die Deutschen weiß wurden [How the Germans became White] (2017) contributed a 
compelling genealogy of Whiteness in Germany, wrote: 
 
»Colonial propaganda, colonial policy and a commodity racism independent of specific colonial property, 
contributed to the association with colonial exhibitions, colonial novels, Völkerschauen and ethnological museums 
for the propagation and generalization of whiteness. As a result, racist symbolic capital was generated and made 
available to all strata of the population. Even those who were poor and had no economic capital or had only a 
moderate level of education and therefore had little cultural capital or, because of their lower position, had hardly 
any career-relevant relationships and thus poor social capital, could at least ideologically benefit from the 
generalized property of whiteness« [my own translation] (Hund 2017, p.109). 
 
What are the prevalent narratives of Whiteness? The analysis of Whiteness has a long 
tradition and has developed most extensively amongst BIPOC thinkers. Some social 
scientists examined how the first encounters between White Europeans and Black Africans 
were perceived by BIPOC people and looked at early images of White people in Black 
representation (Bay 2000). Some theorists of Critical Whiteness state that the development 
of scholarly Whiteness studies can be seen to have developed in three waves (Twine & 
Gallagher 2008). The »First Wave« was initiated by the writings of scholars such as DuBois 
(1996 [1936]) who examine the political and psychological wages of Whiteness. These early 
writers on Critical Whiteness consider racism a form of White supremacy, which 
economically over-empowers White people and gives them the allusion of a higher social 
status in comparison to BIPOC. The scholarship of the first wave also describes the 
invisibility of Whiteness, which is maintained in order to conceal White supremacy and 
nurture the illusion of meritocracy (DuBois 1996 [1970]). With colonialism and globalization, 
White supremacy has expanded beyond Europe and North America and has embraced the 
entire world (Shome 1999). This embrace has created, spread and maintained in many parts 
of the world a racial culture which has Whiteness at its centre, which becomes evident in 
the internalisation of »Western« culture and White beauty standards in many countries 
(Perry 2005; Fuller 2006). I consider Whiteness studies and the internalisation of Whiteness 
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more generally in chapter 4 and 5, where I look at how racial culture (centred around 
Whiteness) shapes identity constructions. 
 The »Second Wave« of Whiteness studies, also mainly based on DuBois’ work (1996), 
is characterised by writers and researchers who investigate and reflect upon racism’s root 
causes, particularly its structural dimensions (Frazier 1968; Baldwin 1955; Ellison 1964). 
While these writers were largely ignored by White mainstream academia, only a few 
scholars on Whiteness were recognized for their consideration of racism as an individual 
White problem (Myrdal 1944). Among them, Gunnar Myrdal argues that racism causes a 
cognitive dissonance in the individual White mind: the ethical dilemma between racial 
injustice and (American) values of liberty and equal opportunities (Myrdal 1944). Only 
through the works of Black feminists, culture and literary theorists and writers such as Toni 
Morrison (1992) and bell hooks (1992), who analyse the normativity of White subjectivities, 
does a critical examination of Whiteness shift from these psychological explanations to the 
discursive practices of White supremacy. Inspired by these writers, some US legal scholars 
began to critically explore the formations of Whiteness manifested in legal structures and 
laws, highlighting how racial culture was also reflected in racialised (legal) structures 
(Delgado & Stefancic 1996; Harris 1993). This also becomes apparent in how Whiteness 
informs notions of citizenship and shapes laws and policies of naturalisation in favour of 
White European or Euro-American people (López 1996). Also relevant to my research is, 
how some scholars of the second wave examine how Whiteness has changed, re-invented 
and re-constructed itself, so it is far from an essential, closed off entity (Allen 1994; Jacobsen 
1998; Roediger 1991, 2005). These historians study how certain ethnic groups like the Irish 
in America were culturally and ideologically absorbed into Whiteness in order to imbalance 
demography to disadvantage BIPOC. I consider discursive practices of Whiteness in chapter 
4 and 5, arguing that Whiteness is not an essential, monolithic identity, but is rather 
continuously socially constructed through discourses. Drawing on these, I consider how the 
construction of an essentially racial »Other«, which White identities depend on, limits the 
subject development process. 
 The »Third Wave« of Critical Whiteness studies can be distinguished from former 
waves by the scope of its »innovative and renovative research methodologies« (Twine & 
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Gallagher 2008, p. 12) and use of racial consciousness biographies (Twine 2004; McKinney 
2005; Knowles 2006). Very fascinating is also the investigation into White biographies and 
racial subjectivation to uncover the invisibility of White power structures (Frankenberg 
1993, 2001), which informs some of the writing of the »Third Wave«. Early racial 
subjectivation, which considers how children are initiated into society’s perceptions of 
colour lines in the US, UK and Germany, is also relevant in regard to the (childhood) 
memories of racialisation the research participants share (Troyna & Hatcher 1992; 
Hirschfeld 1997; Hughes 1997; Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001; Eggers 2006; Quintana & 
McKown 2008). Only a small number of scholars, however, look at the socio-psychological 
dynamics between White power structures and individuals, and the toll of White 
supremacy on White people. Judith Katz (1978), for example, briefly mentions a »cognitive 
dissonance« created through White socialisation, not as a result of an ethical dilemma but 
as a consequence of psychical limitations. Likewise, Richard Dyer (1997) touches upon the 
feeling of alienation that accompanies White subjectivation. Thandeka (2000) also describes 
the strong emotions of guilt and shame that come with »learning to be White«. The most 
recent writing on Whiteness (I am unsure if I should consider it the »Fourth Wave«. 
Gallagher and Twine consider it a tsunami [2017]), some of it academic, some of it 
journalistic, some of it translated into German or even written in German, often deals with 
Whiteness in terms of privilege, entitlement or sometimes fragility (Sullivan 2014; Pinder 
2015; Garner 2016; Ogette 2017; DiAngelo 2018; Eddo-Lodge 2018; Hasters 2019). I only 
found some of these more recent books helpful as they only seem to focus on the benefits of 
being White. Even the notion of White fragility, as promoted by anti-racism trainer and 
writer Robin DiAngelo, is based on the idea that White people are so pampered that they 
fall apart once confronted with an uncomfortable subject (DiAngelo 2018). My argument 
goes further since I understand racialisation, which includes becoming a White racial subject 
to be an event or process which causes suffering in that person. Only a few authors also deal 
with the negative assumptions of being White (Kowal 2011) and of a racial culture, which 
has Whiteness at its ideological centre. I consider the »Whiteness« of culture and the 
development of racial subjectivities in chapter 4 and 5, arguing that the racial conditioning 
leaves the racialised subject suffering and dehumanised. 
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How does the subject become exposed and subjected to dominant narratives of 
»Race«? In sociology, racism is frequently theorised around the polarity of (Black) victims 
and (White) culprits (Rothberg 2019, pp. 1-2). Outside of Critical »Race« theory, racism is 
considered to be an issue, executed by those on the edges of society, for example far right 
extremists and fascists (Tißberger 2017, p. 118). The late 1970s saw the emergence of Critical 
Whiteness studies in the social sciences and cultural studies (Twine & Gallagher 2008). 
Liberal social orders frequently attempt to downplay racism as an issue of the margins, yet 
racism is an underlying ideology, which pervades and shapes social orders in general 
(Emirbayer & Desmond 2015). »Race«, class, cis-gender, sexuality etc. become the dividing 
lines through which power floats unevenly (Crenshaw 2017). In spite of the fact that racism 
is a structural issue, the structures are collectively and personally upheld by individuals 
(Banton 1998, pp. 136-140). In this segment of this thesis, I examine racial subjectivation or 
racialisation. I look at what connects narratives of Whiteness, culture, the subject and the 
social to gather a more profound comprehension of how »Race« and power operates within 
subjects. 
Subjectivation is a philosophical concept primarily developed by Foucault (1976). 
Subjectivation (or subjectification) refers to the social construction of the individual subject; 
to the way individuals turn themselves into subjects of health, sexuality (ibid.) and »Race«. 
So, what role does »Race« play in subjectivation? If society is racially structured, is our 
subjectivation racialized as well? The Dictionary of Race, Ethnicity & Culture (2003) defines 
the term »racialization« in the following way: 
 
»RACIALIZATION (It. razzializzazione; Fr. racialization; Ger. Rassialisierung) The recognition of the socially 
constructed nature of the term ›RACE‹ creates a problem for authors who wish to write about ›RACE 
RELATIONS‹ without legitimizing the idea of race. Racialization is used therefore to refer to social relations to 
which ›racial‹ meanings are attached. The use of the term emphasizes the process of creating racial definitions 
and underlines the constructed rather than the given nature of race. So if an actor defines a relationship as a 
›race‹ relation, he or she is racializing the relationship and making it a race relationship« (Bolaffi et al. 2003, p. 
273). 
 
Similarly, it could be said that »Racialization in this sense is the lens or the medium through which 
race-thinking operates« (Murji and Solomos 2005, p. 3).  
 One of the first theorists who applied the term »racialisation« was Fanon (1965). The 
psychiatrist from Martinique analysed, during the French occupation of Algeria, how 
colonisation leads to a »racialisation of thoughts« (Fanon 1965, p. 171). The coloniser applies 
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the racialisation process in order to construct a homogenous, dehumanised, faceless Other 
without a distinct culture or history (Fanon 1965, pp. 171-173.). This process of Othering 
inferiorised the colonial subject, thereby allowing the coloniser to define its own »Self« as 
superior. The processes of »Othering« took place on a cultural level; the imperial project 
was acted through culture (Said 1978). It might be argued, therefore, that European culture 
during this phase transformed through racialisation into a racial culture. Racial ideologies 
were not a simple expression of opinions; they informed, rather, the way in which people 
related to each other, and how they were positioned nationally and internationally. Notions 
of »Race« manifested themselves in concrete social structures. Racial culture and 
racialisation, therefore, is also about the hierarchisation of (global) society. Michael Banton 
(1977), one of the first social scientists to use »racialisation« in sociology, characterised a 
phase of the imperial project as »a process, which can be called racialization, whereby a mode of 
categorization was developed, applied tentatively in European historical writing and then, more 
confidently to the populations of the world« (Banton 1977, pp. 18-19.). This phase could also be 
understood as the racialisation of the globe. A primordialist racial culture was globalised in 
conjunction with the global European imperial project. As primordial I understand a 
conceptualisation of racial culture, which assumes that essential biological »Races« have 
been with humans, since the dawn of humankind. 
 Colonial society is thus strictly divided into racialised socio-economic classes, with 
the coloniser on top of the power hierarchy (Memmi 1957). Because Whiteness stands in the 
centre of the racial culture imposed on the colonial »Other«, a »culture of racialization« can 
be understood more specifically as a »culture of white supremacy« (Martinot 2003, pp. 130-
131). In other words, because »Race« is a construction employed to shape social relations, it 
is a reflection of cultural and political values and norms. While subjectivation constitutes 
the subject’s general internalisation of power structures, racialisation (or racial 
subjectivation) constitutes the internalisation of society’s values and norms related to 
»Race« in the process of racial subject development. 
In this dissertation racialisation is conceptualised as racial subjectivation, as the 
subject’s general internalisation but also negotiation of cultural values and norms. It is 
important to note that there are many other more specific conceptualisations of racialisation. 
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Some scholars, for example, analyse the racialisation of migration in media or political 
discourses (Carter et al. 1987; Solomos 2003); some examine racialisation in the field of 
crime, policing and the judicial system (Holdaway 1996; Rowe 1998; Chan & Mirchandani 
2002). The conflation of »Race« and ethnicity becomes visible in the work of scholars who 
elaborate on how racialisation can also be understood as a form of ethnicisation: the 
construction of people or denominations as »Race« or ethnicity (for the construction of 
»Jews« as a »Race« see also Miles 1993; of »Muslims« see also Brah 1996). Some scholars 
argue that the difficulty in defining the term »racialisation« lies in the masked movements 
of the term »Race« (Lentin 2020). »Race« moves between biological/genetic, ethnic, 
national/cultural and religious meanings (ibid.). 
Is it possible that someone does not believe in the existence of »Races« as such, and 
at the same time unconsciously thinks and acts according to the racial formations in society, 
as if looking through racialised glasses without necessarily knowing it? The racialised 
structures of society are reflected and re-affirmed in the racial structures of the psyche and 
vice versa (Dalal 2002, p. 7). In other words, a racialised psyche automatically constructs a 
racialised society with racialised bodies (to a certain extent without even being aware of it). 
So, a racialised society constructs racialised psyches, individually and collectively, which 
reproduce racial power structures. Most helpful and fascinating was also the work of Quinn 
Slobodian, who in Comrades of Color (2015) examines racialisation in the former GDR, which 
claimed to be an anti-racist, anti-fascist, and anti-capitalist state. Slobodian's work is 
particularly useful in the analysis of interviews with research participants who had grown 
up in the GDR, highlighting, how even in a state which defines itself as anti-racist, 
racialisation can take place. Having briefly looked at the dynamics between the emergence 
of racial ideology and processes of racial subjectivation, I now turn to examine how »Race« 
as a cultural discourse shapes racial subjectivity. 
What is subjectivity? Subjectivity is related to our social identities and roles in society. 
In the book Subjectivity Donald E. Hall (2004) defines the term as follows: 
 
»Subjectivity: often used interchangeably with the term ›identity,‹ subjectivity more accurately denotes our social 
constructs and consciousness of identity. We commonly speak of identity as a flat, one-dimensional concept, but 
subjectivity is much broader and more multifaceted; it is social and personal being that exists in negotiation with 
broad cultural definitions and our own ideals. We may have numerous discrete identities, of race, class, gender, 
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sexual orientation, etc., and a subjectivity that is comprised of all of those facets, as well as our own imperfect 
awareness of our selves« (Hall 2004, p. 134). 
 
This thesis employs the non-dualistic concept of »subjectivity« as it deconstructs the notion 
of a dichotomous internal and external being (Mama 1995, pp. 1-2). It is preferable to 
essential notions of identity, which run the risk of reproducing primordialist »Race« 
concepts24. As Marx (1971), Freud (1991) and Ferdinand de Saussure (1960) have shown, 
these notions of stable and authentic identity and self, derived from late Renaissance and 
Enlightenment, are dependent on economic and social relations, on the unconscious and the 
psyche and on their positioning in the discursive web of social significations (Hall 2000, p. 
145). So, a conscious, aware, essential and authentic »Race« identity does not exist and can 
therefore not be held responsible for the reproduction of racially structured societies. The 
pervasiveness of racial culture, therefore, is rooted in the dynamics of the social and the 
subject, in the way cultural narratives of »Race« or racial discourses shape the subject’s 
psyche and operate at an unconscious level. 
 Racial subjectivity is inextricably bound with the social. Judith Butler in The Psychic 
Life of Power writes, in reference to Foucault, that »[n]o individual becomes a subject without 
first becoming subjected or undergoing ›subjectivation‹« (Butler 1997, p. 11) through cultural 
discourses. »Race« as a cultural discourse, therefore, shapes the lives of everybody in 
society, White and BIPOC. Hirschfeld’s studies show that young children’s 
conceptualisation of »Race« by the age of three is very similar to the way adults understand 
the concept (Hirschfeld 1997, p. 83). Racial subjectivation thus begins at a very early stage, 
a stage where we are unable to consciously decide whether or how we want to be subjected. 
However, children are far from simply being passive recipients of a racial culture which 
they internalise without any thought. Ethnographic research with children shows that 
children experiment, negotiate, create and re-create the racial culture they are presented 
with (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001). Do people in Germany remember these moments of 
experimenting, negotiating, creating and recreating of a racialised world as children? And 
if not, why? How does not remembering contribute to the pervasiveness of a racial culture 
with Whiteness at its centre? In this way »Race«, Whiteness and the »Other« are socially 
 
24 Mama draws on the post-structuralist psychological definition of subjectivity as »individuality and self-awareness – the 
condition of being a subject« (Henriques et al. 1984, p. 3). 
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constructed; their reproduction is determined through a culture of unawareness, in which 
people’s positions in society are taken as common (meaning dominant) sense. And even 
though White subjects today are not complicit in the violence of colonialism or the Shoah, 
the past shapes the present and thereby they are implicated in the past (Rothberg 2019, p. 
14). Hence, it could be argued that White people’s and BIPOC’s lives are shaped through 
»Race«, in the same way the lives men and women are structured through Gender 
(Frankenberg 1993, p. 1). It is »Race«, but also cis-gender, sexuality, class amongst others 
that shape power structures in society. 
 Very often scholars in Critical Whiteness studies have emphasised the importance in 
recognizing the privileges that come with White subjectivity (Roediger 1991; McIntosh 1989; 
Rothenberg 2002). The damaging and alienating costs of White privileges for the White 
subject are, however, less explored. It is argued that the misinformation that goes along with 
racial subjectivation has a negative cognitive impact on the individual’s psyche (Katz 1978, 
p. 13). If the development of a White racial subjectivity is highly dependent on the 
construction of an oppositional other, how can the construction process of this oppositional 
other – that in the empirical reality is simply a structurally, historically and individually 
oppressed human – be without any effects on the self? What do we lose along the way by 
being engaged in racialised power structures in society? How does this affect our perception 
of social realities and our emotional and behavioural conduct? 
Considering the translation of racial ideology into practice within colonial societies, 
Said (1978) and Fanon (1967) stress the multifaceted identification process related to »Race«. 
Said (1993) also analyses colonialism, hidden behind the mask of an imperial project, a 
mission civilisatrice, to carry civilisation to the uncivilised »Other«. With Fanon’s (1967, 1980) 
examination of the alienation or dehumanisation of coloniser and colonised caused by 
racialised violence and oppression, psychoanalytical concepts of alienation and trauma 
have been translated into a racialised context within colonialism. 
 Fanon is fully aware that there is no essential Whiteness or Blackness, he describes 
the borders between the two as rather fluid. However, in his phenomenology, which is 
strongly based on the thoughts of Husserl and Hegel, the psychiatrist gives a drastic (and 
poetic) in-depth analysis of his observations and experiences as a Black man within a 
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racialised society. Fanon’s main argument is that within the colonial setting only the White 
subject is granted full humanness and the BIPOC subject is denied that status (Fanon 1952, 
pp. 9-10). This denial has two major implications: first, economically Black subjects are 
limited in their access to society’s resources; second, socio-psychologically Black subjects 
suffer from the internalisation of a racial culture that has Whiteness at its centre (Fanon coins 
the term »epidermalization«) which constructs them as inferior (ibid.). As long as there is no 
awareness in BIPOC subjects about these processes and narratives, they will eventually 
assimilate to this culture and try to be White (ibid.). However, Fanon also points out that it 
is both the Black subject and the White subject that is alienated (Fanon 1952, p. 22). Whilst 
this process of alienation is described from a psycho-existential perspective in Masks, in 
Racism and Culture (1964) Fanon’s explanation shifts to the incorporation of the notion of 
cultural alienation (McCulloch 1983, p. 133). However, I conceptualise the (cultural) 
alienation that Fanon mentions as a form of dehumanisation. The White subject may be 
granted the full status of humanness but as I argue in chapter 6, this status remains empty, 
since I understand humanness as relational and if denied to others, it is also denied to the 
self. 
 In Racism and Culture (1964) Fanon states that in some cultures, racism is intrinsic to 
its structures (Fanon 1964, p. 42), in other words they are racial cultures. Additionally, the 
writer describes racism as adapting to the economic structures in order to disguise itself 
within them (ibid.). Here, racism becomes the destruction of the cultural values of the 
colonised and the imposition of the cultural values of the coloniser (Fanon 1964, p. 43). In 
other words, Whiteness stands in the centre of this culture and racism ultimately seeks the 
cultural (and sometimes physical) destruction of the Other. Hence, this is also where the 
alienating moment within this racial culture crystallises: White subjectivities become self-
alienated because their (human) relation is blocked through the construct of the Other; they 
have to construct the Other in order to define themselves. Also, the Other that they 
construct, is less human. It is dehumanised which is reflected in the dehumanised relations 
that (un-)reflected White subjectivities have to the racial Other. Within racial culture, the 
racialisation process is brought to perfection, it is almost invisible to the consciousness and 
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is mainly reflected in cultural codes and representations, which are absorbed from early 
childhood on. 
 In addition to this, Fanon describes this alienation process, particularly for the Black 
subject, as traumatic (Fanon 1952, p. 102) and employs Jung’s term of the collective 
unconscious. In Algeria Unveiled (1959), which was written during the Algerian liberation 
war of 1954-1962, Fanon analyses the obsession of the coloniser with the veil worn by the 
majority of Muslim women in French-colonial Algeria at the time. French colonisers 
transformed the veil into a cultural symbol signifying the limitations of assimilation. Here, 
the process of unveiling the Algerian woman became a key tenet of successful cultural 
colonisation. Why though did the veil hold such significance? Fanon states that the veiled 
woman »who sees without being seen frustrates the colonizer« (Fanon 1959, p. 28). The colonial 
gaze is a strong tool of the coloniser in the psychological domination of the colonial subject 
(hooks 1992, pp. 115-116; Sturken & Cartwright 2017, pp. 113-120). In the coloniser’s view 
the veil symbolises the ability of the colonised to withdraw herself (or himself) from the 
colonial gaze. This withdrawal evokes aggressiveness in the coloniser because they lose 
their privilege - the right to look in order to dominate and to control (Fanon 1959, p. 28). 
More importantly, the coloniser loses the racialised face of projection, the face so desperately 
needed to project the coloniser’s dislocated and denied feelings/humanity. 
 Fanon has been criticised by feminists for fetishising Muslim women and Algeria 
Unveiled was used by certain Algerian circles after the Algerian liberation to justify and 
promote the practice of wearing the veil (Woodhull 2003). There is certainly a danger in 
romanticising the veil as a symbol of cultural resistance. However, it is also important to 
read this text within the revolutionary circumstances it was written. Fanon’s 
phenomenology and his socio-psychological insights on racialisation and dehumanisation 
are at the very core of my work. 
 As a framework, racialisation is a way »of engaging race that emphasizes what the 
sociologists identify as the process of ›making race‹ - racialization – to signify the extension of racial 
meaning to previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group« (Lee 2015, p. 37). 
Racialisation could also be conceptualised as a process of production and application of the 
idea of »Race« in any scope (Dalal 2002, p. 27). In a limited sense, racialisation also came to 
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mean »any process or situation wherein the idea of ›race‹ is introduced to define and give meaning 
to some particular population, its characteristics and actions« (Miles 2004, p. 348). Whilst mostly 
applied to those that are structurally disadvantaged by racism, how racialisation 
emotionally and psychologically affects White people seems under-researched in Germany. 
Does the binary opposition in the process of creating the racial Other not bind the White 
subject to it? In this thesis, racialisation is understood as becoming a racial subject through 
these historical, discursive, collective and individual processes. Decolonial thinkers assume 
that racialisation has become a global process, that only very few parts or no part in the 
world has not been affected by it (Quijano 2000, p. 73). I heavily rely on an understanding 
of racialisation in terms of inner and outer. The outside racialised realm (social) produces 
an inner racialised realm (person), inversely an inner racialised realm re-produces an outer 
racialised realm. Notwithstanding, the inner realm of a subject is not only (in-)formed by 
»Race« but by many other social constructs, so it should not be perceived as the only subject 
identity relevant to suffering or empowerment. This critique is supported by the notion of 
intersectionality. Intersectionality »emphasizes that identity development in one area (race[…]) 
cannot be viewed as occurring outside of, or separate from, the developmental processes of other social 
identities (such as gender, class, sexual orientation, and religious/faith tradition) within individuals« 
(Wijeyesinghe & Jackson 2012, p. 3). 
Nevertheless, a person develops into a subject and they also develop into a racial 
subject. How can this development into a racial subject be understood? Transferring the 
ideas from identity development theories designed by Psychology (Erikson 1959/1994; 
Piaget 1959, 1965) to how a person develops a racial identity, it could be assumed that when 
a child develops a sameness of the self, they also develop an individual but also a shared, 
collective racial identity (Renn 2012, p. 15). This racial identity development process would 
be achieved in the same way identity is achieved, through trial and error, through moments 
of racial identity crisis and performance of the racial self (Renn 2012, p. 16). It should also 
be noted that the majority of studies on identity development theories in Psychology were 
carried out mostly by White researchers, mostly with White children (ibid.). 
Identity development theories have also been designed by Sociology. In the 
pioneering book The Civilizing Process (1994 [1939]) Norbert Elias, a German Jewish 
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sociologist, conceptualised the social habitus (Pierre Bourdieu based a lot of his work on 
habitus on Elias). As already briefly mentioned in the introduction, Elias conceptualised 
social habitus as habits of thinking, feeling and acting that is shared amongst people within 
the same plexus of interdependencies (figuration) (Elias 1994). The personal habitus the 
sociologist conceptualised as the subject developing its personality from the social habitus 
(ibid). The social habitus informs the personal habitus, but the personal habitus also informs 
the social habitus. Elias conceptualised them as reciprocal and not unilateral (Elias 2006, p. 
322). Translating Elias’ notion of identity development (or habitualisation) to the context of 
racial identity development, racialisation could then be conceptualised as the lifelong 
process of creating a racial psyche, as an underlying process in the long-term development 
of creating a racialised society and vice versa. 
Social psychology also contributed to models of racial identity development. Some 
of these theories are based on the notion of a relation between want and knowing, meaning 
that the future a subject imagines for itself can be either informed by what the subject wants 
to become or what the subject wants to avoid turning into (Markus & Nurius 1986). 
Translating the concept of possible selves to racial identity development, highlights the 
knowledge of racial identity narratives the subject is aware of and which ones it is trying to 
emulate or trying to prevent itself from becoming (Renn 2012, p. 18). Another social 
psychological theory of identity development, such as the Human or Developmental 
Ecology theory (Bronfenbrenner 1979), centres the subject around varying processes and a 
range of different systems the subject interacts with or which influence its life, depending 
on their proximity or lack thereof (Kail & Cavanaugh 2010). These systems can be the family 
or school system, media or political systems, or culture and other meta-narratives (ibid.). 
Translating these social psychological models (for example the PPCT model, which stands 
for Process, Person, Context and Time) to racialisation can also help in examining how two 
similarly racialised people develop different narratives of the self (Renn 2012, p. 20). 
 In this thesis poststructuralist theories of subjectivity (for example from Derrida or 
Foucault) are key. Similar to social psychology, poststructuralists highlight process and 
believe that identity is not fixed or essential (Renn 2012, p. 22, Gergen 1991). 
Poststructuralism conceptualises identities as socially constructed, in constant flux, 
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deconstructed and reconstructed (ibid.). Theorists of poststructuralist thought reject the 
notion of an objective or universal truth and argue that many social constructs that are 
assumed to be natural can be genealogically traced back through history and culture, 
sometimes even to their origins (Sullivan 2003, p. 39). Feminists, but also Critical »Race« 
theorists, conceptualise Gender and »Race« as a »complex matrix of discourses« that 
naturalises and normalises the ways we relate and interact with each other through those 
social constructs (ibid.). 
Though this thesis concentrates on the subject of racialisation, critical social scholars 
assume that racial subjectivation cannot be seen as independent from other forms of 
subjectivation (Holvino 2012). In particular, transnational feminists argue that a subject is 
simultaneously affected by being raced, gendered, classed, sexed, nationalised and 
positioned in society (Holvino 2012, p. 166). Furthermore, the transnational feminist 
conceptualisation of subjectivation highlights the relationality of socially constructed 
differences, wherein the subject is assembled relationally (Holvino 2012, p. 167). What White 
and BIPOC means is temporally and locally dependent (ibid.). Additionally, White and 
BIPOC are entangled in a mutual dependency, one cannot exist without the other and needs 
the other in order to distinguish itself from it (ibid.). The meaning these distinctions of 
culture, gender and »Race« are given, are shaped by language, paradigms and institutions 
of that society, and vary from the social contexts and norms the subject is imprinted with 
(Holvino 2012, pp. 167-168). Another aspect of feminist transnationalist and 
poststructuralist conceptualisation of the subject relevant to this thesis is the rejection of an 
essential human self that remains unaffected by racialisation or being gendered (Holvino 
2012, p. 168). An immaculate state of the subject does not exist; the subject does not become 
polluted through racial, class, gender (etc.) bias in society (ibid.). Subjects actively engage 
with the social material they are given by society and weave this material into their 
subjectivity. Thereby, the structures that form a society entail racial and gender paradigms, 
become reflected in the subject, and therewith become racial and gender paradigms integral 
to its subjectivity (ibid.). The concept of power and racialisation used by poststructuralist 




 This thesis argues, that the psyches of racial subjectivities store, mirror, retrieve but 
also shape racial material from and within racial structures in society, therefore, an Eliasian 
approach towards racial identity development seemed sensible. Elias conceptualises 
childhood as a phase in which a person is imprinted with the societal standards of conduct 
so deeply that they become »second nature« to that person (Elias 2000, p. 441). The social 
institutions and structures which keep this second nature alive can be genealogically traced 
through Western history, including the standards of conduct that developed in its process 
and the powers of integration, which changed and spread these standards (ibid.). In 
Western societies it is very common to assume that a person’s behaviour is based on logic 
and rational decisions, but Elias contradicts these assumptions (ibid.). The sociologist states 
that a person’s behaviour and psyche is multidimensional and that emotions, affects and 
ego functions are just as relevant in explaining a person’s behaviour as logic and rationality 
(ibid.). 
One of the objectives of this research project is to investigate how this second nature, 
this imprint of racial standards of conduct, is experienced and described by anti-racism and 
empowerment professionals. Elias' theories are pivotal in investigating where a racialised 
subject consequently builds and upholds racialised structures and embodies them. This 
embodiment and upholding of »Race« sometimes is a conscious, intentional and rational 
act, but mostly it is unconscious, unintentional and motivated by emotions and affects, as I 
contend in my research project (Dalal 2002). One of the main tools in investigating group 
processes is the concept of the group matrix (Foulkes 1973), which can be depicted as a field. 
The group exists and acts in this field, which is intersubjective and creates an interrelated 
and unconscious »field effect« (Foulkes and Anthony 2003, p. 26). Subjects connected to this 
field effect, meet, convey and cooperate in this matrix (Kinouani 2019, p. 64). Some 
psychologists have applied the concept of the Foulkesian group matrix to racialisation and 
Whiteness (Kinouani 2019). »Race« or Whiteness then become a variable in the analysis of a 
groups’ dynamic and it can support social researchers in better grasping the reproduction 
of these variables in the group matrix (Kinouani 2019, p. 66). The matrix has many layers. 
Firstly, the personal layer; secondly the layer in which persons interact with each other; 
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thirdly, the layer in which culture, economics, biology and society convey; and fourthly, the 
layer of the social unconscious, in which symbols and their history meet (ibid.). 
 Many scholars in Germany outside of Critical Whiteness and Critical »Race« theory 
would probably reject the notion that racism is endemic to German culture (Schwarzbach-
Apithy 2005; Arndt 2005). Nevertheless, how do we then explain that German society is 
indeed structured through racism and the persistence of these structures? Dalal uses in his 
book Race, Colour and the Process of Racialization (2002) theories from group analysis, 
psychoanalysis and sociology to explore his answer to this question in a British context. 
Dalal’s main argument and conclusion is that the structures of society are reflected in the 
structures of the psyche (Dalal 2002, p. 7). If society is colour-coded, then so will the psyche 
be, and vice versa (ibid.). Influenced very much by Eliasian analysis, Dalal explores the 
history and semantics of the terms Black and White in the British context (Dalal 2002, pp. 
135-136). Dalal shows how the use of such terms signify power relationships within society 
at large (ibid.). Fundamental to my thesis, Dalal’s work forces us to address racism on two 
interrelated fronts: on the front of political structures and on the psychic front. In my study 
of how racialisation (or racial subjectivation) constitutes the internalisation of society’s values 
and norms related to »Race« in the process of racial subject development, I explore precisely 
how in order for policies to make »common sense« and therefore see implementation, 
psychic change can occur on a social level. In this way the psyche becomes an internal social 
structure. The semantics and historical use of racialised terms show clearly how structures 
relate to psyches. Where a racialised psyche automatically constructs a racialised society 
with racialised bodies (to a certain extent without even being aware of it), as I argue in my 
thesis, Dalal’s notion of the matrix (in reference to Foulkes 1973) describes and categorises 
the complex unconscious social and psychological processes and forces that organise these 
group psyches. Even if someone does not believe in the existence of »Races« as such, this 
person unconsciously thinks and acts according to racial formations in society, as if looking 
through racialised glasses without necessarily knowing it (Kteily & Richeson 2016). 
 Narratives of »Race« are told and then often forgotten but linger beneath the subject’s 
cognitive and emotional surface. Narratives of »Race« affect how the subject understands 
its racial self and how it relates to the racial Other. Dalal’s work is also crucial to my 
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understanding of empowerment as a process of the psyche gaining awareness of the racial 
power structures that shape it. Only through understanding the unconscious forces at work, 
can we begin to imagine how we might allow for or bring about change. Dalal uses the 
analogy of excavating the layers of racial subjectivation similar to an archaeologist (Dalal 
2002, p. 221), an analogy that also describes the processes the research participants share 
about their racialisation and their training experiences. However, the process of excavating 




Remembering Narratives of »Race« 
 
In order for the subject to negotiate narratives (Plummer 2019, p. 76) of »Race«, the subject 
needs to remember or be aware of them in order to address these narratives. Some 
anthropologists highlight the relevance of power in conceptualising collective memories in 
Western civilisations as well as civilisations of the Global South (Trouillot 1995). In reference 
to these theorists, it could be argued that historicity finds itself in the predicament of either 
being understood as objective or as subjective, the first scientifically attempting to discover 
the truth (positivist), the second narratively assembling truths (constructivist) (Trouillot 
1995, pp. 4-6). Most likely, the »truth«, whatever that might be, can be discovered 
somewhere in the middle (ibid.). This wrestling between objective and subjective truths 
makes the entire notion of recollecting memories, individual and especially collective ones, 
very difficult. In the event that collective recollections of racial subjectivation are 
exceptionally subjective, how might we assume they are true? The anti-racism and 
empowerment training of Phoenix, which I use as a case study in this research project, tries 
to create a safe space in which racial subjectivation can be explored and made more aware 
of (Engelmann 2019, pp. 102-112). This thesis addresses the question about historicity as part 
of a research project, which heavily relies on the research participants’ subjective narratives, 
by giving as much historical context about the formations of these narratives as possible. 
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 It is not only narratives that matter in the production of history, but silences matter 
just as much in historicity (Trouillot 1995, p. 26). The historiography of the Global North 
ignored the historicity of the Global South in order to construct itself as superior and the 
racial Other as subhuman (Trouillot 1995, pp. 95-107). Humanness was viewed (and is 
partially still viewed) along a linear process of evolution with White, Western European 
men exemplifying the epitome, Black Africans as the antithesis of it, and the rest in a random 
middle (Trouillot 1995, p. 76). This racialised random Other, which is neither White 
European nor Black African has often been complicit in silencing the histories of Black 
African figures (Trouillot 1995, p. 68) or of shadeism or colourism, a form of discrimination 
amongst BIPOC preferencing lighter skin tones to darker ones (Musafiri 2019, Tate 2007). 
Anti-racism and empowerment movements that attempt to construct an agreeable racial 
history for unity’s sake could land in the pitfall of ignoring histories of shadeism. 
Unfortunately, researching this particular subject of attempted racial harmony by denying 
discriminatory practice amongst BIPOC goes beyond the scope of this PhD. 
 Nevertheless, some historians and anthropologists argue that remembering is not as 
straightforward as it is assumed, that it is not always about accurate memories of things that 
happened in the past (Trouillot 1995, p. 14). Remembering is not returning to the 
permanence of the past (ibid.). The past simply is a location interdependent to the present, 
it is not composed of anything that can be retrieved in a memory (ibid.). This 
conceptualisation of memory could be potentially challenging to the idea of returning to our 
past of racialisation and gaining awareness as a form of deconstruction as is attempted 
within the training used as a case study in this research project. How can we increase our 
awareness without memorising our personal racial subjectivation? Within this context it 
would be necessary to look further into concepts of memory and remembering. 
 Other anthropologists provide very helpful theories of memory that relate directly to 
my understanding of empowerment (Connerton 2004, 2009). Empowerment and memory, 
particularly social memory, are closely linked to each other. One of my main arguments is 
that racialisation or being subjected to racial (power) structures constitute painful memories 
of dehumanisation. Empowerment begins with confronting these painful memories, 
understanding and analysing them, and working through the pain and grief they caused, 
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in order to understand and change one’s own behaviour. This behavioural understanding 
and change of painful racial memories in turn promotes the deconstruction of racial power 
structures. Psychologists conclude about manifestations of suffering and trauma that such 
»phenomena can be traced back to incompletely suppressed psychic material, which, although pushed 
away by the consciousness, has nevertheless not been robbed of all capacity for expressing itself« 
(Freud 1975, p. 344). The British anthropologist Paul Connerton relates the pervasiveness 
and persistence of master-narratives (such as racism) to the assumption that all great meta-
narratives have ended as they move on to become unconscious collective memories 
(Connerton 2004, p. 1) that are still influencing our behaviour. Additionally, Connerton 
concludes that the more these racial memories are rejected, which is significantly the case in 
Germany (Volkan et Al. 2002), »the greater the dependence on the past« (Connerton 2004, p. 61). 
Thereby, forgetting becomes very much a part of racial subjectivation, in particular if they 
are memories connected to a shameful past (Connerton 2008). Those memories in Western 
cultures, in particular memories of being colonised themselves, become repressed and 
erased and make their re-enactment possible (Connerton 2008, p. 60). Applying this 
conceptualisation of (remembering and) forgetting to racialisation, it could be argued that 
White people have forgotten their own histories of dehumanisation and re-enact this 
shameful past by dehumanising the racial Other, turning forgetting into a silencing of a 
shameful past (Connerton 2008, pp. 68-69). Some White subjects in particular, so this thesis 
argues, experience their personal initiation during childhood into a racial culture with 
Whiteness at centre as shameful, an experience which has caused suffering in them. 
 Therewith, empowerment and memory, in particular social memory, are closely 
linked. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that racialisation or being subjected to 
racial (power) structures constitutes painful memories that act very similar to trauma. While 
the memories themselves are not trauma they are still a form of suffering. What is the 
difference between trauma and suffering? The two are not easily distinguished from each 
other, nevertheless, so I would argue, (clinical) trauma threatens a person’s subjectivity 
(Caruth 1996, pp. 91-92)25, suffering is simply a reaction to the certain memories of cultural 
imprinting that constitute the subject. Post-modernist theorists like to see post-modernity 
 
25 Though there is also the subject formation through trauma (Cash 2011, pp. 23-24). 
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as the end of all -isms: the end of communism, the end of religions, the end of sexism, 
colonialism, racism, and so on. They proclaim that all great master-narratives have come to 
an end (Connerton 2004, p. 1). In fact, Connerton relates the pervasiveness and persistence 
of these master-narratives to the assumption that all great meta-narratives have ended as 
they move on to become unconscious collective memories (ibid.) that are still influencing 
our behaviour. In other words, the majority of people who believe that there is no racism in 
Germany (or that it only exists at the margins of society), or that racism in Germany has 
ended are still acting in accordance with their unconscious collective (painful) memories of 
racialisation and are therefore unconsciously reproducing racial power structures. 
Connerton concludes »that our experiences of the present largely depend upon our knowledge of 
the past, and that our images of the past commonly serve to legitimate a present social order« 
(Connerton 2004, p. 3). 
 Connerton’s book takes an interesting turn in asking where social memory is located. 
He relates social memory to commemorative ceremonies, to performativity, to habit and 
bodily automatisms (Connerton 2004, p. 5). Within this context, Connerton differentiates 
between personal memory (personal life history), cognitive memory (something cognitively 
appropriated in the past), and habit-memory (a lesson so thoroughly learned that we have 
often forgotten the moment of learning. Exercising it is less cognitive, i.e., reading which is 
a bodily automatism). He describes the latter as being often neglected in modern social 
theory and philosophy as less of a memory (Connerton 2004, pp. 21-23). Connerton’s notion 
of habit-memory and its relation to bodily automatisms reflects Elias’ conceptualisation of 
embodiment, the embodiment of mental and emotional structures in the subject (Elias 1994, 
p. 49), but also of racialised mental and emotional structures passed on and disseminated to 
the future generations. Racialisation is passed from generation to generation on an 
unconscious level, with children very receptive to registering and imitating non-verbal 
communication, such as facial expressions and body language (Meulenbelt 1988, pp. 175-
176). In other words, racism is not dependent on the explicit verbal articulation of imagined 
White supremacy or Black inferiority. Children read the unconscious language of adults and 
learn to understand that such a thing as ›BIPOC‹ exists and that this is something negative 
while ›White‹ is something positive (Troyna & Hatcher 1992, p. 20). These racial memories 
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become inscribed into the racialised bodies that help to reproduce the racial social order of 
societies. 
 However, as Frigga Haug states in Erinnerungsarbeit [Memory Work] (1990): 
 
»Memory work is among other things based on the assumption that the personality has a memory. By this I mean 
that the individual people build their personalities in the course of their history in such a way that a kind of coherent 
identity is created for them. To do this, they select the single events from the abundance of what they have 
experienced, assess it as meaningful, suppress and forget other things. This process is not as voluntary and 
arbitrary as it sounds here. In the existing structures there are suggestions, obstacles, impossibilities that favour 
this selection« (Haug 1990, p. 42). 
 
 
Negotiating Racial Narratives 
 
In Michel Foucault’s analysis of formative discourses and structures on the subject, 
subjectivity and subjection, the philosopher states that »power is exercised through networks, 
and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks, and they are in a position to both submit 
to and exercise this power« (Foucault 2003, p. 29). As Avtar Brah writes, however, Foucault 
»does not acknowledge that submission to power or effects of its exercise cannot be reduced exclusively 
to conscious procedures. The discursive subject is »hailed« not only by the social but also by the 
psychic« (Brah 2005, p. 83). Although Foucault rarely spoke about »Race« as such, his 
discourse analysis proved essential in Critical »Race« studies. With their examination of the 
dynamics of subjectivity and structure, these authors are essential to the analysis of agency 
within racially structured spaces in this thesis.  
 In Nikolas Rose’s work Governing the Soul (1999), which is a contribution to the 
genealogies of subjectivity, the author argues that over the last century the psychologisation 
of the public sphere has been key in creating governable spaces and subjects. Even though 
social critics viewed psychological knowledge and techniques in favour of power relations, 
Rose argues that they also forged »new alignments between the rationales and techniques of power 
and the values and ethics of democratic societies« (Rose 1999, p. 4). Rose describes how through 
continuous socio-psychological research of workplaces in 1947 a training group was 
established that would analyse group dynamics, intersubjectivity and highlight the 
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importance of »insight« to train leaders tackling racial and religious prejudice26 (Rose 1999, 
p. 101). 
 It could therefore be argued that the lack of insight (into racial subjectivation) could 
lead to a re-production of (violent) racialisation processes. In Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern (The 
Inability to Mourn) Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich (2015 [1967]) describe the socio-
psychological environment that led to the NS atrocities. The psychologists further theorise 
that after World War II Germany was unable to collectively start the necessary mourning 
work, which would have helped to overcome its terrible past (Mitscherlich 2015, p. 24). The 
authors conclude that the Freudian maxim of »remembering, repeating and working through« 
is the essential step in this process (ibid.). Mitscherlich wrote: »That is why the repetition of 
internal conflicts and critical thinking through are necessary, in order to overcome instinctive and 
unconscious operating powers of self-protection such as forgetting, denial and projection or similar 
defence mechanisms« [my own translation] (Mitscherlich 2015, p. 24). The Mitscherlich’s work 
gives compelling accounts of why present Germany may be revisiting aspects of a racial 
ideology, which was thought to be widely dismissed in Europe. The defence mechanisms 
Mitscherlich describes stand in the way of necessary insight needed to get in touch with 
ourselves (Mitscherlich 2015, p. 9). In Der Fremde in uns (The Stranger Within Us) (2000) 
psychologist Arno Gruen considers self-estrangement as a loss of a person’s relation to 
themself and therefore also to others. In this spirit, I consider how »Othering« could be 
understood as a form of alienation or dehumanisation. In relation to the notion of empathy, 
I explore how the inner construction of the Other leads to a loss of communication with the 
self and in turn also with others. In relating Gruen’s theories to racialisation, the 
psychologist’s research becomes intrinsic to my theorisation on how empathy, the inner and 
outer communication, is blocked by primordial notions of racial identity construction, by 
dominant narratives of »Race«. 
How can the racialised subject be supported in beginning to negotiate these 
dominant narratives of »Race«? Racism awareness training (RAT) and its practitioners 
claimed that their work aimed to make the participants more aware of the dominant 
narratives of »Race«. In the late 1980s RAT was heavily criticised in the UK and widely 
 
26 This ›training group‹ could possibly be considered the archetype of empowerment or racism awareness training. 
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abandoned by anti-racism activism in this process. The most outspoken critics of RAT were 
Ahmed Gurnah (1987) and A. Sivanandan (1987). The authors’ main concerns about RAT 
were that, firstly, they were too confrontational and guilt inducing. Secondly, they were 
alarmed by the fact that RAT limited furthermore the scarce resources available to 
supporting BIPOC Communities. It was argued that RAT was being wrongly used as the 
most important panacea for discrimination in society. Thirdly, they strongly disapproved 
of abandoning the structural approach to tackling racism in society in favour of dealing with 
it on an individual level. Fourthly, they were greatly concerned about the commercialisation 
of anti-racism through RAT. Finally, they argued that its practitioners turned RAT into 
»psychospiritual mumbojumbo«, a liberal moral dilemma based on the notion of essential 
humanness (LSPU 1987). 
 More recent criticism of anti-racism training comes from the US by Elisabeth Lasch-
Quinn. In her book Race Experts (2001), the author argues that the efforts and successes of 
the civil rights movement were hijacked and diminished by racial etiquette and sensitivity 
therapists (Lasch-Quinn 2001, p. XIV). The author further states that training methods that 
resembled Alcoholics Anonymous simply exposed White guilt and Black anger, which 
failed to address the root causes of racism (ibid.). With the emergence of a commercialised 
diversity industry, its pseudo-scientific »Race« experts and their ineffective methods 
undermined the attempts of the civil rights movement to create »a democratic nation able to 
transcend racial and other cleavages; a revived civic culture; and a truly humane social order« 
(Lasch-Quinn 2001, p. XII). 
One of the most recent developments is the unconscious bias training in the UK. The 
unconscious bias training is based on IAT (implicit association tests), which were developed 
in the US. IAT indicate that people can be biased against certain groups even if they do not 
want to be prejudiced against that group or even if they are part of that group themselves 
(ECU 2013, p.15; Greenwald and Banaji 1995). The research also highlights that unconscious 
bias has consequences on, for example, recruitment processes and therefore on the 
structural composition of organisations and institutions, favouring mostly White males 
(ibid.). Some elements of this research emphasise that racism or racial discrimination are not 
necessarily a conscious or intentional phenomenon but that they can be reproduced even by 
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people who consider themselves liberal, enlightened, maybe even anti-racist (ibid.). 
However, there are some issues regarding the explanations of these unconscious biases. 
Within the wide literature on unconscious biases, mostly neurological causes are evoked for 
biased behaviour, as in »we discriminate because that is how our brain functions« (ECU 2013, 
p.18; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Thereby, discrimination becomes a biological, behaviouristic 
problem and not necessarily a social or cultural one (Kahn 2018). Some of the large US-tech 
companies, such as Google (2013) and Microsoft (2015) have developed Unconscious Bias 
Training (UBT), based on implicit bias tests. Some UBT seem to have no intention to look 
into the racialised, cultural imagery and children’s early subjection to those racialised 
discourses that could be the root cause for racism and racial discrimination and mostly 
revolves around unconscious bias (Atewologun et Al. 2018, p. 6). Therefore, the responses 
given to these unconscious biases are mostly about conditioning the brain of the person 
harbouring them, similar to behavioural therapy (ECU 2013, pp. 44-49; Olson and Fazio 
2001, 2002, 2006; Ito et al. 2006; Kawakami et al. 2007), which may have some short-term 
effects, however, long-term effectiveness of such implicit bias interventions still remain to 
be researched. More importantly however, such an intervention which is solely based on 
changing what a person associates with certain groups does not necessarily address the 
source of racism. There is no element of memory work in it, no critical searching and 
examining of our culture and its racial imagery which brings forth a racial power hierarchy 
internalised from the early stages of our life. Where is the critical reflection on dominant 
narratives of »Race« that have sedimented in the self? And how can subjects be empowered 
to negotiate or maybe even counter the dominant narratives of »Race« in the self and in 
society? 
 Similar to the term RAT, »empowerment« has become a somewhat contested term in 
the UK. The term empowerment has been widely mainstreamed in the UK through its 
appropriation by business language and neo-liberal discourse, which often misused it as a 
notion to evade government responsibility in resolving issues by placing it on individuals 
(Wilson 2007). In Germany the concept of empowerment is rather new and therefore does 
not have the same discursive implications as in the UK. In this thesis empowerment is 
understood as overcoming processes of racialisation, gaining awareness about racialisation 
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and the ability to act accordingly. Here empowerment means partially overcoming the 
suffering that comes with racial subjection. 
 This thesis considers the construction of the racialised self but also of the racial Other 
as a historically grounded, centuries long process experienced individually and collectively 
through racial subjectivation (starting from birth). In their essay Some Components of the 
Western Dualist Tradition (1975) John L. Hodge and Donald K. Struckmann create a historical 
genealogy of dualisms and binary oppositions within Western thinking, starting with the 
antic Greek philosophical tradition of Plato and highlighting the historical continuities of 
thinkers and theoreticians such as St. Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Descartes and Freud 
(Hodge et. al. 1975, pp. 123-195). Through analysing the Judeo-Christian colour mysticism 
of light/dark symbolising good/evil, and at a later stage signifying White/Black, 
civilised/uncivilised, the authors create a historical trace that highlights the significant 
dependency of White identities (particularly within the colonial setting) on defining and 
constructing the Other in order to define the White self (Trost 1975, pp. 81-82). The authors 
reject the notion of a natural development of racial hierarchies and see rather that the racial 
imperial project is motivated and acted through culture (ibid.). Additionally, the authors 
use examples from Native Americans and other cultures to highlight the many different 
types of cultures and to illustrate that Western culture is (socially) constructed like any other 
culture and not naturally evolved (Hodge 1975, pp. 20-43). Even though there is a slight 
danger of romanticising Native American cultures (a point partially acknowledged by the 
authors), these examples have the important function of showing that cultures (and the 
power structures therein) are not essential and that they have the potential to change. 
 Critics of empowerment explore the pervasiveness of power structures and critically 
examine the appropriation of the term ›agency‹ within neo-liberal settings (Wilson 2007). 
The »internalising the external/externalising the internal«-dichotomy of agency has been used 
by neo-liberal stakeholders to redefine empowerment as a means to bolster the effects of 
neo-liberal restructuring rather than promoting sustainable change, liberation or 
transformation of those who do not benefit from the power structures (Wilson 2007, pp. 136-
140). This critique is relevant to this study, as it examines the research participants’ 
narratives of their first training experience and explores whether these training contribute 
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to critical reflexivity that might result in structural change or whether they simply create the 
conditions for people to survive (but not necessarily change) the conditions they experience. 
 This critique highlights how the concept of empowerment is currently very much 
contested. There is a general understanding of empowerment as »a way of increasing the 
political, social, economic and spiritual strength of communities or a person, generally of those people 
who are structurally disadvantaged through social constructs such as »Race«, (cis-)gender, sexuality, 
class, disability, age etc.« (Hamaz & Ergün-Hamaz 2013, p. 7). What this strengthening looks 
like in detail is left open in this definition. As an idea, empowerment found its way into 
neoliberal discourses and in these contexts, it is mostly understood as a process that helps 
individuals to better exploit themselves within a capitalist society (Wilson 2007). To define 
empowerment as a means to cushion the ramifications of neo-liberal restructuring rather 
than actually changing or liberating those who are disadvantaged from the power structures 
(Wilson 2007 pp. 136-140), does not challenge dominant narratives. In her essay »Beyond 
›Empowerment Lite‹: Women’s Empowerment, Neoliberal Development and Global 
Justice« (2018) Andrea Cornwell also distinguishes between »liberal empowerment« and 
»liberating empowerment«, the former mainly aiming at improved neo-liberal self-
exploitation, the latter at challenging societal power structures (Cornwall 2018, p. 7). I am 
contesting this neo-liberal understanding of empowerment in this thesis and attempting to 
conceptualise it closer to a process of regaining self-determination, which obviously implies 
that self-determination has been lost and can be regained. Empowerment seems to begin 
from a point of lack or loss. However, this thesis mainly touches upon the subject of »Race« 
or racialisation to be more precise. Empowerment will be understood as overcoming the 
processes of racialisation, as a form of de-racialisation. De-racialisation also strongly 
resonates with the term decolonisation. Although decolonisation is mainly understood as a 
historical and political project of attempting to liberate a country or a nation from Western 
domination, decoloniality describes the attempt at liberating regions, people or individuals 
from the dominant Western epistemology (Mignolo 2011). Therefore, the concept of 
empowerment is also closely linked to the concept of decoloniality, which shall be more 
closely examined in the final part of this chapter.  
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Walter Mignolo, in reference to Anibal Quijano (2007), argues that modernity is a 
crucial element in the colonial matrix of power (Mignolo 2011, p. xviii). In light of 
decoloniality, empowerment could be considered a process of liberation by questioning the 
rationales behind modernity such as progress, development and growth, which are 
fundamental features of the colonial matrix of power (Mignolo 2011, p. xviii). What does 
this empowerment, which would free us from the toxic elements of Western culture, look 
like? Maryam Mohseni argues in her comprehensive book Empowerment Workshop für 
Menschen mit Rassismuserfahrungen [Empowerment workshops for people who experience racism] 
(2020) »I understand empowerment as an approach, that aims at expanding the access to power and 
thereby also the possibilities of oppressed groups – on the basis of self-definition and self-
determination« [my own translation], (Mohseni 2020, p. 132). The term »empowerment« will 
simply remain empty if it cannot contribute to re-negotiating or countering dominant racial 
narratives and to re-constructing a humanness denied in those narratives. 
 However, anti-racism and empowerment training are also part of a larger dominant 
narrative, the narrative of governmentality. Governmentality as a concept goes back to 
Foucault (2007), which he described it as the »conduct of conducts« (Foucault 2007), and which 
could also be described as the »Western liberal advanced state subtle way of controlling its citizens 
through a set of empowering techniques like autonomy, self-actualization, self-realization, and self-
esteem« (Madsen 2014, p. 814). Foucault defined governmentality as: 
 
»First, by ›governmentality‹ I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that 
has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as 
its essential technical instrument.  
Second, by ›governmentality‹ I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and 
throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, 
discipline, and so on - of the type of power that we can call ›government‹ and which has led to the development 
of a series of specific governmental apparatuses on the one hand [and, on the other] to the development of a 
series of knowledges.  
Finally, by ›governmentality‹ I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process 
by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries and was gradually ›governmentalized‹« (Foucault, 2007, pp. 108–109).  
 
By critically examining the research participants’ voices through the work of Rose (1996, 
1999) the fifth chapter questions whether the training experience fits into a capitalistic 
understanding of governing and exploiting the subject, of liberal empowerment, to simply 
function within the given structures but not question them. Or is there the possibility for the 
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racialised subject, through training, to remember and grieve the painful racialisation process 
and thereby partially liberate themselves from their racial subjectivation and from dominant 
narratives of »Race«? 
 
 
Between reformist and counter-narratives of »Race« and humanness 
 
Learning is not only a rational or cognitive process (Besand 2014). Cognitively 
understanding Critical »Race« theory does not mean a person understands what it actually 
means to be a racial subject and to be part of racialised structures in society. Politische 
Bildungsarbeit or political education – particularly in Germany – is obligated to be debated 
in a solely rational manner (ibid.). In Empowerment-Workshops für Menschen mit 
Rassismuserfahrungen (2020) Mohseni states: 
 
»- Emotions structure points of access and exit of how the world is discovered and perceived 
- The complexity of political phenomena forces didactically, next to cognitive oriented knowledge transfer of 
facts, to also create emotional accesses to the subject 
- Taking emotions seriously in processes of learning, does not mean that reflection and assessment are 
relinquished. On the contrary, through the removal of taboo of the emotional dimension in political and 
societal discourses, emotions become systematically accessible through reflection 
- In particular for target audiences that experience discrimination, the examination of feelings of marginalisation 
and exclusion is necessary« [my own translation] (Mohseni 2020, p. 439) 
 
What role does cognitive and emotional learning about personal racialisation processes play 
for the racialised subject? Rationality is part of the Western project of modernity (Federici 
2004). In Enlightenment thought emotionality was forced upon the female or the racial 
Other (ibid.). I emphasise: I am not arguing that we should leave all thinking behind and 
just focus on our feelings. However, Mohseni makes a useful point for my argument. 
Examining how a person feels about political discourses and how that person is personally 
affected by these discourses is a way of unmaking some of the taboos that accompany these 
discourses (Rühlmann & McMonagle 2019). The individual psychogenesis of Whiteness can 
be accompanied by strong feelings of guilt and shame (Thandeka 1999). So how can a solely 
rational debate about Whiteness allow a White person to overcome these feelings, especially 
if they are not allowed to feel them? How can they fully grasp the concept of Whiteness in 
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its many facets if their personal experience of becoming White or internalising Whiteness 
and the suffering it has caused them, is not allowed to come to the surface? I argue that 
emotional learning is an important element of not only transforming within the system, but 
also challenging and arguing against dominant narratives of »Race«. 
Dehumanisation is a fundamental part of prevalent racial narratives and racialisation 
processes visible in the practice of »Othering« and dehumanisation (Ahmed 2006, pp. 138-
139; Weheliye 2014, pp. 5-6). Within a multicultural setting, mechanisms of »Othering« have 
implications for recognition and mis-recognition (Ahmed 2000, p. 97). The Anglo-Canadian 
philosopher Charles Taylor argues that recognition of the various ethnic, cultural and 
religious groups is crucial in the politics of multiculturalism as identities are partly shaped 
through recognition (Taylor 1994, pp. 25-26). Taylor has become an important figure in 
discourse on multiculturalism. With his essay Multiculturalism: Politics of Recognition (1994) 
and commentary on this essay by prominent figures such as Jürgen Habermas and K. 
Anthony Appiah, Taylor has made influential contributions to the multicultural debate in 
Canada and beyond. Taylor’s essay raises important questions on the recognition of 
difference, identity and universal values in liberal and increasingly multicultural societies 
(ibid.). Taylor argues that recognition of the various ethnic, cultural and religious groups is 
crucial in the politics of multiculturalism as identities are partly shaped through recognition 
or mis-recognition (ibid.). The philosopher states that mis-recognition leads to oppression 
of those mis-recognised (ibid.). Additionally, Taylor argues that those mis-recognised also 
internalise this mis-recognition, thus if socio-political structures change the mis-recognised 
are unable to adapt to these changes (ibid.). Overcoming this self-mis-recognition – the 
internalised low self-esteem – is the first, most important, step for oppressed groups 
towards empowerment (Taylor 1994, pp. 25-26). 
Taylor’s argument resonates strongly with my argument that the denial of 
humanness within constructions of self leads to a denial of humanness of those constructed 
as the (racial) Other. However, Taylor’s concept of recognition remains a passive concept as 
racialised »Others« seek the recognition which is then granted by the dominant culture. I 
would extend the notion of recognition further: in Precarious Life (2004) Judith Butler 
explores how those gaining the power of self-representation are most likely to be recognised 
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as humans (Butler 2004, p. 141). In this line of thought my thesis understands self-
representation as an active form of empowerment for BIPOC. The power to represent 
themselves (in media, government, etc.), to tell their own story, could potentially ensure the 
revision of dominant narratives of the dehumanised racial Other and could also implicitly 
change modes of self-perception and self-definition. In other words, this could mean 
stepping out of the vicious dynamic of symbolic and experienced dehumanisation. 
 Taylor also examines modern identity constructions (in reference to Herder) in terms 
of »authenticity« or being in touch with the true self (Taylor 1994, pp. 30-31). To a certain 
extent this also resonates with my concept of humanness: only those who are in touch with 
their humanness within themselves are able to relate to others as humans. However, it is 
not only about defining the self solely from within (although Taylor’s emphasis on 
communitarianism also highlights the social constructedness of subject identities), but it is 
also about the how the self is defined: whether subjectivity is created by negation and 
dependency (I am me because you are you and you are you because I am me) or through 
affirmation and interdependency (I am me because I am me and you are you because you 
are you). 
 In relation to this authenticity, Taylor looks into the implications of multiculturalism 
and recognition within liberal societies. One fundamental principle of human equality, so 
the author argues, is that all cultures are valued equally, and that the denial of this value is 
also the denial of human equality (Taylor 1994, p. 42). Nevertheless, the danger of equal 
dignity liberalism is that it turns into another form of imposing a dominant culture onto 
certain racial groups: »The liberalism of equal dignity seems to have to assume that there are some 
universal, difference blind principles. Even though we may not have defined them yet, the project of 
defining them remains alive and essential« (Taylor 1994, p. 43-44). My research project, which 
explores new forms of humanism, also highlights the process, the negotiation of universal 
humanist values. What Taylor does not emphasise, however, is the precise role power plays 
within this dialogue. Should those constructed as White people and those constructed as 
BIPOC not stand on equal footing in order to avoid a colonial monologue? How can this 
space be created, where White people and BIPOC can engage in dialogical negotiations? 
Within Phoenix, the anti-racism NGO I use as a case study in this research project, this 
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dialogical (multi-racial) space is shaped by the »BIPOC Paradigm«. The »BIPOC Paradigm« 
centres the experiences of BIPOC in reflections of how new subject identities can create 
paths of self-definition without compromising the human self. This is not a reversal of 
racism with BIPOC on top and White at the bottom. The painful racialisation experiences of 
those who are constructed as White are equally valid. By centring the reflections of BIPOC, 
the denial of humanness that has occurred in constructions of White selves comes to light, 
and those who are disadvantaged by racial power structures become guarantors of inclusive 
notions of humanness within new forms of humanism27. 
 Certain gaps in Taylor’s elaboration of multiculturalism and his politics of 
recognition could be elaborated upon. His criticism of post-structuralist theories seems to 
render issues of power rather marginal, whilst post-structuralists’ analysis of (racial) power 
structures is rather crucial to my work as it exposes the discursive power that brings those 
structures into place. This seems to coincide with Taylor’s missing oversight of the concept 
of Whiteness and the effects that mis-recognition has on dominant subject identities. 
Besides, while Taylor calls for a »fusion of horizons«, a resetting of defining cultural 
standards, within comparative cultural studies, the Canadian philosopher is also aware of 
the tension between liberalism and those groups who seem to reject secularism (Taylor 1994, 
pp. 62, 67). For Taylor, multiculturalism has to be essentially secular28. However, following 
my reading of Talal Asad’s Formations of the Secular and his analysis of religious-ethnic 
violence in secular states, I have come to question the notion that secularism in practice is a 
total guarantor for protecting religious and ethnic groups within multi-confessional 
settings. Space must be allowed for the addressing of racialised subjectivation processes. 
How far this is possible within a purist secular setting is debatable. 
 In the very centre of my notion of empowerment stands the retrieving and addressing 
of mostly painful memories related to racial subjectivation. The importance of this retrieving 
lies in its capacity to allow for the deconstruction of socio-psychological structures 
 
27 This works mainly towards a dehumanisation caused by »Race«. An intersectional approach would widen an inclusive 
notion of humanness even more. 
28 Coming from an Anatolian Alevi family, secularism was generally highly esteemed. Historically, centuries of religious 
oppression in the Ottoman Empire have led Alevis to generally embrace the notion of secularism forcefully with the founding 
of the Turkish nation state (Borovalı & Boyraz 2014). However, with the reading of Asad (2003), I became more unsure 
about the advantages of secularism. This shall also be further discussed in chapter 6 and the conclusion. 
 
 77 
(beginning from within) of mostly denied and repressed racialising memories. It is these 
memories, which, even if they may not be trauma themselves, manifest very similarly to 
trauma. Remembering and reflecting these dehumanising narratives of »Race« allows us to 
understand how they shape our actions in the present and therefore opens the possibility of 
adjusting our behaviour that reflects a more inclusive notion of humanness (Emirbayer & 
Desmond 2015, pp. 72-73). 
 In the world of epistemology, reflexivity enables a potentially deeper comprehension 
of racial narratives and racialised subjects and their movements in racialised structures 
(Emirbayer & Desmond 2015, pp. 72-73). Researchers of »Race« and racialisation who are 
revealing the concealed and often unconscious racial beliefs in their own epistemological 
thinking, are given the opportunity to engage with the effects of their own racialisation, 
thereby allowing themselves to look more closely into racialised structures and draw deeper 
conclusions (ibid.). At the same time, critical reflexivity should not be seen as the sole 
objective of epistemological development, instead it could be perceived as a method which 
cannot be detached from scholarly work about »Race« (ibid.). In the world of ethics (or the 
justice system and political ideology), critical reflexivity can help to develop more 
convincing approaches to consider and essentially, to work towards racial equity (ibid.). 
Feminist Standpoint theory highlights that we perceive the world from certain experiences 
related to our location in society, thus heavily influences our scholarly analysis of 
racialisation (ibid.). Embracing the troublesome work of reflecting upon our own racial 
subjectivation, so I argue, can only strengthen the knowledge we produce as critical »Race« 
scholars. Additionally, in the world of aesthetics and cultural explorations, critical 
reflexivity »can lead to more thoughtful ways of appreciating racial differences in taste and 
distinction, as opposed to the false choices one so often encounters between universalism and 
particularism or between condescension and populist self-assertion, none of those conducing to a 
genuinely critical race scholarship or activism. Race scholars (and their efforts to address racial 
problems) are influenced far more by expressivist considerations than they may at first realize« 
(Emirbayer & Desmond 2015, pp. 72-73). 
 In the counter-narrative of humanness, inner and outer reflection is understood as 
interdependent. In a way, I argue that the humanness that is withheld from those who are 
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disadvantaged through racial power structures is also withheld in those who benefit from 
racial power structures. This withholding of humanness is what constitutes suffering for 
White people and BIPOC alike. But what is this humanness? Is there an essential human 
core that can be violated and cause this socio-psychological suffering? What would this 
human core be? What would it look like? How might the concept of a human core or 
humanness help us understand what racism is and what it means to overcome it? 
 Political philosophy that explores the concept of humanness from the perspective of 
the neo-colony offers a deep analysis, particularly on the tension field of Frantz Fanon and 
late Enlightenment thought (Sekyi-Out 1996). The post-structuralist exegesis of Fanon’s 
work has often discarded the Martinicans’ politico-philosophical explorations of humanism 
as irrelevant (Sekyi-Otu 1996, p. 16). Nevertheless, a decolonial interpretation of Fanon’s 
testimony of decolonial liberation battles highlights Fanon’s appeal for new humanistic 
standards and values, for a new humanist ethics (ibid.). Whilst post-structuralists as well as 
many post-colonial theorists, point out Western humanism’s failures, only very few offer 
alternatives to fill the ethical gaps that a dismissal of humanism has left (Alderson & Spencer 
2017). Though I find myself often in agreement with post-structuralists’ and post-
colonialists’ critique of humanism, I argue for revisiting and re-imagining the human 
condition and ethical questions raised by that condition rather than ignoring it. 
 Fanon states that in light of decolonial liberation struggles this »new humanity cannot 
do otherwise than define a new humanism both for itself and for others. It is prefigured in the 
objectives and methods of the conflict« (Fanon 1965, p. 246). Inside a twisted dialectic (or anti-
dialectic) the colonial subject defines itself through demarcating its own subjectivity from 
the colonial Other (ibid.). Some historians see this mechanism as a form of trickery, creating 
a false sense of superiority within White subjects, which was translated though into the logic 
of the European racial empires (Fyfe 1992, p. 27). However, the racial histories of Western 
European nations are fraught with much fear and shame and are therefore often erased and 
silenced from Western thinking and history (Poliakov 1974, p. 212; p. 255). In addition to 
shame and fear, the mechanism of creating a sense of racial superiority has also led the 
human compass of relating to each other humanely astray (Sekyi-Otu 1996, p. 100). 
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 Coloniality and modernity are inextricably linked to each other (Mignolo 2018), 
therefore the exclusion and exploitation of the racial Other was generally justified by their 
perceived incapability to adhere to life in a modern world. As I argue in my thesis, the price 
for a superior racial self was the abandonment of an authentic human self. The de-
racialisation of thought can thereby be conceptualised as a re-humanisation of thought 
(Sekyi-Otu 1996, pp. 185-191), from which a new humanism can emerge. 
 What is this »authentic human self« that the racialised subject abandoned in the 
process of racialisation? Does the notion of an authentic humanity not contradict the post-
structuralists’ conceptualisation of humanness, which cannot be essential or pure and 
thereby corrupted? I argue that in itself the self cannot be authentic; its authenticity is simply 
reflected in the relationships it has to others. Fanon’s work and a decolonial reading of his 
writings, play an important role when exploring these questions in the sixth chapter of this 
thesis. 
Decoloniality is another counter-narrative that plays a role in the quest for a new 
humanism in my thesis. Argentinian semiotician Walter Mignolo, Peruvian sociologist 
Aníbal Quijano and Bolivian sociologist Sylvia Rivera Cusicanqui were amongst the first 
scholars to employ the term decoloniality (Bacchetta et Al. 2019, p. 14). Decoloniality stands 
in opposition to colonial narratives and to coloniality. Coloniality refers to the notion that 
Western epistemologies are deeply informed and founded on the colonial project (Jackson 
2018, p. 3). Therefore, knowledge production needs to be decolonised by recognising that 
Western epistemologies are heavily occupied by colonial modes of thinking (Bacchetta et 
Al. 2019, p. 15). Further, the decolonial project can be advanced by including those 
epistemologies from the Global South that have historically been excluded from the 
production of knowledge in the West (ibid.). The current growing call to »decolonise« 
reflects the notion to critically examine those institutions, within which knowledge is 
produced, kept and disseminated, such as schools, universities, museums as well as other 
institutions and more recently commodities (Mignolo 2018, pp. 105-134). Decolonisation 
does not mean the erasure of colonial history and the often painful collective memories 
attached to it. Rather, the »decolonial option offers a particular frame and orientation for research, 




»Decoloniality denotes ways of thinking, knowing, being, and doing that began with, but also precede, the colonial 
enterprise and invasion. It implies the recognition and undoing of the hierarchical structures of race, gender, 
heteropatriarchy, and class that continue to control life, knowledge, spirituality, and thought, structures that are 
clearly intertwined with and constitutive of global capitalism and Western modernity. Moreover, it is indicative of 
the ongoing nature of struggles, constructions, and creations that continue to work within coloniality’s margins 
and fissures to affirm that which coloniality has attempted to negate« (Mignolo & Walsh 2018, p.17).  
 
In summary, the limitation of this key literature is that these theories of racism, racial 
culture, dehumanisation, subjectivity and racial identity constructions are rarely 
synthesised or contextualised in psychosocial theories of racialisation. My research 
considers the contextualisation of these theories as paramount as they provide important 
motivations also for the dominant culture to re-assess racial identity constructions. Only if 
we understand the stories that make us, can we begin to tell a different story. Additionally, 
this literature rarely focuses on the awareness of racialisation and the empowering effect it 
can have on White and BIPOC communities. In the following section I will explore further 
the methodology used in this thesis to examine the aforementioned topics within the 
narratives of the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners from the NGO, Phoenix, as 
case in study.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology »The Believer« 
 
This research project examines the subject of racialisation and its retrospective emotional 
perception by anti-racism and empowerment activists. Since racialisation, Critical Race 
theory, and Critical Whiteness, are under-researched in Germany, I have decided to put my 
focus onto this country. Further, I narrowed the field of interviewees down to anti-racism 
and empowerment practitioners because I assumed that they would have certain expertise 
on the subject of racialisation, that they would have reflected about it in a professional and 
also personal manner. Additionally, I assumed that their didactic or educational practice 
would enable the research participants to share their personal histories in a specifically 
illuminating fashion. Then, I focalised onto one particular anti-racism and empowerment 
NGO, Phoenix. Why did I choose Phoenix as my case study? Firstly, I had/have access to 
Phoenix. I have been an active member of Phoenix for almost 20 years. This gives me 
particular insight into the narratives of the research participants, especially about their 
personal training experience. Secondly, when I began this study in 2009, Phoenix was the 
only anti-racism and empowerment NGO that I was aware of at the time, which used a 
personal and biographical training method29. Thirdly, the active members in Phoenix, in 
particular trainers and trainees, are well practised in remembering and sharing their story, 
their personal narrative related to the subject of racialisation, their personal story of their 
first (Phoenix) training and their path thereafter. This is particularly useful for the research 
method of biographical narrative interviews. Fourthly, the research participants knew me 
and trusted me enough to share their very personal memories, sometimes funny, sometimes 
painful experiences of racialisation, their lives, their thoughts and their feelings of joy, 
shame and empowerment, to an extent and in-depth, which would rarely be possible with 
a stranger. I am in term of anthropological research methods what could be considered a 
deep or intimate insider (Taylor 2011). Their highly subjective recollections of being initiated 
into a racial culture raise questions about social justice being dependent on people’s 
awareness of how society and subjects are formed and subjected through »Race« in order to 
 
29 This will be elaborated also in chapter 4. 
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bring about change. The scope of this study can brush the surface of this question and carry 
it with. With very little research and academic explorations of anti-racism and 
empowerment training in Germany, their impact on inter–racial relations remains to be 
further understood. 
Undoubtedly, this proximity to the organisation and the research participants has its 
advantages, but also its pitfalls, its dead spots and unseen areas. I remember vividly, in 2009 
stepping into the office of Paul Gilroy at the LSE (who supervised my PhD for the first half), 
with a very narrow assumption of what I wanted to research and probably also with some 
assumptions of what the outcome would be. However, I have attempted to make this 
research as little as possible about Phoenix as an organisation and much more about the 
research participants and the rich data they provided to me. I have come to perceive social 
research not as truth seeking but more like an attempt to develop an understanding of the 
social. At the same time, social research is in itself a social process (Khathwani & Panhwar 
2020, p. 140). The subject of objectivity in social research remains ambitious and ambiguous, 
but there are techniques that can help to reduce subjectivity, such as being transparent about 
value preferences and field limitations, reflexivity can also be an important tool in this 
process (ibid.). Some of these issues shall be addressed in this chapter. 
Whilst using qualitative methods that reflect the interdisciplinary character of the 
project, the methodology of this thesis, similar to its wide-ranging theoretical foundations, 
can be described as eclectic. My main methods of this thesis are archiving, discourse 
analysis, ethnography, narrative research and grounded theory, by conducting semi-
structured biographic-narrative interviews with Phoenix trainers and members. Archiving 
allows the management and analysis of related or relevant qualitative data within the field 
of my research. This is particularly useful in interdisciplinary studies such as Critical »Race« 
Theory, where psychology, sociology and history are combined. Discourse analysis, which 
emerged through Foucault’s ground-breaking work The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) 
allows for a thorough investigation of social construction processes. It plays a significant 
role in the »social constructivist view of the social world« (Phillips & Hardy 2002, p. 6; Gergen 
1999) and is important for the development of the psychosocial framework of racialisation 
processes. Although Foucault widely dismissed psychological theories, this work will not 
 
 83 
attempt to reconcile the Foucauldian approach with psychosocial theory. There is simply 
not enough space to attempt this reconciliation in this thesis. Also, the endeavour to 
reconcile Foucault with Psychology shall be left to other, more capable authors. 
My research also incorporates a few (auto-)ethnographic vignettes (Ahmed 2000, 
Siddique 2011). Drawing from my own experiences and reflections as an anti-racism trainer 
and my participant observations, these vignettes create transparency around self-reflexivity 
in the research process, thereby determining my own positioning in this work and giving 
personal insight into the emotional landscape of racialised subjectivities. Claire Alexander 
(2004) argues that ethnography »carries with it the potential to explore the textured and 
contradictory space between ›structure‹ and ›agency‹ that is either occluded or rendered completely 
distinct in other methods of research and writing« (Alexander 2004, p. 148). 
 I conducted biographic-narrative interviews with approximately 20 active members, 
trainees and trainers of the Phoenix association (including a focus group of seven trainees) 
in Germany, where the NGO is based. The first interview I conducted was in Hamburg in 
April 2012. The last interview I conducted with the focus group of 7 trainees was in Berlin, 
in my living room in January 2015. I had started my PhD in autumn 2009, and even though 
I lived in London at the time, I had maintained regular contact with Phoenix and would still 
attend mostly the bi-annual general meetings for the active members. Already at that time, 
I would openly talk about my PhD research project and make people aware that I was 
intending to write about Phoenix and interview some of its members. All the trainers and 
trainees in the Phoenix Train-the-Trainers/Trainees-meetings were very excited about my 
research but did ask that details of the training itself should be spared from being written 
about in too much detail, since it would take away some of the process for potential future 
participants if they read the book. 
In Summer 2011, after two years of frequent traveling from London to Germany for 
work purposes, I decided that it was time to return to Berlin and focus more on my work 
there, and also because I felt that I wanted to be closer to my research field. From then on, I 
began to think more in detail about how and who I wanted to talk to. In late 2011/early 2012 
I also narrowed my search down to a few members, some trainers and trainees, and spoke 
to them in person mostly during the Phoenix meetings that I began to attend more 
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frequently. During those conversations, I would ask potential interviewees if they were 
interested in participating in my research. All of them said that they felt positive about being 
part of my PhD project, since they believed it was an important subject, but they also felt 
happy to support me. In these conversations, I also attempted to make it as transparent as 
possible that I would be interviewing them in the role of a social researcher from the LSE 
and not as a long-standing member of Phoenix, even though I also reflected with them how 
difficult it was to divide the two. I also told them in advance that the interviews would 
probably be long, since I wanted to do partly biographic-narrative interviews, that they 
would be recorded but that they would also be anonymised. 
In the next phase, via email or phone, I would agree for a time and a space for the 
interviews. I suggested that the participants could chose themselves, where and when they 
wanted to be interviewed. An interview situation is rather unnatural, and I wanted the 
participants to feel as comfortable as possible during the interview sessions. One interview 
was done in an empty seminar room at Hamburg University, one interview was conducted 
at the private practice of the research participant, three interviews were done in Fagbola’s 
home in Duisburg, the other interviews took place at the research participants’ home, one 
interview at my home in Berlin, same with the focus group. All research participants agreed 
that the subject was too personal to be discussed in a public space and decided on rooms 
where they would have enough privacy and felt comfortable. In the selection of my sample, 
I tried to be aware of »Race«, Gender and the social background of the participants’, since I 
assumed that their differing social positions would also allow a broader perspective on the 
research topic. In the sample that I chose for my analysis, are 9 male and 7 female research 
participants. 12 of the research participants are White and 4 BIPOC. Amongst the White 
research participants 3 members, 8 trainees and one trainer, amongst the BIPOC research 
participants all four are trainers. Most of the names are pseudonyms, in some cases, with the 
research participants consent, I used their second names. All interviews were conducted in 
German, except the interview with Nana, who was a native English speaker. I translated 
only those excerpts from the German language transcripts that I used in my thesis and 




Name Gender Occupation Age »Race« & social 
background 
Ann Female Student, Phoenix Member 20-30 White German, 
FRG, middle 
class 













Female Project manager (development policy 
education), Phoenix trainee 
30-40 White German, 
FRG, middle 
class 
Dina Female Student, Phoenix member 20-30 White German 
FRG, working 
class 
Dre Male Protestant Minister, executive secretary 
of Phoenix 
40-50 White German, 
FRG, lower 
middle class 
Eve Female RE (religious education) teacher, 
protestant minister, Phoenix Trainer 
50-60 White German, 
former GDR, 
middle class 








Male Project manager (development policy 
education), Phoenix trainee 




Kabera Male Psychologist, Phoenix Trainer 30-40 Black German, 
FRG, middle 
class 
Lena Female Retired local government worker, 
Phoenix member, former vice chair of 
Phoenix 
50-60 White Eastern 
European, 
migrated from 






Female Market worker, Phoenix trainee 30-40 White German, 
FRG, middle 
class 







Male Student, workshop instructor (political 






Nana Female Medical doctor, psychiatrist, Phoenix 
trainer 
30-40 Black German, 
migrated from 





Martin Bauer (1996) writes that narrative interviews conceptually undermine the dualistic 
question-and-response-schema. The presence of the interviewer in the questions may 
influence the interviewee and therefore corrupt the data. Narrative interviews thus leave 
more space to the interviewee to develop their own voice and narrative. Everyday 
communicative interactions such as storytelling and listening become the main methods as 
they allow the participants to express their perspective, thereby minimising the influence of 
the researcher on the data (Bauer 1996). Interviewees - all research subjects are over 18 - only 
had to tell me what they want to tell me. The research subject received a written consent 
form prior to the interview, which was signed by them and by me. The method of Grounded 
Theory is then applied to extract a theoretical framework for racialisation processes. 
My study is in compliance with the LSE Research Ethics Policy. I worked with 
informed consent, oral explanation of my research project, and participants were 
continuously informed about the study. Research subjects may refuse to participate without 
given reason. Some research participants are from ethnic minorities; however, they are also 
trainers and trained to deal with sensitive topics such as racialisation. My research did not 
induce any unacceptable psychological harm or more than mild discomfort. There were also 
no doubts about my own wellbeing during the research period. 
Still, during this research project, not only during interviews but also whilst writing 
up this thesis, I had to reflect on my position as a deep insider of Phoenix continuously. Few 
of the research participants have grown to be close friends in the almost two decades that I 
have been in Phoenix. So how would I be able to portray, methodologically and 






Male Student, workshop instructor (political 
education) Phoenix trainee 






members? I had most formative years as an academic writer at Birkbeck College, University 
of London, during my M.Sc. in Race & Ethnic Relations. At Birkbeck College, under the 
supervision of Yasmeen Narayan and Tarek Qureshi I developed my voice as scholar and 
already began to reflect on some of the aspects of my work in Phoenix. Nevertheless, I have 
to admit that distancing myself from Phoenix in this research project – something that my 
supervisor for the second part of this thesis, Chetan Bhatt would constantly remind me of – 
remained a great challenge well into the final months of writing this thesis. How would I be 
able to position myself as a researcher, as a writer of an academic text in social sciences and 
as member, a trainer, a person, who believes in the work Phoenix is doing, who could be 
considered not only an insider, but a deep insider? Sandra Harding (2004), who developed 
feminist standpoint theory, helped very much in shaping the academic analysis and voice 
of this thesis. Very influential is also the writing of Black feminists, mostly bell hooks (1992) 
but also Patricia Hill Collins (1999). In particular hooks’ writings empowered in many ways 
my thinking and my language. Feminist standpoint theory is a powerful tool of knowledge 
production in the social sciences and gives researchers the opportunity to develop an 
epistemology from the margins of society. Is my position as a deep insider of Phoenix, my 
proximity also to the research subjects defendable as a social researcher and an academic 
writer? Concentrating on Phoenix and its trainers, trainees and members, whilst applying 
an epistemological method of Feminist Standpoint theory, supports the reflexivity of my 
writing but also the voices of those who might have not been heard in various spaces. 
The following paragraphs in which I further discuss the methods and epistemologies 
applied in this thesis, are divided into three parts. In the first section I reflect on objectivity, 
epistemologies and the application of Feminist Standpoint theory. In the second section, I 
examine the proximity to the field and how I experienced the interview-situations. Here I 
also analyse the significance but also the entanglements of as I refer: ›the researcher going 
native‹. In the third section I discuss the methodological eclecticism, which ranges from 
biographic-narrative interviews, to participant observation and Grounded Theory in 





Thoughts on Objectivity: Objective much? 
 
My proximity to Phoenix, which I chose as a case study for this research project is 
admittedly very close and could raise concerns about the objectivity of my social research. 
The concept of objectivity has various meanings and is under much scrutiny recently 
(Myrdal 1969; Harding 1995; Hammersley 2013; Khatwani & Panhwar 2020), it could be said 
that objectivity is not uncontested in current social research. Some social researchers criticise 
the notion of a »realist objectivity«, another baby from late Enlightenment thought, namely 
Kant, in which knowledge production is almost equated with representing, reflecting or 
reproducing the truth (Hammersley 2013, p. 95; Khatwani & Panhwar 2020, p. 129). 
Objectivity necessitates neutrality, it can be considered a standard which marks something 
as scientific or if it lacks as unscientific, it could also be understood as the removal of 
subjectivity (Khatwani & Panhwar 2020, pp. 129-130). However, examining human 
behaviour is not about a universal verification of the truth (Bollnow 1974) and Karl Marx 
criticised objectivity as a tool to disguise power structures, since it is those in power who 
define what is objective or not (Marx 1970 [1846], pp. 65-66). And how is it even possible to 
remove our subjectivity from any type of research? Some might claim because I am a Person 
of Colour, because I experience racism, I cannot be objective about researching matters of 
»Race« and racialisation, but could a White person be more objective? That would contradict 
the argument of my thesis that states everyone is affected by racialisation. It would be similar 
absurd to claim that heterosexual men are more objective about Gender and Queer studies. 
Our subjectivity cannot be entirely removed from social research, I would not be the first 
social researcher to argue that total objectivity is a myth (Myrdal 1969). Nevertheless, 
objectivity is not about truth, it is more a set of procedures (Khatwani & Panhwar 2020, pp. 
130-131; Hammersley 2012, p. 93), some of which I have used in this thesis and explore in 
this chapter. I treat the narratives of the research participants like a text that I analyse and 
interpret using a variety of methods. Additionally, some social researchers argue that 
objectivity can be (re-)modelled through applying reflexivity (Hammersley 2013, p. 97), 
which is another tool I use in this thesis. Using these instruments, I consider objectivity »an 
epistemic virtue that is designed to counter one particular source of potential error: that deriving from 
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preferences and preconceptions associated with commitments that are external to the task of knowledge 
production – in other words, those that relate to the various goals any researcher has as a person, citizen, etc.« 
(Hammersley 2013, p. 102). 
 
 
Thoughts on epistemology: Can the real researcher please stand up? 
 
Why do we believe that what we believe is true? It is the role of the science of knowledge, 
epistemology, to figure out the principles behind the knowledge that is produced. However, 
there is more to the production of knowledge, since »[f]ar from being the apolitical study of truth, 
epistemology points to the ways in which power relations shape who is believed and why« (Collins 1999, p. 
252). Feminist Standpoint theory became a crucial tool in questioning the relationship 
between power and knowledge production. The theory began to question many taken-for-
granted truths; it began to critically question who had produced that knowledge and how 
was that person, who produced it, positioned in society. Furthermore, Feminist Standpoint 
theory saw a correlation of where and how we are placed in the social web of power and 
the way we shape, understand and view social realities. Who decides what scientific 
objectivity is? Who decides which social researcher is neutral or not? Are not the rules of the 
currently dominant epistemologies subjacent to dominant ideologies, which form the 
principles of these rules? Feminist standpoint theory helps to ask these relevant questions. 
And it is not that these rules were never contested. The famous German poet Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe »contrasted the artificial empiricism of controlled experiments with what he 
called delicate empiricism (zarte Empirie), ›the effort to understand a thing’s meaning through 
prolonged empathetic looking and seeing grounded in direct experience‹ (Seamon and Zajonc 1998: 
2)« (Santos 2018, p. 5). Similarly, Donna Haraway wrote in her ground-breaking text Situated 
Knowledges that her essay »is an argument for situated and embodied knowledges and an argument 
against various forms of unlocatable, and so irresponsible, knowledge claims« (Haraway 1988, p. 
583) and irresponsible knowledge claims are those which cannot be held accountable. So, 
do they actually exist, the social researchers free of emotions, never touched by any 
ideology, which would channel their thoughts in a certain direction? This is simply an ideal, 
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which cannot exist (Harding 2004, p. 4). Furthermore, Sandra Harding (2004), who 
contributed significantly to Feminist Standpoint theory states: 
 
»Standpoint theories argue for ›starting off thought‹ from the lives of marginalized peoples; beginning in those 
determinate, objective locations in any social order will generate illuminating critical questions that do not arise in 
thought that begins from dominant group lives. […] The epistemologically advantaged starting points for research 
do not guarantee that researcher can maximize objectivity. It is useful to contrast standpoint grounds for 
knowledge with four other kinds: the ›God-trick‹, ethnocentrism, relativism, and the unique ability of the oppressed 
to produce knowledge« (Harding 2004, p. 128). 
 
How does this apply to my research, when 12 of the research participants were White and 
not necessarily marginalised in terms of »Race«? Certainly, I am starting off from my own 
position as a Person of Colour, as an Anatolian German Alevi. But I am also starting off from 
the lived experiences of anti-racism and empowerment practitioners, White and BIPOC, 
who are part of an organisation, which centres the experiences of marginalised people in its 
work. I attempted to present the voices of the research participants not as victims of 
racialisation but as subjects, who were actively trying to negotiate their way through their 
racialisation processes. Following Haraway’s proposition, I attempted to view the 
participants as »actors« (Haraway 1988, p. 591) in this thesis, and to not write about them but 
to develop a dialogue between them and social theory with their voices. Therefore, I do not 
see this thesis as a form of seeking the truth, but rather like a painting of a single moment 
in time and space. Or to use the words of Australian feminist scholar Elspeth Probyn in 
Sexing the Self (2004): 
 
»Conceived of as an element of an enunciative practice, experience may, ›under certain conditions‹, make ›a 
unity of two different elements‹. This is to emphasize, then, that the autobiographical, or the enunciation of 
experience, cannot be understood as a fixed condition; it may work as ›a linkage‹ which is not ›necessary, 
determined, absolute or essential for all time‹. Moreover, theorized within a theory of articulation, the experiential 
may be pried from its commonsensical location in ›belongingness‹. It then becomes possible to distance the 
autobiographical from a representational logic. Instead of representing a ›truth‹, a ›unity‹ or a ›belongingness‹, a 
critical use of the self may come to emphasize the ›historical conditions‹ involved in its speaking« (Probyn 1993, 
p. 24).  
 
This means, by analysing the narratives of German anti-racism and empowerment 
practitioners with a standpoint epistemological approach, this research contributes to the 
writing of a contemporary German multiracial history. 
As much as this thesis is about empowerment, I would also like it to be empowering 
to read. This text tries to explore empowerment from an angle, where bell hooks in Yearning: 
Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics (2014 [1990]) asks »[h]ow do we create an oppositional 
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worldview, a consciousness, an identity, a standpoint that exists not only as that struggle which also 
opposes dehumanization but as that movement which enables creative, expansive self-actualization?« 
(hooks 2014, p. 39). Far from being solely based on decolonial epistemologies, since many 
of the authors referenced are from the Global North, the voices in this thesis (and hopefully 
also my own) reflect a »radical openness« (hooks 2014, p. 223) about the lived experiences of 
racialisation, thereby pursuing the possibility of developing counter-hegemonic knowledge 
and narratives. Black feminist scholars have been an inspiration to me and many others, in 
developing groups and spaces that devote themselves to a »politics of location« (hooks 2014, 
p. 223) and the creation of new narratives rethinking and transforming lived encounters in 
a way that both name the connections of power structures and furthermore suggests 
processes by which to change racial subjection and exclusion. 
In order to develop those counter-hegemonic narratives, I believe, it needs a kind of 
labour and process that is emotional and personal. And to bring these narratives to live, also 
needs an atmosphere, which allows this personal and emotional labour to take place, to 
make subjects comfortable enough to open up their lived experiences to others. Positioned 
as a social researcher, but also as an anti-racism and empowerment practitioner myself, I 
decided to anonymise the names of the research participants or use their second names as 
some research participants offered themselves. The proximity to the research subjects, the 
rapport and the working relationships that developed over the years, but also the 
transparency of what their contributions would be used for, the conversations prior and 
during the research project, made it possible to the participants to share their very personal 
stories with me as a researcher – and as a deep insider. 
 
 
The Racialisation of German Subjects and the Insider-Outsider question 
 
What is an insider? In social research an insider is considered a person, who shares similar 
demographic features, such as »Race«, gender or social background, just to name a few. An 
insider can also be a person that over a longer time period lived in the same location or has 
common values to the group they are researching. In social research, an outsider describes 
 
 93 
more or less the opposite of the insider, as a researcher who, before they begin their research, 
is not familiar with the field or the people they are researching. Anthropology, a Western 
colonial science, established itself during the 19th century, and, for a long time consisted of 
predominantly Western White males travelling to the colonies and researching the colonial 
native, informing those in power, how to better manipulate and exploit this colonial Other 
(Lewis 1973, p. 590)30. The Western scientists were the outsiders capable of doing objective 
research about the »natives« (Lewis 1973, p. 586). However, the insider/outsider dichotomy 
is not unquestioned in anthropology, and some scholars ask how useful is this subjective 
insider/objective outsider divide (Back 1996; O’Reilly 2009). There is, for example, the 
phenomenon of the researcher »going native« (clearly indicating the colonial heritage of 
anthropology), referring »to the danger for ethnographers to become too involved in the community 
under study, thus losing objectivity and distance« (O’Reilly 2009, p. 88). In other words, here, 
the social researcher, the objective outsider becomes a subjective insider and thereby useless 
as a scientist. It seems that the ideal in anthropology is that the ethnographer, gets in the 
field, collects the data and gets out again (O’Reilly 2009, pp. 9-11), thereby leaving the social 
researcher not particularly accountable to people they have researched (Stacy 1991, p. 113). 
This raises many ethical concerns about the power the ethnographer has, in particular over 
vulnerable groups such as those who are disadvantaged by racial power structures. Kirin 
Narayan (2003), Indian American writer and anthropologist suggests that »[i]nstead of the 
paradigm emphasizing a dichotomy between outsider/insider or observer/observed, I propose that at 
this historical moment we might more profitably view each anthropologist in terms of shifting 
identifications amid a field of interpenetrating communities and power relations (Narayan 2003, p. 
285). 
In some ways, I experienced similar things to the BIPOC research participants, being 
born and raised in Germany as an Anatolian German Alevi male. There is a shared 
experience of sometimes not being seen as a full human being, but rather as a skin colour, a 
culture or a religion in Germany in all sorts of everyday settings. In addition, with some I 
shared memories of how Phoenix developed from a small NGO with barely 50 members to 
 
30 Though I should mention that anthropology came back to »bite« its founders back in a special section of the American 
Anthropologist, edited by Aisha M. Beliso-De Jesús and Jemima Pierre examining the anthropology of White supremacy 
(American Anthropologist Vol. 122, no. 1, March 2020). 
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one of Germany’s largest and oldest anti-racism organisations. This also highlights that the 
research participants and I share a lot of common values, one of them racial justice, since 
many of us decided to not only be active members in Phoenix, but also become trainers 
teaching anti-racism and empowerment. On the subject of shared experience and locations 
Patricia Hill Collins concludes: 
 
»The cultural context formed by those experiences and ideas that are shared with other members of a group or 
community give meaning to individual biographies. Each individual biography is rooted in several overlapping 
cultural contexts—for example, groups defined by race, social class, age, gender, religion, and sexual orientation. 
The most cohesive cultural contexts are those with identifiable histories, geographic locations, and social 
institutions. Some can be so tightly interwoven that they appear to be one cultural context, the situation of 
traditional societies with customs that are carried on across generations, or that of protracted racial segregation 
in the United States where Blacks saw a unity of interests that necessarily suppressed internal differences within 
the category ›Black.‹ Moreover, cultural contexts contribute, among other things, the concepts used in thinking 
and acting« (Collins 1999, p. 286). 
 
The complex entanglements in fields such as anti-racism and empowerment activism 
and my personal position in this entanglement, is very complex. The complexity starts with 
me being a second-generation Anatolian German Alevi, growing up in a Turkish German 
working class family. They continue with my own lived experiences in Germany, of being 
active in Phoenix for several years, but also working as an anti-racism and empowerment 
trainer. My doctoral research is thereby located in a field that raises many questions about 
what I am researching, who my research participants are and my personal biography. My 
status in this research field can only be described as a deep insider or as a believer. I still am 
an active member in Phoenix, and I am hoping to stay one for a very long time. Therefore, 
the investigation of this field does require radical transparency, as well as self-reflexivity 
(Maynard 1994, p. 16). Both, radical transparency and self-reflexivity inform many 
methodological inquiries, especially in critical »Race« and Gender theory. 
 
 
The »Native« going researcher – researching as a »believer« 
 
My first encounter with Phoenix took place during a Phoenix anti-racism training in 2001 in 
a small town in Brandenburg. This training was the starting point of my active membership 
in Phoenix. In the following years, with the progress of my personal development and 
studies, my interest in conducting research about some concepts related in the Phoenix 
 
 95 
empowerment and anti-racism work evolved. In the first 5 years I looked for other training 
forms, organised by individuals or other groups in Germany but only discovered a few, 
who I thought made the subject of anti-racism and empowerment personally accessible. In 
summer 2006, when I moved from Berlin to London, I began to study Race & Ethnic 
Relations for a Master’s degree at Birkbeck College. During my studies I realised how much 
I owed to Phoenix in understanding this wide and fascinating field of »Race« relations. And 
I began to conceptualise Phoenix work in academic terms, making use of the plethora of 
theories I encountered related to Cultural Studies, Critical »Race« Theory, Critical 
Whiteness, Postcolonialism and Gender studies. These theories became more and more 
crucial in my personal analysis and understanding about what it was that Phoenix was 
actually doing. After the completion of the MSc programme, I decided to take a closer look 
into the subject of racialisation and Whiteness. Finishing my degree in 2008, I decided to 
continue my research, this time including the subject of empowerment and intending to 
develop a theoretical framework of racialisation with the voices of Phoenix anti-racism and 
empowerment practitioners. Between 2008 and 2009 I took a break from studying but 
decided in Spring 2009 that I would apply only at one university, which employed the only 
supervisor that I could imagine myself working with at the time. Some of the theories that 
went into this PhD project were already engaged with between 2006 and 2008 for my 
Masters’ thesis. The active fieldwork for this study began in 2012 and ended in 2015. The 
last interviews for this project were conducted in 2015. 
I conducted 13 interviews, which included short conversations of about 45 minutes, 
and interviews up to five hours long. One of these interviews was with a focus group of 
seven Phoenix trainees in 2015. I recorded all of the interviews on my smart phone. The 
recordings of the interviews were transcribed completely. I told the research participants 




1. Tell me your story of racialisation, before your first training 
2. Tell me about your first training experience 
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3. After the training, how did your story continue 
 
Therefore, the interviews are coded according to the larger themes »racialisation«, 
»training«, »empowerment« and »humanness«. Further sub-themes emerged after more 
interviews were conducted and during the coding process of all interviews. All interviews 
were conducted with research participants who are either full trainers or trainees in Phoenix 
except three. I conducted semi-structured biographic-narrative interviews with the research 
participants (Wengraf 2001). I would begin the interviews with a short introduction about 
my research project and also about my interview method. I encouraged research 
participants to take their time in telling their story. Once the research participants began to 
share their accounts, I would talk as little as possible, with an open facial impression, 
keeping eye contact, sometimes nodding encouragingly to show that I was listening 
actively. I also had a notepad, where I would sometimes write down my personal 
impressions and feelings about the interview situation or noteworthy things the 
interviewees mentioned. If the flow of their sharing was interrupted or ended, I would ask 
if they wanted to tell me more, or sometimes ask follow-up questions. 
With the Phoenix leadership team, I conducted three to four recorded interviews and 
had several informal conversations over the span of seven years (between 2008 and 2015). 
With regards to my access to interviews with these research participants, emails and phone 
calls led to swift responses, and research consent forms and a research information sheet 
were handed out prior to the interviews. 
Some of the early encounters and conversations, I had them with the research 
participants, who were trainees at the time and would later work as Phoenix trainers. Other 
participants became members and trainees after I had already started my research. All the 
trainees from the focus group that joined my research project, were Berlin residents. 
Therefore, I had little difficulties accessing the field. The transparency regarding my PhD 
thesis at LSE, an elite university in London, encouraged Phoenix leadership occasionally to 
mention at meetings, that my research project was in progress. However, once I was finished 
with my fieldwork, these mentions of my PhD diminished over the final years. 
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Even though the interview situation was new and unusual to most research 
participants, sharing their stories of racialisation, their first training experience and how the 
training had affected their lives, was familiar to them. In particular the session with the 
focus group felt very much how a possible Phoenix meeting could progress. The one-to-one 
interviews felt slightly different though. The fact that I spoke as little as possible, sometimes 
gave the interviews an air of a therapy session. Some of the interviewees did also mention 
that participating in the interview felt therapeutic. In about half of the interviews, the 
interviewees would cry, expressing their suffering through feeling ashamed or sad. I would 
always carry tissues with me, handing them to the crying research participant, silently 
acknowledging their emotions and tears. Occasionally, when there were moments of 
silence, I would give the research participants some time to recollect their thoughts. Having 
witnessed many active members expressing their emotions through tears during Phoenix 
meetings, and on plenty of occasions, seeing participants cry did not trigger any discomfort 
in me, apart from my own empathetic response. As much as these common experiences 
generated the research participants’ trust in me, there was also the risk that many things 
would be left unmentioned since Phoenix has its very own discourses and silences. If I felt 
that a narrative was too thin, I would ask different questions or change the subject for a few 
minutes before I returned to the research topic. I was not interested in assuming what the 
research participants meant, therefore I sometimes asked to provide me with more details, 
asking if they could elaborate on certain things they had mentioned. I attempted to be 
critically aware of my closeness to the research participants, but I also did not shy away 
from asking innovative questions (Innes 2009, p. 457). Of course, there is also the danger of 
turning into an »enthusiastic radical« that Gayatri Spivak warns of (Spivak 2010, p. 283), of 
idealising the field and remaining in denial of undesirable data. Undoubtedly, there have 
been pitfalls, said and unsaid things, which have been overlooked in this research due to 
my proximity. Through the methodological and theoretical eclecticism of this thesis, I have 
attempted to triangulate the data (Greene 2007). I will expand on this also in the section 
about Grounded Theory. 
How does academic work differ from the work of activists? Academia is about 
science, about producing knowledge. The production of knowledge has to abide by certain 
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academic standards, to be actually considered knowledge. Some of the standards are that 
the work is autonomous, accountable and scrutinised. Activists fight for social justice and 
transforming oppressive structures. These differences between academia and activism 
create imbalances and gaps. There are activists, in particular non-academic ones, who find 
some discourses in social sciences simply inaccessible. Some activists might refer to concepts 
that cannot be transferred into an academic language. This was actually a huge test for me, 
since some of the discussions in Phoenix would probably raise some questions for an 
external researcher, especially those conversation that evolve around epistemologies from 
the Global South. 
Being member and trainer in the anti-racism NGO Phoenix has challenges and 
advantages. The potential problem that comes with my membership could be that I am 
partial and feel that I have to prove what Phoenix does is good. The advantage of my 
membership is that it gives me access to an organisation that is quite wary of researchers 
wanting to do academic research on Phoenix. I tried to ensure that I am detached during 
my research from the work that Phoenix is doing. However, this study is not so much an 
evaluation of Phoenix anti-racism or empowerment training. In the centre of my research 
rather stands to find out what it is that the anti-racism and empowerment activists have to 
say about racialisation and empowerment – I simply chose Phoenix as my case study. This 
study was not commissioned by Phoenix nor do I receive any financial support for my 
research from the organisation. It was motivated and proposed by me. Initial conversation 
with trainers and members showed great interest and support in my work. Nonetheless, 
one of the conditions that trainers made on my research is that I do not reveal training 
methods in detail. The trainers asked for this because they believe that exposing detailed 
units would make their work very difficult for the future. I do understand that my position 
as trainer and active member in Phoenix allows me to have an in-depth look into the 
organisation and its work, as its members do put a lot of trust into me. However, I ensured 
that trainers, members and participants were aware of my position as a researcher during 
my fieldwork. I tried to achieve this through a maximum amount of transparency and a 
minimum amount of ambiguity. By preparing consent forms for interviewees, by using 
open research methods, I wanted to ensure that during my fieldwork trainers, members and 
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participants understood that I was present in the function of a researcher. Nevertheless, as 
researching »Race« is neither accidental nor apolitical, and not so much the researcher going 
native rather than the native going researcher, is one of my key concerns, I hope, through (auto-
)ethnographic methods and »radical contextualisation« of the theories produced, to 
circumvent the dangers of »claiming […] a specialist knowledge« (Alexander 2004, p. 147; Keith 
1995). 
 Other ethical concerns relate to my role in Phoenix. Fortunately, I do not have any 
line management responsibilities towards the participants. This provides some level of 
independence from each other. There is also variation in proximity to the research 
participants, but I generally would describe it as close. By most of the participants I would 
be perceived as a Phoenix »senior« due to my long and active commitment to the NGO. 
However, participants were aware that I was a part-time PhD student and with some 
experience as a social researcher. The research process was not continuous but rather on and 
off, often interrupted through either other work commitments or the birth of my child. 
Nevertheless, I was always close to my field and regular participant observation allowed 
me to stay in role as an active member, and, at the same time, distance myself conceptually 
through the process of taking notes, recording my observations (Simmons 2007). 
Membership is complex, neither being an insider nor being an outsider is an absolute 
perspective (Merton 1972, Naples 1996). As member and practitioner, I have insights into 
the role of a trainer/active member in Phoenix; however, I openly talked about my PhD, and 
my research methods, which also helped me to conceptually distance myself from the object 
and subject of study and get me into the mental mode of observing the structure of events 
with a researcher’s practiced objectivity. Access to the field was very easy due to people’s 
trust in me, I always had the feeling participants wanted to participate, and one participant 
actually invited herself to partake in this research. Many also stated the therapeutic 
character the interview sessions had and were very appreciative of their participation. The 
independence of my study was never questioned, it was clear from the beginning that the 
research arose from my personal interests in the field, and not as commissioned by Phoenix 
leadership or any other party. Phoenix leadership did not encourage me to begin this 
research, and as it proceeded, did not present me with any objections. 
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 However, my research still experienced moments of loyalty conflicts, where a tension 
between my role as a semi-senior Phoenix member and in addition a researcher, did arise. 
One of the research participants in 2012 once mentioned that she observed a »healthy 
patriarchy« in Phoenix in relation to the mainly male Phoenix leadership. It had a double 
meaning; she was stating that the leadership was doing a good job, and there was also an 
implicit critique in the predominant maleness of the leadership. At some moments I also 
witnessed and was part of a rather unhealthy patriarchy. Those moments of mostly jovial 
sexism behind closed doors with no females present, made me feel very uncomfortable, and 
at some point, I experienced a personal crisis in relation to Gender in Phoenix, the 
organisation, but also the work itself. In these moments I noticed the challenge I was 
presented with in critically perceiving the dynamics of a group I was very much a part of. I 
was met with my own cis-male privileged role and function in this dynamic. To study the 
group in this regard was undoubtedly also a process of reflecting on myself in relation to 
the group and beyond, as regards to power, Gender, »Race« and other intersections of 





Ground Theory was developed by two US-American sociologists, Barney Glaser and 
Anselm Strauss (1967). In their work, the social researchers »addressed how the discovery of 
theory from data—systematically obtained and analyzed in social research—can be furthered« 
(Glaser & Strauss 2017, p. 1). Grounded Theory became more relevant for my thesis as I 
moved away from writing about Phoenix and moved towards using the voices of the anti-
racism and empowerment practitioners, to develop a theoretical framework of racialisation. 
Grounded Theory is also very advantageous from my point of view as an educational 
scientist, because it helps to develop theories that are not too abstract and can be useful in 
relation to teaching about anti-racism and empowerment also in non-academic settings 
(Oktay 2012). Furthermore, the methodology of Grounded Theory does assume an inherent 
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foreignness between the researcher and the research subject. German sociology professor 
Cornelia Helfferich (2004) states: 
 
»This ›assumption of foreignness‹ has been further developed, especially in ethnology and cultural anthropology, 
to an attitude of ›making the familiar foreign‹ and suspending the unquestioned validity of the obvious. As the 
assumption of foreignness promotes respect for the other person and refrains from adapting the foreign sense to 
the interviewees’ own vision, it also helps to adopt an attitude of viewing one’s own explanations and 
interpretations only as one possibility among others, one’s own point of view or ›horizon of normality‹, to put it into 
perspective and thus also to postpone it with open expectations« [my own translation] (Helfferich 2004, p. 117).  
 
Put another way, I attempted to perceive the research participants during the interview 
situation as foreigners. I tried to treat their interview transcripts like a foreign text during 
its analysis. The words of the research participants and my interpretation of their words 
became one of the cornerstones of my argument, that racialisation constitutes a form of 
suffering for the racialised subject. However, the interpretation of data is never really 
finished and in addition, data never tells a single story (Corbin & Strauss 2008, pp. 48-49). 
In other words, this research project is not about presenting reality, it is about interpreting 
it. Nevertheless, as one of the founders of Grounded Theory states »knowledge arises through 
(note the verbs) acting and interacting of self-reflective beings« (Corbin & Strauss 2008, p. 2). The 
inductive approach of Grounded Theory also allows to view the collected material openly, 
not necessarily to test a theory or hypothesis. Rather the empirical data is used to develop 
categories, breaking the material into content fragments and then systemising them in 
codes. Coding thereby helps to crystallise the content essence of the raw data (Saldaña 2016, 
p. 4). I decided to not use software for this coding process. I simply never felt that there was 
a need to download the software and get acquainted with it, since I wanted to focus on the 
narratives. This might also explain some of the longer quotes used in chapter 4, 5, and 6. I 
did the coding »old-school-style«, reading and re-reading the transcripts several times, 
highlighting the categories of »racialisation«, »training«, »empowerment« and 
»humanness« with different colours. Since I had almost 30 hours’ interview material, I 
selected that material which I assumed would show the broadest range of experiences, 
thoughts, and emotions. The coding process and its categories are also reflected in the 
structure of this thesis and in the interpretation of the data using, amongst others, the 
method of Grounded Theory. I found this hybrid of deductive and inductive approaches 
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particularly useful, since I also aim at generating knowledge about racialisation and not 
simply to verify theories. Additionally, the phenomena of empowerment and the 
connection that I draw between this term and humanness are based on the subjective 





The method of participant observation actually became less significant during the final 
phase of writing this thesis, since I moved further away from describing what is happening 
in Phoenix and moved towards the voices, the narratives of the anti-racism and 
empowerment practitioners. Nevertheless, I decided to keep a small paragraph on the 
subject of participant observation. 
Ethnographies are heavily based on the method of participant observation, especially 
if the researcher is absorbed in the field for a prolonged time (Emerson et Al. 2001, p. 352). 
In order to examine certain social groups or settings, participant observation can be a 
necessary tool in gaining knowledge about this group or setting. In other words, participant 
observation »is a way to collect data in naturalistic settings by ethnographers who observe and/or 
take part in the common and uncommon activities of the people being studied« (Musante & DeWalt 
2010, p. 2). In the previous paragraphs, I have already stated my proximity to the research 
participants and the field. However, participant observation also entails writing field notes, 
which during the process of writing not only helps in distancing myself as a researcher, but 
also creates data in support of writing this thesis. It is the written form of my reflections on 
particular situations and interview settings, thereby central in the understanding of my 







This chapter has outlined the research trajectory and the epistemological and 
methodological approach of this seven-year research project. As a researcher who 
conducted fieldwork at home with multiple methods (such as interviews, participant 
observation), I initially discussed methodological debates about Feminist Standpoint 
theory, insider and outsider research, and positioned myself as an insider/believer to the 
organisation I investigated. Furthermore, I argued that my approach to insider research, 
feminist standpoint epistemology and also Grounded Theory opens possibilities to 
knowledge production which contribute to a theoretical framework of racialisation in 
Germany, informed by anti-racism and empowerment practitioners.   
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Chapter 4: Racialisation – Narrating Memories of Childhoods & 
Race 
 
»For if colonization destroys the colonized, it also rots the colonizer.« 
Albert Memmi, (quoted from The Colonizer and the Colonized 2003 [1957], p. 13) 
 
Having discussed the methodological implications of researching as a deep insider of the 
field, I will now move on to the phenomenon of racialisation. In the book Racism (2000 
[1982]) Albert Memmi offers two definitions of the term, a short and a longer one. The short 
one defines racism as making »reference to biological differences for the purposes of subjugation 
and the establishment of certain privileges and advantages for itself« (Memmi 2000, p. 93)31. The 
biological differences Memmi refers to are usually coded as »Race« (but also sometimes as 
ethnicity or culture). The system of racism needs racial subjects, which can be either 
advantaged or disadvantaged. The system of racism needs racial subjects that maintain 
racialised power structures. The process of generating these racial subjects can be referred 
to as racial subjectivation or racialisation (Dalal 2002, p. 198). When does this process of 
racialisation take place? Social researchers, who have specialised on the question of how 
»Race« influences children and the development of the child, state that »between birth and 
adulthood, children become racialized beings, some of whom endorse hostile racial attitudes, many of 
whom endorse egalitarian values, but all of whom are to some degree beholden to the psychology of 
intergroup cognitions and relations« (Quintana & McKown 2008, p. 5). In other words, the 
process of racialisation begins during the childhood of a person, where they become 
racialised, where they become a racial subject. Becoming a racial subject should not be 
confused with becoming a person that is openly racist. In fact, in Germany about 13% agree 
to the statement that White people are superior to BIPOC people and about 20% tend toward 
right-wing populist attitudes (Zick et Al. 2019). How is it then possible that BIPOC are 
significantly and continuously discriminated against in the education system, the labour 
 
31 I am hesitant to call this definition outdated. Though, as already discussed in the introduction and in the literature review, 
»Race« is not understood in a biological sense in this thesis. However, I have also already discussed the conflation of the 
terms culture and ethnicity with the term »Race«, therefore Memmi’s definition could be complimented as ›making 
reference to biological and/or cultural differences for the purposes of subjugation…‹. 
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market, and the housing market (Bonefeld & Dickhäuser 2018; Koopmans et Al. 2019; Müller 
2015), if 80-90% of the people do not hold openly racist attitudes? 
Some research suggests that racism or racial bias can also operate on an unconscious 
level, even in people who consider themselves open-minded and liberal (Agarwal 2020; 
Kahn 2018). Whilst some evolutionary scientists suggest that racism is inherent to the 
human brain (van den Berghe 1987), other social scholars assume if racism was genetic, then 
we would have chaos and not a racial order (Hirschfeld 1997, p. 78). Rather than inherited 
genetically, research suggests that racism and »Race« is learned (van Ausdale & Feagin 
2001). How does this process of learning racism and »Race«, the process of racialisation take 
place? In order to explore this question, I chose a group of anti-racism and empowerment 
practitioners who are well rehearsed in remembering and narrating the process of how they 
learned about »Race« and racism. Therefore, in the following chapter, I explore the 
question: How do anti-racism and empowerment practitioners narrate their personal 
experiences of racial subjectivation? In this chapter I argue that the narratives of the 
research participants highlight that racialisation constitutes a form suffering caused by 
the dehumanisation of the racialised subject. In the first section, beginning with a short 
excursion on childhoods, identity and racialisation, I also look into the subject of memory, 
since the research participants talk about what they remember about their racialisation 
process. In the second section, I look at, first, how the white research participants talk about 
their racialisation and, afterwards explore the narratives of the BIPOC research participants. 
 
 
Childhoods, identity & »Race« 
 
Racial subjectivity and our racial identity are inextricably linked to the social. In The Psychic 
Life of Power (1997) Butler writes in reference to Foucault that no individual is a subject 
without being previously subjected to a »subjectification« through cultural discourses (Butler 
1997, p 11). In the Handbook of Race, Racism, and the Developing Child (2008) the editors 
Stephen M. Quintana and Clark McKown understand that sometime between being born 
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and becoming an adult, children are racialised and express racial views in varying ways 
(Quintana & McKown 2008, pp. 6-7). Therefore, the following section, before continuing to 
examine memory and the narratives of racial subjectivation, looks into the subject of 
childhoods, identity and racialisation. 
 Similar to the notion of »Race«, childhood is a fairly modern concept, heavily 
influenced by early Enlightenment thought, namely English philosopher and physician 
John Locke (1693) and the Romantic period (Hendrick 1997, p. 35). Locke saw children as a 
tabula rasa, as a clean and empty slate awaiting its inscription with data from the adults 
(ibid.). The Genevan writer and philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who heavily influenced 
thoughts on childhood and education throughout Europe, disagreed with Locke and 
assumed that children had a natural, inherent goodness, that childhood was a phase of 
innocence which needed a particular protection and support (ibid.). Rousseau even drew 
parallels between children, guided by their nature, learning to negotiate the ways of the 
social and becoming an adult, and »noble savages«, similarly guided by their nature, who 
ultimately become civilized people (James & Prout 1997, p.10). In other words, Rousseau 
assumed that children were innocent and then became corrupted by either people in their 
vicinity or wider society, an assumption which resonates with the idea that children are also 
innocent in regard to racism and are only turned racist by openly racist parents. However, 
research indicates that this common belief that »children are naturally naïve to race and that 
they are taught to be racist by parents turn out to be simply wrong« (Quintana & McKown 2008, 
p. 1). 
 Analogous to »Race«, class, gender etc., most modern sociologist and educational 
scientists view childhood not as universal to all human societies, and therefore socially 
constructed. Simultaneously, childhood cannot be completely separated from social 
constructs such as aforementioned concepts in the analysis of social settings. Additionally, 
contrary to common notions of childhood, children are not solely recipients of subjectivation 
but also actively participate and construct their environment and social structures within 
their means (James & Prout 1997, p. 8). In Constructing and Deconstructing Childhood (1997) 
Allison James and Alan Prout conclude that »[c]omparative and cross-cultural analysis reveals 
a variety of childhoods rather than a single universal phenomenon« (James & Prout 1997, p. 8). 
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Therefore, I also use the concept of childhoods in plural, in order to highlight the different 
locations where the research participants grew up. 
 Nevertheless, Rousseau’s romantic notion of childhood created the basis for 
developmental psychology, which initially focussed on the psychological development of 
the child but was later expanded to include adolescence and adulthood. Though it would 
exceed the limits of this dissertation to go in-depth into the different theories of 
developmental psychology, I summarise a few of the concepts of (racial) identity 
development.  
 The concept of racialisation relies somewhat on the idea of an external and internal 
(Wijeyesinghe & Jackson 2012, p. 3). An external racialised world creates an internal 
racialised subject identity, vice versa an internal racialised subject identity re-creates an 
external racialised world (ibid.). However, a subject has a plethora of identities, so simply 
looking at racial identity means a flattening of identity development, a criticism highlighted 
by the emergence of the concept of intersectionality (ibid.). Intersectionality »emphasizes that 
identity development in one area (race[…]) cannot be viewed as occurring outside of, or separate 
from, the developmental processes of other social identities (such as gender, class, sexual orientation, 
and religious/faith tradition) within individuals« (Wijeyesinghe & Jackson 2012, p. 3). 
Be that as it may, how do subject identities develop and how do racial subject identity 
develop at that? Psychology generated some identity development theories, for example 
Jean Piaget (1963), Erik Erikson (1959/1994) and James Marcia (1966/1980). When engaging 
with child development, it is difficult to get past Jean Piaget’s ground-breaking work on 
cognitive development. Piaget, a Swiss psychologist and theorist, argues that children adapt 
to environments through either assimilation, the passive acceptance of environmental 
circumstances or accommodation, the active modification of environmental circumstances. 
Piaget suggests four stages of cognitive development, building on each other: birth to age 2 
sensorimotor stage, age 2 to age 7 preoperational, age 7 to age 11 concrete-operational, and 
age 11 to age 15 formal-operational stage (Flavell & Piaget 1963). Erikson and Marcia who 
focussed more on emotional development and crisis rather than cognitive development 
extended their model into adulthood. Transferring both developmental psychologists’ 
notions of identity development onto racial identity development, educational scientist 
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Kristen A. Renn concludes that »racialized beings, then, people develop both self-sameness in terms 
of racial identity and a shared racial identity with others of the same group« (Renn 2012, p. 15) and 
»[a]chieved racial identity results from exploration or crisis related to racial identity and 
commitments made to having and expressing racial identity in particular ways« (Renn 2012, p. 16). 
Psychological identity development theories focus on the individual and less on the social. 
In addition, these development theories seem to lack the perspective and experience of 
BIPOC though. 
Sociology also offers an alternative model of identity development differing from 
psychological ones. George Herbert Mead (1934), US-American sociologist and philosopher, 
believed that the mind-body dichotomy needed to be transcended and argued that the mind 
was born in the social interactions between human bodies. Mead did not see the mind as 
something that existed separately somewhere in the ether from the body, he saw the mind 
as part of the body and the body as part of the mind (Mead 1972 [1934], pp. 139-140). In 
other words, without our bodies, our brains etc. we would not be able to meaningfully 
interact with each other; at the same time, without meaningful interaction, we would be 
unable to internalise any significant symbols. Similarly, Jewish German sociologist Norbert 
Elias developed in his ground-breaking work The Civilizing Process (1939) the notion of the 
social habitus (which was later further developed by Pierre Bourdieu). The social habitus 
describes habits of thinking, feeling and acting that are common to members of a figuration 
(synonymous with social personality structure: the psychological characteristics common to 
the members of a group) and as personal habitus the individual that develops from it their 
personality structure (Elias 1994). Elias describes the concept of the habitus as reciprocal, as 
forming society and as being formed by society (Elias 2006, p. 322). Transferring Elias’ 
notion of identity development (or habitualisation) onto the concept of racialisation, racial 
identity development could then be described as lifelong process of personal racial 
psychogenesis, as sub-processes in the long-term process context of racial psychogenesis 
and racial sociogenesis of a racialised society. I return to Elias later in this section. 
Similarly, social psychology offers a useful model of racial identity development 
based on an article from social psychologists Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius Possible Selves 
(1986). In the article the authors argue that a person’s imagined future self, whether ideal or 
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the one they are trying to avoid becoming, offers a conceptual link between motivation and 
cognition (Markus & Nurius 1986). Transferring the concept of the possible selves onto 
racial identity development, it could be concluded that »a person’s hoped for and feared possible 
selves may lead him or her into groups that encourage exploration and commitment to a particular 
racial identity« (Renn 2012, p. 18). Correspondingly, the Human or Developmental Ecology, 
developed by psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner (1979)‚ places a person’s development also 
into a social setting. By using the PPCT-Model32, Bronfenbrenner developed a conceptual 
tool of analysing in particular the transitions and processes (not so much the outcomes) a 
person experiences while moving between and being influenced by different systems (Kail 
& Cavanaugh 2010). In regard to the Human or Developmental Ecology theory Renn 
concludes that the »PPCT model provides a rich, multidimensional approach to examining how 
development occurs and how, for example, two mixed-race individuals of the same racial heritage 
might develop different racial identities« (Renn 2012, p. 20). 
 The influence of poststructuralism on humanities and social sciences also focuses on 
processes and questions the idea of a fixed identity which could be the outcome of a finished 
identity. Poststructuralist theorists such as Derrida or Foucault assume that identities are 
socially constructed and therefore constantly deconstructed and reconstructed (Renn 2012, 
p. 22, Gergen 1991). In A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory (2003) Nikki Sullivan writes: 
 
»Poststructuralism is most often associated with a rejection, or at least a critique, of humanist logic and 
aspirations. It therefore involves a rethinking of concepts such as ›meaning‹, ›truth‹, ›subjectivity‹, ›freedom‹, 
›power‹, and so on. Poststructuralist theorists such as Foucault argue that there are no objective and universal 
truths, but that particular forms of knowledge, and the ways of being that they engender, become ›naturalised‹, 
in culturally and historically specific ways. For example, Judith Butler, and Monique Wittig argue (in slightly 
different ways) that heterosexuality is a complex matrix of discourses, institutions, and so on, that has become 
normalised in our culture, thus making particular relationships, lifestyles, and identities, seem natural, ahistorical, 
and universal. In short, heterosexuality, as it is currently understood and experienced, is a (historically and 
culturally specific) truth-effect of systems of power/knowledge. Given this, its dominant position and current 
configuration are contestable and open to change« (Sullivan 2003, p. 39).  
 
In her essay The Simultaneity of Identities Evangelina Holvino (2012) explores 
poststructuralist theory in view of racial identity development and assumes that 
transnational feminism »conceptualizes gender, class, race, sexuality, and nationality as complex 
 
32 (Process: interactions between a developing person and it’s close surroundings such as people and cultural signifiers; 
Person: the person and it’s individual characteristics, its social positioning [including »Race« and Gender] and personality 
traits; Context: the ecosystem the person lives in, divided into microsystem [i.e. family, school], mesosystem [i.e. 
interactions between caretakers and school], exosystem [i.e. mass media, local politics], and macrosystem [i.e. culture]) 
(Kail & Cavanaugh 2010). 
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and simultaneous social processes and discursive constructions that produce inequality« (Holvino 
2012, p. 166). Holvino further theorises that social differences are viewed as relational 
(Holvino 2012, p. 167). In other words, there is no such thing as a BIPOC or a White »Race«, 
»Race« only exists in the »relational arrangement« (Holvino 2012, p. 167) and varies at 
different places (and different times) in the world. In Western societies BIPOC and White 
only exist in a discursive binary opposition, without the other, the other one cannot exist, 
they are bound up together in a dialectic, like the left and the right. Without the left, there 
is no right, without BIPOC, there is no White and vice versa. So BIPOC only exists in relation 
to White and the other way around, but also because it can be differentiated from it. Holvino 
continues to state: 
 
»Second, differences are socially constructed. They reflect the socially attributed meanings to specific dimensions 
of human differences that have been signaled as important in a given society. Thus, gender or race or ethnicities 
are not intrinsic or innate physical, psychological, or cultural attributes. Instead, race, gender, and ethnicity are 
the meanings attributed to differences of sex, phenotypes, or culture, in specific social contexts. These meanings 
are shaped by socialization practices, organizational and institutional arrangements, belief systems, and language 
itself« [original emphasis] (Holvino 2012, pp. 167-168). 
  
Holvino then further writes: 
 
»Third, differences also construct who we are and are important elements of our subjective identity (…). There is 
not an essential (ungendered or unraced) ›self ‹ that humans possess, which is then ›tarnished‹ by gender 
stereotypes, socialization patterns, or the media. Subjectivity, how we think of ourselves as social beings, is 
always in the making and individuals actively participate in constructing their identities. But subjectivity is also 
shaped by gender beliefs and structures embedded in society, and these beliefs are inseparable from our self-
identity« [original emphasis] (Holvino 2012, p. 168).  
 
Transferred onto the subject of racial identity development, I would add that subjectivity is 
also shaped by racial beliefs and structures in society, and these beliefs also cannot be 
separated from our self-identity. Holvino then concludes that poststructuralist theory and 
transnational feminism help to understand that »identity refers to how differences signify 
relations of power« (Holvino 2012, p. 167). 
 Social researchers, who collected empirical data on young children and their learned 
perceptions of racial differences, also saw the value of a social and relational approach 
towards racial identity development (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001, pp. 17-25). Children, so 
these social researchers argue, »like adults, become human beings in interaction with other 
human beings« [original emphasis] (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001, p. 1). Furthermore, research 
suggests that children take racial cues from their social environment and then try to weave 
those cues into their everyday life, through interacting with adults and other children (Van 
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Ausdale & Feagin 2001, p. 20). Adults wrongly assume that children do not know what they 
are doing, in particular when they act racially explicit (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001, pp. 2-
3). Sometimes children even expose certain racial phenomena unaware of the taboos 
surrounding the subject of »Race« (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001, p. 21). By the reactions of 
the adults, they also learn though, that »Race« matters should not be discussed too openly 
or they will cause discomfort or shame (ibid.). The social researchers also observed that in 
particular the White children were actively participating in the construction of the racial 
order, with the information they had gathered from their (adult) social environment (ibid.): 
 
»A key part of our argument is that children learn by doing, not just by parroting the views of adults. The cultural 
past of racialized language and thought is constantly pressed on children from the outside, but it is the active 
construction of racial concepts and ideas that is central to their lives. In everyday social interaction children utilize 
the surrounding culture’s features and tools in their own ways to create individual and social realities. This use of 
culture in interaction reinforces the meanings of new ideas and concepts in their active minds. While most racial 
and ethnic concepts are initially conveyed from the outside, children internalize the concepts most completely 
when they use them in regular or recurring interactions where they can observe the effects that such usage has 
on other children and on adults. By using racialized language in social contexts, children develop their own 
individuality in relation to others, garner attention from other children and adults, and – at least in the case of the 
dominant group – develop a strong sense of power over others. The ›doing‹ of racial and ethnic matters is what 
embeds these things strongly in their minds« (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001, p. 23). 
 
As a sociologist (and educational scientist) a leaning towards an Eliasian approach of 
identity development allows to examine how a racially structured society is reflected and 
re-affirmed in the psyche of racial subjectivities and vice versa. In The Civilizing Process Elias 
writes: 
 
»The behaviour patterns of our society, imprinted on individuals from early childhood as kind of second nature 
and kept alert in them by a powerful and increasingly strictly organized social control, are to be explained, it has 
been shown, not in terms of general, ahistorical human purposes, but as something which has evolved from the 
totality of Western history, from the specific forms of behaviour that developed in its course and the forces of 
integration which transformed and propagated them. These patterns, like the whole control of our behaviour, like 
the structure of our psychological functions in general, are many-layered: in their formation and reproduction 
emotional impulses play their part no less than rational ones, drives and affects no less than ego functions. It has 
long been customary to explain the control to which individual behaviour is subject in our society as something 
essentially rational, founded solely on logical considerations. Here it has been seen differently« (Elias 2000, p. 
441).  
 
How is this second nature, this imprinting of racial behavioural patterns experienced and 
narrated by anti-racism and empowerment practitioners? Elias’ work is crucial in exploring 
where a racialised psyche automatically constructs a racialised society with racialised 
bodies (to a certain extent without even being aware of it), as I argue (Dalal 2002). The group 
matrix, which is a central teaching of group analysis (Foulkes 1973) can be described as an 
»intersubjective field within which the group operates, a ›field effect‹ which is primarily unconscious 
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and, which interconnects all people in a network, in which they ›meet, communicate and interact‹. 
(Foulkes and Anthony, 2003: 26)« (Kinouani 2019, p. 64). Guilaine Kinouani applies in her 
essay Difference, whiteness and the group analytic matrix: an integrated formulation (2019) the 
Foulkesian group matrix concept onto whiteness and states: 
 
»A formulation of whiteness, as a significant group analytic variable may help analysts better understand how it 
may become reproduced within the key interlinked levels of the matrix including, 1) at micro or individual level: 
within the personal matrix; 2) at interactional level: within the dynamic matrix; 3) at macro level: within the 
foundation matrix and finally; 4) at the historico-symbolic level within the social unconscious« (Kinouani 2019, p. 
66). 
 
In other words, »Race« as a cultural discourse thus consciously and unconsciously shapes 
the lives of almost everyone in society, White and BIPOC. Lawrence Hirschfeld’s studies 
with young children »demonstrate that by three years of age, children have a much more adult-like 
understanding of race, and particularly racial essentialism, than previous scholars have credited them 
with« (Hirschfeld 1997, p 83). Racialisation thus begins at a very early stage, at a stage of our 
development in which we are unable to make an informed choice as to whether or how we 
want to be subjected to this cultural/racial imprinting. In this way, »Race«, Whiteness and 
the racialised »Other« are socially constructed. Their reproduction is determined by a 
culture of non-perception, in which the positioning of people in society is recognised as 
common sense. Therefore, it could be argued that the lives of White people and BIPOC are 
formed by »Race«. This process of racial identity formation, how is it remembered? Before 
I delve into the memories of racialisation from the research participants, I explore the 
concepts of memory and remembering. 
 
 
Forgetting, silencing and remembering 
 
In a discussion that bell hooks had with Gloria Steinem at Eugene Lang College 2014 for the 
New School Event bell hooks: Transgression the Black feminist famously said: »Patriarchy has 
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no gender«33. There are numerous ways of understanding this statement, one could be that 
even in the absence of males* women* can uphold patriarchal structures or that men* can 
also be damaged by patriarchy, albeit differently from women* (or feminities). Similarly, 
the feminist Frigga Haug (1990) explored through memory work how women learn to be 
complicit in patriarchy, thereby questioning the perpetrator/victim dichotomy. Haug 
suggests that memory work is subjective that the process of remembering also relies on how 
the subject looks at the world they are imbedded into (Haug 1990, p. 7). Further Haug states 
that the subjects attempt to create a consistent and logical narrative about their self when 
they remember (Haug 1990, p. 42). This leaves into question how accurate our memories 
are, since the process of identity development is probably far from being coherent and 
logical. Most likely it is marred with contradictions, breaks and incomprehensible decisions. 
At the same time, the (racialised or gendered) structures surrounding the subject create a 
choice of memories which are favoured or unfavoured, a point that is underpinned in 
Connerton’s work (2008). How then would the subject even be able to remember, if the pool 
of unfavourable memories is far more difficult to access? Haug asks a similar question and 
has a suggestion: 
 
»In fact, the constructedness of the social and within that of our selves plunges us into a dilemma if we want to 
research in and with our memories. The great unity of subject and object in research also means entanglement. 
We are not used to being socially aware; our prioritisation is already an ideological product. The very fact that we 
want to question valuations, re-evaluate, means that we somehow have to pull ourselves out of the swamp like 
Munchausen – by our own hair. Unlike him, however, we are many; the project can succeed with mutual support« 
[my own translation] (Haug 1990, p. 63). 
 
How can entanglements of the subject in the net of cultural imprints and societal silences, 
be overcome by the subject that intends to liberate itself from it? To do this on its own seems 
rather difficult, as Haug describes it. Remembering and reflecting on the past can be 
supported by social spaces of shared experiences, where memories can be retrieved and 
reviewed from different angles. 
 In his essay Seven Types of Forgetting (2008) Paul Connerton explores various forms of 
failed memory retrieval. One type of forgetting that Connerton examines is »Repressive 
 





Erasure«: English people, who like to perceive themselves as conquerors of a vast (now lost) 
Empire, erased the fact that they were once colonised themselves by the Normans 
(Connerton 2008, p. 60). Similarly, this could be applied to racialised subject identities. In 
order to function in racial power structures, White people, who are constructed as most 
human in the racial hierarchy have erased the memory of being dehumanised themselves. 
It could also be perceived as a form of »forgetting as humiliated silence« (Connerton 2008, pp. 
68-69) as the sometimes painful and shameful initiation into a racial culture with Whiteness 
at its centre (Thandeka 1999) could be understood as a process causing suffering that the 
subjectivated child, either White or BIPOC, prefers not to remember. 
 In his book How Societies Remember (1989) Connerton makes an interesting additional 
point on memory and bodies. Here Connerton argues that the cultivation of habits signifies 
the understanding of the body. In addition to this, Connerton argues that the body is not 
only discursively constructed, it is »also socially constituted in the sense that it is culturally 
shaped in its actual practices and behaviour« (Connerton 1989, p. 104). This may help to 
understand how the memory of racialisation is sedimented in the body. Racial power 
structures are therefore not only inscribed into our bodies, they are also embodied and 
transmitted with our body-language (Meulenbelt 1988, Weisbuch et Al. 2009). This could be 
relevant also in the non-verbal transmission of racial culture from generation to generation 
that makes the internalisation of racial power structures even less conscious and traceable 
(Volkan et Al. 2014). 
 In the very centre of my notion of empowerment stands the retrieving and 
addressing of mostly painful memories related to racial subjectivation. The importance of 
this retrieving lies in its capacity to allow the deconstruction of socio-psychological 
structures (beginning from within) of mostly denied and repressed racialising memories. It 
is these memories, which, even if they may not be trauma themselves act very similar to trauma in 
their manifestations. Remembering these memories allows us to understand how they shape 
our actions in the present and therefore opens the possibility of adjusting our behaviour to 
a more inclusive notion of humanness. 
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s intriguing book Silencing the Past (1995) points out the 
importance of the notion of power within the perception of the Haitian Revolution amongst 
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Western historians, as well as the Haitian collective memory. According to Trouillot, 
historicity suffers from the dilemma of being conceptualised either positivist (meaning: 
scientific, discovering truths, factual, objective) or constructivist (meaning: narrative, 
constructing truths, fictitious, subjective), while the Haitian historian sees the »truth« 
somewhere in the middle (Trouillot 1995, pp. 4-6). This positivist/constructivist dilemma 
complicates the whole idea of remembering or memorising personal and particularly 
collective memories. If collective memories of racialisation processes are highly constructed, 
how can we claim them as true? The anti-racism or empowerment training experience, 
which I examine in the next chapter, attempts to create a safe space within which awareness 
of this racialisation process may be gained on a personal but also collective level. Without a 
clear concept of historicity, however, this personal examination might be futile as a mainly 
constructivist notion of history could fall into the trap of examining historical racial 
narratives without examining the contextual circumstances and the processes of production 
through which these narratives are formed. 
 As the moment where silences enter historical narratives, looking into the process of 
producing history is essential to understanding historicity (Trouillot 1995, p. 26). According 
to Trouillot these silences have different functions at certain historical stages. The silencing 
of the Haitian Revolution by Western historians was intended to deny Black people their 
humanness, as the acknowledgement of their revolution would have meant the 
acknowledgement of Black people as human beings with the capability, and therefore, also 
the right of self-determination (Trouillot 1995, pp. 95-107). During the Renaissance and 
Western colonial expansion, Europeans granted those perceived as Non-Europeans only a 
gradual humanness, beginning with White, Western European male, ending with Blacks 
and the rest in a confusing in-between (Trouillot 1995, p. 76). The strength, influence and 
agency of this narrative is also highlighted in the silence around the Haitian historical figure 
Sans Souci, who kept the spirit of the Haitian revolution with his eloquent guerrilla tactics 
alive, whilst many former Black revolutionaries had temporarily abandoned the project 
during the French counter invasion. The story of the Congolese Sans Souci is silenced 
because otherwise it would mean confronting unpleasant memories of racial hierarchies 
amongst Haitian revolutionaries (Trouillot 1995, p. 68). Anti-racism movements have the 
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potential danger of falling into the trap of constructing a harmonious racial history in order 
to promote unity. Is it not exactly for that reason that it is important to remember our 
personal racialisation processes, in order to become aware that we ourselves most likely did 
not live in racial harmony but rather reproduced a racial order as children (and also in other 
stages of our lives) and are thereby complicit in its pervasiveness? 
 There remains nonetheless a telling issue with Trouillot’s work. The author writes 
that »[r]emembering is not always a process of summoning representations of what happened« 
(Trouillot 1995, p. 14). Memorising is not retrieving a fixed past, as past is just a position that 
stands in relation to the present. Past is not content and has no content (Trouillot 1995, p. 
14) that can be retrieved via remembering. So, what do the research participants remember, 
when they share their personal stories of racialisation? Maybe that is exactly what the 
research participants narrate, a personal story, logical and coherent but not necessarily 
factual that explains to them, how they became racial subjects, who they were at some point 
in their life, which also explains who they are now? Having explored the concepts of 
racialisation, identity and memory, the following section examines these narratives of racial 




Being racialised as White 
 
The process of narrating a personal story is also very often a process of making meaning of 
those personal experiences (Phoenix 2008, p. 12). For example, the »small« or »big« story of 
racialisation becomes connected to the meta-narrative of the societal racial order (ibid.). This 
makes the context in which those personal narratives are developed even more important 
(ibid.). The narratives of the interviewees who participated in my research project were 
developed in the context of biographical anti-racism and empowerment work. How do anti-
racism and empowerment practitioners narrate their personal stories of racialisation? Which 
meanings do they give to their own experiences? 
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 Dre was one of the first people I interviewed for this thesis. He is a White male in his 
early 50s and works part-time as a Protestant minister. He is also acting secretary of Phoenix. 
He was with Phoenix from day one and was one of the first White trainees and later trainers 
in the early 90s. Later, around 2004 or 2005 he became less active as a trainer and got more 
and more into administrative tasks in Phoenix such as replying to emails, administering 
requests for training, planning and organising which trainers are available, and keeping a 
training schedule etcetera. Personally, Dre was the second person I met from the anti-racism 
and empowerment NGO Phoenix. He is a very tall, lean man, with a very open and friendly 
demeanour. The first time I met Dre, I was cold and distant towards him, simply because 
he is White. But I quickly grew fond of Dre, his critical reflexivity, his deep understanding 
of racism, his ability to express his thoughts in a very accessible manner. I was also 
impressed by his role as a family father, seeing – though from a distance of living in two 
separate parts of Germany – his shy children growing up into confident young adults. 
 When I asked him to tell me his story, about his personal racialisation process, he 
started with the following account: 
 
Dre: »Well, I know I ... I had picture books, where we have to colour them in. And I remember very well... um 
representations of people with grass skirts, which I loved to colour in. I remember... mud huts and so on, that was 
all in my colouring books. And I guess that was before primary school. So those are the oldest memories that I 
have, my colouring books. […] I remember quite a lot of cartoons. Classically, the cooking pot in which a white 
missionary sits, some with jokes like ›What’s for lunch today‹ and that kind of thing. Those I think I saw those in 
my parents’ TV-guide. Probably early, six, seven years old or so. Mickey Mouse, every day, […] Comics. [...] So 
the adventure stories of Donald Duck, Scrooge and his nephews Huey, Dewey and Louie in South America and 
Africa, which were always the highlights, which I always liked reading the most. And it was also very clear to me 
that I am located in South America or Africa, South America was very clear, as there were more representations 
of Native Americans, you know, feathered headdress and so on. The excursions for obtaining new raw materials 
or to steal raw materials that went to Africa, which I also recognised very clearly, by type of huts, through the 
grass skirts, arrows, animals, that was quite clear to me what this is« (Dre 11/07/2012-1 #00:14:04). 
 
Dre then continues: 
 
»Of course, not at all critical, at this stage […]. You take it all in, you soak it all up. And that shapes your perception 
of the world. And clearly, I identified with the white ducks, [laughs] so rather White and duck then Black and human 
[laughs]. […] I was delighted when somehow the adventure was successful, against the poisonous arrows and 
the people at that time were not as politically correct than they are today, so they could not speak properly and 
were also more likely... to attack the White ducks, you know. And also defended actually what belonged to them, 
but... so that was absolutely formative, clearly. And what I also read uh, was Asterix and Obelix, all titles. My late 
brother and I, we have all the books there, due to this bond I guard them jealously, but of course the stupid pirates 
were only to be topped by the even more stupid Black lookout. With his giant lips and his mighty speech 
impediment he was again set apart. […] There was no one who had ever indicated that there was something 





Dre, who grew up in the late 60s and 70s in Germany remembers only very few personal 
encounters with BIPOC, in particular Black people. He does remember however how BIPOC 
were portrayed in his colouring books, TV-magazines, Mickey Mouse comics and in Asterix 
& Obelix. Many scholars of Cultural Studies such as Hall (1992) and Katharina Oguntoye, 
May Opitz & Dagmar Schultz (1992) have critically examined and analysed this imagery. 
The mostly Black Other is represented through grass skirts, mud huts, cannibalism, a wealth 
of untapped resources, poisonous arrows, broken language and stupidity. These 
representations become signifiers for primitivism, being uncivilised, violent, lack of proper 
speech and intelligence (Oguntoye et Al. 1992, p. 127). At the same time Whiteness is 
negotiated in the binary opposition to this imagery, personified either in the White 
missionary who is being prepared as food or the (White) ducks from the Disney comics, 
who the reader mostly identifies with (ibid.). In the mirror image of the racial »Other« 
Whiteness constructs itself as modern, civilised, peaceful, proper use of language and 
(cunning) intelligence (Oguntoye et. Al. 1992, p. 167). Moreover, the Mickey Mouse comics 
can be read as an introduction to imperialism, the White adventurous ducks overcome the 
resistance of the violent, primitive natives in order to rob them of their raw materials, their 
resources that they were not using anyway (Dorfmann & Mattalart 1971, Bolaffi 2003, p. 57). 
Dre describes how he, as a child, celebrated with the ducks, when they returned from their 
adventures successfully with riches stolen from the natives. He clearly states that he 
preferred being a White duck to being a BIPOC human. In addition, he describes, how he, 
as a child, soaked these images up like a sponge; there was no critical awareness, no adult 
who he could have talked to and who could have explained to him, how problematic this 
imagery was. 
 In other words, the White child is subjected to this racialised imagery from very early 
on. Children books and comics with racialised imagery are still very much prevalent and 
available for the children’s and young people’s cultural consumption (Mätschke 2016, Stock 
2014). The racialised discourses of the primitive Other, but implicitly also of the civilised 
White people become inscribed at a very early age in the bodies and unconscious of the 
racialised subject (Rommelspacher 2009, p.30; Hirschfeld 1995; Holmes 1995; Boldaz-Hahn 
2014). Can a child be able to protect itself from racialised imagery? Does not the child’s 
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perspective on the world, on others but also on itself become racialised, like a racialised 
prism, that distorts how the child sees itself, White people and BIPOC? The Other only exists 
as a notion, only as a function, it does not act humanely, it does not speak a proper language 
(Ashcroft 2001, p. 319), the Other is less human and only needs to exist as an idea that helps 
the White subject in defining itself, particularly as superior, as more human as the racial 
Other. 
 At a different point in the interview, Dre describes the effects of this dehumanisation 
as follows: 
 
Dre: »I remember some forms where I perceived racialisation in the aftermath. That was ... so there is such a 
very unpleasant situation, which I remember well, because it recurred frequently. When I read newspaper in the 
morning, and I have begun very early to read newspaper, as a 10-year-old, and I read of an accident, and then 
went on reading and read that nobody, I’m gonna say now a little provocative, not one of us, so none of my group, 
with my current terminology, no White German was harmed or killed, then I felt a moment of relief. […] And at the 
same moment I felt a sense of bad conscience that you cannot think like that. And that happened to me for years 
like that. So I had this feeling of reassurance that none of us is, who is killed in this car accident, or whatever is 
written always in the newspaper, or bus accident, 40 dead, you will read in the heading and then you read, oh, it 
was in Turkey or, alas it was in Syria or wherever, […] and that has irritated me and that was long before the 
training, I perceived: well, it’s not quite as bad, if it’s not with us. If it’s not in Germany, if no White German was 
harmed. But immediately, virtually a millisecond later, ups, what are you thinking, you must not think so. Um ... 
that was for me actually, if I so think about it, the first emotional access, without being able to reflect intellectually 
to the feeling you’re somehow grown into this distinction, we and the others. And not just as a seemingly objective 
criterion, but certainly very subjective. You’re attached a lot more to the »we« then to the »Other« […]. So, what 
happens in Africa, is not as bad as what happens in White Europe« (Dre 11/07/2012-1 #00:11:12). 
 
Dre describes another very common phenomenon of the racialisation process. Through 
racialisation the empathy he feels with other human beings becomes selective. Dre describes 
how he feels more pain and loss, when the person or people in the news who suffered 
terrible accidents are White subjects. At the same time, Dre describes a feeling of relief, when 
the person or the people who died were BIPOC. Interestingly, perhaps through his Christian 
Protestant upbringing, the research participant also feels guilty and bad about this. Feeling 
guilty however, does not seem to change that Dre feels like this for a very long time. Butler 
also describes (2004) how the misrepresentation of the racial Other (in her books it is the 
Muslim Other) makes us mourn the death of BIPOC far less than the death of White people. 
 Dehumanisation is also the main topic in Judith Butler’s essay Precarious life (2004). 
Using Levinas’ philosophical concept of the face, Butler examines how the US American 
public was manipulated by the State through the media’s selective representation of US 
military successes and a selective broadcasting before and during the Afghanistan war 
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(Butler 2004, p. 131). She summarises how images of young Afghan women dropping their 
veil were represented as a triumph, as a success in the colonial civilising mission (Butler 
2004, p. 143). Butler discusses how the faces of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein 
became iconographies of inhuman evil; and how images proving the disastrous impact on 
the civilians caused by this mission civilisatrice were withheld and censored in order to avoid 
public outrage and resistance to the war in Afghanistan (Butler 2004, p. 141). Butler explains 
the power of these mechanisms as follows:  
 
»These are two distinct forms of normative power: one operates through producing a symbolic identification of 
the face with the inhuman, foreclosing our apprehension of the human in the scene; the other works through 
radical effacement, so that there never was a human, there never was a life, and no murder has, therefore, ever 
taken place. In the first instance, something that has already emerged into the realm of appearances needs to be 
disputed as recognizably human; in the second instance, the public realm of appearance is itself constituted on 
the basis of the exclusion of that image« (Butler 2004, p. 147). 
 
Butler further explores how those having or gaining the power of self-representation are 
most likely to be recognised as humans (Butler 2004, p. 141). This notion of recognition is 
also reflected in Dre’s perception of the racial Other, whose deaths seem far less tragic, albeit 
not without feeling conflicted. What could this conflictedness mean? Why does Dre not just 
feel content about the way he perceives the racial Other? Could this be explained with his 
Christian values or could there be something else? Butler’s use of Lévinasian theory paves 
the way for exploring those questions. Lévinas argued that a human subject can only 
understand their own humanity through the humanity of others (Lévinas 2003 [1972]). It 
could then also be argued that if the human subject dehumanises the other, they fail to 
understand their own humanness. Interestingly, Dre describes the moment, when he 
realises as a child, how he feels about the lives of the BIPOC humans, as shameful, as in his 
own words: »you must not think so« (Dre 11/07/2012-1 #00:11:12). 
 In a focus group I conducted, seven trainers and co-trainers,34 also shared some of 
their memories related to racialisation. They mostly work in the political education sector 
with young people, one of them works as a social worker. Some, including Ryan, grew up 
in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). I met Ryan for the first time when he 
was still facilitating workshops and training for young people who were planning to go 
abroad for a few months or a year. He joined Phoenix a short time before I moved back to 
 




Berlin and I got to know him more in the TTT (Train the Trainers/Trainees). He was in his 
20s, usually with a very short beard on his face. There was a softness about him, his 
masculinity and his manners were very pleasant to be around. At some point Ryan crossed 
some boundaries, which caused tension in the TTT, but he redeemed himself over time. 
 When I asked the focus group to tell me their stories, Ryan recalls: 
 
Ryan: »I think in my case, it was an East-West thing, so I was socialised in the East and then in the West, that I 
in the East, when I think back, so it’s of course from a current perspective, probably distorted but I had the feeling 
that I... I had little contact with POC people. I can remember none from my childhood in Dessau. The only people 
who were perceived as foreigners, were the Russian soldiers. I... I grew up right next to Russian barracks. And 
of course, it was somehow very martial. And there were just soldiers like that. And there were also many 
stereotypes against them, in everyday discourse. It was always clear as a child already, as a small child: ›Be 
careful!‹ […] But otherwise there were also these typical socialist racial images: ›There are different races and 
we are all brothers and sisters. But there are different races.‹ They were also in my children’s books, Bummi for 
example. […] And always the three colours: yellow ... or? Yes: red, yellow, black and white« (Ryan, Focus Group, 
11/01/2015-2 #00:21:12). 
 
Ryan describes a perceived physical absence of BIPOC in the former East where he grew 
up. This is not unlikely, there were small numbers of BIPOC living in the GDR from other 
socialist countries such as Vietnam, Angola and Cuba (Slobodian 2015). The number of these 
mainly workers and BIPOC students was insignificant and many of them lived in 
accommodations isolated from the main White German population (ibid.). However, the 
presence of BIPOC is mostly irrelevant when it comes to racialisation, crucial is being in 
touch with the dominant discourses about racial Others, for example, through media 
representations (Graves 2007, pp. 299-301). Nevertheless, through the presence of the 
Russian soldiers who were stationed all over the former GDR, Ryan was already 
familiarised in his early childhood with an everyday discourse about a racial, strange and 
violent Other. Yes, they were soldiers, so their martialness seems intrinsic, but the everyday 
discourse about them seems to imply that even civilians, small children could be 
endangered by them, and therefore, it was paramount to be careful around them. 
Simultaneously, this discourse was in contradiction to a socialist ideal of a siblinghood of 
the »red, yellow, black and white« races, a »Race« theory which stands as a continuation of 
colonial racial theorists’ thinking, such as that of Gobineau and Blumenbach. Gobineau’s 
and Blumenbach’s pseudoscientific »Race« theories were also adopted by Enlightenment 
thinkers such as Hegel and Kant, proclaiming the superiority of the White »Race« to the 
other »Races« (Eze 2007, pp. 38-40, pp. 109-112). As the former GDR understood itself as 
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antifascist, the colonial »Race« theories were seemingly stripped of their narrative of White 
supremacy and replaced by the idea of the »Races« living peacefully in social(ist) harmony 
(Slobodian 2015, p. 23). The colonial notion of the inferiority of BIPOC »Races« was 
succeeded by a racially, biologically, genetically different but equal thinking. Nevertheless, 
the notion of an essential racial other, that can be identified through whatever biological, 
racial or genetic features remains. It is only a small step from this essential difference to 
essential hierarchies (Slobodian 2015, pp. 26-27). After he fled with his family to the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1989, the remnants of these »Race« theories became less 
visible.  
 
Ryan: »And the exciting thing was that it was in ... in the West, it was different in the sense that there was not 
this discourse […] And there’s been but then... all of a sudden then, I then grew up in Aix-La-Chapelle and there 
I had very little contact with POCs, Black people. It was the suburbs where I grew up, in my school, there were 
maybe three POCs or so. From 1600 people. […] Very little. And they were very visible. So, I do not know what 
they have experienced. But they’re definitely..., it was clear that these are the POCs. And there the discourse 
was more like: ›Yes, in certain quarters of Aix-La-Chapelle you cannot go at certain times, because there are the 
Turks. The Turkish gangs are there.‹ I had never made any experience, never had any experience, but these 
were the discourses that in retrospect were different in the East, or in Dessau, at least, where I was. This indeed 
constructed a sense of otherness, thus: ›Somehow, these are strange, violent Others. With whom I’ve nothing 
to do. I do not want to have anything to do with them‹« (Ryan, Focus Group, 11/01/2015-2 #00:25:06). 
 
The seemingly dangerous presence of the Russian soldiers, was replaced by the presence of 
the »Turkish gangs«, who made it unsafe to walk through certain areas of the town at night, 
a prejudice that was never verified or falsified by personal experience, as he complied with 
the dominant narrative of staying away from them. 
 Two different levels of racialisation become apparent here. The first one has to do 
with how to relate to human diversity. The socialist propaganda turned this relationship to 
people from other countries and cultures into a »Race« relationship (Bolaffi et al. 2003, p. 
273). By employing race theories developed by Gobineau and many others, the difference 
between humans becomes naturalised and essentialised by grouping them into biological 
categories of »white, black, yellow and red races« (Banton 1998, p. 66). The socialist 
propaganda that attempts to evoke the notion of different but equal, nevertheless constructs 
the relationship between human beings into a racial relationship; it racialises the 
relationships and therefore all subjects within those relationships become racialised (Bolaffi 
et al. 2003, p. 273). The intention might be good, as in all people and cultures, no matter how 
different they are, should be respected, they are our siblings; but through racialising them, 
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the white subject becomes racialised as well. Between subject and other people stands the 
construct of »Race«. It is also fascinating how Ryan describes that when he fled to the West 
with the disintegration of the GDR, this type of racialising socialist propaganda was absent, 
but it was replaced by a different kind of »Other« with a seemingly different kind of concept 
of »Otherness«. Ryan describes how the discourse about the »racial« Other in West-
Germany mainly evolved around the dangerous »Turks«. But »Turks« are not a »Race« as 
such, Turks are nationals of Turkey generally living in Turkey. So Turkishness is not so 
much seen as a nationality but rather as an ethnicity, which in the German context is often 
used as race because the cultural component is superseded by the biological or genetic 
element (Mandel 2008, pp. 311-325). If culture had a matter in the definition of those young 
people that were part of this gang, then they would have to be considered Turkish Germans, 
but they are not, they are »Turks«. And this racialised »Turk« is described in the dominant 
discourse amongst family and peers as dangerous, violent and strange that should better be 
avoided. In other words, as Fanon describes the People of Colour who came or originated 
from Turkey are othered and dehumanised (Fanon 1964, p. 42). 
 Which effects do these discourses have on the subject? In Beyond the Masks: Race, 
Gender & Subjectivity (1995) Amina Mama concludes: 
 
»This theorisation of subjectivity implies that the discursive movements […] are accompanied by psychodynamic 
processes within the individual and vice versa: psychodynamic processes have discursive (social and historical) 
content. In other words, there is a constant resonance between psychodynamics and social experience in the 
construction and reproduction of the individual’s subjectivity. This means that both discourses (theorised as 
conveyors of history, culture and social meaning) and individual subjects are produced in a continuous dialectic, 
out of reverberations between historical-cultural and psychological conditions. Here we have a theory which 
transcends dualism because it conceptualises the individual and the social as being produced simultaneously. 
This is not to suggest that every individual change generates new discourses but that when individual changes 
are provoked by conditions that are widely experienced—such as those of race and gender—then these are more 
likely to become widespread, to gain social power and become discourses that convey culture and social meaning, 
or collective knowledges« (Mama 1995, p. 133). 
 
Liz, was also part of the focus group. Liz is a White lesbian, who joined the TTT around the 
time I returned to Germany in 2011. Her racial literacy, cognitively and emotionally, was 
absolutely astounding to me. Her brain seemed in constant overdrive and sometimes she 
would struggle to express herself coherently when she felt nervous. This made her a bit 
socially awkward, but I really appreciated her perception on training process and internal 
processes in the organisation and became something like a mentor to her. Unfortunately, 
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due to subtle toxic masculinity in Phoenix, also in the TTT, and due to health reasons, Liz 
decided to take a break from Phoenix a few years ago and has not yet returned. She still 
remained friends with other members, including me.  
 Liz grew up in West Germany, and when I asked her to tell me her story, she 
described her first experience with racialisation as follows: 
 
Liz: »This topic: ›Do not play with the grubby children.‹ Because I’d like to start with that. So, my father is a 
pastor. My mother was trained as a teacher. […] She was, is depressed […] So, directly opposite our... on the 
corner of this community park, where our house was, just on the street opposite, was just a corner house, quite 
run down. And that was called the ›Turks’ House‹. And what ... where the people actually came from, no idea, 
but that was always irrelevant. Everything was summarised under ›Turk‹. And that was just always like that. […]I 
was friends with a girl from this house. And she never wanted to, she’d totally felt inhibited to come to our plot. 
So, we always played on the road. And at some point I realised that. The white children of the neighbourhood, 
did not feel that way. […] And at some point I convinced her. […] [T]hen we just also played in our huge garden, 
this park that belonged to the church where we lived. Then at some point we had an encounter with their brothers 
or cousins or neighbourhood children. I don’t know. In any case, they totally looked at her with huge eyes that 
she played with us. ›So, you are there on the other side?!‹ And then she said: ›Yes, you can also come here« 
Or asked me: »Can they also come here‹ And I: ›Yes, of course, they can also come here‹ And that was somehow 
a funny moment. […] And then we all played there. And we went back and forth. And then [laughs] sometime, so 
the mothers or aunts wanted to pick up their children. And those church grounds were too big… so that then they 
had to come on to the land, to take their children home. Or to look where they are, or something. […] That was, 
so to speak, the news that you can play there as well. And then they were just with us. There were then several 
women, the mothers, aunts or neighbours of the children. And they would just sit on our lawn. And it was summer 
and sit there and chat. […] My mother then, was totally confused, so (laughing): ›Huh? Why are so many people 
out there at once?‹ […] And then I said: ›Mom, they are really nice. Why don’t you go there?‹ […] In any case, 
she went out of the house and they were totally kind to her, those other women. And then she totally relaxed. 
And my mother was never relaxed. And in fact she sat on the lawn, my mother... a gesture that she almost never 
does… cross-legged on the ground. And then they all laughed together. […] And that made me really happy« 
(Liz, Focus Group, 11/01/2015-3 #00:11:23). 
 
As with Ryan, in Liz’ narrative, the racial Other are the Turks. She is even aware, that it was 
unnecessary how the people defined themselves, potentially as Turkish, Kurdish, or Arab 
German. The rundown corner house they inhabited therefore was referred to as the »Turks’ 
House«. The brown bodies of the racial Other thereby become all compounded under the 
term »Turk«. Fascinating in Liz’ narrative is also that the White children seem to be able to 
move freely on the church premises that Liz and her family inhabit. The BIPOC children 
seem to be less able to do so, which Liz realised at some point, because one of her Turkish 
German friends does not want to come onto her land. How do the children learn, which 
(racial) spaces are available for them and which one’s not? Recent critical social theorists 
argue that »race and place are made in relation to one another« (Murji & Picker 2019, p. 915). Liz’ 
account highlights, how children are aware of the invisible borders of the racialised spaces 
and the spacialisation of »Race«. Liz convinces her Turkish German friend and her friends 
of Colour to join them on the church grounds, and in this moment, it seems that the invisible 
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racialised borders have been lifted and all children are allowed to play everywhere. This 
deracialisation of space even allows new encounters between the children’s caretakers. Liz 
describes a beautiful and emotional encounter her White mother has with the mothers of 
the BIPOC children that are now playing on her grounds. Liz’ mother who was very 
depressed was usually very withdrawn, quiet and unhappy. When the mother meets with 
the other parents, they treat her nicely, and it is almost as she becomes a different person, 
less inhibited, chatting and laughing. It seems like a very rare sight, which Liz talks about 
with a sense of happiness and sadness. For a few days, it seems like a curtain has been lifted, 
the quiet, silent house where nobody talks to each other is now a place full of life, with 
plenty of playmates ready at hand and even some other parents that her mother can socialise 
with. However, this deracialisation of space is only short lived, as Liz continues to narrate: 
 
 Liz: »And then I remember that I went almost always running […] from elementary school, quickly home. 
Because I was hoping that when I get home, that it would be like this again. That the garden is full, and children 
playing and so forth... busy and stuff. Not like usual: ›I alone at home and no one says anything in the house‹ 
but playing outside and there are just a lot of people, etc. And then it actually was like that for a few days, I think, 
that I could come home and I then immediately go to play. And then, someday, I quickly ran home again and 
then there was no one. Nobody. So, the whole garden was empty. Ohh, and I had totally a funny feeling, because 
I immediately thought: ›Shit, […] something happened.‹ […] And then I asked my parents, because I wanted to 
know anyway: ›What happened? Why are they all gone?‹ And I immediately knew already, that they are not 
going to answer me. […] Actually, I knew immediately what had happened: My parents had told them that: ›This 
is not a public park. There have been complaints. You cannot just sit around‹ Something like that. So, I knew 
immediately that was exactly what had happened. Or someone else had said: ›What’s going on in the church 
community garden? All these Turks hanging around there all the time. What’s going on here?‹ And I never got 
an answer. But I’m sure that was exactly what happened. So that my father and my mother, although she was 
happy, obviously happy with chatting to them and spending time with them […], she supported that« (Liz, Focus 
Group, 11/01/2015-3 #00:12:22). 
 
The moment of deracialisation and of human encounter, between the White and BIPOC 
children and parents is only fleeting. Liz returns to her house, realising that things have 
changed, have returned to the way they were before. The White German psychologist 
Ursula Wachendorfer also phrases this mechanism as White people ensuring that White spaces 
remain White (Wachendorfer 2005, pp. 530-539). When Liz demands answers to her question 
and wants to know what has happened exactly, the sole response from her parents is silence. 
The child is punished with this silence for daring to disturb and distort the colour lines that 
separate Whiteness from the others. This moment highlights how the taboo about racial 
issues are implemented at the same time with racial borders and turned into a humiliating 
silence (Connerton 2008, pp. 68-69). To assume, just because Liz was a child at that time, 
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that she is unaware of what racist processes enfold in front of her, is wrong. Liz knows or 
has a very clear idea of what has happened in that moment: somebody, presumably a White 
person came and complained to her father, the protestant minister, one of the leading figures 
of the (White) community, about the presence of the »Turkish« people on the church 
grounds. As long as White children play on the premises it is fine, as soon as BIPOC children 
play there, under the supervision of their parents, they are being told that it is not a »public 
space«, implying that they are not part of the (White) community which is allowed to move 
freely and make use of these grounds. They are not welcome in this community, they are 
disinvited from the premises, from the invitation given by the White child attempting to 
negotiate the racial boundaries. The previous racial and spatial order is maintained and 
reinforced. The racial Whiteness of the church grounds and garden is ensured by the White 
community and will not be undermined through the presence of BIPOC (Wachendorfer 
2005, p. 534). The depressed mother, despite having enjoyed the human engagement with 
the BIPOC parents, falls in line and supports the father in clearing the grounds of the 
presence of the racial Others. She supports the exclusion of these people, although they had 
probably helped her in feeling less depressed and isolated. Racial integrity trumps the 
mental and emotional well-being of the White person. It also highlights how enforcing 
White spaces impedes White people to connect to BIPOC. Liz cried and had to take short 
breaks on a few occasions during this account even though this was not the first time she 
had shared it. Her tears and her pain were also an indicator, that being subjected to 
Whiteness even as a White child causes suffering and pain (Thandeka 2000, Miller 2015, p. 
147). 
 Chi, also part of the focus group, remembered a similar racialised space in his 
hometown in southern Germany. Chi was of medium height, with dark long hair and 
usually bearded. He was skinny, but in a sporty way, and there was this non-threatening 
nervous energy about him. I got to know Chi, like Ryan and Milan in the context of political 
education, before he joined Phoenix. By the time of the interview in 2015, Chi and I had 
spent a lot of time together, since we both had children of similar age. When Chi expected 
his second child, he decided to leave the TTT, to focus more on his family. 
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 Chi’s parents were originally from Romania, his mother from a German speaking 
minority, the Transylvanian Saxons who lived for centuries in Transylvania. According to 
Chi Transylvanian Saxons are a very closed community, and marrying outside the 
community often resulted in being alienated or excluded from the family. In fact, Chi shared 
how one of his uncles, who got married to a Roma woman, got ostracised from the family 
and thereafter any sign of solidarity that Chi’s mother may have shown with this brother 
meant possible withdrawal of love from the family. Chi’s mother then moved to Germany, 
married, got divorced, re-married Chi’s father. After the children were born, Chi’s parents 
assured that the children would have German sounding names so that they would not suffer 
discrimination because of their Romanian roots, but also in order to re-gain the approval 
from the German Romanian family, since his mother had married an outsider: 
 
Chi: »I got a very German name which I think had a bit to do with this inner-familial pressure and withdrawal of 
love. It was somehow clear: ›We now came to Germany, the German children must have German names, 
everything must be washed white nicely‹. Yes, and then I also had to watch a bit somehow: ›What children I have 
in my class? What children I had a lot of contact with? In which groups of people was I hanging around? Which 
were out of the question?‹ And then again this separation after primary school that the entire POC kids who at 
the time for me were all somehow Turkish kids who naturally had all sorts of roots, from Lebanon or whatever 
that group was just called the ›Turks‹, just like that. So that was just always how we called them. And there was 
also a quarter, I’m talking about an 8,000-inhabitant village, in the end it was just a road crossing where just 
several families lived, which then somehow always was a little bit: ›Yes, that’s kind of the ghetto‹ or whatever« 
(Chi, Focus Group 11/01/2015-2 #00:54:43). 
 
Chi describes a very strong pressure to assimilate to a White Western culture, which he 
refers to as white-washing. The fear of love being withdrawn by the family as his mother 
had experienced in the Transylvanian Saxon community, is the same fear that guides him 
in kindergarten and primary school to ensure that he socialises with the »appropriate« 
children, meaning White. Gruen writes how the withdrawal of love becomes one of the first 
punishments a child experiences, which leads to further alienation and dehumanisation, in 
this case for overstepping racial boundaries by marrying a racial Outsider (the Roma 
woman married by Chi’s uncle) and even showing solidarity with those who did (Chi’s 
mother feeling empathetic with her brother who married the Roma woman) (Gruen 2001, 
p. 452). At a very early age, Chi learned to direct himself and the choice of playmates he 
makes to ensure that they fit into the »whitewashed« image his family is trying to project. 




 It is a reoccurring theme in these accounts that the racial other is being made faceless, 
a non-human, and is given no agency in defining themselves (Melter 2006, pp. 62-63). After 
primary school, when Chi progressed to a grammar school, there were no more BIPOC 
children left for him to socialise with35. Nonetheless, Chi remembers the discourse about the 
»Turks« in the little village he grew up in. The area inhabited by BIPOC was referred to 
derogatorily as the »ghetto« making it sound shabby and dangerous. Here the discourse 
about a dangerous and violent racial Other returns in the image of the »Turk«. Chi describes 
the same dehumanisation of the racialised Turkish Other as Liz and Ryan did before (Fanon 
1964, p. 42) and their narratives highlight how endemic racism is in the middle-classes, the 
centre of society (Zick 2019). 
 Milan shares a history similar to Chi’s of migration from Eastern Europe. He is tall, 
muscular and sported a hipster beard for some time. Milan was a drama teacher and would 
make me laugh with his impression of a dialect from Swabia, where he had grown up. Like 
Chi, Milan recounts a similar feeling of conforming to a felt pressure of assimilation: 
 
Milan: »I went to kindergarten and it was definitely so that... there were kids from Turkey, from Italy, from Portugal. 
Those were the migrant families. I cannot remember now if there were Black children in kindergarten. I either 
can’t remember or it is hidden somewhere. I do not know that. But what I know is... and I’m starting now more 
and more to analyse that again, even through a few hints of Chi. I have not played with them. Because they were 
the loud children. Those were the ones who made noise. These were those who were rude. That was... yes ... 
those who talked rough. Those who chatted to the girls in kindergarten, I remember that. And I would not play 
with those. On the one hand I wanted to play with them because somehow it was also cool. And from the outside 
it looked to me like: ›When they play with each other, then there is always fun.‹ And at the same time there was 
something that kept me away from them. A thought like: ›Ok, here... You will not be such a foreigner child but 
you want to be another foreigner child.‹ And I was mega-well behaved child already in kindergarten. Extremely 
well behaved. And all the chaos these other children made... I was rather one who, when they leave a mess, I 
was just the one who got to then somehow clean up all that stuff alone. (Laugh)  
 
Ryan: He still does that (all laughing)« (Milan, Focus Group 11/01/2015-2 #01:02:13). 
 
 
When Milan arrived in southern Germany from Serbia at the age of three, he did not only 
perceive a difference in the cultural backgrounds of the children, he also perceived that 
some of them behaved differently from the White German children. He knew he was also a 
»foreigner child« as (German) BIPOC children were referred to in the 80s and early 90s. Very 
fascinating is the process that Milan describes of making a decision of what kind of a 
»foreigner child« he is going to be. Milan decides to become their opposite, not loud and 
 
35 The German school system maintains and amplifies social inequalities significantly (Schindler 2017). In particular Turkish 
German pupils are still disadvantaged by the German education system (Alba et Al. 2017). 
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rowdy, but quiet and well behaved. He assimilates to the expectation of a well-behaved 
child in order to not be associated with the »problematic« BIPOC children and confirms into 
a White norm of tameness and compliance, the dominant racial narrative. The social-
psychological process of racialisation manifests itself here in face of the possible self that 
Milan is trying to avoid becoming (Nurius & Markus 1986; Renn 2012, p. 18), thereby 
limiting his choices of who he could be. Three or four-year-old Milan, when confronted with 
the choice of being perceived as White or a non-White foreigner, instinctively chooses 
Whiteness, highlighting how the assimilation to Whiteness functions through internalising 
its codes and core values (Kilomba 2008, p. 124). 
 
Milan: »And then we’re out of Wangen, and moved to a small village, Emzell and wound up there with my 
Grandpa and his new wife or girlfriend, just to live for some time. In a house where above us was a Turkish 
family. And I could play with Mohammed and Emine out there, but I can only remember two or three times, in 
which where we were up in their flat. And we have lived there for several years. So that must have been because 
my parents obviously made sure of it. And my sister has now recently confirmed when I talked to her about it a 
few days ago, that my parents made sure that we did not have contact with these ... with the Turkish family. And 
that was ... that was kind of strange because I do not understand until now why, why, why« (Milan, Focus Group 
11/01/2015-2 #01:07:41). 
 
Even when they moved to a new neighbourhood and were neighbours to a Turkish German 
family who had children their age, the parents ensured that Milan and his sister do not 
become close friends with them. In Milan’s narrative, we encounter clearly defined colour 
lines that the parents try to uphold and the children adapt to. Again, it is the dependency of 
the child to its parents, its fear of losing their love and care that is used here to uphold these 
racial barriers (Gruen 2000, p. 14). Milan’s perception of the past also shows how distraught 
he feels about it, how painful this experience is to him. He asks himself many times »why« 
his parents did that to him, highlighting also the pain a person suffers, being subjected to 
Whiteness. 
 Another account of Dre highlights the violence that comes along with racialisation 
processes. As a teenager, Dre had a conversation with his father about the N-word36: 
 
Dre: »I grew up in a protestant congregation. There were, of course, critical thinkers. And we also knew so to 
speak, what is politically correct and not politically correct. We knew of course that word ›negro‹ is not correct. 
And I remember very well a quarrel with my father, who was born in 1937 and grew up in a very different situation, 
he would naturally still speak of ›Negroes‹. And I told him at the age of 16, well before the training: ›Listen, this is 
unacceptable but that is abusive language‹. And my father then responded to me with an immense vehemence 
 
36 The word »Neger_in« in Germany has the double meaning of »negro« and »nigger« (Arndt 2011, p. 653-657). I chose 
to translate it here as the former. 
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that I did not know from him. So, I actually never had stress with my father, really never, we’ve actually always 
had a good relationship. But in this a situation, it completely escalated, when I said: ›Hey Dad, that’s wrong what 
you’re saying‹. And so, at the age of 16 you dare indeed some things and he has really defending it aggressively. 
And I remember very well, also as a form of violence, which escalated means, we actually had a physical 
altercation. The only time in my whole life that we actually had a physically altercation. And it was only about, can 
you say that word or not. And he, with all his authority, and he did not hurt me, but he actually raised his hand 
against the 16-year-old son, because I said that what he was ... that word that he uses must not be said. And he 
defended it. And that impressed me, really still, when I think about it. These are so ... so highlights I would not say 
rather low points in life, that remain somewhere, even with a bad memory. I mean, there I experienced the violence 
of racism through cultural imprinting in my family situation and I experienced a situation that I never had before 
with my father. No other argument ever really escalated. [...] No other situation was comparable with that one and 
we never talked about it again afterwards« (Dre 11/07/2012-1 #00:08:04). 
 
Dre touches upon a public debate here that had its peak in German media around 2012-13: 
whether it is correct to refer to Black people using the N-word. Dre has this conversation 
with his father when he was 16, around the late '70s, and the debate escalates quickly. Dre 
tries to convince his father that the use of the N-word is wrong. His father, who was born in 
1937, meaning in his early years he must have been subjected to drastically hyper-racialising 
Nazi-propaganda, defends the use of this derogatory term. However, at some point the 
discussion becomes even more heated and Dre and his father have their first and only 
physical fight over the expression. On some level there is the dynamic of the teenager 
questioning the parent’s authority, to which the father responds with raising the pressure, 
in the end physically. It is still interesting, that the discussion about this racialising 
expression seems to be the only physical fight the White teenaged son has with his White 
parent. Symbolically, the teenager questions the defining power of Whiteness. The N-word 
has been used in Germany as a derogatory term for centuries in the colonial language to 
locate Black people in a certain position within society (Kilomba 2008, pp. 94-97). The 
teenager exclaims that this practice is wrong, the father disagrees and starts to physically 
defend the defining power of Whiteness. Symbolically the father turns into a guardian of a 
racialising language saying through his violent action that Whiteness should under no 
circumstances let go of the power of defining the racialised Other. Could the violence that 
the White father subjects his White child to be the same symbolical violence the White father 
experienced as a child when he was initiated into racialised (Nazi/White supremacist) 
discourses? Maybe the father never reflected upon his own racialisation process and was 
therefore more likely to subject his own children to the same violence unconsciously. In 




»At the intrapsychic level, however, the need for constant reaffirmation can be attributed to the fact that the 
individual never entirely jettisons earlier positions. Rather it would seem that the individual is in some sense the 
sum of all the positions (discursive and psychodynamic) that he or she has ever been in. Even if nothing is ever 
absolutely forgotten—and we are made up of all the former selves we have been in our personal history—clearly 
not all these positions continuously coexist at the same level of our subjective experience. This is where we need 
a theory of the unconscious. Subjectivity can then be conceptualised as being multilayered, with deeper levels 
that are less accessible to the conscious mind containing material that has been repressed, either with the 
passage of time and the constant laying down of new material, or because the material is anxiety-provoking, a 
sense of unease having been the initial cause of its being split off and repressed« (Mama 1995, p. 134). 
 
Mama further states: 
 
»This observation concurs with psychodynamic theory, since according to this, splitting and repression does not 
eliminate the rejected aspects of one’s past object relations. Even the projective processes provide no final 
solution. Instead, repressed material, particularly when associated with high levels of emotion or anxiety, 
continues to affect individuals, and this can be observed in the course of their relationships with other people« 
(Mama 1995, p. 134). 
 
The situation, which Dre describes sadly as one of the lowest points of his relationship to 
his father, remains a taboo. It never reoccurred and they never spoke about that situation 
again. It was pushed into the realm of the unspeakable, probably similar to the father’s own 
racial subjectivation. Mama concurs that the subject’s repressed past is not gone, but it has 
an impact on the subject’s affects, in the way, how the subject relates to others. In the case 
of Dre’s father, the emotions that came to front in the discussion of the use of a derogatory 
racialising word, were expressed in physical violence. 
 The fight could also have been about the moral authority the teenaged son claims in 
that moment. Dre even said it himself at some point in the interview:  
 
Dre: »This discussion about the N-word, it is not a lot, just the question can you use a word or not. Not more. It is 
just a moral lead, a kind of moral finger pointing, it is not about questioning a system of thinking« (Dre 11/07/2012-
1 #00:18:57). 
 
Dre in retrospect questions his own motivation as a teenager in starting this discussion. He 
says that moral reasons or simply political correctness were not sufficient to explain why it 
would be necessary to stop using the term. More so, Dre sees the use of the word as related 
to a system of thinking. Elias viewed language as »intimately bound up with experience: that 
language forms and constrains one’s experience – not only of the internal but also of the psychological 
world« and »by examining the structures of language and society, we discover something about 
the structures of the emotions and psyche« (Dalal 2002, p. 135). In other words, if the language 
of the society we live in is racialised then so will be our thinking and vice versa. The 
racialised language is signified in Dre’s example with the use of the N-word. Can moral 
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reasons or political correctness suffice in changing this? How can a de-racialisation of our 
thoughts look like that could result in de-racialising our language? The de-racialisation of 
our language will most likely help and accelerate the process of de-racialising our thinking. 
How is it possible for the racialised subject to understand what the personal racialisation 
processes did to them mentally, emotionally, and physically? What almost all the narratives 
of the White research participants have in common is the suffering they express. To the 
White subject, racial subjectivation does not seem to appear like a pleasant experience. On 
the contrary, it is in most narratives of the research subjects experienced as something 
wounding, painful, scarring. Some of the research participants even cried, whilst they were 
sharing their narratives, expressing sadness, and shame. Why do the research participants 
remember their personal racial subjectivation in such a painful way? Is it possible that in a 
Lévinasian sense, the humanity denied to the other, reflects the painful dehumanisation of 
the (White) self? In regard to the narratives shared by the White anti-racism practitioners, I 
argue that racialisation constitutes suffering, inflicted through racialisation processes that 
could also be viewed a form of de-humanisation to the White subject. Having explored the 
narratives of the White research participants, the following section looks into the narratives 
of the BIPOC research participants.  
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Being racialised as Black/Person of Colour 
 
»The torturer is the black man, Satan is black, one talks of shadows, when one is dirty one is black – whether one 
is thinking of physical dirtiness or of moral dirtiness. It would be astonishing, if the trouble were taken to bring 
them all together, to see the vast number of expressions that make the black man the equivalent of sin. In Europe, 
whether concretely or symbolically, the black man stands for the bad side of the character. As long as one cannot 
understand this, one is doomed to talk in circles about the ›black problem‹. Blackness, darkness, shadow, shades, 
blacken someone’s reputation« (Fanon 1967, p. 189). 
 
»The man who adores the Negro is as ›sick‹ as the man who abominates him« (Fanon 1967, p. 8). 
 
Having looked into the formation of White racialised subjects, I will know continue to 
examine the racialisation processes of BIPOC. Kabera is a Black psychologist in his early 
thirties who lives in Hamburg. He joined Phoenix a little after my brother and I in 2004 and 
has been a co-trainer for a long time. I felt that I really saw Kabera mature over the years 
from a sometimes a bit cocky psychology student to a settled family father and psychologist. 
Despite his maturity, Kabera has a great sense of humour, which I always appreciated about 
him, and also the willingness to continuously develop himself. I have also come to know 
Kabera’s White mother, whom Kabera talks about in the following section. I occasionally 
worked closely with Kabera’s mother and came to respect her as a very honest and reflected 
person. When I asked Kabera about his story, he began an account related to his conception: 
 
Kabera: My mother, I think that’s my explanation, grew up in the Africa Estate in Kassel. Togo Street, Wissmann37 
Road, and I think she grew up as an only child so to speak, has this big loneliness theme in her life. I believe that 
Africa was for her the Promised Land, this holy land. [...] She grew up in the Africa Estate and therefore let all her 
projections on Africa loose. Without checking actually what Africa means, what are the different countries in Africa, 
which cultures prevail there […]. Exactly, she completely neglected to do this. My nasty presumption would be, 
my mother has even initiated it that my father was gone before I was born. Because my mother was satisfied that 
she had me as living proof […] that she accomplished not to be white anymore. So, she put a black baby into the 
world, and thus then ex-positioned herself, she had an exceptional position and was able to live her otherness 
through me. The desire to be different and with a black baby, she achieved that. Because she is indeed reflected 
in the symbiosis with the baby. Exactly, that’s I think this story, so to speak, where I realize I’ve already been 
abused very early or my skin colour was abused. (Kabera 14/04/2012-2 #00:05:15) 
 
Kabera feels that, already, his conception symbolizes a kind of abuse. His mother, who got 
obsessed with Africa at an early age, sought a Black man to have a (mixed-raced) child with 
him. In Kabera’s perspective, his biological father soon became irrelevant to the White 
mother, as she was now (for some time even physically) unified through her Black child 
with her fantasy or fetish of Africa. In other words, Kabera’s biological father is reduced to 
a form of personification of Africa, »donating« his essence, his Blackness, his Africanness, 
 
37 Wissmann was a brutal colonial officer and later governor of German East Africa during Germany’s colonial project 
before World War I (Bechhaus-Gerst 2019). 
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to the White mother, who attempts to step out of Whiteness. In a way, she also does become 
ex-positioned of being White, because her being a White mother of a Black child could be 
considered as »Race« treason (Ware & Back 2002, p. 167). Vron Ware and Les Back describe, 
how »the visual image of the race traitor is invariably the white woman clutching a dark skinned 
baby. Race in this context, can be understood as embodiment and containment« (Ware & Back 2002, 
p. 167). However, Kabera’s mother still remains White, her Whiteness is highlighted in the 
way she uses Kabera and his biological father. Kabera as Black child and his Black biological 
father cease to be people, they both become tools for the White Mother to exalt herself out 
of the commonality of Whiteness. After the conception of the Black child the Black biological 
father even becomes replaceable, the Black child suffices as a way of being exceptional. This 
functionalisation of Blackness is, where Kabera sees the abusive moment in the relationship 
to his mother. 
 Kabera assumes that his exposing response to the question of »Where are you from« 
is related to the way his skin colour was functionalised as a child. His reaction to this 
question highlights for him his own suffering caused by the mother’s early behaviour: 
 
Kabera: »And I can remember when people asked me where I’m from, I told them my whole life story, with different 
fathers, with Nigeria, exactly this way, as sure as death and taxes. And I completely emptied myself. I was 
colonially overexploited so to say. My story was not with me, but my story was available for everyone. And I 
realised that was just hurtful. Like an animal in the zoo with three ears« (Kabera 14/04/2012-3 #00:06:15). 
 
The perception of Kabera’s Blackness in Germany makes him prone to being asked about 
his roots (Sow 2008, p. 252). The basic paradigm that Germanness equals Whiteness is still 
very prevalent in Germany (ibid.). Asking BIPOC where they are from and feeling 
unsatisfied with the answer of a city or town in Germany often leads to the second question 
»but where are you really from« [my own emphasis] (Sow 2008, pp. 252-253) implying that 
BIPOC cannot really be from Germany. This has also been considered a form of symbolic de-
naturalisation (Kilomba 2006, pp. 64-68). As a child, this question becomes like a kind of 
ritual to Kabera. He always shares his life story, sometimes to complete strangers that ask 
him that question. At the same time, Kabera feels that this story was not his, as he made this 
intimate part of himself so readily available for everyone. In reference to Fanon Kilomba 
describes it as the BIPOC subject being »forced to develop a relationship to the self and give a 
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performance of the self that has been scripted by the colonizer, producing in oneself the internally 
divided condition of depersonalization« (Kilomba 2006, p. 68). The racialisation of the BIPOC 
subjects, in Kabera’s case on one side through the circumstances of his conception on the 
other through the colonial exploitation of his life story, puts them into a dehumanised state 
of consciousness in which racialised subjects feel like non-persons, non-human and 
detached from themselves and from reality. The dehumanising experience is also 
emphasised in Kabera’s description of his hurtful experience: »like an animal in the zoo with 
three ears« (Kabera 14/04/2012-3 #00:06:15), a combination of being a displayed, bizarre, 
trapped animal made available for an audience to be looked at. The human, which is not 
fully human, but a weird inhuman/human hybrid, turns in the process of racialisation into 
a grotesque racial Other (Cassuto 1997, pp. 22-24). 
 How early this racialisation process starts is highlighted in Nana’s account of her first 
memory of racial subjection. Nana and I joined Phoenix about the same time around 
2001/2002. We became friends very quickly and had some epic train rides from Berlin to 
Duisburg and back before I moved to the UK. Even after my return from London, we just 
picked up where we left off. We also became parents around the same time. In the last 
couple of years Nana felt increasingly alienated on the board of Phoenix. An initial effort of 
extending the board in 2015 was an attempt to heal the growing rift in the board, by creating 
a greater gender balance, but the extended board was never sanctioned and had little effect. 
Although this was recently changed and a new more intersectional extended board became 
part of a new structure in Phoenix, Nana decided to leave the board but still remain in 
Phoenix. Nana is a psychiatrist, who grew up in Ghana, Botswana and Namibia. In her late 
teenage years, she moved by herself to Germany to study Medicine. She became the first 
(Black) female Phoenix trainer around 2004. Nana remembers the early days in her 
kindergarten in Ghana, when she was age three: 
 
Nana: »Looking back to Ghana, when… I think, my first sense of being a race goes back as far as the age of 
three. […] I remember in my preschool, like, you know, kindergarten, I had this teacher, Mrs. Crimson, she was 
from England and she had married a Ghanaian. So, she was teaching in preschool, I was three, three and a half 
years old. And when I was introduced into this preschool, I came to her class. And I remember that she sat me at 
the back. She was a white woman. […] Because she was white, and because she was English, like, most of the 
white kids in the school were in her class. So, all the white kids were sitting in front, and the black kids were sitting 
in the back. […] I remember that, because it was the first, first day that my parents took me to school. […] And I 
had the feeling, that being at this school, like, for my whole life. It was so terrible. I just wanted to go away. And I 
remember that all the kids had to draw something. […] And then, first the white kids would get the chance to pick 
up the kind of crayons they wanna have. And the rest, like the broken ones, the white kids don’t want… that’s 
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when we were, like, the black kids were allowed to. So, I remember that. And at that time, I didn’t understand. I 
just had the feeling: ›I shouldn’t be like the black kids‹. But I understood at the age of three, I understood, that it 
had something to do with being black. Because it was only the black kids, who were not allowed to choose the 
crayons, like, as first choice. So, it was like: ›We got the rest‹ (Nana 04/08/2012-2 #00:05:19). 
 
Even though Nana’s account is located in Ghana and not in Germany, it highlights how 
early children get a sense of racialisation processes. At the age of three, Nana is already 
aware that her White teacher treats the children differently, and that it is related to skin 
colour. This early awareness of racialised situations is not unusual and confirms research 
showing that children start getting a sense of skin colour at the age of two, and a sense of 
hierarchy amongst the skin colours at the age of four (Quintana 1998). The differences in 
how the White English teacher treats the children are very blatant. The White children have 
first choice and get to choose the crayons of their liking, the Black children have to make do 
with the mostly broken crayons left by the White children. Nana also expresses less a sense 
of injustice but more a sense of not wanting to be Black. This changed for a brief period, 
when Nana got a different teacher, a Black teacher: 
 
Nana: »And also, when she was sick, and I was very happy, when she was sick, or when she went on holiday in 
England, then we had another teacher. It was a black Ghanaian teacher. And then, I remember, I drew my first 
apple. It was an apple. It was a red one. And I was allowed to choose […] a red crayon. And I drew a big apple. 
It was so beautiful. And it was so perfect, because I was a bit like, you know, (laughs) doing everything like perfect. 
And there was… I was four, and she was like: ›Wow!‹, like, the fine motor skills were so good. And then she 
pasted my apple on the wall. And I got a star. So, I loved her, you know. And I told my mom, I want to be in her 
class« (Nana 04/08/2012-2 #00:06:27). 
 
Once the White teacher is gone and replaced by a Black teacher, who does not seem to 
discriminate the children on the basis of skin colour, the Black child blossoms, excelling in 
its performance and receiving high praise for it. Unfortunately, the time with the Black 
teacher is only limited: 
 
Nana: »But, Mrs. Crimson came back from holiday and I had to go back to her class. And so, I hated, I hated 
preschool. […] And also in her class, we had a piano. And the black kids were not allowed to play on the piano. 
But the white kids, they could jump around. You know, that was one thing, which I recognized immediately the 
white kids were allowed to move. Like, they had the freedom to move. Also, when she was teaching, like, she 
was telling us something, a story or reading to us, I don´t know, Snow-White or whatever, she would read to us 
poems. And she would read to us these fairy-tale stories. And while she was reading, we had to sit still. And not 
make any noise. But the white kids will move around. They’d move around, they will go to the piano and maybe 
press some note or something like that. So, this was something, that I would not say at that time I understood it 
was racism. I did not know, what it was, white or black. But I understood at that time, that it has something to do 
with my colour. Because it was only the kids, who had my skin colour who had to sit at the back and sit still, the 
whole, whole, whole time and wait for their parents to come and pick them up. And the white kids were allowed 
to move around. And they were allowed to go on the swings and play on the piano. And choose the colour of 
crayons. So, this is for me a very vivid picture. I will never forget that. I remember exactly where I sat in that room. 
[…] I remember her face. I remember the pictures I drew. My preschool time is very vivid in my mind. And I hated 




The White children are allowed to play the piano, the Black children are not allowed to play 
the piano. The White children are allowed to move freely, when a story is being told or when 
they wait for their parents, the Black children have to sit on their seats and remain quiet. 
The scenario Nana describes resembles a lot Discrimination Day, an experimental day 
where 3rd grade teacher Jane Elliott divided her class (which consisted of White children 
solely) into a group of brown-eyed pupils and blue-eyed pupils after the assassination of 
Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968 (Peters 1987). In A Class Divided (1987) the author describes 
how she came into the class and announced the superiority of the brown-eyed children, then 
the brown-eyed children were given certain privileges such as second helpings at lunch, 
drink water from the fountain as usual, five minutes extra recess et cetera, all things that 
were denied to the blue-eyed children (Peters 1987, pp. 22-23). The experiment had an 
immediate impact on the children, their body language, moods and their academic 
performances changed (ibid.). Those favoured by the experiment experienced a boost in 
their mood and performance, their postures straightened up, their body language signalling 
pride and a sense of security (ibid). The performance and the mood of the children that were 
discriminated immediately deteriorated, their postures slumped, their body language 
signalled defeat and a sense of insecurity (Peters 1987 pp 23-25). The next day she would 
change the privileged and discriminated group with similar results (ibid). Elliott’s 
experiment only lasted for a few days and she later reflected with the class about the effects 
the experiment had on them (ibid.). Her experience and the results of the experimental 
discrimination day inspired her to later develop her Blue-Eyed-Brown-Eyed-training, 
widely known in the diversity industry (ibid.). 
 Elliott’s experiment raises a couple of interesting questions, in particular when 
related to Nana’s account. Nana’s preschool teacher never openly exclaimed the superiority 
of the White children and the inferiority of the Black children, but her actions did. Nana 
repeats very often that she remembers it vividly and that, even as a child, she could sense a 
kind of injustice and she also sensed that it was somehow related to skin colour. What would 
be the effects for children subjected to this kind of treatment not for several days but for 
years? Elliott spoke with her class about the different experiences and how they were related 
to other experiences of discrimination such as racism. What if the differential treatment of 
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the children would never be spoken about and reflected upon, what if it remained a taboo? 
In Silencing the Past (1995) Trouillot argues: 
 
»I also want to reject both the naive proposition that we are prisoners of our past and the pernicious suggestion 
that history is whatever we make of it. History is the fruit of power, but power itself is never so transparent that its 
analysis becomes superfluous. The ultimate mark of power is its invisibility; the ultimate challenge, the exposition 
of its roots« (Trouillot 1995, p. XIX). 
 
Several studies have highlighted how racial micro aggressions or even mentioning to BIPOC 
students their stereotypical underachievement in education leads to a deterioration of their 
academic performance (Steele & Aronson 1995). Next to the differential treatment of BIPOC 
students of Colour by White teachers (Bonefeld & Dickhäuser 2018), this could also be a 
potential indicator why BIPOC students underperform in the German education system. 
What about the White students though? How much do they start to depend on the security 
given to them through racialisation that they are superior in their (academic) performance 
to BIPOC? And what happens when they are made aware of their dependency on those 
over-empowering elements of their racialisation, when their sense of security in relation to 
the racial order is challenged? As James Baldwin writes in Notes of a Native Son (1955) »[i[t 
must be remembered that the oppressed and the oppressor are bound together within the same society; 
they accept the same criteria, they share the same beliefs, they both alike depend on the same reality« 
(Baldwin 1955, p. 15). However, Nana’s account of her first memory of racialisation 
highlights how early the differential racial treatment of children begins, how early they are 
being initiated into a racial culture that has Whiteness at its centre. It highlights how early 
the children begin to view each other through a racialised lens, a lens that superimposes a 
potential human relationship they could have to each other. Instead, their relationship 
becomes a racial relationship (Banton 2014, p. 26). 
 In the following passage, Kabera describes how the racial relationship changes when 
it progresses from childhood to puberty: 
 
Kabera: »And then […] I went to a boarding school. I then met someone at boarding school, who came from 
Liberia […]. And through him I experienced, so to speak, what it means to be a Black man. He showed me racism. 
So, I can still remember exactly, he was like a personal coach. He showed me situations, where White people 
were bumping into one to establish contact. […] And I’ve always thought that they are stupid, or they stagger, 
right. And then he showed me one time and he walked along somewhere and then someone bumped into him 
and ›Hi‹, ›Hello‹ and they were talking at once. And then people wanted something from him. And then I also 
noticed that he told different stories to different people. Right, so he played with it so to speak. He borrowed 
money from them, he got paid for the stories, and he didn’t return the money to them. And people also knew that 
they would not get their money back, but he did it with such ease. He knew what it was about, they knew what it 
was about. The tragic thing is that is, he became psychotic. He did not experience racism simply, but he smelled, 
breathed, perceived it, so... was highly sensitive for that. And I think, as a theory, he did not want to be part of this 
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society, knew that if he became part of it, he is vulnerable. And as long as he moves outside of it, he is 
untouchable, he is not vulnerable. With him, so to speak, I went this way for some time. And then it developed 
from this, I’ll call it prepubertal racism experience where I was just exoticised that then at puberty, the experience 
of violence became a part. That I was as it were no longer seen as Black sweet baby, but as a Black dangerous 
man, where people were freaking out and wanted to beat me up, for no apparent reason« (Kabera 14/04/2012-3 
#00:08:57). 
 
In secondary school Kabera meets a young Black man, who is older than him. This person 
becomes like Kabera’s mentor, showing him a way of how to navigate through a racialised 
German society. The mentor shows Kabera how he can manipulate the racial encounter 
between him and White people to his favour. The mentor demonstrates to Kabera, that 
White people bumping into a Black man may not be accidental but are sometimes an 
attempt to establish contact with the Black person. The mentor than responds to this 
approach and begins a degage conversation with the White person. Kabera describes, how 
he observes the different stories his mentor uses with different people, mostly with the aim 
of »borrowing« money, which he never returns and also does not intend to return. In other 
words, the mentor utilises the projections that are being put on him as a Black man by the 
White person and feeds the White person’s desire of being literally in touch with an imagined 
Blackness. Additionally, the mentor charges the White person for their »service« so to speak; 
he knows, that they know that he is a crook, a swindler, and that they will never get their 
money back, but admitting that would be admitting their own racism and admitting that 
they only initialised contact with him because he is Black in the first place. So knowingly 
the White person lets the racial stereotype of the fraudulent encounter with a Black person 
play out, so that the projection, the prejudice of the dishonest Black man becomes an 
experienced reality. Another reading of the situation could also be that the White person is 
so aware of their racial stereotype that they counteract it by trusting a complete stranger, 
only because he is Black. Either way, »[t]here are two ways to dehumanize: the first is to strip 
people of all virtue; the second is to cleanse them of all sins« (Emirbayer & Desmond 2015, p. 46). 
Kabera’s mentor is aware of all this and uses the negative or positive notions that are put 
on him as a Black man in order to financially benefit from them. However, the mentor’s 
manipulation of the White system may leave him economically empowered for a short time, 
but mentally, his actions do not challenge the dehumanising projections that he is constantly 
confronted with in those situations. On the contrary, he constantly feeds the disempowering 
capacity of those projections in him and in his White counterpart, which, not surprisingly, 
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leads to his mental deterioration, the psychosis. This also highlights the issue in racialised 
societies that BIPOC and Migrants in Germany are overrepresented in mental homes or 
psychiatric care (Künzler et Al. 2004; Lay et Al. 2005; Morgan et Al. 2004). As Kabera 
analyses the tragic situation, his mentor’s attempts to navigate the racialised society as a 
constant intangible and invulnerable outsider manipulating the system to his assumed 
benefit, end in the disintegration of the self. Kabera’s account finishes with him talking 
about the shift of how he is perceived as a Black child by the White society, as cute and 
cuddly, and how this perception ends, the moment he becomes a teenager, where he is 
perceived as a violent and dangerous (sexual) threat (Dillard 2016; Dietze 2013, p. 122). The 
White German anthropologist Walter Kirchner, who published a study of mixed-raced 
children in Germany in 1952 wrote, »[a]s far as racial factors are concerned, we can assume that 
the advance in development demonstrated by mulatto children will probably stop at puberty. 
Intellectual ability in particular should remain moderate, according to available studies of American 
Negro half-breeds. By the same token, that the strong tendency to be ruled by physical urges, as shown 
in the mulatto children, will remain present as a negroid racial trait« [my own translation] 
(Kirchner 1952, p. 62). This study, which was published after 1945, not only highlights the 
continuities of racial thinking in post-Nazi-Germany (Chin et Al. 2009), but also how »Race« 
and sexuality are bound to each other. With sexual maturity the Black child now becomes a 
Black man incapable of controlling his physical urges. The binary opposition of the 
controlled, moderate White Westerner is implicit in this racialising stereotype (Ashcroft 
2000, pp. 19-20). 
 Can, the only Turkish German research participant, shared a similar shift in the way 
he was experienced in childhood and early teenage years. Can was in his mid-twenties 
during the interview and lived in the same city as Fagbola. He was close friends with 
Fagbola’s sons and kind of grew into Phoenix. I immediately took a liking to Can, the first 
time I met him. He was a bit of a Johnny Depp lookalike and he was also an Anatolian 
German Alevi, like my brother and me. When I asked Can to tell me his story, he first shared: 
 
Can: »My primary school teacher used to call me Pasha: ›You are a little pasha, at home you are always allowed 




Can describes how he was perceived by his primary school teacher, who saw him as a 
person who was given unlimited freedom at home. The perception and the naming as a 
pasha, a person who was a high official in the Ottoman empire, is very common (and very 
wrong) amongst teachers in Germany, who assume that in particular Turkish German boys 
(or Muslim boys in general) are tremendously spoilt by their parents (Rühle 2015, p. 320). 
However, this perception of the cute little prince in primary school shifts once the Turkish 
German boy gets older. Can narrates his experience as follows: 
 
Can: »I completely disregarded an experiences that I only became aware of later, my judo teacher, who said to 
me at age eleven: ›Listen, you're Turkish, you have to knock your opponent off the mat properly, you have to be 
aggressive, don't you remember, the soldiers outside Vienna, how they were?‹ I had no clue what he was talking 
about, I had to ask my mother: What kind of soldiers outside Vienna? What did they do?« (Can 10/07/2012, 
#00:11:14). 
 
Stereotypes of Turkish German men reduce them to aggressive and authoritarian beings, 
oppressing their women, killing in the name of honour and utterly rejecting Western 
modern liberal values (Spohn 2002, p. 442). In Can’s story, his judo teacher tries to encourage 
him to be more aggressive (since Can does not seem to fit into the stereotype), by reminding 
him of the Ottoman soldiers who got as far as Vienna in their quest to conquer Europe, 
assuming that their history was still alive in him. In both encounters, the encounter with his 
primary teacher and his judo teacher, Can is not perceived as an individual but through the 
lens of racial stereotypes, as either a spoiled Turkish macho in the making or as someone 
who has to unleash the Ottoman beast within him. That Can as an Anatolian Alevi probably 
has very little connection to the Ottomans is irrelevant. His perceived Turkishness suffices 
for both teachers to draw the connections to his assumed cultural heritage. 
 There is one more story though, which sets Can aside from the two other Black 
research participants: 
 
Can: »Or my primary school teacher, for whom I had a lot of respect, that was Mr. Bracke and the director of the 
school and he thought a lot of me, so he liked me and always said that I reminded him of a Umut he once had 
and who is now studying too, and that he sees that in me now too. And that was such an encouragement, very 
early on, on the one hand, but also someone who shaped me in a very specific topic, because when we looked 
at the world map, he said: ›Here, Africa, the people there are poor, they are all poor, because God has punished 
them‹. It was something biblical too, I can no longer reconstruct it. ›But God punished them, that’s why they are 





Can’s narrative highlights the simultaneity of empowerment and disempowerment. On one 
side his teacher empowers Can, by expressing that he believes in him and that he as the 
ability to progress to university. On the other side reproduces racism in a very ugly form 
and presents it to the students: a religious explanation for the poverty that exists in some 
parts of the African continent. The biblical derivation that Can cannot fully remember could 
potentially be the religious justification that was used to enslave African people and colonise 
Africa. Some Christian slaveholders used the story of Noah and his son Ham, who mocked 
his father’s drunken- and nakedness and was therefore cursed by his father, that his progeny 
shall be slaves for eternity. The slaveholders argued that African people were the 
descendants of Ham and thereby it was God’s will that they shall be enslaved (Rae 2018, pp. 
442-444). In other words, the enslavement of African people and the colonisation of Africa 
was divinely sanctioned and almost a good Christian’s duty. Can’s narrative leaves him in 
a fascinating intermediate position, where he – as Anatolian German – is on one side the 
racialised other but also has another racial Other beneath him. In relation to Gender, Haug 
reflects on social positioning and silences: 
 
»Story writing and editing is also a way to gain self-awareness. For reasons of emotional survival, we usually 
perceive ourselves from the place in society that is possible for us and in which we are positioned. This is not 
very much for women. Compared to our experiences, wishes and plans in early childhood, it is certainly an 
impoverishment. By excavating the motifs from early childhood and attempting to confront them with today's life, 
expands our claims and skills. Of course, this is not as easy as it sounds. The stories are expressed in our 
language today. The buried and left behind does not speak with loud words. Conversely, we are much more likely 





Some educational and social scientists believe that White people tend to take a passive role 
in racial matters, simply because they do not think of themselves as racialised (McKinney 
2003, p. 53). Some White people even go so far as to assume that they have no »Race« or 
ethnicity in contrast to BIPOC (McKinney 2003, p. 52). This ignorance leaves the White 
subject unaware that Whiteness is actually the »master signifier (without a signified) that 
establishes a structure of relations, a signifying chain that through a process of inclusions and 
exclusions constitutes a pattern for organizing human difference« (Seshadri 2000, p. 3-4). 
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However, a child is not born into the position of the White master signifier, it has to learn 
what it actually means to be in that position (Troyna & Hatcher 1992). It was Karl Marx 
(1971), who highlighted that societies do not consist of solitary individuals but are the »sum 
of connections and relationships in which individuals find themselves« (Van Ausdale & Feagin 
2001, p. 21). Human children learn about the world and themselves through the 
relationships that they have to other human beings or as Elias puts it: »It is only in and through 
dialogues with others that a child develops into an individual person« (Elias 1991, p. 47). This very 
Eliasian notion only highlights that »[n]o human agent, or any social phenomenon for that matter, 
subsists by itself; it exists on the intersection of various networks that inform its social identities and 
imagination continuously evolving across time and place« (Shalin 2020, p. 4). The research 
participants are not only digging through their own personal memories, but also through 
their social memory, which, according to Connerton »we are likely to find it in commemorative 
ceremonies; but commemorative ceremonies prove to be commemorative only in so far as they are 
performative; performativity cannot be thought without a concept of habit; and habit cannot be 
thought without a notion of bodily automatisms« (Connerton 1989, pp 3-4). I argue that racial 
memories and racialisation exist in the nexus of mind, body and society, and imprint or 
inscribe themselves as a racial culture with Whiteness at its centre onto the human body. 
Through memory work, the research participants attempt to recollect this process of 
inscription of racialised content and practices, be it through media consumption, socialist 
propaganda, silences, things they were told in families or in schools. However, there was 
an apparent discomfort during this recollection process, not so much because the research 
participants felt unsafe or judged by my presence, but rather the processes of racialisation 
were remembered as painful, generating strong emotions of sadness and shame. The 
narratives of the BIPOC research participants highlighted how they were not seen as 
individuals or as persons, but perceived or treated as something lesser then human, a 
grotesque human-nonhuman hybrid, as incapable of adhering to the modern Western ideal 
of a human being (Cassuto 1997); they were dehumanised. Simultaneously, the research 
participants who supposedly benefit from being White, experienced their initiation into 
Whiteness not as a pleasant process, but rather as a memory, which caused suffering in 
them. Almost like being caught in a Levinasian trap, the dehumanisation of the other, the 
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denial of the human face to the other, so I argue, affected the White subject in a way that in 
reflection of this inhuman face, it became inhuman itself, it became dehumanised. Therefore, 
based on my analysis of the narratives of anti-racism and empowerment practitioners, I 
conclude that racialisation processes constitute a type of suffering for the racialised subject. 
This suffering is derived through the process of racialisation, which can be considered a 




Chapter 5: The Training – Empowering Racial Subjectivities 
 
»Stand on your toes and you won’t stand strong, 
Rush ahead and you won’t get far, 
Try to shine and you’ll extinguish your light, 
Try to define yourself, you won’t know who you are, 
Hold power over others, you can’t empower yourself, 
Cling to your work and you’ll create nothing that endures. 
If you want to accord with the Tao38, 
Just do your job, then let go« (Lao Tzu in Tao Te Ching, 400 BC) 
 
Having analysed how the research participants remembered their racialisation and having 
concluded that the racialisation processes constitute a sort of dehumanising suffering for 
the racialised subject, the following chapter takes a closer look into the research participants’ 
first training experience. A training is generally an educational setting, in which a group of 
participants learn and practice a (new) set of skills, usually supported and guided by a 
trainer or two (or more) trainers. Historically, the idea of most anti-racism training was to 
make participants aware of their racial attitudes. Most anti-racism practitioners have the 
hypothesis that once a (White) person became aware of their racism that they would then 
be less or even stop being racist (Egan Brad et Al. 2018). Similarly, the idea behind 
empowerment training is that the participants are disempowered by the discrimination or 
racism that they experience and that the training would help them to develop a mental and 
political attitude, which makes them feel more empowered (Can 2013, p. 8). What both anti-
racism and empowerment training have in common, is probably the basic assumption that 
those who participate become empowered, not only to cope with racism but also to address 
and if necessary, challenge, fight and change it. However, evaluating anti-racism or 
empowerment training is another completely subject matter. What would be the factors of 
measuring an anti-racism or empowerment training’s success or effectivity – or lack thereof? 
Additionally, the term empowerment is not uncontested: in a neo-liberal understanding 
empowerment is about giving employees more autonomy and responsibilities in order for 
businesses to maximise profits (Blanchard et Al. 2001), not to critically engage with 
capitalism and the exclusions it produces. In a BIPOC-activist setting, empowerment is more 
readily understood as a form of resistance against racism, as a form of anti-racist liberation 
 





(Mohseni 2020, p. 101). In the previous chapter, the research participants remember their 
personal racialisation processes. In the following chapter, I explore the question: How do 
anti-racism and empowerment practitioners narrate their personal experience of anti-
racism and empowerment training. In this chapter I argue that the narratives of the 
research participants highlight that the emotional and cognitive understanding of 
personal racial subjectivation processes partially liberates the racialised subject. I have 
decided to focus on the first training, because here it is more likely that the research 
participants experienced their first major shift in their personal core beliefs, which in many 
cases triggered a strong emotional response. Beginning with a very condensed summary of 
the development and reception of anti-racism and empowerment training in the UK and 
Germany, I then progress to examine the narratives of the research participants about their 
personal training experiences. Therein, I explore the notion of (self-)empowerment and 
(self-)governmentality, applying Nikolas Rose’s (1996, 1999) critical analysis of (self-
)governmentality connected to psycho-therapeutical discourses in relation to concepts of 
individual improvement and liberation. 
 
 
Governmentality and very brief history of anti-racism and empowerment 
training 
 
Liberal Western governments have developed a set of subtle forms of ruling over its citizens. 
This set of subtle forms of governing includes methods of empowerment such as »autonomy, 
self-actualization, self-realization, and self-esteem« (Madsen 2014, p. 814) and has been coined 
by French philosopher Michel Foucault as governmentality (Foucault 2007). 
Governmentality, which is composed of the two words »governing« and »mentality«, 
reflects forms, techniques and arts of governance that are found in a network of power and 
knowledge not only in the management of a state, but also to find guidance in the diverse 
power relationships, for example, between doctors and clients, students and teachers, and 
within families, but also within one’s own subjectivity (Lemke et Al. 2000, p. 8). The term 
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governmentality makes it possible to describe the relationship between power and 
domination and to link techniques of domination with »techniques of the self« (ibid.). 
Amongst those techniques of the self also belong different forms of training, which are about 
conduct, which also include anti-racism and empowerment training. 
 Training generally has an educational approach, it is about teaching and learning, 
sometimes also spreading knowledge and ideas around anti-racism and empowerment in 
wider society. The idea is that individuals, usually in a group, gather and guided by a trainer 
become more sensitive about questions of racial equality and multiculturalism (Knoth 2006, 
Brown 2004). Jane Elliot and Judith Katz were amongst the pioneers in 1960s US to facilitate 
anti-racism training (Vaughn 2007, Schlicher 1998). These early training were developed in 
support of the US-American civil rights movement and promoted the idea of equal 
opportunities. Around 1980 racial awareness training (RAT) began to spread in the UK. In 
Germany this process began almost 10 years later around 1990 with anti-racism training 
(ART). However, as soon as racial awareness training was increasing in the UK, so was its 
critique in politics and in the media. The conservative discourse about the »loony left« 
(Curran et Al. 2019) finally led to an anti-anti-racist movement (Petley 2019, pp. 189-193), 
branding the subject of racial equality in the press as a pet project of the militant-left and as 
»political correctness gone mad« (Petley 2019, p. 196). 
There was, however, also critique from anti-racism activists themselves, who argued 
that the RAT was too confrontational and only led to participants feeling guilty, but not 
necessarily more empowered (Gurnah 1987; Sivanandan 1987). There was also the question 
of resources for anti-racist commitment, which was already scarce and now seemed to pour 
solely into RAT (LSPU 1987). It seemed as if RAT, that were dealing with attitudes of 
individuals, were seen as the sole response to racial inequalities, thereby losing sight of 
tackling those on a structural level. Furthermore, for some anti-racism activists the 
commercialisation of anti-racist practice was very problematic, additionally some training 
forms turned into a kind of New Age therapy, thereby losing credibility and seriousness 
(LSPU 1987). Similarly, Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn’s (2001) critique of anti-racism training in the 
US, resonates with some anti-racism activists’ criticism in the UK. Lasch-Quinn argues that 
the »premium on individual identity, emotional satisfaction and expression, and an immediate, 
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superficial sense of well-being were the staples of the therapeutic sensibility that increasingly held 
Americans in thrall« (Lasch-Quinn 2001, p. 40). Ultimately, by the early 1990s the racism 
awareness approach was more or less abandoned in the UK and replaced by the language 
of diversity. This switch from a language of anti-racism to diversity also happened in 
Germany just a few years later, towards the end of the 1990s (Bendl 2006). The 1990s also 
saw the Betzavta-Training from Israel, which could be described as democracy-oriented 
education and the Blue-Eyed-Brown-Eyed-Training, which was developed by Jane Elliott 
and attempts to make White people experience discrimination for a few days, translated 
and adapted to a German setting (Schlicher 1998; Bommes 2002). 
 The latest trend was triggered towards the end of the 1990s through the emergence 
of the study of implicit associations beginning in the US. Social researchers of implicit or 
unconscious bias assume that a person holds deep seated beliefs, biases against certain 
groups, sometimes even against their own group, without being aware of them (ECU 2013, 
p. 15; Greenwald & Nanaji 1995; Agarwal 2020). Through Implicit Association tests (IAT), 
so some social researchers believe, it is possible for a person to find out if and to what extent 
they have unconscious biases (Greenwald et Al. 2009). Out of the research of study of 
implicit biases a new training emerged, the Unconscious Bias Training (UBT). In 2018 the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) authorised a report Unconscious bias 
training: An assessment of the evidence of effectiveness and described the recently emerged 
training form: 
 
»UBT is often designed, developed and modified on the basis of the large body of research on unconscious bias. 
During everyday interactions, our brains receive an influx of information. Unconscious biases arise because we 
rely on ›short-cuts‹ to filter this information rapidly. The function of these short-cuts, or heuristics, is to categorise 
and make decisions about people and tasks efficiently. 
One of the negative consequences of this automatic processing is the influence of social stereotypes on 
our decision making. There is ample research documenting the influence of stereotypes on workplace evaluations 
and decision making (for example Eagly and Karau, 2002; Correll, 2017; Kossek et al., 2017), leading to 
detrimental outcomes for women, ethnic minorities, disabled people and others with a protected characteristic« 
(Atewologun et Al. 2018, p. 11). 
 
The aim of the UBT, which are often facilitated online, is to raise awareness of unconscious 
biases and thereby improve the situation for those who are disadvantaged by them 
(Atewologun et Al. 2018, p. 6). Some major US tech companies, for example Google and 
Microsoft, have developed their own UBT training formats. A UBT usually begins with the 
participants taking the IAT and then they are guided through the results (ibid.). Afterwards 
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the participants receive some information about the current research on unconscious bias 
and then usually receive some strategies on how to counter their own biases (ibid.). The key 
findings of the report on the effectiveness of UBT can be summarised as: 
 
»● UBT is effective for awareness raising by using an IAT (followed by a debrief) or more advanced training 
designs such as interactive workshops. 
● UBT can be effective for reducing implicit bias, but it is unlikely to eliminate it.  
● UBT interventions are not generally designed to reduce explicit bias and those  
that do aim to do so have yielded mixed results.  
● Using the IAT and educating participants on unconscious bias theory is likely to increase awareness of and 
reduce implicit bias.  
● The evidence for UBT’s ability effectively to change behaviour is limited. Most of the evidence reviewed did not 
use valid measures of behaviour change.  
● There is potential for back-firing effects when UBT participants are exposed to information that suggests 
stereotypes and biases are unchangeable.  
● Evidence from the perspective of the subjects of bias, such as those with protected characteristics, is limited. 
This evidence could provide additional information on potential back-firing effects« (Atewologun et Al. 2018, pp. 
6-7).  
 
In addition to essentialising the notion that biases cannot be changed, UBT could also be 
criticised for not exploring when and how each and every individual has learned those 
biases, and how remembering this process of learning these biases makes them feel. 
 The development of empowerment training for BIPOC is difficult to trace. Most 
likely did empowerment training for BIPOC originate in the Black Consciousness 
Movement, which had its beginnings in the South African Anti-Apartheid movement. 
About Black Consciousness Training (BCT), a prominent figure in the Anti-Apartheid 
movement Steve Biko wrote: 
 
»All in all the black man has become a shell, a shadow of man, completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, 
a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity.  
This is the first truth, bitter as it may seem, that we have to acknowledge before we can start on any 
programme designed to change the status quo. It becomes more necessary to see the truth as it is if you realise 
that the only vehicle for change are these people who have lost their personality. The first step therefore is to 
make the black man come to himself; to pump back life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride and dignity, 
to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign 
supreme in the country of his birth. This is what we mean by an inward-looking process. This is the definition of 
›Black Consciousness‹« (Biko 1987 [1978], p. 29). 
 
The Black Consciousness Movement and therefore also the Black Consciousness training 
was based on the premise that Black people are disempowered and need to first be 
empowered in order to start resisting racial injustices. Biko’s notion of Black Consciousness, 
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as empowering as it might appear, also creates a victimology of BIPOC39. Are BIPOC victims 
of racism and therefore need empowerment? And if they think they do not need 
empowerment, are they missing out on the opportunity to liberate themselves? These 
questions shall be further explored in the third section of this chapter, which explores the 
BIPOC research participants’ first training experiences. 
 There seems to be not enough research on the history of empowerment training for 
BIPOC in the UK and Germany to pinpoint, where and when the first training was 
facilitated. Some research suggests the first Black empowerment training must have been 
organised latest by the beginning of the 1990s in the UK (Christian 1998) and probably also 
in Germany. Most empowerment training in Germany aims at making BIPOC, people who 
experience racism the subject of their educational work (Mohseni 2020, p. 113). Generally, 
the trainers attempt at emphasising the skills and resources that the participants already 
bring with them (Yiğit & Can 2009, p. 162, Nguyen 2013). Most BIPOC felt that anti-racism 
training catered for the needs of White people and that the perspectives, experiences, and 
needs of those structurally disadvantaged by racism were left out (Yiğit & Can 2009, p. 162). 
Therefore, BIPOC developed their own safer spaces to address the issue of racism but also 
of empowerment. Empowerment training became spaces, where BIPOC could share their 
common experiences (and also the differences), where they could discover different 
languages for their perceptions and the things that were happening in their lives (Mohseni 
2020, p. 113). Empowerment training for BIPOC carries the notion that the difficult and 
painful experiences of racism, which can sometimes make the BIPOC subject feel powerless 
or disempowered, into a source of strength and resilience (Can 2013). Instead of perceiving 
BIPOCness and the experiences that come with it as a deficit, empowerment trainers attempt 
to shift it into a strong point, from which personal (and sometimes communal) strategies of 
resistance are developed (ibid.). 
 There are several individuals but also a range of organisations that offer 
empowerment training in Germany: Antidiskriminierungsnetzwerk Berlin (ADNB – 
Counselling Center for Equal Treatment – Against Discrimination Berlin) of the Türkischer 
Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB – Turkish Union in Berlin-Brandenburg), the Migrationsrat 
 
39 Though I believe that Biko’s quote should be read in the context of 1960s South African Apartheid system. 
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Berlin-Brandenburg (Migration Council Berlin-Brandenburg), the Bildungswerkstatt 
Migration & Gesellschaft (loosely translated as Education Workshop Migration & Society – 
a network of trainers active in the field of anti-racism, empowerment but also development), 
GLADT and LesMigras (both BIPOC LGBTIQ+ organisations based in Berlin) and Phoenix 
(Mohseni 2020, p. 114). 
 Phoenix anti-racism and empowerment training is strongly based on systems 
psychology. Systems psychology is based not only on a theoretical but also an applicable 
science of systems theory, in which not only human conduct, but also the experiences of a 
person are viewed as complex frameworks. Clinical psychologist Shelly Smith-Acuña 
defines in her book Systems Theory in Action (2011) systems theory as »a set of unifying 
principles about the organization and functioning of systems. Systems are defined as meaningful 
wholes that are maintained by the interaction of their parts (Laszlo, 1972)« (Smith-Acuña 2011, p. 
6). Applying systems theory into systems psychology, Smith-Acuña narrows the use of 
systems theory down to set of questions: 
 
»1. What are the various contexts in which the problem is embedded? How would I describe the problem or issues 
in terms of biological, individual, couple, family, or community levels of involvement? How do these systems and 
subsystems work together, and how do they compete?  
2. How does each member of the system describe the cause of the problem, and how can this causality be 
reframed? What is the circular pattern that maintains the problem, and what are the multiple factors that reinforce 
this pattern?  
3. What is being communicated about the issues at hand? What are the conflicts between the explicit and implicit 
communication about the problem? How could the communication work better and be more effective?  
4. What are the forces that encourage the issue to change, and what are the forces that resist change?  
5. What are the rules, roles, and boundaries that establish the structure of the most relevant system? How is the 
structure functioning well, and how does the structure contribute to the problem?  
6. What are the historical and developmental patterns that are being repeated in the system? How do these 
patterns cause resistance to change, and how do these patterns provide identity?  
7. What are the cultural stories that influence the problem? How do these invisible stories reinforce oppression 
and inhibit empowerment? How can these stories be used for greater self-acceptance or to promote change?« 
(Smith-Acuña 2011, pp. 145-146). 
 
Through the biography of the training participants some of these questions are explored, 
sometimes in the group, by receiving inputs from the trainers or in personal reflection. In 
some stages of the training, the participants are also introduced to epistemologies of the 
Global South, for example Ubuntu or the decolonial critique of Western knowledge 
production. Far from being a complete description of the training, the closest to describe the 
aim of the training is for participants to personally examine how they stand in relation to 
the phenomena of racism and racialisation. Thereby the training could be understood as a 
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form of critical, reflexive socio-analysis of a person’s racialisation (Emirbayer & Desmond 
2015, p. 47) 
 Following this brief look into the history and development of anti-racism and 
empowerment training, the next section explores the narratives of the research participants’ 
personal first training experience. 
 
 
The Anti-Racism or White-Awareness-Training 
 
In Governing the Soul (1999) Nikolas Rose argues »that over the last century, ›veridical 
discourses‹ - positive knowledges and expertise of truth - have played a key role in rationalities of 
government, notably in the making up of governable spaces - ›irreal spaces‹ such as economy, factory, 
population etc. - and in the making up of governable subjects - members of a flock, children, subjects, 
citizens, self-realizing actors« (Rose 1999, p. xxii). These »veridical discourses« that Rose refers 
to play a significant role in how the research participants speak about their first training 
experience. When I asked the White research participants about their first training, the 
reaction to the question and their memories were very different, but also had a lot of 
commonalities. Many described a general feeling rather than single details of the training 
experience. Two participants had actually very strong emotional reactions when they spoke 
about the training. One of them was Dina. Dina was one of the first ones to become a 
research participant in April 2012. I met Dina probably around early 2009 in Duisburg at a 
Phoenix gathering. She lived in Hamburg at the time as a university student. She came from 
a working-class background and was mostly working in retail before she came in touch with 
Phoenix. Her working-class background made Dina stand out in Phoenix, since most 
members come from a middle-class background. We connected on that level, since my 
parents also came as workers to Germany. Dina was also part of new younger generation in 
Phoenix that was growing. She was very likable and had a contagious laughter. I 
interviewed her in an empty seminar room at the University at Hamburg. That did not stop 
her from sharing her personal story candidly with me. Her stepfather was in the military 
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and was very strict, at times physically abusive. He would very openly express his racist 
and homophobic thoughts in the family. She also found herself very often in a circle of 
friends where racist or right-wing attitudes were not uncommon. Later, through second-
chance education she embarked on her BA in Social Economy. When I asked her about her 
first training, she had the following response: 
 
Dina: »I know how it felt. But, it’s difficult to describe. It was definitely very, very painful. Well, it starts from the 
belly, from down here and it comes up. Nah, I know how it feels, I can put myself right there into that situation, 
but I do not know how I... in what constellation or when I did it« (Dina 13/04/2012-1 #00:40:14). 
 
Dina does not remember many details from her first Phoenix training, but she does 
remember that it was »very, very painful«. Rather than describing the training as an academic 
experience or an experience of cognitive learning, Dina mostly remembers the (almost 
physical) emotions that the training triggered in her. The mentioning of the painful feelings 
indicates a sort of therapeutical terminology, or in the language of Rose, self-governing. In 
reference to Foucault’s notion of »governmentality«, Rose locates the language of painful 
experiences in the realm of »therapeutic culture of the self« and concludes that the »guidance of 
selves is no longer dependent on the authority of religion or traditional morality; it has been allocated 
to ›experts of subjectivity‹ who transfigure existential questions about the purpose of life and the 
meaning of suffering into technical questions of the most effective ways of managing malfunction and 
improving ›quality of life‹« (Rose 1996, p. 152). 
The confessional character of the responses to the training becomes also more 
apparent in the next quote. Similarly, Lena, who I interviewed briefly after Dina in a small 
town near Berlin, described her first anti-racism training as a very strong emotional 
experience. Lena was actually from Lithuania, but her parents were of Polish descent. She 
remembered very often the feeling of being an outsider in her childhood. When she moved 
to Poland in her early teenage years, Lena was considered there also a kind of outsider, 
having grown up in Lithuania. Later, Lena had migrated from Poland to East Germany in 
the 70s and had remained there with her East German husband and her children. During 
the GDR, maybe also due to her migration experience, Lena worked as a liaison officer 
between Polish and German workers, and after the unification, she became the Integration 
Officer for a small town in Brandenburg. Through her work Lena met Fagbola and 
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participated in a training. Lena and I joined Phoenix about the same time. There was a 
warmth and an ease about Lena, which made it easy to connect to her. Later, she was also 
active as Vice Chair of Phoenix from 2002 till about 2010 and had a crucial role in developing 
the regional Phoenix White group in Berlin-Brandenburg. She had just started her 
retirement, when I interviewed her in May 2012 and asked her about her first Phoenix 
training experience: 
 
Lena: »So my first training, I will never forget it. I know when the world breaks down (crying) the tears come. […] 
So until the first training I always thought, I’m open-minded, I’m tolerant, towards other people, no matter who 
they are. I had this opinion of myself that I really see people as human beings […]. I do not classify them. That 
was my life too; my house was always open, for many.  
But what shook me was that... especially children’s poems, children’s songs my mother has taught me 
(crying) are also racist. I’ve always thought that Polish literature, that it has indeed played a very important role 
for my mother, for me too. But that it also actually transported racist images and we Poles and I, for example, 
Sienkiewicz who is wonderful, writer, he has written wonderful, patriotic books that helped many Poles to survive, 
even during the time of the partition of Poland, to not forget their mother tongue and their country. 
I think that hurts me most of all, that I did not see it myself before. Yes, yes. Looking at it from a logical 
standpoint, I know, it’s not my fault, anyway it still hurts. Let’s take a short break« (Lena 16/05/2012-2 #00:40:50). 
 
Lena’s emotional response, when she started talking about her first training, was very 
strong. She began to cry as she described the training as a turning point, a moment when 
her »world breaks down« (Lena 16/05/2012 # 00: 40: 26-2 #). What Lena describes is the 
breaking down of her self-image. Whiteness constructs itself as liberal and open-minded 
identity (Fanon 1952, p. 150), whilst at the same time creating an ignorance of its racialising, 
divisive and oppressive underbelly. In the analysis of her childhood books and stories, Lena 
realises that the narratives, that her mother shared with her from early childhood, which 
meant a lot to her and also to the Polish people, carry racialised subtexts of a primitive, racial 
Other, which was imprinted on her as a child. 
 The confessional character of Lena’s statement is also highlighted by the self-
reproach of not seeing herself before as the »injunction to know oneself, which Foucault traces 
back to the Christian confession and forward to contemporary techniques of psychotherapeutics: here 
the codes of knowledge are inevitably supplied not by pure introspection but by rendering one’s 
introspection in a particular vocabulary of feelings, beliefs, passions, desires, values, or whatever and 




In the training Lena realised, that even though she was working as an integration 
officer in local government and considered herself a person that sees another person as a 
human being, she was far more racially biased than she had imagined herself to be. That 
realisation was very painful to her, the awareness of having been pulled into an ignorance 
which allows Whiteness to maintain itself, but which also divides humans from each other, 
not only structurally but even in small everyday interactions (Banton 2018, p. 8). 
Lena’s response is also fascinating in light of her being aware that she is not 
responsible for how she was subjected to these racialised narratives and subtexts as a child. 
Rationally, Lena understands that these images were passed on to her by her mother (which 
were passed on to her by her parents etc.), through society and the culture that she was 
living in. Nevertheless, Lena seems pained by the realisation of her (White) ignorance, she 
seems pained by the realisation that she was unable to see this ignorance despite the notion 
of herself as encountering everybody unbiased and as human beings. The research 
participant felt she was far more surrounded very early on by a racial culture then she could 
have ever imagined herself to be. Lena also became painfully aware that this could not have 
left her unaffected and that there was a strong possibility that she related to others through 
the social construct of »Race« even if she was not aware of it, even if she did not want to. 
Eve, a middle-aged primary school religious studies teacher and protestant minister, 
who together with Lena played an important role in the development of the regional 
Phoenix White group in Berlin-Brandenburg, had a comparable experience during her first 
training. I met Eve around the same time that I met Lena. Initially, I kept Eve at a distance, 
maybe it was her protestant religious studies, primary school teacher vibe, but she was 
consistently engaged in the organisation. I got to appreciate Eve as a co-trainer, and the 
interview session with her was one of the most intense interview experiences I had during 
this research project. It was the first time that I heard Eve’s life story to the extent she shared 
with me in the course of two days. It certainly changed the way I viewed Eve profoundly. 
Eve, who had grown up in the GDR, was from a family where the Christian belief played a 
great importance. The communist regime in East Germany sought to abolish religion, as 
religions were considered in the Marxist tradition the opium of the people. Although the 
socialist regime in the GDR took a rather pragmatic approach towards the Church, there 
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was a persistent discrimination of Christian individuals in the educational and career sector 
(Goeckel 1988, p. 211). Eve studied to become a physiotherapist in East Berlin but decided 
later to become a Protestant Minister in a small town outside of the capitol. During the late 
1980s, with the beginning collapse of the GDR regime, Eve was convinced that the Church 
should be an integral part of the process, and took a hands-on approach organising and 
participating in public political debates. After the collapse of the GDR government, people 
from all walks of life, such as former policemen, but also families with children, came to the 
protestant minister for her guidance. The dissolving of the GDR government meant also the 
dissolving of government run institutions such as orphanages and Eve was asked to foster 
two Black children, which she agreed to. Later, after the reunification of West and East 
Germany, the Church also became active in the facilitation of refugee accommodation, 
where Eve was asked to be part of. Through her work, the protestant minister met with 
Fagbola and decided to participate in one of his training. Similar to Lena, Eve described a 
painful moment in her first training: 
 
Eve: »And then, the first point, where the biography work started, was the crux: Stop, what did you actually hear 
about Black? How is Black? What was taught to me how Black is? Yes, I do not remember which part, but at one 
phase I fell into a deep sadness and cried a lot. In my helplessness or in my awareness, in my self being shown 
to me, as White, how are you socialised as White, what does it mean to be White, a White woman? To exercise 
racism as you exercise it every day. […] But to feel my pain deeply, my pain, that too, yes, that was the point I 
think, in the training, in basic training I got to this point, where I felt the pain, that you are doing wrong and how 
miseducated or deformed you are. […] And you have these and these pictures inside and you see Black like that, 
needy and so on. […] And I believe only if you are emotional, only if you feel something, then you can also change 
something, if you go through the pain, only then you are really ready [...]« (Eve 30/05/2012-2 #01:11:15). 
 
Eve, similar to Lena and Dina, describes a painful moment of gaining awareness. First there 
is the realisation that the misrepresentation of Black people in current German culture 
created a false imagery of Blackness. At the same time there is a dialectic between the 
imagination of Blackness, which is related to the self-construction of Whiteness (Yancy 2004, 
p. 68). Secondly, there is the realisation that Whiteness is related to forms of everyday 
racism, in other words not necessarily racist excesses such as physical violence or outspoken 
forms of xenophobia but rather small everyday interactions which when analysed more in-
depth show a racial culture that has Whiteness, usually disguised as the invisible norm, at 
its centre (Yancy 2004, p. 39; Wachendorfer 2001). Thirdly, there is the sense of having been 
miseducated or rather deformed by this racial culture, which aims to create racial 
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subjectivities that will function within the racialised power structures even if they are not 
aware of it. 
 However, Eve also mentions the possibility of change, that White subjectivities do 
not have to remain in their Whiteness forever. This is a very important point as it highlights 
that Whiteness is not essential, it is not a rigid, never-changing identity. Just as much as 
White subjectivities are socially and psychologically constructed, Eve points out here the 
prospect of deconstructing Whiteness. Interestingly enough, Eve does not describe a call to 
action leading to an aimless process where people act for the sake of doing something rather 
than working towards a sustainable change. Nor does Eve describe a rational/intellectual 
effort, where people just need to educate or enlighten themselves in order to overcome 
racism. Neither does the religious studies teacher talk about an often superficial and often 
misguided (as in patronising) multicultural education, reproducing cultural clichés such as 
the three »Bs« as in belly-dance, böreks, and baklava, the German equivalent to the British 
the »Ss – saris, samosas and steel drums« (Cole 2014, p. 689). Eve clearly states that change is 
only possible through an emotional process. If a person is ready to work through the pain 
of being subjectivated to Whiteness, so I argue in this thesis this person can also be ready to 
change the racial structures they have internalised. This does not only imply that being 
subjected to Whiteness is a painful experience, it also implies in order for a racialised person 
to change their behaviour, which is informed and guided by racial power structures 
inscribed into their body, they need to emotionally work through the experience of that 
subjectivation. 
 What are the dangers of feeding into the primacy of feelings of the White subject? Is 
this simply not a new form of White self-centredness and White narcissism? In Feeling White: 
Whiteness, Emotionality and Education (2016) Cheryl E. Matias states: 
 
»Needless to say, emotions are forever present in the work of race. To not deny or further repress those emotions, 
and the state of discomfort they create, makes us nothing more than somnambuliacs, walking through life asleep. 
Imagine, if you will, the hypocrisy in how one is living a life, proclaiming life, protecting life yet refusing to feel life 
itself. Is that truly life?« [original emphasis] (Matias 2016, p.2).  
 
Whilst Matias argues that feeling is part of living a human life, the author also critically 
examines the toxic emotionality that comes with Whiteness. White people tend to centre 
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their emotions over those of BIPOC (Matias 2016, p. 5). Additionally, the educational 
scientist also critically examines this form of White people’s self-centredness as White 
Narcissism (Matias 2016, pp. 69-80). Nevertheless, as the subject of emotionality related to 
racialisation processes remain, how can White people explore their feelings without 
centring themselves? Research suggests that there is an interesting distinction between 
narcissism and self-esteem, »that narcissism is strongly related to extraversion and dominance, 
but in contrast to self-esteem little with agreeableness and warmth, also narcissism is less communal 
and more related to other mental health issues than self-esteem« (Hyatt et Al. 2018, pp. 23-25). 
Matias argues that White people need to »learn to re-learn their emotions« (Matias 2016, p. 
135). This could mean that White people learn to see their feelings central to their humanity 
and not as central towards a racial culture that has Whiteness as its centre. Eve states that it 
takes working through the pain in order to change. This highlights an emotional trajectory, 
which is similar to other models of emotional stages, such as the Kübler-Ross model for the 
process of dying (Kübler-Ross 1973). As fascinating as these models are, they usually follow 
the logic of evolvement, (that is also why I mostly avoided them in this thesis) and leave 
little room for regress or the simultaneity of contradictory positions within the subject. 
Notwithstanding, I do see the value of emotionality in the transformation process of racial 
subjectivation. 
 Concurrently, in Inventing our Selves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (1996) in which 
Nikolas Rose explores how disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy etc. 
constitute the modern self, the author criticises that notion of transformation and writes 
»[a]lthough our subjectivity might appear our most intimate sphere of experience, its contemporary 
intensification as a political and ethical value is intrinsically correlated with the growth of expert 
languages, which enable us to render our relations with our selves and others into words and into 
thought, and with expert techniques, which promise to allow us to transform our selves in the 
direction of happiness and fulfilment« (Rose 1996, p. 229). In other words, the training makes 
this promise by offering the possibility of transformation through rendering the relation to 
the racial self and racial others into words, thoughts and feelings. 
 Ann describes a different emotional process during her first training experience. Ann 
was at the time of the research a young Psychology student, almost at the end of her studies. 
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Ann and her friend joined Phoenix about the same time I did. I remember her as tall, a bit 
lanky, and with very distinct facial features. She was young and fun to be around. Ann had 
grown up in South Hesse but studied in Jena in a former East German university. Ann said 
in the interview that she was from a dynasty of protestant ministers, so her parents were 
protestant ministers as well. With another friend from university, Ann participated in her 
first anti-racism training somewhere in Saxony, where she describes a similar racialised 
imagery of Black people as Eve: 
 
Ann: »Yeah... and yes, man, what did we do there again? Yeah, you should somehow talk about what kind of 
contact you had in your childhood, youth or in your life with POC, and then I somehow talked about my mother, I 
come from a parish family, and, then in the village an asylum seekers’ home was built, my mother went there and 
made contact with the people. Then somehow [name of Phoenix trainer] picked it up, and […] said: yes, Blacks 
are somehow perceived in terms of neediness, and you have to help them and so, and I thought whoa... what’s 
that now? That’s just the first thing I can think of. These are perhaps more emotional moments that I still 
remember. I cannot remember the exercises in the training. […] 
And that was just like a hunch, and [...] I had the feeling that many somehow many thought it’s kind of 
interesting, but maybe it’s more irritating or something. And to me there’s the question, if you get to a point where 
you somehow catch on, and the feeling is: ok, yes, somehow I get, that there is something, that I hadn’t had 
before... which was somehow not in my experience of the world, or not in my consciousness... and it was like 
that... it was a very exciting moment...« (Ann 28/05/2012-2 #00:07:13). 
 
Ann describes two phases during her training process. The first emotion that Ann 
remembers is a spark of inner resistance she felt, when the trainer mentioned in the 
interview, shared his interpretation of how some of the racial imagery and also memories 
contributed to the notion of Black people being inferior and in need of help – a notion that 
has been discussed in plenty of research of how Blackness is constructed in the White racial 
imagination (Della & Kiesel 2014; Kiesel & Bendix 2009, Hutnyk 1996). Ann’s initial reaction 
shows how she at first struggles with a possible reading offered by the trainer. It is not 
uncommon in the early training process, where in particular BIPOC trainers offer a critical 
reading of racialised imagery that their perspective is dismissed as subjective and therefore 
unscientific. Kathy Hytten and John Warren did an interesting collection of resistance that 
form within White subjects once they are confronted with the subject of Whiteness in 
educational settings (Hytten & Warren 2003). One of the resistances the researchers mention 
in their work is the »appeal to authenticity«, where the participants »focus on the fact that while 
they understand the whiteness literature cognitively, it does not match how they experience the 
world« (Hytten & Warren 2003, p. 71). 
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 In the second phase, Ann describes a »hunch«, a feeling that she has, which allows 
her to dive deeper into the training process. Whilst, as it seems, the majority of participants 
in Ann’s first training, despite their interest, felt rather irritated by the experience, she finally 
caught on: she realised that the trainer helped her in perceiving a part of reality, which she 
had been unable (or unwilling) to perceive beforehand. Part of the White racial experience 
is to ignore the BIPOC racial experiences, epistemologies and perceptions (Sullivan & Tuana 
2007). Whiteness creates and sustains ignorance in order to leave the racial power status quo 
related to Whiteness unquestioned (ibid.). However, once Ann allows this knowledge, this 
perspective into her world, her consciousness, she becomes aware of racial realities that she 
had not seen before and which also had a lot to do with who she was and how she perceived 
and experienced the world. She became aware of her own racialisation. In contrast to the 
other participants Ann describes it as a »very exciting moment« (Ann 28/05/2012-2 #00:07:13), 
a fascinating moment that allowed her world to expand. In other words, once she was able 
to work through her irritation, once able to overcome the inner resistance she felt at the first 
stage of the training, she was capable of immersing herself into a compelling change of 
perspective. This perspective change broadens her horizon, a horizon which is otherwise 
limited through Whiteness, an identity that needs to shut out the voices of BIPOC identities 
in order to maintain itself. Nevertheless, should the subject of inner resistance not be ignored 
in the sense of »[w]hen we begin, however, with the split subject of psychoanalytic theory, we 
discover new forms of conflict and contraction […] that require us to consider the complicated ways 
in which learning must take a detour through psychic resistance« (Pitt 1998, p. 551). 
 Growth, progress and self-improvement seem also prevalent in Ann’s depiction of 
her first training experience. Rose suggests: » there is no way of living as an ethical subject except 
through certain modes of subjectification, involving the monitoring, testing, and improving of the 
self« (Rose 1999, p. 245). The question would be here, what kind of ethics do the research 
participants follow? It is also unclear, how Phoenix influenced the way Ann feels about her 
training, since as an active member, she is also subjected to the discourses of the 
organisation. 
 Similar to Ann, a few other research participants mentioned the subject of inner 
resistance and self-examination during the training. Dre describes his most significant 
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memory from his first anti-racism training, the resistance from one of the participants but 
also his own inner struggle. In this particular training situation, the existence of biological 
human races is discussed. The trainer explained to the group that biological human races 
do not exist, that most of modern geneticist, reject the idea of biological human races as 
unscientific. However, one participant resists this statement of the trainer: 
 
Dre: »What I remember most is the following story, when we came to the question, are there biological human 
races, came a participant, my age or a year younger and thought that could not be possible [that races don’t exist] 
because he had been taught something different at school. Well, he’s clearly covered racial theory as in the 
existence of biological human races at school, learned that, and I remember my feeling well back then, which I’d 
best describe as torn, and that, I did not learn that at school, I think either I was not paying attention in the biology 
class, but I cannot remember being told by a biology teacher […]. But this young man, who was now younger 
than me, and claimed so vehemently that he had learned this here at the Copernicus Grammar School, he made 
me feel very unsure. […] And I know for a fact that at that moment I was leaning more towards the school, to this 
institution. I had the feeling, if they say that at school, well, they must know it. […] And then what I just learned in 
the training, at least, it’s doubtful. And (laughing) so it was really a strong inner conflict, between […] a trainer, 
and the one […] who said... who stood there with his, with all the weight of the German school system, saying 
that in school they teach it differently. And what I, what I just noticed at the time, is how strongly this authority of 
the school is anchored in me. […] So, no critical consciousness at all or the possibility of things that are taught in 
school to be considered potentially wrong, biased or out-dated, but what is taught in school is right. […] Although 
I […] knew very well, probably, most likely this trainer is right. (laughing) Well, that was a very unpleasant feeling 
in this training, which is already over 20 years ago« (Dre 11/07/2012-1 #00:04:56). 
 
Participants, in particular of the anti-racism training, very often feel a latent doubt or 
disbelief towards the realities and analysis the trainers, in particular BIPOC trainers, share. 
Dre very openly speaks about these feelings he had during the first training experience. It 
may be that the absurdity of everyday racism, which is not located at the fringes of society 
but rather at its centre, is difficult to grasp for White subjects. Also, in this phase of the 
training, one participant struggles with the information and analysis he is given by the 
trainer. The participant had learned in school about the existence of the white, black, yellow 
and red races and that there were distinct physical (or genetic) markers, which allow 
dividing humans into those separate racial groups. For that reason, the information that he 
was given by the trainer had to be wrong. The participant was not able to question whether 
the information he had received in school was right. 
Dre admits that as a White participant, it comes more naturally to follow the logic of 
the other White participants rather than the knowledge, logic, or authority, of the BIPOC 
trainer. Despite feeling torn, Dre leans more into the direction of the White participant 
regarding the question of which racial theory to believe in. In particular as the White 
participant evokes the institutional authority of the German school system. 
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In addition to showing different forms of resistance during the training, this 
particular situation reveals another important factor in the racialisation process. Racialised 
thinking and racial culture that has Whiteness at its centre leads to a racialised knowledge 
production (Sullivan & Tuana 2007, p. 154). The racialised knowledge comes here in the 
form of early racial theory, as a pseudo-science which despite being scientifically disproved 
by most of modern geneticists, maintained the notion of biological racial markers that allow 
the division into four to five different races (white, black, yellow and red). This knowledge 
of essentially different human races was in turn fed into the German school curriculum till 
about 2004 (Quentin 2019)40. Within the school system the students become subjected to this 
racialised knowledge production and leave the school system with this knowledge, whether 
they remember it consciously or not. In turn, if these racialised subjects never gain 
awareness of their racialisation, they will contribute to a racialised production of 
knowledge. The circle or the system of racialisation therefore maintains itself. 
Dre describes how the resistance related to the discussion about the existence of 
essential races made it very difficult to immerse himself into the training process and the 
perspective that the BIPOC trainer was sharing. Even after 20 years, Dre feels the emotions 
that the inner conflict triggered in him very vividly. Questioning Whiteness, in particular 
when it comes in the form of authority, an institution such as the school system, is very 
difficult for the White subject. Dre describes being in the tension field of maintaining 
Whiteness and questioning it (embodied by the BIPOC trainer), as very disconcerting and 
discomforting, almost like he was questioning who he himself really was. 
In relation to the subject of self-inspection and self-problematisation Rose writes: 
 
»Through self-inspection, self-problematization, self-monitoring, and confession, we evaluate ourselves 
according to the criteria provided for us by others. Through self-reformation, therapy, techniques of body 
alteration, and the calculated reshaping of speech and emotion, we adjust ourselves by means of the techniques 
propounded by the experts of the soul. The government of the soul depends upon our recognition of ourselves 
as ideally and potentially certain sorts of person, the unease generated by a normative judgement of what we are 
and could become, and the incitement offered to overcome this discrepancy by following the advice of experts in 
the management of the self. 
 The irony is that we believe, in making our subjectivity the principle of our personal lives, our ethical 
systems, and our political evaluations, that we are freely, choosing our freedom« (Rose 1999, p. 11). 
 
 
40 In a school in Saxony Rassenlehre was taught as recently as January 2019 (Quentin 2019) 
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Is the anti-racism training such a management of the self? Some of the terminology used in 
Rose’s quote certainly fits the description. There is the element of »self-monitoring«, the 
confessional character of the statement itself, including the »unease« that even 20 years later 
is vivid in Dre’s memory. In this case the anti-racism trainers would be the »experts« of the 
racialised soul, helping the subject to overcome their own racialisation. Is it really an illusion 
to assume that there potentially lies more self-determination and liberty in gaining 
awareness of our subjectivation? Does the illusion lie in the scope of freedom we assume we 
can win through self-examination and social-psychological growth? Or is the irony simply 
related to the fact that we assume we make a self-determined decision if we choose to put 
our racial subjectivation into the centre of our inner thought processes, but are actually 
following the pathways of modern (self-)governmentality? 
»Process« was also a central theme in Jean’s narration of his first training experience. 
Jean’s looks are almost nondescript. He has a rather calm and steady personality, I never 
got the impression that Jean was keen to hear himself talk. Jean, one of the participants in 
the focus group, who had grown up in the GDR, was a social worker and a computer 
scientist. He came from a working-class background, and shared about his sometimes 
crippling angst of coming from a working-class family that was upwardly mobile but still 
scared of losing that precarious newly achieved middle-class position. He was pivotal in 
collecting comics and children books from the former GDR with racialising content. The 
material Jean had collected became important in training with participants who had 
predominantly grown up in the GDR and would find it sometimes difficult to remember 
any racialising imagery in their childhoods. Jean also spoke about his inner resistance 
during the first training. At some point during the training, the participants are given a short 
text that summarises the drastic effects of the transatlantic slave trade on the African 
continent. 
 
Jean: »There is a new theory or a new perspective that we get to know and then realise in the training: It’s not 
about theory at all. It’s not about definitions. It’s not about: what are the right steps, but it’s only about me. In the 
training I also remember that there were few moments where I felt very troubled. In particular during the reading 
of the text […] I had feelings such as: ›That’s too heavy now. I’m being indoctrinated here.‹ (Laughs) So, some 
nice inner resistance, but I managed to somehow hold that. And I believe that a process set in like: ›I am going to 
look more into myself.‹ I do not know..., after the first training, I first ordered for a lot of money, like ten books that 
lay on the […] book table (all laugh), so I could learn the knowledge at home. And till today I don’t think I read all 




Jean remembers a moment of inner resistance very vividly during the reading of the text on 
the enslavement of African people and its disastrous aftermath on the African continent. 
Confronted with the history of physical (but also cultural) genocide of African people, Jean 
finds the feeling of pain and shame almost unbearable. The feeling of discomfort seems to 
be so intense that it transforms into an impression of being indoctrinated, of being taught 
an ideology, which is partial and not neutral or objective. Whiteness in Germany usually 
functions as an invisible norm (Wachendorfer 2001), but it entails also an ideology, which is 
not impartial, neutral, or objective either. Nevertheless, once Whiteness is questioned as also 
a position that produces history and knowledge, feelings of indoctrination and 
manipulation are often transferred onto the position questioning it (ibid.). 
 However, Jean states that he was able to somehow hold the tension and resistance 
the training was creating in him. In other words, he allowed himself to feel his internal 
blockades that came up during the training, without disrupting the process, simultaneously 
keeping an open mind to what was happening in front of him. This persevering in the 
training allows Jean to enter a new phase of his internal process. It dawns on Jean what the 
training is about, that it is not about theory, not about cognitive knowledge, but that it is 
about his subjectivity, about who he is, and about who he learnt to be in relation to »Race« 
and »racism«. Jean narrates that his next steps in order to tackle the subject of »Race« is 
introspection, critical reflection, beginning a de-racialisation of his thoughts. He orders 
numerous books, and, even though he has not read them all during the time of the interview, 
the books assist and guide him through this critical introspection of himself. 
As with the research subjects before Jean, his language neatly fits into discourses 
around psychology, process and development. Rose concurs, psychology has been critiqued 
in a variety of ways (Rose 1999, p. xxvii). It was mainly argued that theories of psychology 
and psychotherapeutic methods, treat a person like a detached entity and is mainly 
concerned with making that person a functioning member of society (ibid.). Rose disagrees 
with that perception as he assumes that contemporary psychology does not handle a person 
in order to dominate or control that individual (ibid.). Rose further states »the contrary, the 
subject is a free citizen, endowed with personal desires and enmeshed in a network of dynamic 
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relations with others. The very psychological theories and practices promoted by ›progressive‹ critics 
of ›adaptationist‹ psychology - dynamic and social psychologies, psychotherapies, family therapies - 
in stressing the significance of subjectivity as the key to our humanity, in elaborating techniques that 
enhance subjectivity through self-inspection and self-rectification, have underpinned the ways in 
which subjectivity has become connected to networks of power (Rose 1999, pp. xxvii-xxviii). Is 
Jean’s narrative of the anti-racism training in this case also underpinning the knowledge of 
how racial subjectivities have been connected in the network of racial power structures? 
Matt, a Biochemistry PhD student at the time, similar to Jean, was a very soft-spoken 
and gentle character, a little on the chubby side. Matt had also grown up in the former GDR 
and similarly to Eve came from a Christian family, which gave him a sort of outsider status 
before the unification. After the unification his family did well with a local business in 
Southern Mecklenburg-Pomerania. During his Biochemistry postgraduate course he met 
with Nana, one of the first Black female Phoenix trainers, and they started dating. After 
some time of dating Nana, Matt realised that his literacy on the subject of racialisation and 
Whiteness was rather limited. Confronted with the possibility of losing the relationship with 
Nana, he decided to participate in an anti-racism training. Resembling Ryan’s account of his 
early childhood in the GDR, Matt also remembered the socialist propaganda of racial 
siblinghood. Nevertheless, when Matt remembered his first anti-racism training experience, 
he described the realisation of his own Whiteness in different words: 
 
Matt: »I heard about Whiteness during the training for the first time. Um […] so I found that very exciting that […] 
I’ve been socialised as White, I wasn’t aware of it before. It was important to me; it did not have to be important 
to me. I became aware of it, yes. And then, so it was not a pleasant feeling, because I associated it with 
manipulation and heteronomy, so I’m basically programmed by my environment, well, I think everyone is 
programmed by their environment, but that I’ve just been programmed and that it makes sense in a certain system 
that I benefit from, the White System. For me then, that was extremely unpleasant, I must say. But I understood 
it at the moment« (Matt 04/08/2012-2 #00:47:07). 
 
Similar to Eve, Dina and Lena, Matt describes the realisation of his Whiteness as »extremely 
unpleasant«. Matt describes his subjection to Whiteness as a kind of programming, of being 
manipulated, or with the term »heteronomy«, as in being under the influence or domination 
of an outside authority – as opposed to being self-determined. This is particularly 
interesting, as Matt is clearly aware also of the structural advantages he has as a White 
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person, and despite that, the realisation of being subjectivated as White is not a pleasant 
one. 
 What Matt is saying is that he did not choose to be White. If subjects could choose, 
which discourses and ideas would be deeply inscribed into their bodies and psyches, would 
they consciously choose racist notions? Probably not – unless they want to be consciously 
and openly racist, a choice that seems to be more and more popular in Germany and other 
European countries (Zick et al. 2019, p. 66). But by simply growing up in a racial culture that 
has Whiteness at its centre, in Matt’s narrative he had absorbed all the norms and values he 
had to adhere to in order to fit into the system and to maintain it. Matt refers to this 
racialisation process as programming and states that everybody is programmed, which is a 
rather deterministic understanding of becoming a subject. I disagree here with Matt’s 
assessment of a racial programming, since it suggests a very passive racial subjectivation of 
the subject and does not reflect how children actively shape also the racial material that they 
have been given by society (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001). 
 Though subjectivities and power not necessarily always have to be confined to 
relations of domination and subjection, Matt narrates here, how understanding racial 
subjectivation affected him. In relation to power and subjectivities Rose also states that »the 
distinctive features of the modern knowledge and expertise of the psyche have to do with their role in 
the stimulation of subjectivity, promoting self-inspection and self-consciousness, shaping desires, 
seeking to maximize intellectual capacities. They are fundamental to the production of individuals 
›free to choose‹, whose lives become worthwhile to the extent that they are imbued with subjective 
feelings of meaningful pleasure (Rose 1999, p. 4). Matt’s narrative highlights that after the 
training, he perceived Whiteness as a source of displeasure, since, in his understanding 
being racialised also meant losing the freedom to choose. The subject of free-will choices 
shall be revisited later in this chapter. 
 Ryan, who described a similarly intense reaction to the realisation of his Whiteness, 
also dwells on the question of freedom and domination: 
 
Ryan: »And there are some elements that I remember from the training. So, I believe what I have in mind now, 
two things that moved me the most were, on the one hand, the […] text, because it was so condensed that it 
opened up a different historical perspective than the one I’m used to. And for me at that moment just explained a 
lot of things. But this short section by Judy Katz has moved me even more - what’s the name? White identity? - 
 
 167 
Where she describes how White people through racism and socialisation into being white, are hindered in their 
development, have experienced a psychological deformation. And are complicit. And that really blew me away 
the moment I read that. I still know that feeling to this day. I do not really know how to express that. That kind of 
opened a whole new door. A whole new perspective: to look outside of you and to realise, so this beautiful building 
in which I live, that I’ve built myself, which is very much shaped by my white identity, is quite a ruin, a broken 
house« (Ryan 11/01/2015-1 #00:24:34). 
 
Jessica Ringrose’s article Rethinking white resistance: exploring the discursive practices and 
psychical negotiations of ›whiteness‹ in feminist, anti-racist education (2007) states how 
Whiteness is still widely under-theorised in educational literature. The sociologist 
concludes »that the treatment of white students as unambiguous ›carriers of privilege‹ in 
educational research makes them read like ›stock characters in a social play‹ because social 
biographies, issues of class, gender and sexuality, and difficulties of contradiction and anxiety among 
white students grappling with race are largely suppressed in recent debates over whiteness in 
education« (Ringrose 2007, p. 324). Ryan describes how he is almost shocked once he is 
confronted with a side of Whiteness which he has not experienced in his political 
engagement before. In the training the research participant is confronted with a perspective 
on Whiteness, which describes the White subject apart from being structurally advantaged, 
also as hindered in their personal development or as having experienced a psychological 
deformation. 
 Many scholars in the field of Critical Race Theory, but also most anti-racism activists 
and practitioners, are familiar with the advantages and privileges that come with being 
racialised as White. Only very few theories on Critical Whiteness (and therefore I am also 
assuming other antiracism training or workshop [Fernández García 2018]) address the 
disadvantages that come from being racialised as White. As a workshop facilitator, Ryan 
had touched upon notions of the overdevelopment of the Global North, the wealth of 
Western societies based on histories of colonial exploitation, and the over-empowerment of 
White people through texts such as Peggy McIntosh’s »White Privilege and Male Privilege«, 
where the author collected about 46 conditions, which she describes as White privilege 
(McIntosh 1988). In other words, Whiteness is described, as rich, powerful and favoured, as 
preferential within these discourses. Nevertheless, once Ryan can move past the guilt and 
shame of being part of a chosen elite, in being complicit and benefitting from a system, 
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which is stratified in his favour, he begins to realise that this »beautiful building« (Ryan 
11/01/2015-1 #00:24:34) in which he lives, comes at a cost. 
McIntosh’s text on privileges, and therefore also plenty of other critical »Race« 
theorists that followed, treated privileges as something that can be accumulated. But what 
if privileges were conceptualised as something that is rather relational (Yancy & Gilroy 
2015)? Would that render privileges a relative term? Very often, if a White person is asked 
if they remember the first time they realised that they were White, they do not remember, 
or it takes a long time for them to remember (Ogette 2017). It also needs a lot of trust for a 
White person to share those often very uncomfortable moments or situations where they 
understood that they were related to as a White person (Thandeka 1999; Frankenberg 1993). 
In contrast, BIPOC generally find it much easier remembering early moments in childhood, 
where they realised that they were related to as BIPOC, albeit those experiences often being 
unpleasant, painful and/or traumatic (Kilomba 2008). Is this head start then a privilege that 
BIPOC have, because they realise much earlier what racialisation does to them, and have 
therefore much earlier also the opportunity to address these issues? 
Ryan would even go so far as to call that illusion of a beautiful house (in this case 
Whiteness or his White identity) a »ruin, a broken house« (Ryan 11/01/2015-1 #00:24:34). Is it 
possible that Whiteness constitutes itself through a certain brokenness, which Ryan 
describes here? The process of Othering the own, as Gruen describes it, »hinders humans from 
relating to each other humanly – with sympathy, empathy and mutual understanding« (Gruen 2000, 
p. 20). In the previous chapter, I highlighted the process of Othering the own in order to 
construct the White subject, and also the emotional, psychological and epistemic (sometimes 
even physical) violence, which is at the core of this process. Once made aware of the violent 
process of Othering, the damage it causes in the White subject, the dehumanisation of the 
White subject that comes with being racialised, that realisation made Ryan aware and 
opened new doors of thinking and feeling about himself. However, in Governing the Soul 
(1999) Rose has some thoughts on the notion of humanness developed in the Western 
tradition of psychology, and shows »that, in producing positive knowledges, plausible truth 
claims, and apparently dispassionate expertise, psy makes it possible to govern subjects within these 
practices and apparatuses in ways that appear to be based, not upon arbitrary authority, but upon 
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the real nature of humans as psychological subjects. The human sciences have actually made it 
possible to exercise political, moral, organizational, even personal authority in ways compatible with 
liberal notions of freedom and autonomy of individuals and ideas about liberal limits on the scope of 
legitimate political intervention« (Rose 1999, viii). 
 Rose further states: 
 
»It is easy to misunderstand this argument, and to think that I am proposing a critique that is based on the 
inappropriate technologization of some ineffable humanity. My argument, however, is quite the reverse. These 
new forms of regulation do not crush subjectivity. They actually fabricate subjects - human men, women and 
children - capable of bearing the burdens of liberty. From the mid-nineteenth century, psy expertise has developed 
in symbiosis with a culture of liberal freedom. But I argue that psy acquires a particular significance within 
contemporary western forms of life, which have come to celebrate values of autonomy and self-realization that 
are essentially psychological in form and structure. These values establish and delimit our sense of what it is to 
be a human being, and what it is to live a life of liberty: indeed contemporary human subjects, at least when they 
are accorded the status of adults, are ›obliged to be free‹ in this psychological sense. That is to say, however 
apparently external and implacable may be the constraints, obstacles and limitations that are encountered, each 
individual must render his or her life meaningful as if it were the outcome of individual choices made in furtherance 
of a biographical project of self-realization« (Rose 1999, pp viii-ix). 
 
 Is the notion of humanness according to Rose, reflected in the training process bound 
to these current Western lifestyles? Admittedly, as I have already examined in the first 
section of this chapter, Phoenix training has been heavily influenced by systems psychology, 
Fanonian theory and epistemologies of the Global South. However, the research 
participants’ narratives on their notion of humanness shall be further examined in chapter 
6. Notwithstanding, the idea of liberation and oppression is still a crucial element in Ryan’s 
narrative and shall be explored later in this chapter. 
Similarly, C.L., one of the participants of the focus group, talked about her 
experiences in predominantly White, leftist political spaces and the oppressive experiences 
she made there. C.L. was employed at a government programme facilitating school 
exchanges between Germany and the Global South. I met C.L. around 2011 at a training, 
where she was a participant. She is very tall, skinny and I perceived her as very cerebral. 
Her intellectual understanding of Critical Race Theory was very impressive, but it took C.L. 
some time to relate to the emotional side of the training. She grew up in rural southern 
Germany, in a very traditional Catholic, value-conservative, non-academic family on a farm. 
Her older brother was also active in the local Neo-Nazi scene for some time. Despite 
growing up in a conservative, far-right environment, C.L. developed rather liberal, leftist 
views and was always supported by her mother in discussions with her openly racist 
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brother. Shaped by the predominantly White political, anti-racist/anti-fascist spaces in 
Berlin, she was very much surprised to encounter a political space created and led by 
BIPOC: 
 
C.L.: »[I] remember quite a bit about my first ART and it became very clear to me that I came from such a very 
typical Berlin postcolonial radical left-wing political hard-core discussion culture, and I... and I also had participated 
in workshops with many people before, they’ve already done a lot with me. And I think it was a bit like: Yes, there 
is now a Black trainer - the training was with [name of trainer] - and of course I want to do everything right. And 
in contrast to the others: ›I already know the right words‹, etc. and I am already here - yes, I would say almost a 
bit like catholic guilt (all laugh), and I think that’s such a nice topic, that [name of trainer] and I still have till today, 
he started to poke in this left-radical born-again-Christian supercritical narrative (a few laughs). I also remember 
that I had talked with a friend before I participated in the […] training, who just said: ›Well, that’s one of the few 
NGOs where POC people do the antiracism training‹« (C.L. focus group, 11/01/2015-1 #00:16:34). 
 
C.L.’s narrative highlights that until she participated in the Phoenix training, she had mostly 
learned about Whiteness in White settings. Encountering BIPOC trainers for the first time, 
she had no idea what to expect: 
 
C.L.: »I waltzed in there relatively undiscerning. And then it was just that I totally came from such a very orthodox 
direction (laughs) in this training and my presentation, and what I’d like to happen and so on, and then I had a 
huge discussion with [name of trainer]... he really sat down with me at lunch... and I was like: ›Yes, but this soft. 
And this easy. Are you not stabbing the others in the back?‹ etc. So we had a proper political discussion. And 
then [name of trainer] talked about his story and just said that his experience was that when he does anti-racism 
work like that, people are changing the street until today when they see him, because he used to be that way too. 
[…] That gave me reason to think. And at the same time, I know that I had great difficulties to trust, because I 
really was... that was changing into another political culture. […] And I know after that, I said to this person who 
said, Phoenix is the only one in which POC do the training. That I went to her and was like ›Oh, well, that happy 
people thing, that’s actually not really political‹. And then I had with her an exchange, where she then said: ›Well, 
but […] that’s very substantiated, what they are doing‹ (some laugh). And a lot of what probably seems to have 
happened in the unconscious of vibes, then made me decide to take part in the next training. And stay on it« (C.L. 
focus group, 11/01/2015-1 #00:20:43). 
 
C.L. uses the term »catholic guilt«, describing the phenomenon of White politicised anti-
racists that seem to live in constant self-flagellation due to their Whiteness and their 
assumed White privileges. Though anti-racism pioneer Judith Katz had already criticised 
the phenomenon of White guilt as counterproductive (Katz 1978, p. 22), it seems to have 
crept into anti-racism movements in the USA and some European countries (Steele 2006; 
Tißberger 2017, p. 250). Some social researchers highlight the resemblance of third wave 
anti-racism, though considering itself widely secular, to a religious movement and state that 
the »idea that whites are permanently stained by their white privilege, gaining moral absolution only 
by eternally attesting to it, is the third wave’s version of original sin« (McWorther 2018). This also 
seems to resonate with C.L.’s description of conventional Critical Whiteness discourses in 
Berlin as »left-radical born-again-Christian supercritical narrative« (C.L. focus group, 
11/01/2015-1 #00:16:34), meaning the discourse has taken on a religious zealotry that seems 
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to hinder personal development and puts many who are not part of those political spheres 
off to even join. Leaving these political spheres behind, which includes also letting go of 
White guilt, White self-flagellation (but also the flagellation of other not so »conscious« 
White people) is then described as changing political culture by C.L. In Ringrose’s research 
on anti-racism education, the author also comes across the phenomenon of zealotry and 
writes: 
 
»These researchers seem to point to an important dynamic of ›omnipotence‹ in education, whereby the knower 
holds power to transform the ignorant (Pitt, 1998). However, they resort back to this same dynamic in their 
research, interpreting their students’ concerns that critical whiteness theories did not seem to account for capacity 
for personal or social change, as evidence of the students’ hopeless ›idealism,‹ simplicity, ›naiveté‹ and ultimately 
›resistance‹ to knowledge of their own whiteness. These authors go so far as to cite the dangers of students’ 
›zealotry‹—those who ›think they »get it« (that is, they understand their own whiteness and know how to arrest 
white privilege) and know they must pass »it« on‹ (Hytten & Warren, 2003, p. 76). We have, therefore, a kind of 
false consciousness thesis that is not tolerated in other avenues of educational research where complex 
poststructural debates on contradiction, fluidity, agency and subjective shift thrive« (Ringrose 2007, p. 326). 
 
Ringrose’s research highlights, how the issue of White guilt and its violent off-shoots hinder 
the awareness of complexities within anti-racist education that are necessary in order for 
the White subject to develop and progress. How can anti-racism practitioners ensure that 
»contradiction, fluidity, agency and subjective shifts« (Ringrose 2007, p. 326) remain part of their 
practice? 
 In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (2005 [1930]) Max Weber concluded: 
 
»For sure, even with the best will, the modern person seems generally unable to imagine how large a significance 
those components of our consciousness rooted in religious beliefs have actually had upon culture, national 
character, and the organization of life. Nevertheless, it can not be, of course, the intention here to set a one-sided 
spiritualistic analysis of the causes of culture and history in place of an equally one-sided ›materialistic‹ analysis. 
Both are equally possible. Historical truth, however, is served equally little if either of these analyses claims to be 
the conclusion of an investigation rather than its preparatory stage« (Weber 2005, p. 125). 
 
The religious undertones in the research participants’ narratives of their first training 
experience is evident. The confessional character of their narratives is highlighted by almost 
all White research participants’ sense of emotional realisation that they have been racialised 
as White and the consequences this racialisation process has on their subjectivity. The 
research participants express that they felt conflicted (C.L., Dre) or insecure, troubled and 
irritated (Ann, Dre, Jean) in the training. Some research participants also expressed that they 
experienced extreme discomfort, emotional tenseness or unpleasantness during the training 
(Dre, Jean, Matt). Half of the research participants stated that they felt hurt, pain and sadness 
during the training (Dina, Eve, Lena, Ryan). One participant experienced the training also 
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as exciting (Ann). Either way, in their search for ethics, most of the research participants 
seek to give meaning to their suffering: 
 
»Finally, and of central importance, the special life of the saint—fully separate from the ›natural‹ life of wants and 
desires—could no longer play itself out in monastic communities set apart from the world. Rather, the devoutly 
religious must now live saintly lives in the world and amid its mundane affairs. This rationalization of the conduct 
of life—now in the world yet still oriented to the supernatural—was the effect of ascetic Protestantism’s concept 
of the calling« (Weber 2005, p. 100). 
 
 Through critically examining the White participants memories of their first anti-
racism training through the lens of Nikolas Rose’s Governing the Soul (1999), I have 
highlighted the confessional character of their statements. Similar to the subjects of 
psychological disciplines as examined by Rose, participants of the training are invited to 
examine their racial subjectivity. To some participants, this examination is a painful process, 
but at the same time, their suffering is given the meaning of transforming or liberating them 
slowly and partly from their subjectivation as racial subjects. 
 In the second part of this chapter, I will further examine how the BIPOC participants 
remembered their first experiences of empowerment training.  
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The Empowerment or BIPOC-Consciousness-Training 
 
Having examined the White research participants narratives of their first anti-racism 
training (with Phoenix), it highlighted a number of feelings such as conflictions, discomfort 
and sadness, which were triggered by the realisation of their racialisation. I will now explore 
how the BIPOC research participants narrate their first empowerment training.  
 Despite her early memories of racialisation, Nana had difficulties on identifying 
herself as »Black«, when she arrived in Germany in her late teens in order to study medicine. 
A few years into her studies, through a scholarship from a green and left-leaning foundation 
in Berlin, she got in touch with other more politicised BIPOC students. These students had 
decided to organise an empowerment training for themselves and had invited two trainers 
from Phoenix to facilitate it. Nana describes how she arrived very late at the training and 
was initially dissatisfied, the majority of the participants were Black women but there were 
two male trainers and one of them wasn’t even Black but »this Turkish guy« as Nana 
recollects (Nana 04/08/2012-2 #00:43:12). Nevertheless, she allowed herself to be immersed 
into the training process: 
 
»But I understood something. I understood something like the way [name of trainer] and [name of trainer] were 
speaking, and the way they would interact with the people. I was, at that moment, I was just watching, you know. 
I did not say anything. And then I realised: ›No, something is different about this kind of lecture‹. There was 
something different about this atmosphere. There was something different, like very… em, something very 
welcoming, something very warm, you know. It is difficult to describe it« (Nana 04/08/2012-2 #00:44:00). 
 
Similar to Dina in the first part of this chapter, Nana describes the empowerment training 
less in terms of content, but in terms of atmosphere and emotion. However, whilst Dina 
described a rather painful anti-racism training experience, Nana describes her impression 
of the empowerment training with the words »warm« and »welcoming«. The concept of 
empowerment currently is (not unjustifiably) critiqued of being part of the neoliberal project 
of (self-)governance, self-optimisation and self-improvement41 (Cornwall 2018, p. 8). In her 
essay Beyond ›Empowerment Lite‹: Women’s Empowerment, Neoliberal Development and Global 
 
41 Even though Aradhana Sharma in her book Logics of Empowerment (2008) also states that »While the neoliberal 
governmentalization of empowerment can connote depoliticization, I argue that it also makes possible political activism 
and transformation« (Sharma 2008, p. xx).  
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Justice (2018) Andrea Cornwell distinguishes between »liberal empowerment« and »liberating 
empowerment«, the first mainly aiming at improved neo-liberal self-exploitation, the latter at 
challenging societal power structures (Cornwall 2018, p. 7). Rose further states that whilst 
»[n]ot all political subjects are embraced in the new regime of the self«, in particular marginalised 
groups fall under the regime of »community care« with empowerment strategies that use the 
identical psychological wording (Rose 1996, pp. 166-167). Through creating an atmosphere 
of unconditional positive regard, the trainers and the empowerment training fit almost into 
Rose’s description of »special educational programs set up by leaders of disadvantaged groups and 
communities, one sees the operation of a very similar image of the subject we could and should be, 
and the use of the same psychological and therapeutic devices for reconstructing the will on the model 
of enterprise, self-esteem, and self-actualization« (Rose 1996, p. 167). Nevertheless, the language 
of self-actualisation is also highlighted in Nana’s following statement: 
 
»And these guys were talking about something else. They were talking about, how to be strong, how to follow 
your dreams […]«. (Nana 04/08/2012-2 #00:44:18) 
 
Nana then continues:  
 
Nana: »So, I just sat back, and I saw this [name of trainer] guy going on his knee and saying that: ›You don’t have 
to be empowered. You can choose also not to be empowered. But give yourself time.‹ Just to relax. And just to 
communicate with each other and have fun. And I said: ›Wow! We are gonna have fun. That’s great‹. And I felt 
kind of good« (Nana 04/08/2012-2 #00:44:53). 
 
This passage highlights the value of self-determination the trainers put into the training. 
According to Nana’s narrative, training participants are ensured by the trainers that no-one 
is forced to be empowered. »Being empowered« becomes a choice, it also defines 
empowerment in this instance as self-determination, and being obliged to be empowered 
would, in any case, undermine the logic of self-determination. What is self-determination? 
What is the self in self-determination? There is an international legal dimension to self-
determination, for example in the UN-Charter. The UN-Charter states in chapter 1, article 
1, section 2 that the purpose of the UN is to »develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace« (UN Charter 1945). Through the UN-Charter (and 
other historical events) the term self-determination became an important concept in 
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decolonisation movements all around the world (Simpson 2018, pp. 417-435). The origins of 
the concept of self-determination can be traced back to the French Revolution, the US 
Declaration of Independence, German Enlightenment thinkers, such as Kant and late 19th 
century Marxism (Simpson 2018, p. 418). Kant coined the word Mündigkeit (which loosely 
translates as maturity) and meant with it the inner and outer capacity of a person to self-
determination and accountability (Kant 1784). In Nana’s narrative self-determination 
resonates with a similar understanding of the concept as a subject’s autonomy, free will and 
the freedom of choice. It suggests that being a free subject is related to the idea of having the 
possibility to choose. In the context of the empowerment training for BIPOC that would 
mean that the participants are reminded that they have choices. But why? It assumes that 
racism limits choices of BIPOC possibly in a structural sense, but also on an interpersonal 
level. On one level the discourse on choice might highlight, that structural racism could 
possibly mean a limitation of access to housing, work, education, life possibilities etc. On 
the other level, it could put a focus on how everyday interaction with White people might 
be limited through racism. In a racialised setting a person might feel reduced to their 
perceived »Race« whilst their complex subjectivity is ignored. In addition, it could also put 
an emphasis on how we respond to racist incidences and question if there is a choice on how 
BIPOC respond to racism and/or racialised settings. Rose also underlines the importance of 
the question of choice in the chapter Obliged to be Free (1999) and concludes: 
 
»It is here that the techniques of psychotherapeutics come into accordance with new political rationales for the 
government of conduct. They are intrinsically bound to this injunction to selfhood and the space of choices that it 
operates within. They are themselves predominantly distributed to individuals through free choice in a market of 
expertise, rather than imposed by legal or religious obligation. They are characteristically sought when individuals 
feel unable to bear the obligations of selfhood, or when they are anguished by them. And the rationale of 
psychotherapies - and this applies equally to contemporary psychiatry - is to restore to individuals the capacity to 
function as autonomous beings in the contractual society of the self. Selves unable to operate the imperative of 
choice are to be restored through therapy to the status of a choosing individual. Selves who find choice 
meaningless and their identity constantly fading under inner and outer fragmentation are to be restored, through 
therapy, to unity and personal purpose. Selves dissatisfied with who they are can engage in therapeutic projects 
to refurbish and reshape themselves in the directions they desire. The psychotherapies provide technologies of 
individuality for the production and regulation of the individual who is ›free to choose‹« (Rose 1999, p. 231-232). 
 
Similar to psychotherapies, the empowerment training suggests that individuals have the 
freedom to choose, whether or not they want to be empowered. Already imbued in its name, 
the empowerment training implies that the individual, a Black/Indigenous/Person of Colour 
is kind of disempowered, in this case by racial power structures. This is very reminiscent of 
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Steve Biko’s idea of Black Consciousness programmes, which also assumed that Black 
people were victims of racism and the Apartheid system. So, if a Black/Indigenous/Person 
of Colour does not feel disempowered and (therefore sees no need to participate in an 
empowerment training), are they deluded? Of course, it is impossible to answer if each and 
every individual that has been racialised feels disempowered or not, there might be some 
who do and some who do not. There might be some people in denial of feeling 
disempowered, there might be some people who felt empowered by certain circumstances 
in their lives. Why a person chooses to participate in an empowerment training can be 
manifold. Whatever their personal reasons might be, training participants can receive 
support and strategies in order to cope with or respond to the racialised social settings they 
have to navigate through (Can 2013). Similar to psychotherapy, empowerment training aims 
at enabling the participants to act – so Rose states – as »autonomous beings in the contractual 
society of the self« (Rose 1999, p. 232). Here, I find it necessary to question Rose’s reference to 
social contract theory made popular by the likes of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant. Does 
the contractual society of the self also include the subject which is marginalised and 
disadvantaged by racialisation? In The Racial Contract (1997) by political philosopher Charles 
W. Mills, the author concludes that »[b]y its crucial silence on race and the corresponding 
opacities of its conventional conceptual array, the raceless social contract and the raceless world of 
contemporary moral and political theory render mysterious the actual political issues and concerns 
that have historically preoccupied a large section of the world’s population« (Mills 1997, p. 124). In 
other words, so Mills suggests, the social contract has been mainly made applicable to White 
men, and could also be described as White supremacy, therefore a racial contract, as it 
usually excludes BIPOC. Nevertheless, the notion of autonomy in empowerment could also 
be complimented by the notion of decoloniality (Torres & Can 2013). The decolonised self 
acts freely of internalised Whiteness and internalised racism. 
 The concept of decoloniality highlights that the »coloniality of power is based upon 
›racial‹ social classification of the world population under Eurocentered world power« (Quijano 
2007, p. 171). The methods in both, anti-racism and empowerment training, though they 
have some resemblance to Western psychotherapeutic concepts, claim to have their 
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methodological roots in Non-Western culture and epistemology42. One of the heavily used 
methods in the empowerment training (but also in the follow up training of the anti-racism 
training) is the Theatre of the Oppressed (2000) founded and developed by Brazilian theatre 
practitioner, drama theorist and political activist Augusto Boal. Boal developed the Theatre 
of the Oppressed in Brazil in the late 1960s during the military junta (Cohen-Cruz & 
Schutzman 2006, p. 3). One of the branches of this theatre method that Boal developed was 
the Forum Theatre, which was based on simultaneous dramaturgy (Amkpa 2006, p. 170). 
The participants of the Forum Theatre would mostly depict everyday situations of 
oppression such as domestic violence or misuse of authority in mainly public spaces such 
as markets or universities. Together with the audience, the participants would seek 
solutions for these oppressive situations and the spectators also had the opportunity to 
replace one of the actors turning them into »spect-actors«, a mix of spectator and actor 
(ibid.). This particular method had also been used in Nana’s first empowerment training. 
Drama studies researchers also compare this method to the Berthold Brecht’s Lehrstück: 
 
»Theatre of the Oppressed can be compared to some extent to Brechtian didactic works (Lehrstücke) for several 
reasons. First, because the main interest lies in the acting experience and not the spectating one. At the core of 
these two theatrical practices is the actor. The essential is to act, not to sit and watch other people acting. Also 
and for the same reason, both don't necessarily implement public performance, because the biggest part is the 
process, not the finished work. Besides, none have been conceived for professional actors – Lehrstücke were 
intended for political activists as training in dialectical materialism. Even if Theatre of the Oppressed's Marxist 
background is less obvious, yet it asserts itself as a rehearsal for concrete political actions« (Coudray 2017, p.7).  
 
 
In her interview, Nana had reported a situation on her arrival in Germany when she tried 
to register as a medical student at a Berlin university. In a hunt of Kafkaesque proportions, 
she was sent from one office to another, asked to provide documents constantly, which she 
did, only to be told to go to another office, where she would be asked to produce new or 
different documents, until it was the last day to register. Finally, she ended up in the office 
of a senior staff member who was flabbergasted at the gruelling and unsuccessful process 
Nana had already gone through, empathised with her, and took the time to register the 
 
42 It should also be noted here, that Freud was very much influenced by the ideas of religions and philosophies of Non-




young Black woman as a medical student. In the training, the story of her trying to register 
as a medical student was used in the Forum Theatre: 
 
Nana: »I do not remember like every detail, but I know, that it was such a comfort, you know. It was such a 
comfort, these themes, the way, we had some exercises. And then we had some drama. Oh, I remember that 
drama. I was in this drama play with Maria. And then I played out. I played out the experience I had, when I tried 
to register for medicine. And in this drama, so many aspects of that experience just came into my mind. It was 
the first time, that I understood, that I had gone through racism. I did not know at that time, that I had gone through 
racism, you know. So, on that Saturday I learned so much. Like, I learned, what it means to be Black, what it 
means to be White. And these constructions. The theory stuff also was very good. All of a sudden, I had a 
language. I had a language to speak. And I had people, who understood, what I was talking about. And that was 
just amazing. It was so amazing. I remember, I just did not want this day to end« (Nana 04/08/2012-2 #00:47:22). 
 
It could be said that at this stage, the empowerment training (but also the basic anti-racism 
training and the follow up training) brings in here the question of »agency«. The idea is that 
the participants are made aware that they have agency, that they have the capacity to act in 
any way necessary to stir situations towards the best potential outcome/change they can 
achieve. However, Rose states that the question of agency might be a dead-end. In 
accordance with Butler (1995), he states that »such capacities for action emerge out of the specific 
regimes and technologies that machinate humans in diverse ways« (Rose 1999, p. 187). Rose also 
states that the invocation of a universal notion of human agency is unnecessary, as the 
linkages, associations and struggles the postmodern human has to go through, generate also 
reactions such as transformation and resistance as an outcome (ibid.). In other words, 
agency is simply a consequence, »a distributed outcome of particular technologies of 
subjectification that invoke human beings as subjects of a certain type of freedom and supply the 
norms and techniques by which that freedom is to be recognized, assembled, and played out in specific 
domains« (Rose 1999, p. 187). 
 The Theatre of the Oppressed highlights though also the embodiment of racialisation 
and resistance at the same time.  
 
Can: »After the training, the training was something very special for me, because the atmosphere that was 
created, uh, made it much easier to talk about difficult, yes, facts, to share it with others and not to have to explain 
for hours, but directly to be understood straight away. But uh, a very physical reaction at the end of the training, 
which for me has been very, very… yes, it was a paradigm shift in terms of body and mind. I got an extreme rash. 
I have no problems with rashes, but at the end of the training, so for the last third of the training, I felt my skin 
extremely all over, everywhere. It was super-hot, I had the feeling that I got some fumes coming out of my pores, 
as if hot air wanted out of all my pores. And the topic also has something to do with skin and skin colour and with 





Can describes his first empowerment training as special, as distinct experience that stands 
out from his everyday life. The research subject describes a feeling of safety, of being able to 
share experiences of racialisation without them being questioned or denied that they are 
racist experiences. The denial of racism and its meanings for BIPOC is »[t]o insist on being 
seen, that is, to contest the dominant group’s perception is - for an oppressed person - to be smashed 
in the process by a wall of denial that makes of one’s existence an illusion, an imagined story of 
unfairness and injustice (Razack 1998, p. 24). In other words, the denial of racism evokes fears 
within BIPOC that they are not seen as subjects, their life experiences become invalidated 
and their voices silenced. This makes talking about racialisation within a mixed 
White/BIPOC setting very difficult. The absence of White people in the room creates an 
imagined safe space; I say imagined safe space because there are no safe spaces as epistemic 
and symbolical violence can be performed on many different levels43. 
Nevertheless, Can does describe his experience within the training as a paradigm 
shift, once he was able to share his experiences of racialisation without them being 
questioned or invalidated, he responded, not only mentally but also physically. There is 
some research on the effects of racism on a person’s mental and physical health in long-term 
studies (Prasad 2012; Bhopal 2007). What does it do to our racialised bodies that we navigate 
through a racialised world? The research subject’s response to the empowerment training 
and the confrontation of suffering caused by racialisation are described as deep emotions 
exuded by his body in aethereal form. The empowerment trainer and social scholar Pasqual 
Virginie Rotter, who developed the Empowerment-In-Motion training form, which works 
with mainly non-verbal and physical means of expressing and overcoming suffering caused 
by racialisation, argues that »we have to understand racism experiences as a whole-body 
experience, which also causes whole-body reactions and coping mechanisms« (Rotter 2013, p. 124)44. 
 
43 The most recent development in anti-racism and empowerment movements is the concept of »safer spaces«, which are 
not 100% safe but still safer than other spaces. 
44 Rotter continues to write: »So of course, it is important to know what I have experienced, how I have responded to it so 
far and what I can say in the future. But it is just as important to realize that I hold my breath every time I face racism. And 
to break the connection to the basic movement of my life. Or that my body has learned to make itself imperceptibly smaller 
in order to avoid racist attacks. Or my vocal cords slightly constrict every time because a thin voice makes me less 
threatening for my racist counterpart. Or that I retreat gradually when my limit is exceeded, thereby giving up my need for 
my space. Or that I lower my eyes in the public space, so as not to be hit by the many potentially violent energies in the 





 Rotter also describes how many participants want rational methods to counter 
racialised situations (ibid.). Yet, as much as the aspect of acting liberated in the 
empowerment training has its relevance, another much basic facet is important in the 
training. Kabera, who, with a few exceptions had grown up in a very White environment, 
shared his most important emotion, he experienced during his first empowerment training: 
 
Kabera: »When I think back to when I went through my first own BCT, I think in 2005 that was where I think it was 
the realisation that there is racism, it is everywhere, I have had this experience and others have also had this 
experience. And I think that was such a magical moment when I noticed that I wasn’t really alone with it and it 
actually exists, even if there are people who say, no, it doesn’t exist, or candle-lit demonstrations would be enough 
to tackle it« (Kabera 14/04/2012-1 #00:45:51). 
 
Kabera’s statement here suggests, that the experience of racism can be an isolating 
experience for the racialised individual in Germany. Further, racial discrimination is also 
described as a life experience, which is very often denied or not acknowledged. 
Understandingly, a person that felt isolated from people with shared life experiences, could 
feel a magic moment, once they enter a room in which biographies of people who have been 
racialised as BIPOC assemble are recognised. However, Kabera also describes how difficult 
it can be to enter those spaces, where people with in particular painful shared experiences 
of racialisation converge: 
 
Kabera: »And I also believe this goal, it is so that I realise that it is actually about doing it and having this 
experience again and writing this experience anew. […] But I realise that it actually still costs me strength, I realise 
that before every training session, I somehow get a little sick, have a cold, have a stomach-ache, have an ear-
ache or something. And then, yes, almost force myself to go there, to do that and then come back out of it with a 
bit of relief and a bit of recovery, so to speak. To say wow, I kind of faced it« (Kabera 14/04/2012-2 #00:05:44). 
 
Even though Kabera seems unsure what the aim of the empowerment training is, he does 
mention facing the pain or discomfort he senses before the training, in order to write the 
experience anew. Kabera’s statement also implies that the process of rewriting the meaning 
of experiences is a long process that should improve and feel much easier over the course 
of time. The quote, but also most of the other statements from BIPOC research participants 
and White research participants also imply that this is an internal process, going inward 




»The codes and vocabularies of psychotherapeutics thus can bring into alignment the techniques for the 
regulation of subjectivity and the technologies of government elaborated within contemporary political rationales. 
It promises to make it possible for us all to make a project of our biography, create a style for our lives, shape our 
everyday existence in terms of an ethic of autonomy. Yet the norm of autonomy secretes, as its inevitable 
accompaniment, a constant and intense self-scrutiny, a continual evaluation of our personal experiences, 
emotions, and feelings in relation to images of satisfaction, the necessity to narrativize our lives in a vocabulary 
of interiority. The self that is liberated is obliged to live its life tied to the project of its own identity« (Rose 1999, p. 
259). 
 
The BIPOC research participants expressed different emotions than the White ones in their 
narratives of their first training. There certainly was a feeling of warmth, being welcomed, 
of feeling good or amazing and in awe, a sense of something magical happening but also 
the feeling of being understood (Can, Kabera, Nana). Some research participants also shared 
a kind of negative physical experience triggered by the training (Can, Kabera). What 
relevance do these emotions have? What role do they play also in the new narratives of self 





The fifth chapter highlights how the language of self-governmentality as examined by Rose 
(1996, 1999) is heavily used in the statements made by the research participants. This 
resonates also with Lasch-Quinn’s critique of Race Experts (2001), some of which have turned 
the efforts of the US Civil Rights movement into a form of Californian-style racial self-
discovery, with the aim of transcending racial differences: 
 
»Initially this trend brought highly credible examinations on the part of Kenneth Clark and others of the real 
psychological dimensions of racial discrimination, but increasingly the terms and mode of the new therapies 
including the twelve-step programs and the larger recovery ethos, the movement to free the ›inner child,‹ and the 
like-became mixed in with the racial struggle indiscriminately. The idea that therapy could and should help bring 
about political change, at the very least by helping one individual at a time confront his or her own psychological 
inheritance – the legacy of racism and oppression – spawned a number of initiatives that fused race and therapy. 
A rough consensus over what came to be known as a perspective dedicated to ›empowerment‹ united the 
disparate approaches: therapy could help blacks and whites take charge of their own lives, ridding themselves 
respectively of the scars of oppression or their racism« (Lasch-Quinn 2001, p. 110). 
 
Whilst some of the narratives of the research participants’ experience of the anti-racism and 
empowerment training echo in Lasch-Quinn’s criticism, the narratives of the training do not 
fit into other training forms that put a focus on racial etiquette or shaming in particular 
 
 182 
White participants about their White privileges, or unleashing the rage of BIPOC 
participants on White people. However, participants describe a process that goes inward, 
examining, scrutinizing their racial subjectivation with the aim of understanding 
themselves and the racialised relations around them better. Furthermore, it is not solely 
about a cognitive understanding of racial matters, but also grasping emotionally what the 
racialisation process has done to the human subject. There is of course, the danger, 
especially for the White participants to fall into the trap of an emotional self-centredness, of 
an unintentional reproduction of White narcissism (Matias 2016). (It could also be argued 
that the BIPOC participants’ feelings could make them fall into the trap of an ethical pedestal 
from where they could reproduce symbolical violence). There might be ways for the White 
self to learn to re-learn how White people feel about themselves (Yancy & McRae 2019), but 
it certainly would not mean a breakout from the realm of self-governmentality. Some 
scholars argue that feelings play a crucial role in political learning processes (Besand 2014). 
I would argue that emotions play a role in how we perceive ourselves and the world, and 
that they can also play an important role of how we relate to theories of racialisation not 
only in the abstract but in the personal. Being in denial of emotions would only lead to 
denying part of our humanness, and taking emotions seriously is not an argument to let go 
of reason, evaluation and critical reflexivity (Mohseni 2020, p. 439). Some practitioners of 
political education might even argue that once the restrictions of expressing emotions is 
lifted, critical reflexivity can thrive (Mohseni 2020, p. 439). The research participants’ 
narratives of better understanding and feeling of their own racialisation is understood as 
giving more autonomy to the racialised subject, empowering and enabling to regain initially 
embryonic forms of freedom that the subject can build on. 
 Though in some instances Rose’s critique does not account for those marginalised 
subjects that are not always included in the social contract, the discourses in the accounts of 
the research participants of their first training experience highlight the significance 
psychotherapeutic concepts are given to them. They fit smoothly into the notion of Western 
lifestyles that focus on beliefs of psychological independence and self-realisation. The 
consequence of that is a restriction of what it means to be a human being, of what it means 
to be free or liberated. And they are thrust into the involuntary contradiction of being forced 
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to be free. In the context of the anti-racism and empowerment training it could mean that 
racialised subjects are forced into giving their lives meaning such as deconstructing the 
racialised structures and ideas that limit them, their interpersonal relations and their 
relations to societal resources. 
 Can these choices only be relegated to the realm of self-governmentality (is it even 
possible to see them outside this realm?) or is it possible to reconcile them with a vision of 
decolonised structures and deracialised being? I have probed, in a particularly condensed 
form, the development and reception of anti-racism and empowerment training in the UK 
and Germany. In reflection upon the personal training experiences that anti-racism and 
empowerment practitioners share, I examined the notion of (self-)empowerment and (self-
)governmentality. In the analysis of the narratives of the anti-racism and empowerment 
practitioners’ first training experience, I conclude that the cognitive and emotional 
understanding of individual racialisation processes partially transforms and liberates the 
racialised subject.  
 Having analysed the research participants’ narratives of their first training 
experience, the following chapter examines the new narratives of the self that have been 




Chapter 6: After the Training – Re-Writing Racialised Subjectivity, 
Re-Imagining Humanness 
 
»For whatever reasons, good or bad, I have been unwilling to open in myself what I have known all along to be a 
wound - a historical wound, prepared centuries ago to come alive in me at my birth like a hereditary disease, and 
to be augmented and deepened by my life. If I had thought it was only the black people who have suffered from 
the years of slavery and racism, then I could have dealt fully with the matter long ago; I could have filled myself 
with pity for them, and would no doubt have enjoyed it a great deal and thought highly of myself. I am sure it is 
not so simple as that. If white people have suffered less obviously from racism than black people, they have 
nevertheless suffered greatly; the cost has been greater perhaps than we can yet know. If the white man inflicted 
the wound of racism upon black men, the cost has been that he would receive the mirror image of that wound 
upon himself. […] 
This wound is in me, as complex and deep in my flesh as blood and nerves. I have borne it all my life, 
with varying degrees of consciousness, but always carefully, always with the most delicate consideration for the 
pain I would feel if I were somehow forced to acknowledge it. […] Yet I know that if I fail to make at last the attempt 
I forfeit any right to hope that the world will become better than it is now (Berry 2010 [1970], pp. 3-4). 
 
After having examined the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners’ narratives of their 
first training experience, the following chapter looks into the new narratives of the self 
emerging after the training. What is the difference between a story and a narrative? The 
sociologist Ken Plummer wrote in his book Narrative Power: The Struggle for Human Value 
(2019) a story is about what we tell, and a narrative is about how we tell it (Plummer 2019, 
pp. 4-5). Narratives can be powerful, especially if one narrative is used to represent an all 
(Plummer 2019, p. 7), such as narratives in Western media about a Black/Indigenous/Person 
of Colour or a small group of BIPOC that do not adhere to the Western notion of modernity 
and thereby almost all BIPOC become incapable of adapting to the Western notion of 
modernity (Foroutan 2020, pp. 12-18). Narratives of dominance sustain a system of control, 
exploitation and suffering (Plummer 2019, p. 22). However, narratives also have the 
capacity to empower: »they can foster imagination, emancipate and give us hope« (Plummer 2019, 
p. 22). In any case, »stories only work when people act in relation to them; stories have absolutely 
no life on their own. Through narrative actions, they become social events« [my own emphasis] 
(Plummer 2019, p. 22). The research participants’ realisation in the training of having been 
racialised was accompanied by strong emotional responses in their narratives (Chapter 5). 
The narratives of realisation enabled not only the research participants’ narratives of 
remembering personal processes of racialisation in-depth, but also working through the 
suffering caused by these processes (Chapter 4). The following chapter explores: What are 
the new narratives of the self created by anti-racism and empowerment training? How do 
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anti-racism and empowerment practitioners re-write racial subjectivation and re-imagine 
humanness? In the first two sections, the new narratives of the self that have been developed 
from the training experience are explored. In the final section of this thesis, I look into how 
anti-racism and empowerment practitioners re-imagine humanness. Thereby, I delve into 
an existential reflection on Fanon’s appeal for a new humanism and delineate the concept 
of decoloniality.  
 
 
Narratives of the self 
 
I assume that, in the nexus of subjectivity, self and narratives, new possibilities of life are 
located. Why has there been in the recent years, a growing interest in narratives and 
subjectivity? Some scholars argue that the »interest signifies a move away from the search for 
essential, universal or even rational identities and instead stresses more uncertain and creative 
processes of construction and fabrication« (Byrne 2002, p. 1). Narratives can be powerful, and 
narratives can be both, empowering and disempowering (Plummer 2019, p. 22). Plummer 
suggest nine theses of narrative power: 
 
»1 Narratives make us human 
2 Narratives live through human actions 
3 We dwell in narrative realities 
4 Narrative actions of power are produced ubiquitously in everyday living 
5 Deep infrastructures shape narrative power 
6 Narratives encode the struggle for human value 
7 Narrative power is animated through drama 
8 Narrative power is dialogic, contentious and fragile 
9 Narratives have limits« (Plummer 2019, p.22). 
 
Similarly, in his essay »What is Enlightenment« Michel Foucault assumed that narratives 
give us access to the »practices« and »techniques« of the self (Foucault 1991, p. 41). 
Progressing from his earlier work, in which the subject appeared to be much more 
determined and caged by discourses, the philosopher began to see subjectivity more as the 
result of processes of being constructed and constructing the self through the interaction of 
discourse and applying the self (Byrne 2002, p. 2). Foucault contended that modernity does 
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not free a person in their own existence; it forces them to confront the project of creating and 
applying themselves (Foucault 1991, p. 41). In another essay »On the genealogy of ethics« 
(1991), Foucault explored the development of practices of the self, of living an ethical life 
from Ancient Greece to the Greco-Roman period, and then from Christianity to modernity. 
According to Foucault, ethics was about aesthetic choices, the »reason for making this choice 
was the will to live a beautiful life, and to leave to others memories of a beautiful existence« (Foucault 
1991, p. 341): 
 
»Foucault uses this genealogy to argue that the task for individuals in modernity should be to produce themselves 
as a work of art. ›Art is something which is specialised or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn’t 
everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object but not our life?‹ 
(Foucault 1991, p350). This is art considered not as an elite practice, but at the level of the everyday. An ethics 
of the self, for Foucault, involves the reflexive examination of the process of subjection – the processes through 
which individuals come to understand themselves as subjects. As Lois McNay argues, ›A Foucauldian ethics of 
the self is not based on an adherence to externally imposed moral obligations, but rather on an ethics of who we 
are said to be, and what, therefore, it is possible for us to become‹ (McNay 1994, p145). Nor is this ethics about 
discovering a true essence – there is no self waiting to be discovered, but it is a process of creation and re-
invention out of available resources« (Byrne 2002, pp. 2-3). 
 
Narrative subjectivity reproduces a self-portraying history, and envisions what is about to 
come in a form to cater the subject’s existence with some level of coherence or cohesion, 
with an aim, with a sense. Accordingly, a subject’s biography blends remembering with an 
imagined meaning, »creating a coherent account of identity in time« (McAdams & McLean 2013, 
p. 233). In order to generate new narratives of the self, the subject needs to find a way to 
share their personal stories according to specific social locations, within the family or with 
peers, in formal and casual social settings (McAdams & McLean 2013, p. 235). One of the 
themes that develops in narrative subjectivity is the subject of redemption. The racialised 
subject cannot really be held accountable for having been racialised as a child, since they 
did not actively choose what type of racial material they were confronted with in society 
(even though, once presented with it, children make active use of that racial material) (Van 
Ausdale & Feagin 2001, p. 22). However, a great majority of children also learn at some point 
that confronting adults with racialised realities causes a lot of shame and silences in society, 
so the racial material is repressed (Riepe 1992, pp. 175-176). Once racialised subjectivities 
become aware of their racial subjectivation, how can they ethically, »live a beautiful life«, 
one that is not poisoned by toxic racial inequalities, which they came to realise, they are 
more part of than they would like to be (Rothberg 2019)? In this thesis, one of the themes 
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that arises through narrative subjectivities, who are aware of their racial subjectivation, is 
redemption. The anti-racism and empowerment practitioners re-write their narratives as 
stories of redemption, in order to empower themselves for potential momentary challenges, 
but also for the responsibility to improve the lives of others in a way that can be sustained: 
 
»The theme of redemption points to the broader adaptational issue of how human beings make narrative sense 
of suffering in their lives. In general, research on narrative identity suggests that adults who emerge strengthened 
or enhanced from negative life experiences often engage in a two-step process (Pals, 2006). In the first step, the 
person explores the negative experience in depth, thinking long and hard about what the experience felt like, how 
it came to be, what it may lead to, and what role the negative event may play in the person’s overall life story. In 
the second step, the person articulates and commits the self to a positive resolution of the event. Research 
suggests that the first step is associated with personal growth—the second, with happiness« (McAdams & 
McLean 2013, p. 234). 
 
Within the research participants’ narratives of racial subjectivation, suffering was one of the 
other major common themes. How do anti-racism and empowerment practitioners 
transform this suffering from racialisation into new narratives of an empowered self? 
 Jean-Paul Sartre wrote in the foreword of Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth: 
»We only become what we are by the radical deep-seated refusal of that which others have made of 
us« (Fanon 1965, p. 15). The sixth chapter explores the anti-racism and empowerment 
practitioners’ narratives of the self that emerged after their first training experience. In 
Narrative Power Ken Plummer (2019) developed a model of narratives that describe how we 
become what we are:  
 
»I Collaborative Narratives: staying with dominant stories  
1 Hyper-conformist narratives: exaggerates acceptance; often self-loathing; the HyperNormal.  
2 Conformist narratives: deferential, colonized.  
II Negotiated Narratives: living under dominance but developing weapons to resist while not challenging the 
existing order  
3 Innovation narratives: develops new creative story, but not threatening of dominant stories (e.g., crime, 
corruption).  
4 Retreatist narratives: withdraws from the dominant narrative into own world (e.g., isolation, illness, mental 
illness, religion, drug use, denial, ‘dropping out’, indifference, despair, etc.).  
5 Ritualist narratives: resists dominant stories through repertoires of rituals (e.g. humour, mockery, games, 
distancing, posing. etc.).  
6 Reformist/rehabilitation narratives: Looking for ways of changing within the system (e.g. campaigning, therapy).  
III Counter-Narratives: not accepting dominant stories, seeking change  
7 Resistance and rebellious narratives: challenging, arguing against, finding ways to reject the dominant story.  
8 Radical and revolutionary narratives: rejecting and seeking change. Possible violence« (Plummer 2019, p.76). 
 
Plummer’s model of narratives by listing three stages with a total of eight levels implies a 
linear evolution from the first level of the first stage to the eighth level of the third stage. I 
assert that modelling the self as a narrative evolving in a straight line would be a gross 
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oversimplification. It would flatten the multi-dimensionality of the self into one dimension, 
it would render its complexity, the simultaneity of contradictions, the evolvements and 
regresses, the between and betwixt, invisible. However, Plummer’s model is still a very 





In Machinery of Whiteness (2010), Martinot concludes his book, by proposing a way that could 
potentially lead to an »alternate decolonized consciousness« (Martinot 2010, p. 185). The 
author’s suggestion on how to proceed on this way to decolonising Whiteness, is based on 
the DuBoisian concept of the double consciousness. In The Souls of Black Folk (1903) DuBois 
describes the double consciousness of Black people as »a peculiar sensation, this double-
consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s 
soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity« (DuBois 1903, p. 2), »the 
others« meaning here White. Martinot invites his White readers into a reverse double-
consciousness, where White people let go of their normative perception of the world and 
begin to assume a position, from where they begin to see themselves through the eyes of 
those who are disadvantaged by racialised structures in society (Martinot 2010, p. 185). 
Martinot hypothises that three things will arise, once White people see themselves through 
the reverse double consciousness:  
 
»First, for a person to see himself as he or she is seen by another would be to grant that other person a subjectivity, 
an autonomy of consciousness that is denied to that other by racism and white supremacy. One would have to 
see oneself as judged by that other, not as an individual but as a part of a social machine. Part of the purpose of 
the vilification of the victims of racist violence is to de-authorize the racialized from rendering such judgments. 
Second, since white identity is based on the ability of whiteness to objectify those it racializes for itself, to see 
oneself as seen by those racialized would dispel both the other’s objectification by one’s white identity and one’s 
own ability to use them for white identity construction. One’s white identity, which depends on that objectification, 
would unravel. And third, one would become an object (in one’s own mind) because one had become an object 
for those others. But one would become an object whose nature, in its capacity or potentiality to dominate, would 
be seen as other, as objectified, by oneself. One could see the dehumanization one had imposed on others in 
oneself. One could then see the modes by which one dominates or oppresses simply by being white, because 




How can this reverse double consciousness for White people be initialised? The White 
research participants shared how the anti-racism training was a change of perspective in 
their narratives, of perceiving themselves and the social world they exist in from the point 
of view from BIPOC. The training has been partially developed from epistemologies of the 
Global South (some of which shall be explored in the final part of this chapter) and it aims 
at making perceptions from this BIPOC realm accessible for White people. From the 
narratives of the White research participants, it was evident that the training does not 
attempt to create awareness by trying to reverse the BIPOC experience for White people like 
the Blue-Eyed-Brown-Eyed-Training. In the Blue-Eyed-Brown-Eyed-Training, participants 
with blue eyes are subjected to the experiences of BIPOC for the duration of the training. 
The narratives rather highlight how, from the perspective of BIPOC, White people are very 
early subjected to racialised discourses in which a racial Other is constructed, which 
inversely constitutes the White subject. In this process it »is not a question of guilt, but rather 
of seeing who one is, and who one is made to be, by one’s position, one’s role, and one’s complicity in 
the machinery of whiteness« (Martinot 2010, p. 185). 
Which methods of anti-racism and Critical Whiteness training or seminars, help 
White participants to move beyond guilt and irritation? Henry A. Giroux concludes that 
»[t]here is a curious absence in the work on Whiteness regarding how students might examine 
critically the construction of their own identities in order to rethink Whiteness as a discourse of both 
critique and possibility« [my own emphasis] (Giroux 1997, p. 285). Is it possible to relate 
Whiteness with a new language of racialisation, allowing participants to analyse the 
discursive, personal and structural dimensions of being White? Theorising the relationship 
between racialisation and subjectivity empowers participants to locate themselves within 
those structures, and enables them to construct transitional locations of belonging and a 
sense of direction (ibid.). In the centre of this political and personal transformation process, 
stands also the re-imagination of relating to oneself differently and thereby relating to others 
also differently. When I asked the participants to tell how their stories continued after their 
first anti-racism training, C.L. was one of the first to reply: 
 
C.L .: »[…] [T]his has a total impact in all areas of my life, from before to after. And it opened a whole, on many 
levels worlds and doors and gates and emotions and knowledge and everything, i.e., on all levels, what I thought 
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was closed off before and which somehow accompanies me much more in the way of humanity, to become the 
human being I want to be somehow or so, or where I want to go« (C.L., focus group 11/01/2015-4 #00:20:43). 
 
C.L. describes how the training changed her life drastically. The research participant 
describes a fundamental change of perception, which is evident in the use of time as a 
category, a »before« and an »after« the training. Whilst the life before the training is described 
as »closed off«, the after, the encounter with her own racial subjectivation and the suffering 
it caused in her, is described in terms of »open gates« and »doors« but also »emotions« and 
»knowledge« (C.L., focus group 11/01/2015-4 #00:20:43). C.L. portrays two modes of existence 
for White people, the first one being a closed-off (or maybe toxic) form of Whiteness, unable 
to move through certain passages, unable to feel certain emotions, unable to grasp certain 
knowledges. This closed-off, fixed Whiteness stands in contrast to a form of liberated or 
transcended Whiteness, which is capable of moving, feeling and understanding. C.L. 
assumes that toxic Whiteness can only relate to the racialised Other as a function, the mirror 
image of the White self but not actually as a being that exists for the sake of being. According 
to C.L. transcended Whiteness departs from the reference of the racialised Other as its 
mirror image, and moves towards itself, feels itself and understands itself, thereby relating 
to a counterpart aware of its own perceptions. This transcended Whiteness is also capable 
of self-determination, which C.L. sees as an integral part of humanness, as something that 
accompanies her on the way of becoming »the human being« she wants to be (C.L., focus 
group 11/01/2015-4 #00:20:43). Though the notion of humanness will be examined further in 
the final part of this chapter, Ryan had a similar response: 
 
Ryan: »And what you just said, […] also resonated with me, because […] for me also has changed a lot in my 
way of life and the way I move in spaces, in which spaces I move, who I am on the move with, has changed. Two 
elements come to mind: that I pay much more attention today, so to speak, how relationships are lived, and that 
I want to live many more relationships that are good for me. Somehow going deep, with a kind of authenticity, 
where people really meet, instead of exchanging roles. And that it is becoming increasingly difficult for me to be 
moving in spaces where this is not the case. So, for example, in radical left-wing White spaces, where a lot works 
with certain codes, certain language, certain behaviours and it is not a question of people meeting each other and 
exchanging beyond these whole schematics. […] And that I really appreciate spaces and I am always looking for 
where it is possible to meet people. […] And the other thing is the desire to build things up. […] So, what I also 
know from radical left-wing perspectives: somehow against, deconstruct, destroy, break the system. Which is 
good and justified, but only very limited if that’s somehow the only way. And what shaped me […] is the desire or 
the idea of building something together. To create something. And that’s what humans are actually there for. So, 
from our basic capacity we are beings who can create things. And before […] I unlearned over the course of a 
years-long process to create things, building things. And that’s only now that I’m gradually coming back into 





Ryan describes, similarly to C.L. a before and an after the training. Ryan’s statement also 
resembles C.L.’s in regard to using a language of movement that seems to be initialised 
through the training or process. The research participant narrates that his ability to move in 
places has changed and that he is now seeking more genuine or in his words »authentic« 
relationships within those spaces. So, following Ryan’s narration of certain political spaces 
in Berlin, toxic Whiteness is not capable of having relationships that are true. Ryan further 
states that the relationships he encounters in those spaces are neither good nor nurturing; 
this seems to be also the case in »radical left-wing White spaces« (Ryan, focus group 
11/01/2015-4 #00:28:57), where people relate in very coded and ritualised ways to each 
other’s roles, rather than to the actual person. The genuine »meeting« of people is 
considered important by Ryan, and he does also mention places where people are more 
willing to meet each other in an interchange. The notion of »interchange« that Ryan evokes 
seems to relate to the idea of recognising each other’s subjectivity and not simply the role a 
person holds. According to Charles Taylor, recognition is crucial in politics of 
multiculturalism, where some identities are partly shaped through misrecognition, which 
leads to oppression of those mis-recognised (Taylor 1994, pp. 25-26). Taylor further 
examined a shift from monarchical honour to modern dignity, which is also used in human 
rights discourse (ibid.). Here, according to the philosopher, recognition becomes more 
important through the modern emphasis on individuality and implicit »authenticity«, 
which also came with a shift from religious morality to an intrinsic human morality (ibid). 
By analysing the question of the »true and full human being«, which in a pre-modern view 
meant being in touch with God, Taylor argues that a modern view of humanness is much 
more related to being in touch with oneself (via God, ideas etc.) (Taylor 1994, pp. 27-29). 
This being in touch with oneself was coined by 18th century Genevan philosopher Jean-
Jacques Rousseau also as »le sentiment de l’existence«, a feeling of existence (ibid.). The 18th 
century German philosopher and theologian Johann Gottfried Herder stated that every 
person, but also a Volk, has their own measure of what it means to be true to themselves, 
which places moral importance on individuality. It can also place a moral importance on 
respect for other cultures (but also nationalism) (Taylor 1994, pp. 30-31), which is generated 
from the inside. However, modern philosophy tends to forget that we are social beings, and 
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that identity and recognition are closely linked to each other, and that this inward dialogue 
is also shaped by an outwards dialogue (Taylor 1994, p. 32). Taylor concludes that »[w]e need 
relationships to fulfil, but not to define, ourselves« (Taylor 1994, p. 33). One of the main problems 
of modernity is the failing of recognition: »Not only contemporary feminism but also race 
relations and discussions of multiculturalism are undergirded by the premise that the withholding of 
recognition can be a form of oppression« (Taylor 1994, p. 36). Ryan seems to be familiar with 
this form of withholding recognition in different political spaces, even those that claim to be 
working toward some kind of equality or social justice. 
Another term that Ryan uses in his narrative is »building something up«, »creating« 
something, which stands in contrast to other conventional White political spaces. The 
research subject uses words such as being »against« things, deconstructing, destroying, 
breaking structures, but not necessarily being for something, constructing, building, fixing 
something. I find this a rather reductionist perception of a variety of political spaces. 
Interestingly, Ryan attributes the ability to build and create something as one of the reasons 
for the existence of human beings. This also seems to omit the destructive potential human 
beings hold. However, the destructiveness of a non-liberated Whiteness or of the Machinery 
of Whiteness is also highlighted in the following statement of C.L. 
C.L., who at the time of the interview was working at a governmental organisation 
for international exchange programmes, had made very difficult experiences at her 
workplace. The research participant had tried to critique the way the organisation from the 
Global North was handling instances of racial discrimination, and the complex of problems 
that arise in developmental work with organisations from and in the Global South: 
 
C.L.: »[W]hat I actually want to say is that I had an experience with Whiteness in there that was incredibly horrible. 
[…] And that was an experience with Whiteness and dominance and power relations, which felt like being between 
a rock and a hard place, which caused me to blow open at some point and just not be there anymore. Or like 
many sharp knives that it can somehow knock a soul out. And I would say that the orthodox radical-left struggle 
structure has that too. […] And, somehow, I found it very interesting because I think I came from structures in 
which simply… the incredibly painful violence of Whiteness just somehow showed itself like this. And I felt like I 
sailed in somewhere and was somehow hexed there. And with this whole […] process [after the training] I also 
learned a little bit, like tools, […] to take away their punch from them, or maybe even endure them in part or deal 
with them and look at them somehow differently. […] I think that is something very important to explore: How do 
White structures affect White actors in there? And what does that do to people in there who try to change 
something in White cemented structures. […] I just wanted to say that I really have the feeling: ›This machinery, 




I would object to the notion that racial structures and the White people that move within 
those become inhuman automatons. However, why would people who consider themselves 
probably anti-racist, who work in developmental places, who probably consider themselves 
to be »good«, through forms of symbolic violence, maintain or as C.L. phrases it »cement« 
racialised structures centring Whiteness? Notwithstanding, C.L. does refer to a form of 
conditioning of the White subject that contributes to a cementing of White power structures, 
which would mean that these structures become or are very rigid, and therefore difficult to 
break or change. In other words, racialised power structures would become a normality 
which could simply remain unquestioned. C.L.’s language of mechanisation resonates also 
with Martinot’s description of Whiteness as a brutal or inhuman machine. Martinot 
concludes that: »[i]t is the familiarity of the many racist actions, both the atrocities and the small 
harassments, that tells us that the machinery of racialization has conditioned our consciousness and 
our intentions to attribute a certain normalcy to racism« (Martinot 2010, p. 171). 
 Simultaneously, C.L. narrates that the training »saved« her, that it gave her tools to 
handle the difficult situation she felt she was in at her workplace. The handling of the 
situation is described by C.L. in different ways, of either being more resilient in accepting 
the situation or in being able to absorb, or withstand the racialised (symbolic) violence in 
some kind of manner. Either way, the research subject characterises her training experience 
as a change of perspective, which helped her to cope with the situation at her workplace. 
This change of perspective could also be considered a form of paradigm shift. Can the 
awareness of how racialisation has conditioned our subjectivity in order to accept the 
normality of racial power structures, allow racialised subjects to question its normalisation? 
Very often racism is perceived by White people as a problem, which is located in the past 
(McKinney 2003, p. 53). The belief is that younger generations grow up in a much more 
multi-racial setting, and therefore, racism will slowly dissuade as a societal challenge (ibid.). 
These beliefs and attitudes amongst White people only lead to making anti-racist and anti-
discrimination actions and policies irrelevant (ibid.). White subject identities will, at best 
take, a passive role, or at worst, resist matters of racism or racial equality because they do 
not realise that they themselves are also racialised (ibid.). Dominant White discourses on 
racism only see racial oppression as a problem in its excessive form, in the vocalisation of 
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racist epithets, or in racist violence. The normalcy of racialisation mainly then leads to a 
prevalence of colour-blind discourses, as in »we are all the same« or »we do not see 
race/difference here« (Perry 2001, p. 67). Another possibility is also that the conversation 
about racism will be diverted towards White Germans being the victim of multiculturalism 
(Shooman 2018). McKinney concludes that it »will take a shift in these everyday White people’ 
views before the racial status quo can be changed to a more equitable system« (McKinney 2003, p. 
53). Can this questioning of normalisation of racialised power structures within White 
subject identities, be the beginning of changing and shifting those structures? The following 
passage also highlights the question of change within the family: 
 
C.L. »And maybe on a positive note […]. I’m very touched at the moment right now, because I was at home with 
my family at Christmas, and I come from southern Germany from a farm, from a Catholic, traditional, non-
academic home. [...] And what I find very exciting, is that my brother has a neo-Nazi past, so it’s an incredibly 
right-wing environment in which I grew up. [...] And what is really cool is that my mother has really followed me 
over the years. Well, that’s when we had arguments and I started to discuss with my brother, my mother very 
often... I mean, she’s a farmer, secondary school, finished school at 14, no further formal education, no... absolute 
sexist, blatant sexist discrimination [...]. But who was always on my side somehow, as far as racism is concerned. 
[…] And now at Christmas, suddenly, my brother also started to utter different tones. And somehow a lot of 
refugees were admitted in Baden-Württemberg and the Catholic Church is somehow very active. [...] And my 
mother is involved too. My brother now somehow asks me and is interested and stuff. [...] And somehow my heart 
opened. And I thought like: ›Crazy Shit! It really radiates […]‹. And I think right now, my brother, yes, well, in his 
mid-40s, White, a little bit lonely out there in southern Germany and in regard to that subject... he’s beginning to 
turn around. […] Austen also said: ›Hey, if you can talk to your relatives about racism, that’s a bit advanced‹ 
(Laughter). And I can totally talk to my family about it. […] And I really think that these things are being decided 
in the heart. And that they are not decided by the fact that I somehow read three books more […]«. (C.L., focus 
group 11/01/2015-4 #00:20:57) 
 
C.L. shares how the debate around »Race« in her parents’ home, shifted over the years. 
Living in a non-academic, Catholic, rural household, did not stop the family from discussing 
the subject of racism. Her mother, despite little formal education, would support C.L. during 
discussions with her older brother, who was part of the local Neo-Nazi scene and who had 
strong right-extremist attitudes. With C.L.’s constant anti-racist position in the family, the 
increase of refugees in the area, and the Catholic churches stance to welcome and support 
these people, her mother now also became active in supporting the church’s stance, and 
getting involved with helping the new arrivals. More surprisingly, even C.L.’s openly racist 
brother seems more empathetic towards refugees and is also interested in his younger 
sister’s political views. 
C.L. also assumes that the shift in her family was facilitated through a few other 
factors. Firstly, the research subject exclaims: »It really radiates« (C.L., focus group 
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11/01/2015# 00: 20: 57-0 #), meaning that the inner change, the inner attitude becomes 
reflected in creating more openness towards addressing difficult subjects, such as racism. 
Secondly, C.L. assumes that the change in her family had very little to do with cognitive 
processes, with reading the right number of books, but with emotional processes, of how to 
relate to each other, and also to oneself. C.L. concludes the matter of anti-racism and Critical 
Whiteness, is not decided in the mind but in the heart. In Why Love Hurts (2012) Eva Illouz 
points out a flaw in the dominant feminist discourse in critiquing love. Illouz writes that in 
the subjectivity of women and men, love played a far less relevant role, whilst patriarchy 
was much stronger (Illouz 2012, p. 5). The sociologist further states, that the importance of 
love in modern culture is related to the decrease of men’s power within family structures 
(ibid.). Illouz further concludes that »much of feminist theory is premised on the assumption that 
in love (and other) relationships, power is the primary building block of social relationships. It thus 
must disregard the vast amount of empirical evidence suggesting that love is no less primary than 
power, and that it is also a powerful and invisible mover of social relationships« (Illouz 2012, pp. 5-
6). In other words, love can play a significant role in changing people’s attitudes and self-
understanding. Could it be possible that Critical Race Theory suffers from a similar 
underestimation of the power of love in facilitating social change? 
Ryan, shortly after his training, gave his mother an anti-racism training as a birthday 
present, with very mixed results: 
 
Ryan: »[I]t went totally wrong. So, she was the person who derailed the training a bit. [Name of trainer] and [name 
of co-trainer] were the trainers. And, yes, I can’t tell what happened there, but it definitely went wrong. She totally 
blocked. Couldn’t do anything with the socialisation images. Said: ›Here, my GDR socialisation was very different. 
I saw completely different pictures.‹ And somehow [Name of trainer] triggered something with her, I think some 
father thing. Well, I don’t want to go too deeply into the psychological depth because I can’t, but it was clear, it 
got out of hand somehow. And I gave it to my mom because she... because I perceive her like, she has a lot... 
there are so very exoticizing images. So, she has such a great romanticising idea of Africa. Was there often. Had 
two black boyfriends. […] I don’t have to say everything, but the love of nature and the warmth and happiness 
and things like that. And so, I felt like I had to shake her up somehow. […] I tried for a long time to explain it to 
myself: ›How is it that my mother has these images?‹ […] I perceive her as impervious to see her own Whiteness. 
And also, about where the images she has, come from. And how much they clash with reality. […] [O]ne of the 
explanations for me today is that socialisation in the GDR is a little bit like: ›We are all siblings‹, she can’t really 
get away from it. So, this: ›No, there’s no such division. […] We’re all the same.‹ It is an element« (Ryan, focus 
group 11/01/2015-3 #00:29:34). 
 
Ryan’s statement is very interesting on many levels. Firstly, it shows what can happen if a 
participant is forced, or coerced to participate in an anti-racism training45. Ryan’s mother 
 
45 Usually, the participation in a Phoenix training has to be facultative, Phoenix does not allow employers or organisers to 
force people into participating in the training. 
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participates in the training potentially more for her son’s sake rather than her own. 
Secondly, the plan backfires also as Ryan implies because one of the middle-aged male 
trainers triggers a psychological response in his mother, presumably related to patriarchy, 
which manifested itself in distrust and disregard towards the father figure’s/trainer’s 
statements but also the information which he provided. Thirdly, Ryan’s mother simply goes 
into denial mode and assumes that, because she grew up in the GDR, she was not racist. 
 Ryan’s mother leans on the anti-racist discourses in the GDR, which could also be 
described as racial egalitarianism (Slobidian 2015). The first part in Quinn Slobodian’s book 
Comrades of Color (2015) in reference to the GDR’s racial egalitarianism is titled »Race 
Without Racism?« (Slobodian 2015, p. 23). Slobodian examines how the UNESCO in the 
1950s, promoted the notion of racial egalitarianism, and how this notion found its way into 
the GDR’s self-understanding of an anti-fascist state (Slobodian 2015, p. 27). However, what 
also remained in the GDR was a cultural racism, which though it was coded racially, was 
not so heavily relying on distinct physical differences, but rather perceived cultural 
characteristics (Slobodian 2015, p. 26). In reference to colonial imagery, representation of the 
three great races, as in yellow, black, and white were evoked in the former socialist country 
(Slobodian 2015, p. 31). This racial triad became an iconography of internationalism in GDR 
and other countries of the former Eastern Bloc (ibid.). In 1950, officials decreed that there 
was no more racism in the GDR, in other words, it only existed in other places, for example 
in the imperialist Western states (ibid.). The GDR’s anti-racist strategy was to create an 
uncritical cult, a state-sanctioned pity for the racially oppressed behind which racist 
attitudes were hidden (Slobodian 2015, p. 32). Personal contacts between (White) GDR 
citizens and BIPOC from other socialist states such as Vietnam, Cuba, or Angola were highly 
regulated and restricted by the SED regime (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands = 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany) (ibid.). Simultaneously, there were racially motivated 
attacks against BIPOC and Jews by a rising right-extremist Neo-Nazi scene, in particular in 
the 80s, which were rarely reported about in the media and were mostly covered up, because 
these attacks did not fit the anti-fascist and anti-racist self-image of the GDR (Waibel 1996, 
2017). Nevertheless, it is not to say that there were genuine moments of empathy and 
solidarity with the struggles of BIPOC in the world (Schwenkel 2015, p. 269). This was the 
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contradictory face of racialisation in the GDR until its demise in 1989, thereafter racist 
attacks flared up in the »new federal states«, as they were referred to now in a united 
Germany (Lewicki 2018). These racist attacks after the unification of the German states 
indicate that racism was not really gone from the GDR, presumably people in the former 
GDR felt freer to exercise it after the unification. Slobodian concludes: 
 
»Socialist chromatism in East Germany was an ambivalent mode of anti-racism. It broke definitively with the Third 
Reich’s hierarchical associations between phenotype and ability. Yet the visual repertoire of race and racism in 
the GDR reproduced many of the exaggerated and even offensive stereotypical depictions of people of color. The 
right of representation also remained in the hands of white Germans, producing the effect, arguably 
subconsciously, of either the prioritizing of the white leadership role or the presentation of the nonwhite person 
as icon rather than individual« (Slobodian 2015, p. 33). 
 
Ryan continues to narrate about his personal motives of giving the anti-racism training as a 
birthday present to his mother: 
 
Ryan: »And another element of the story that is very important to me is that I wanted to missionise her so badly 
in the beginning. And that for me it is also a bit of a symbol of an anti-racist Whiteness, which I’d describe as 
such, the violence […], which I learned before […] in dealing with racism and being White. And I also took it in 
and reproduced it. Especially towards my mother. And since a lot of the conversations ended up somehow in 
such a way that she felt condemned or judged […]. And we couldn’t establish a connection at all for a long time. 
And there was also a moment when I really had a break with my family, with my mom and with my brother. […] 
So that I didn’t celebrate Christmas with them for a year. And so, it really was a cut, no contact for several months, 
because I simply did not see myself in it and could not establish contact beyond the confrontation with racism. 
And that’s definitely something that changed through the […] processes […]. So, it should always be pointed out 
that every person has and needs his or her own way to deal with themselves, if at all, with the topic of racism. 
And that the worst or the least constructive thing that I can do, […], is to somehow push people and force them. 
And that it will definitely backfire. And that’s how it was with my mom. And I’ve gained a lot of relaxedness« (Ryan, 
focus group 11/01/2015-3 #00:30:18). 
 
Ryan then continues: 
 
Ryan: »And I was able to establish a completely different contact with my mother and I am much more in touch 
and can go into depth with her in conversations. And the issue of racism doesn’t really play such a big role right 
now, but because I keep letting them know that […] I do training and take part in things and have questions or 
something. So, I just keep bringing it in, but I’m just talking about myself. And that of course, it also does something 
with her. Because I am her son, she is interested in what I do. And that somehow, so... a constructive underlying 
sentiment about racism builds up. So, in the past two years. And that’s kind of very relaxed and feels very good« 
(Ryan, focus group 11/01/2015-3 #00:31:10). 
 
Another aspect in Ryan’s comment that is very fascinating, is his acknowledgement of 
wanting to »missionise« his mother badly. In other words, after his first anti-racism training, 
Ryan felt the urge to convince his mother to have a similar training experience, and adopt 
similar views in regard to racism as he did. In another Weberian twist, the Christian 
connotations of Ryan’s language are obvious. In the research participant’s narrative, the 
missionary approach to anti-racism is an attitude that assumes a kind of moral superiority 
 
 198 
and absolute claim of truth. Ryan also relates this attitude to a non-liberated Whiteness. The 
anti-racism practitioner implies that White subjects have been subjected to a form of 
racialised discursive violence in order to come into existence as Whites. If White subject 
identities are not aware of their violent racial subjectivation, they will reproduce this 
violence in a political zealotry even if they are trying to deconstruct Whiteness and White 
supremacy (Pontoretto 1988). Ryan reproduced the discursive violence in a way that his 
mother felt attacked, judged and condemned, which made it difficult for her to acknowledge 
her son’s differing anti-racist views. Further, this attack led to an emotional disconnect 
between the two family members, to the extent that Ryan would discontinue meeting and 
talking to his family for a few months, and even miss the familial Christmas celebrations. 
The cultural anthropologist Emma Kowal writes in »The Stigma of White Privilege« (2011) 
that »within liberal and radical discourses, Whiteness is also associated with a host of negative 
characteristics, such as exploitation, colonisation and imperialism, and general dominance over non-
White people« (Kowal 2011, p. 317). Ryan’s mother’s denial of those associations of 
Whiteness, makes it, at some point, very difficult to remain in touch with his parent. 
However, at the same time, Ryan creates a stigma about being White, which makes it 
difficult for his mother to relate to her son and his views on Whiteness. Kowal concludes 
»White stigma acts as a barrier to the broader goal of constructing ethical White subjectivities fit for 
the post-colony« (Kowal 2011, pp. 315-316). 
 Once Ryan lets go of stigmatising Whiteness around him but also within himself, he 
understands that a critical reflexivity, which is needed to deconstruct racialised 
subjectivities (Emirbayer & Desmond 2015, pp. 72-76) cannot be forced upon people. Is it 
possible that a de-racialising form of critical reflexivity is an individual process which 
cannot be turned into an obligation? Is it possible that racialised subjects have to decide for 
themselves where, when and if they are going to embark on the process of critical 
reflexivity? Dina made a similar experience to Ryan after her first training: 
 
Dina: »Or and then of course it was exciting, after I came from the first training session, I went outside first, so 
typical. First, I told all the White people how shitty they all are (laughs). I hadn’t yet understood that and really hurt 
people, which in retrospect I’m really sorry about. Although these people don’t really mean a lot to me, but simply 
that it hasn’t been so good now. And maybe produced more defences (laughs). I notice that I’m still not free from 
these emotions. So, there are still moments when I, uhm typical, so I don’t know how to describe it, react typically 
White, on the subject of racism, but I’m just trying to be more loving and more loving with myself, that’s more 




Similar to Ryan, Dina was overzealous at criticising other Whites for not sharing her views 
on Whiteness after her first anti-racism training. However, Dina also realises just like Ryan, 
that judging people does not make them more open and interested towards the subject of 
Critical Whiteness, on the contrary, it seems to build more resistance within racialised 
subjectivities. Interestingly, Dina describes the behaviour of trying to evangelise other 
Whites to also become believers of Critical Whiteness as »typically White« (Dina 13/04/2012-
2 #00:10:49). However, there also seems to be a shift that Dina, but also C.L. and Ryan 
describe, a transcended Whiteness that is more loving towards itself and also towards 
others, which makes the racialised subjectivities in the vicinity of C.L., Ryan and Dina more 
open towards the subject of racism. »It really radiates« C.L. had at some point exclaimed 
(C.L., focus group 11/01/2015-4 #00:20:57). Is it really possible that simply by changing our 
inner position towards racialisation, this will also change the people and structures 
surrounding us? The Austrian-Jewish philosopher Martin Buber wrote in The Way of Man – 
According to the Teaching of Hasidism (1960) on love and social change: 
 
»[T]his perspective, in which a man sees himself only as an individual contrasted with other individuals, and not 
as a genuine person whose transformation helps towards the transformation of the world, contains a fundamental 
error. The essential thing is to begin with oneself, and at this moment a man has nothing in the world to care 
about than this beginning. Any other attitude would distract him from what he is about to begin, weaken his 
initiative, and thus frustrate the entire bold undertaking« (Buber 1960, p. 21). 
 
 
Buber reminds his readers that once a person embarks on the process of critical reflexivity 
and begins to change their inner belief system, it will also inspire some change in the people 
surrounding that person. How to enter the process of critical reflexivity is an individual 
choice. Eve describes how, after her first training, she began more to reflect critically on her 
Whiteness and how that affected the relationship to her Black children: 
 
Eve: »And so I really need literature, literature and reading, reading. I am for education, this being miseducated 
or deformed, this is a beautiful word, that Austen used very much in training at the time, this helped me. Also, to 
say, ok, you are not to blame, so this guilt question, guilt is not good, guilt paralyses, does not lead you further. If 
you have the word ›miseducation‹, you did not have the right education, you got a one-sided education, I could 
do something with that, because this one-sided education was clear in the GDR anyway. So, and with that, and 
then I said that I am responsible for myself and you can continue your education. […] Today, I stand in front of 
these two children, in front of Jonah and Molly, and say to myself, yes, I can listen to them, I can listen to them 
differently, no longer have to cover that up, don't have to say, oh Molly it’s not so bad, if everyone looks at you on 




Eve’s process of critical reflection begins with reading the plethora of literature that exists 
on the subject of Critical Whiteness. Reading literature seems to be of importance to Eve as 
she wants to counteract, as she describes it, »miseducation«, »one-sided education« or 
»deformation« that comes with being subjected to Whiteness (Eve 30/05/2012 #00:40:31-2#). 
Eve even compares this racialisation process, the subjection to Whiteness, to the education 
during the authoritarian communist SED regime and its socialist propaganda, a unilateral 
form of education aiming at indoctrinating children and young people to become uncritical 
and functioning citizens of the GDR. 
 Interesting is also how Eve juxtaposes blame and guilt against responsibility. 
Resonating with a variety of anti-racist activist discourses, Eve describes guilt and blame as 
counterproductive, as debilitating emotions that mainly turn racialised subjects into 
powerless and incapacitated subjects unable to act (Katz 1978, p. 22). Hence the racialised 
subject becomes useless to initiate a de-racialisation process and thereby social change. In 
Eve’s narrative the de-racialisation process begins with taking responsibility, not necessarily 
with her being subjected to dominant narratives of »Race« as a child. Being racialised as a 
child is something that Eve would not have been able to resist or change, but she can take 
responsibility for the structures and realities Whiteness creates in her current everyday life. 
In other words, Eve understands not being in denial of racialised experiences that BIPOC 
make in Germany, as one way of taking responsibility. When Eve’s Black daughter talks 
about her everyday experience of riding the bus in rural Brandenburg as the only Black 
person and, as her daughter perceives the stares she is subjected to as racist, Eve could easily 
dismiss her daughter’s perception. Eve could create a different interpretation of why her 
Black daughter is being stared at in the bus; for example, she could relate the stares to her 
daughter’s beauty, thereby rejecting her daughter’s perception of a racialised experience. 
However, Eve’s rejection of her Black daughter’s perception and feeling would also mean 
that she rejects the Blackness or racialised-ness of her daughter, and inadvertently her own 
Whiteness, her own racialisation as a White subject. In other words, Eve would also be in 
denial, that she, as a White person in Brandenburg, can generally have the experience of 
riding the bus without being stared at because of her skin colour. In Eve’s new narrative of 
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the self, she decides to listen to her daughter and allows herself thereby to look at her self, at 
her Whiteness, through her daughter’s eyes.  
 Though the use of »responsibility« within activist discourses has been inflationary, 
Eve’s statement highlights the values of critical reflexivity and the practice of listening 
empathetically to the experiences and perceptions of BIPOC, and the possibilities of 
maintaining close relationships as a White person to BIPOC friends and family members. 
 Lena, who at the time of the interview had just recently retired from her job in local 
government in Brandenburg, shares what changes she made after her first anti-racism 
training: 
 
Lena: »Either ’99 or 2000. But I think we had the lecture first and then the training afterwards. Because I know, I 
organised training myself in 2001 and must have been in 1999 or 2000. So, there were several training in a row 
for the foreigners’ representative of the state of Brandenburg. And there we were in groups, afterwards we talked 
about the training sessions, in the national conference, because we said that the training sessions were intensive. 
They were really great, so it would not be a bad thing if all social workers in the area of migration did training as 
well. Then we started organising training in the state of Brandenburg with the support of the RAA [RAA Berlin – 
Regional Centre for Education, Integration & Democracy]. In different places« (Lena 16/05/2012-4 #00:01:40). 
 
Lena’s first impulse, in contrast to Eve’s, was not to read as many books as possible, but to 
step into action. Lena’s approach of coping with her training experience was to organise as 
many training as possible, at first for the integration officers or foreigners’ representatives, 
and later for the social workers in the area. It is interesting to see, how this personal change 
of Lena translated into structural change in the local government of Brandenburg, offering 
White integration officers the chance to critically reflect on their Whiteness, and therefore 
also on their practice. Unfortunately, it would exceed the limits of this dissertation to 
evaluate the scope, depth and sustained yield of this change initiated through the anti-
racism training offered to people who work in local government. 
 However, it is also very interesting to see how Lena’s narrative of personal change 
initiated by the training impacted also BIPOC she was closely working with. As an 
integration officer Lena had close contact to a group of young asylum seekers and refugees 
predominantly from Muslim countries, such as Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Most of 
these young people had fled from war in their countries, some of them without their 
families. The young people, mostly but not exclusively boys, were living in a small town in 
Brandenburg, where they were hyper-visible in the area. Brandenburg, which at the time 
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and also today has a very active Neo-Nazi scene, is known to most BIPOC in Berlin as an 
area to avoid because many fear of being racially harassed or attacked (Feldmann et Al. 
2016). However, these young people were settled there by the government and did not have 
the opportunity and means to move somewhere else. As BIPOC youth they were frequently 
harassed and attacked, sometimes getting into fights, which caught the attention of the 
authorities, adding to their precarious situation that was now also threatened by potential 
deportation. Lena then organised for these young BIPOC an empowerment training in 
which they participated: 
 
Lena: »What was also very important, the teenagers […], we had previous incidents here that when the teenagers 
were mobbed, the fists flew right away. The empowerment training have led to the fact that the young people 
managed to develop alternatives for themselves to counteract the vulgar remarks and racist insults without using 
violence« (Lena 16/05/2012-4 #00:21:56). 
 
Lena’s understanding of empowerment is very telling: it centres around developing 
alternative reactions to racist harassment, ideally non-violent ones. In reacting non-violently 
to racial harassment, they reduce the precariousness of their residency status, putting the 
responsibility to navigate the racialised immigration system onto the teenagers. Lena 
understands empowerment as finding a way out of the spiral of violence, having your 
emotions such as fear and anger under control, leaning again on the notion of the subject 
that has to self-correct its behaviour. The idea that empowerment means to learn how to act 





After having looked into the White research subjects and their re-writing of Whiteness 
following their first anti-racism training, the following subchapter examines of how the 
BIPOC research participants narrate their empowerment experience, what they understand 
as empowerment, and what they consider to be a person that is empowered. Effected by 
racism, many BIPOC in Germany but also elsewhere have wondered how to resist a 
racialised system of oppression (Taylor 2017). There has always been a plethora of methods 
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of resisting racism and colonisation, some of them violent, some of them non-violent, some 
creative and subversive. This subchapter will not so much explore which one is the »right« 
or the »best« one, it will explore how the research participants understand their actions or 
their views as part of that notion of resistance against a system that by racialising, reduces, 
essentialises, isolates, oppresses and marginalises them. 
 In the White imagination Blackness is often equated with rage, therefore if a Black 
person addresses racism, it is assumed Blacks act according to the trope of the »Angry Black 
Woman/Man/Person« (Doharty 2019). It also follows the understanding that BIPOC should 
act rationally and not irrationally, if they encounter racism (ibid.). But how can BIPOC 
respond rationally to an arbitrary system of racialisation whose only rationale is to create a 
racial order within a society that legitimises domination, exploitation, and at its logical end, 
annihilation? Kabera describes his response at a job interview at a mental health institution. 
Though it is illegal to ask a person’s nationality or cultural origin during a job interview, the 
psychologists who work at the facility and interview him, have a reaction to the 
interviewee’s black skin colour: 
 
Kabera: »And yet, I even know that the last time, it was also funny, there was a job interview, a situation, so to 
speak, where I am clearly in a subordinate role, a supplicant, […], where there is a power gap. And it's in a clinic 
[…], where I'm going to start working, later this year. And there was the senior doctor, who’s running the 
department, and two male senior doctors and another senior doctor. Middle-aged people […], who have a lot of 
experience with psychotherapy, analysts, […] and then we talked […]. And at some point, the bravest of the group 
asked where I came from. And then I thought, funny, uh what was going on now and then I thought, we are […] 
among psychologists here and then I said: I’ll be happy to answer that, but please tell me your fantasies first 
(laughing). And then he was puzzled and then somehow said something about adoption, the senior doctor 
immediately got in: Yes, exactly adoption. And I noticed that all hell was getting loose (laughing) and had to grin 
like a Cheshire cat and then she caught herself boring me with her projections, in a situation where it was 
completely inappropriate. And then she said: ›That doesn’t matter‹. And then I asked: ›Would anyone like to 
continue guessing?‹ (laughing) And then they noticed that I had turned the game around. And I think they thought 
it was very smart, but they were also a bit offended and then I said that my father came from Rwanda, my mother 
was born here in Germany. And, then the conversation was over. […] And then they gave me the job. And I felt 
like it was just right not to be a victim, and just to say people come here, no, not like this, right? […] I am supposed 
to be employed here as a psychologist and not as an adopted child (laughing). […] And exactly, that was somehow 
very, very powerful and so it worked. […] And exactly to use this space, I think in the training it is this pro-active, 
stimulus-reaction, Frankl, Viktor Frankl, because it is easy to get in between and to not repeat old, grinded-in, sick 
behaviours, so to speak, but something to create something new, in this space, yes« (Kabera 14/04/2012-3 # 
00:28:46). 
 
Kabera refers here to the notion of stimulus or trigger and response, concepts that relate to 
the discourse of behavioural theory. The Russian physicist Ivan Pavlov (1927) experimented 
on dogs and their response to a bell, which was rung at the same time as the dogs were 
given food. Pavlov, who is considered one of the founding fathers of behavioural therapy, 
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found out that the dogs would respond to the bell, even if they were not given food (ibid.). 
Kabera relates this idea of stimulus and response to racism: once a person is confronted with 
a racist experience, that person tends to respond to it by either being hurt, getting angry, or 
unable to respond at all. The racialised person becomes trapped in a mental cage of pre-
programmed responses within racist situations, causing a debilitating inability to act or to 
act only in limited fashion. In other words, in Kabera’s narration of empowerment, an 
unempowered person, is a person which is stuck in that mental cage of limited, pre-
programmed responses. An empowered subject is a subject which learns to overcome the 
typical response to racialised settings and develops its own actions and answers to counter 
racist situations. The highly inappropriate question during Kabera’s job interview leads to 
him deciding on his own how to respond it. The subject counters the inappropriate question, 
with a question of his own. Being amongst colleagues, the psychologist asks the job 
interviewers in psycho-analytical fashion about their fantasies about his origin. The answers 
to Kabera’s question expose the job interviewers’ projections onto him and Black people in 
general. The psychologists at the facility assumed that Kabera might be adopted, maybe due 
to his middle-class habitus and formal education. Nevertheless, the job interviewers do 
realise at some point that their question and the fantasies related to it, had racialised Kabera, 
simply because where he was from, was probably asked due to his assumed »Race«, his skin 
colour. Kabera’s counter question however, exposed, though he might be racialised, so is 
the world of ideas, the mental and conceptual world of the psychologists who asked him 
that question. From being the object of the inappropriate question about his origin, Kabera 
had turned himself into a subject, which exposed the racialising character of that question 
and the complicity of those involved in racialisation processes. In Kabera’s own words, he 
had decided to leave the status of being a victim to racism and becoming a subject, regaining 
his sovereignty of acting in his own behalf. This notion of breaking the stimulus and 
response mechanism, is related to the discourse on Viktor Frankl’s work on logotherapy 
(2000). Frankl was a determinist, believing that a subject’s behaviour is utterly determined 
by its environment (ibid.). The behavioural psychologist was also an Austrian Jew and was 
deported to a concentration camp by the Nazis, where Frankl continued to develop his 
logotherapy, a form of behavioural therapy, by which a subject can overcome most forms 
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of (long-lasting) suffering predominantly by giving life meaning (Frankl 2000, pp. 9-10). 
Imprisoned in the concentration camp, Frankl observed his surroundings, his fellow 
inmates and began to ask himself, if the effect of the environment – even a brutal and 
dehumanising environment like the death camps – on the subject is as certain and total than 
he had previously assumed (ibid.). Frankl began to ask himself questions regarding 
humanness and free will (ibid.). The psychiatrist began to wonder if there was a – to be 
human – inherent form of spiritual liberty, despite the determining factors of a subject’s 
environment (ibid). Frankl began to question, if a subject’s biological, psychological and 
social location were the only factors that determined a person’s choices (Frankl 2000, pp. 
74). The logotherapist began to question whilst being incarcerated in the concentration 
camp, if it was possible to liberate oneself to a certain extent from the deterministic 
structures of one’s environment: 
 
»The experiences of camp life show that man does have a choice of action. There were enough examples, often 
of a heroic nature, which proved that apathy could be overcome, irritability suppressed. Man can preserve a 
vestige of spiritual freedom, of independence of mind, even in such terrible conditions of psychic and physical 
stress. We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the huts comforting 
others, giving away their last piece of bread. They may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof 
that everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms—to choose one’s attitude 
in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way. And there were always choices to make. Every day, 
every hour, offered the opportunity to make a decision, a decision which determined whether you would or would 
not submit to those powers which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner freedom; which determined 
whether or not you would become the plaything of circumstance, renouncing freedom and dignity to become 
molded into the form of the typical inmate« (Frankl 2000, pp. 74-75). 
 
The notion of being free and the ability to choose how a situation can or cannot affect 
subjectivities, is also reflected in Can’s narrative following his empowerment training: 
 
Can: »I said to myself, I choose what I let myself stress about, I choose what really hurts me in my substance, 
and the training has contributed a huge part to developing this freedom of choice myself, what I let into my life 
and what not« (Can 10/07/2012 #00:05:58). 
 
Similar to Kabera, Can’s narrative reflects the notion that he might not have the freedom to 
choose the (racialised) situation that he lives in, but he has the freedom to choose how he is 
going to be affected by this situation. In contrast to the anti-racism training, the 
empowerment training appears to be less about awareness of being racialised per se, since 
as we saw in chapter 4, the BIPOC research participants were, very early, aware of their 
racialisation processes. However, there is a commonality in both groups of anti-racism and 
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empowerment practitioners’ training narratives: working through the racialised discourses, 
which have inscribed themselves deeply into the subject, cognitively and emotionally, 
allows racialised subjectivities to take ownership of their own narratives of racialisation, 
thereby imbuing the subject with a sense of liberation. 
Questions of freedom and choice are also relevant to Nana’s narration of 
empowerment. Nana, a doctor and psychiatrist, explores her process of empowerment in 
the following words: 
 
Nana: »Because, anyway, through the training […], I had learned some aspect of myself, that, like: Doing 
everything in your head. […] And trying not to feel anything, like, you know, there were parts of me that were like 
paralysed. Like anaesthesia. Like, no feeling. And I think this was not only passive. I had actively done that. So, 
you don't feel pain. Ok. You don't feel happiness. […] So, I decided… I had decided, over the years, while 
experiencing racism, that I would rather paralyse this part of me and give up feeling joy, then having to feel joy 
and pain. […] And then I decided: ›Ok, let me look at this part of me as well.‹ This was not easy, you know. So, 
when I finished studying, I did not wanna work as a doctor. […] So, when I finished studying, I really intensively 
decided to go into […] training activity. And reading a lot. And also […] going into workshops. Doing a lot of 
Augusto Boal. Doing a lot of theatre. I went into dancing. I was doing ballet. Learning new languages. […] And 
so, through all these activities, I think, somehow, I calmed down« (Nana 04/08/2012-2 #01:22:09). 
 
In Nana’s narration of empowerment, it is counterproductive to turn racism and 
racialisation into solely cognitive or rational experiences. The denial of feelings caused by 
racialisation, such as suffering and pain that come from everyday experiences of racism, 
lead also to the loss of feeling joy and happiness. Nana’s decision to de-accelerate her life, is 
understood by her as choice to mentally and emotionally prepare herself for working in a 
predominantly White, racialised work environment. Nana describes taking a break, looking 
at herself and racism from a distance, making the realisation of how racialisation is also 
linked intersectionally. Nana then continues: 
 
Nana: »So, I think, this made me realise that racism is one part of the enslavement of peoples. So, there are 
different types of systems, which can enslave people. And so, I can actually choose. And this is very important. 
The freedom of choice. I can choose what racism does to me as a person. I cannot choose to be a race, because 
I have already been racialized. I knew that at three years old. (laughs) […] I cannot choose to be made a woman 
by society. I cannot choose to be made Black by society. But I can choose what I do with that. Or what it does to 
me. And that gave me that kind of freedom, that at one point I thought, I make the choice, you know. Like to lead 
a life, which is legitimate to me. And to me alone. And to nobody else. 
And I think, that has something to do with that first empowerment training, where I would say, basically 
I learned not to be classified. And then, I can choose to put some tags on myself. […] I can choose what to do 
with that. So, for me, that is freedom. It is not very big. If you look on a scale of like 100, it is maybe only three. 
Like three percent. But this three percent is so important for me to breathe, that I can choose what I am gonna do 
with this kind of classifications. Even if I can't change it now, through that understanding, I can start a process in 
me, which can bring about change. Maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but maybe in 500 years. Or maybe in 




Nana’s narration of empowerment underlies also a very deterministic world view. Nana’s 
determinism is reflected in her description of the environment as shaping a passive subject, 
which has no choice in its subjection. In other words, children do not choose how they are 
subjectivated, who they want to be or become. In Nana’s narrative the question of freedom 
of choice as an adult, is therefore rather small. The percentage of 3% that Nana awards to 
choices that are made from free will, is rather minimal and could be almost considered 
embryonic. As small as that percentage of free-will choices might be though, to Nana it 
delegates a certain feeling of agency and self-determination. It does feel problematic to me 
though, that the individual is thrown back on itself. Where is the change of structures there? 
The subject just appears to be passive? The subject in Nana’s narrative does not interact or 
even shape the social. Notwithstanding, the focus in Nana’s narrative of the self remains on 
what can be changed rather than only suffering from the things that cannot be changed or 
that take a long time to change. In this process Nana further states that dealing with your 
biography, your own childhood experiences and traumas separately from racialisation is 
just as important to personal empowerment processes (Nana 04/08/2012 #01:25:31-7#). How 
much of our suffering comes actually from racism alone? Which sections about our personal 
biographies that are independently from racism, can cause a lot of suffering within us? How 
much is the fact of having neglectful, overbearing or abusive parents related to realities of 
racism? And how much of that suffering is also triggered in racialised settings? 
 Moving away from the question of free will, Nana’s narrative then moves on to the 
subject of being an inspiration or a role model to other BIPOC: 
 
Nana: »But one experience, I make with People of Colour, with biography in Turkey […]. Maybe she was 12 or 
13. And she came with her mother in the emergency room. I was on duty. And then she said: ›My mother has 
very bad headache.‹ […] And then I said: ›Oh! That is pretty bad. But maybe your mother should tell me what she 
has. Because you are speaking for your mother. And that is a bit rude.‹ […]. And then she was like: ›Well, you 
know, my mother can tell you everything, but I do not think you are gonna understand. Because she is gonna say 
everything in Turkish.‹ ›Oh‹, I said, ›my Turkish is not that good. Maybe you are right. Maybe you can just translate 
for me, if you may.‹ (laughs). We were talking like that. […] She was just looking at me, and being shy, and like 
smiling, you know. […] The mother asked her in Turkish. ›What did she say? Why are you smiling with the doctor 
like that?‹ […] The child told the mother: ›She is very nice. We are just discussing, who is gonna speak, you 
know.‹ So, the mother looked at me and smiled. And then I said: ›Ok, you take your seat‹« (Nana 04/08/2012-2 
#02:09:37). 
 
Nana then instructs the young person to translate each of her mother’s sentences, so that 
she can get an impression of the possible symptoms. Nana then decides to thoroughly 




 »And then she is like: ›You are really nice.‹ And I said: ›Oh, thank you.‹ And then she said: ›You know, we have 
been here for two or three times. And then we were here for maybe ten minutes. And then they said: »Everything 
is fine.« And then we went home again.‹ ›Oh, is that true?‹ ›Yeah. Nobody took time to speak to us.‹ And then I 
said: ›Why? Why? Maybe it was very busy? And my colleagues did not have time?‹ And then she said: ›Well, I 
think, you are just saying that, to protect your colleagues. But me, if you ask me personally, I think, that they just 
did not want to speak to my mother, because she does not speak German.‹ I said: ›Well, I think, you are right.‹ 
And then she said: ›I know, I am right.‹ I was so impressed by this girl. She was just like 12« (Nana 04/08/2012-
2 #02:11:35). 
 
Impressed with the young person’s perception of racism, Nana begins a conversation about 
the girl’s aspirations: 
 
Nana: »And then I asked her: ›Are you going to school?‹ ›Yeah, I am going to school.‹ ›Do you like school?‹ And 
then she said: ›Well, you know, right now I am at the secondary modern school, and actually I wanted to go to 
grammar school. But my grades were not that good.‹ And I said: ›What do you wanna be, when you grow up?‹ 
And then she thought about it. And then she said: ›You know, actually, at first, I was thinking, that I was going to 
be a shop assistant. But today, after spending some time with you, I wanna be a doctor.‹ And she said: ›You 
know, in secondary school I am going to work hard. And I am gonna get… I am gonna change to grammar school. 
And I am going to do A-Levels. And I am going to be a doctor.‹ And I said: ›Yeah, more power to you, girl.‹ And 
then the mother asked her: ›What are you saying? What are you saying to the doctor?‹ And then she said: ›I just 
told the doctor, I am gonna be a doctor.‹ The mother started crying, you know. And this kind of experience for me, 
it is more than a thousand diamonds […]. It was so precious for me« (Nana 04/08/2012-2 #02:13:57). 
 
Nana’s narrative of her encounter with that young person and her mother at the hospital 
raises a few questions: does being empowered mean, it also empowers our surroundings? 
As an empowered person, do we automatically become role models for others, in particular 
younger people? It would exceed the means of this research project, to find out what 
happened to that young person, if she actually did not become a shop assistant and 
succeeded in studying medicine. Nevertheless, for a moment that person was inspired to 
change the narrative that was given to her as a Turkish German girl by society. Through 
experiencing a Black doctor, who took her and her mother seriously, the young person came 
to think that if she gave it a good try, she might put herself into a similar position as the 
BIPOC doctor she had just encountered. The young person of Colour seemed to be aware 
of racism but most of the White doctors she had encountered, did not seem to be aware of 
their racialisation and how that effects the way they treat their patients, in particular their 
BIPOC patients (Hoffman et Al. 2016). 
 Finally, Nana states that: 
 
Nana: »So, for me, empowerment basically is not only something about race. And being Black. And learning to 
overcome that. But it is also about being human and knowing that you can make choices. […] And this area of 
choice for me is just so little. It is so narrow. And so… I make it a point to put it into my consciousness and to use 
it. This three percent of choice. And this three percent, I use it to the maximum. (laughs) Then I say: ›Ok. I do 




In other words, empowerment is understood as self-determination, which for Nana is 
something intrinsically human. 
The new narratives of the self that the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners 
have developed, highlight different aspects of empowerment. The first aspect is that racism 
is not solely a cognitive experience, but also affects the physical and the emotional. The 
second aspect is the acknowledgement of racism experiences, the understanding that racism 
is a system in which BIPOC make shared experiences (Mohseni 2020, pp. 517-518). The third 
aspect is a healthy, non-narcissistic re-centring of the self, which attempts to acknowledge 
a personal well-being but also the well-being of others. The fourth aspect is the development 
of a political community, in which people attempt to interact with each other more 
humanely. And the fifth aspect is the recognition of certain freedoms in regard to techniques 
and practices of the self. 
Having analysed how the White research participants are re-writing Whiteness into 
a form of human connection and how the BIPOC research participants understand self-
determination as choosing how to overcome dehumanising realities of racialisation, I will 
now look further into how, the research participants re-imagine humanness in their 





The term »Humanität« (humanity) was spread predominantly by theologian and 
philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder in the German-speaking countries (Vöhler 2009). 
Herder’s seemingly liberal position on humanity was probably mostly owed to the 
Protestant influences he was surrounded by (Dover 1952, p. 127). The German philosopher 
and theologian openly criticised the enslavement and exploitation of African people, and 
also openly opposed colonialism and racism (Vöhler 2009, p. 129). In his Letters for the 
Advancement of Humanity, which he wrote between 1793-1797, Herder addressed the so 
called civilised nations of Europe and accused them of crimes against humanity: »Let the 
land be named to which Europeans have come without having sinned against defenseless, trusting 
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humanity, perhaps for all aeons to come, through injurious acts, through unjust wars, greed, deceit, 
oppression, through diseases and harmful gifts! Our part of the world must be called, not the wise, 
but the presumptuous, pushing, tricking part of the earth; it has not cultivated but has destroyed the 
shoots of peoples’ own cultures wherever and however it could« (Herder & Forster 2002, pp. 381-
382). Thereby Herder unified very early the contradiction of Western humanism, since he 
had only published between 1784 and 1791 The Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of 
Mankind in which the philosopher and theologian promoted very Eurocentric notions of 
humanness and historicity (Dover 1952, p. 132). Since Herder held only very thinly veiled 
assumptions about the superiority of Europeans and in particular the Germanic people, and 
the inferiority of Jews, Africans, Asians and other races, some scholars see Herder also as a 
predecessor to Gobineau and National Socialism (Dover 1952, p. 132). 
When I asked the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners, if they thought that 
there was a concept of humanness, which their work was based on, I received a variety of 
answers. In order to showcase the contradictory narratives of the research participants, I 
chose the following two answers: 
 
Kabera: »So in psychology it's called, um, who'd said that again, Winnicott, the true self. The true self is, so to 
speak, the core that one has. The true self can never be known, but that it is, uh, the power that everyone has in 
themselves. And the closer you get to it, the closer you are to yourself, the happier you are, the more satisfied 
you are. And then there is this reactive self, which is built around it, uh, like protection, you react to something 
and then, so to speak, reaction patterns form, which then somehow solidify […]. I am like that because the racism 
or the racist experience has shaped me. And that again, so to speak, a tumour, like an ulcer, to cut off, separate 
and say, no, this is me and that's how I want to be and the other, uh, just to say, that was a behaviour, these were 
strategies that I needed to survive, to get through, but I need these strategies now, I don't need the old ones 
anymore« (Kabera 14/04/2012-2 #00:35:36). 
 
It is not surprising that as a psychologist, Kabera employs D. W. Winnicott’s notion of the 
true and false self (Winnicott [1989] 2018, p. 43). Probably inspired by Kabera’s previous 
statement on Frankl, who believed in an indestructible human core, the research participant 
refers to a similar notion in Winnicott’s work: »the imprisoned true self is unable to function, 
and by being protected its opportunity for living experience is limited. Life is lived through the 
compliant false self, and the result clinically is a sense of unreality« (ibid.). There are many 
elements in Kabera’s narrative that surprise me and that I disagree with. Firstly, Winnicott 
worked with the assumption of a person being born good and then made bad (Dalal 2002, 
p. 55), that their true self becomes corrupted, but I would argue that a person is born neither 
good nor bad, but with the potentiality of both, goodness and badness. Secondly, Kabera 
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describes painful racialisation processes as a disease, which needs to be eradicated. The 
erasure of the suffering caused by racialisation would simply mean living in denial of it, 
while it still affects the way we interact with each other. I would argue that denial of 
suffering caused by racialisation does not help in transforming it. Nevertheless, I am still 
intrigued by Kabera’s choice of Winnicott, since the psychologist had a profound »awareness 
that concept-formation and ›thinking‹ come not from individual but from interpersonal activities« 
(Klein [1987] 2004, p. 291). 
The interpersonal is much more prevalent in Milan’s re-imagination of humanness: 
 
Milan: »Ubuntu. […] It was for me and is still inconceivable how a human can think themselves independently of 
another human. […] And I would say that was at academia […] cultivated very well. So, this idea of an independent 
individual. Both on a theoretical as well as on a practical level. But, that’s... well, humanity is Ubuntu. Knowing 
that your actions, the way you behave, will have an impact. No matter what you do, it will be at some point... it will 
have a feedback to another person. And to always have this consciously in your life. Every action you do will 
make a difference to other people... or if you see the ecosystem as a whole, it will change something somewhere. 
And to handle it responsibly. Pachamama. For me this is clearly a huge point of humanity« (Milan, focus group 
11/01/2015-3 #00:47:12). 
 
Milan’s mentioning of Ubuntu, a belief system predominantly prevalent in southern Africa, 
highlights a notion of humanness, which differs from the Renaissance/Enlightenment 
concept of being human. The concept of Ubuntu, which has not only informed the work of 
the Truth & Reconciliation Commission, which aimed at working through the horrors of the 
apartheid regime but has also found its way into the South African constitution, is not easily 
translated into Western contexts and languages (Tutu 1999). According to Desmond Tutu, 
former Archbishop of Cape Town and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Ubuntu conveys what 
is elemental for human being-ness (Tutu 1999). In Zulu, to praise someone with Yu, u 
nobuntu (Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu), means that a person is considered giving and big-
hearted, cordial and companionable, cares for and feels with other people (Tutu 1999, p. 29). 
A person that is understood to have Ubuntu acts as if their humanity is inextricably 
interlinked with the humanity of others, that they are bundled up in the interbeing of human 
lives (ibid.). Tutu describes that humanness and personhood in Ubuntu could also be 
surmised in the following sentence: »A person is a person through other persons«, which stands 
in contrast to the Cartesian »I think therefore I am«, a maxim on which Western philosophy, 
thought and culture is based (Tutu 1999, p. 29). Though I would not necessarily describe 
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Ubuntu philosophy in binary opposition to Western ideologies, Tutu describes the maxim 
in this southern African belief system more as »›I am human because I belong. I participate, I 
share.‹ A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel 
threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from 
knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or 
diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are« 
(Tutu 1999, p. 29)46. 
 The way Milan imagines humanness is very much related to these values of co-being, 
co-existing and conviviality. Milan even extends it to the environment, drawing on the 
notion of Pachamama. Pachamama, known to the indigenous people of the Andes also as 
earth/time mother, conceptualizes nature not in a Cartesian or Baconian sense of natural 
resources, but rather ascribes nature rights, similar to human rights, which is reflected in 
the Ecuadorian constitution (Constitution of Ecuador 2008, Chapter 7, Article 71). So, here, 
nature is understood as a living being, the source of life; without nature, life would be very 
difficult or impossible on earth (Santos 2018, p. 10). 
 The question of how we relate to each other, which already appeared in the first two 
sections of this chapter, also appeared in the question about humanness: 
 
Can: »Looking at shared experiences. [...] Without giving advise or being moralising, or being a professor or being 
a psychiatrist, but simply being a fellow human being. […] We are a community, and we can only be in community« 
(Can 10/07/2012 #00:46:41). 
 
 Can’s narrative emphasises the relationality of humanness, similar to Ryan’s, relating 
to each other not in our roles or professions but humanely. The inter-relational aspect of 
humanness is also highlighted on Liz’s comments about dehumanisation: 
 
Liz: »[...] I say now sufficient or fully developed ability to be able to outline this degree of dehumanization again 
and again. To be able to name that. […] I can just have confidence in it that the reality of interpersonal destruction, 
that is between us and within us, is also named. Realistically. […] And because of the specifics of humanity, I 
remember for a moment that Fagbola somehow had the same thing when he talked about abuse, that [it] is really 
about nothing other than learning to not abuse each other. And that also hit me like a bomb, when I thought: ›Oh, 
yes, that’s how you can say it‹. So, yes, because that’s dehumanising« (Liz, focus group 11/01/2015-4 # 
00:56:00). 
 
46 Michael Onyebuchi Eze (2012) wrote a very interesting critique of Ubuntu as an ideology in view of past genocides in 
Ruanda and Burundi or ongoing political corruption in some contemporary African nation states but still sees many useful 




To Liz, de-humanisation is mostly related to the term »abuse«, which in the logic of the 
research participant’s narrative makes not being abusive part of re-humanisation. The 
narratives of the anti-racism and empowerment participants (as analysed in chapter 4) 
render racialisation into a form of abusing children to function within racialised settings. 
Generally, abuse is understood as a cruel and violent treatment of a person, so where is the 
cruelty and violence in racialisation, in being racialised as BIPOC or a White person? 
Modern psychology also believes that abuse causes damage to a person’s self-esteem and 
subjectivity (Chen & Qin 2019); I would therefore argue that the systematic use of a mostly 
unintended imprinting (I assume here that only a few parents want their children to actually 
grow up to be racist) through mostly non-physical acts against a subject (which in the case 
of a child often means it is depending on the abuser), constitutes a form of dehumanisation. 
Which, in turn, would establish re-humanisation as »learning to not abuse each other« (Liz, 
focus group 11/01/2015 # 00: 56: 00-2 #). But what does that mean? Do all power relations 
and all encounters where these power relations become relevant turn us into abusers and 
abused? Can it simply mean that when we encounter each other within those power 
relations, respecting each other’s boundaries, helps us in reducing the abusiveness and 
dehumanisation of our social positioning and the way they interact with each other? 
 In The Politics of Friendship (2005) Jacques Derrida explores the ethical implications of 
social positioning and three different types of responsibility interacting with each other. The 
French philosopher and deconstructivist, described »answering for oneself«, »answering to the 
other«, and »answering before the other« (Derrida 2005, pp. 250-252). According to Derrida 
»answering for oneself«, highlights the responsibility a subject has to itself: »The ›self‹ or the ›I‹ 
thus supposes the unity – in other words, memory that answers. This is often called the unity of the 
subject […] ›I‹ am assumed to be responsible for ›myself,‹ - that is, for everything imputable to that 
which bears my name« (Derrida 2005, p. 250). Though our memories and recollections can 
never fully re-assemble the past, the subject also has a responsibility towards its historicity 
and its structural positioning (Rothberg 2019). Depending on the structural positioning, the 
subject can also be dehumaniser and dehumanised at the same time. The relational character 
of Derrida’s notion of responsibility is highlighted in the »answering to the other«. In a very 
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simplified way, if »answering to the other« is a much more foundational responsibility as the 
subject does not exist in a social vacuum, and its subjectivity is related to the subjectivities 
surrounding it, could it resonate with the notion of Ubuntu, that a person is a person 
through other persons? Whilst Derrida’s »answering before the other« suggests that the subject 
»answers before the law, a court, a jury, an agency authorized to represent the other legitimately, 
in the institutional form of a moral, juridical, political community« (Derrida 2005, p. 252). In other 
words, the human subject also carries an ethical responsibility towards others. 
 The historian and political theorist Achille Mbembe states in On the Postcolony (2001) 
that Western philosophical and political traditions generally had an issue with the Other. 
Mbeme writes that »theoretical and practical recognition of the body and flesh of ›the stranger‹ as 
flesh and body just like mine, the idea of a common human nature, a humanity shared with 
others, long posed, and still poses, a problem for Western consciousness« [original emphasis] 
(Mbembe 2001, p. 2). The global legal scholar Boaventura De Sousa Santos rallies in his book 
The End of Cognitive Empire (2018) towards an epistemological shift, away from Eurocentric 
thought towards epistemologies of the South as a project of decoloniality. Santos criticizes 
the Western conception of humanity and the underlying dichotomies constituting it: 
 
»Modern social sciences have conceived of humanity as a homogeneous whole inhabiting this side of the line 
and hence as wholly subjected to the tension between regulation and emancipation. Of course, modern science 
did acknowledge the existence of historical colonialism based on foreign territorial occupation, but it did not 
recognize colonialism as a form of sociability that is an integral part of capitalist and patriarchal domination, and 
which, therefore, did not end when historical colonialism ended. Modern critical theory (which expresses the 
maximum possible consciousness of Western modernity) imagined humanity as a given, rather than as an 
aspiration. It believed that all humanity could be emancipated through the same mechanisms and according to 
the same principles, by claiming rights before credible institutions grounded on the idea of formal equality before 
the law. At the very heart of this modernist imagination is the idea of humanity as a totality built upon a common 
project: universal human rights. Such humanistic imagination, an heir to Renaissance humanism, was unable to 
fathom that, once combined with colonialism, capitalism would be inherently unable to relinquish the concept of 
the subhuman as an integral part of humanity, that is to say, the idea that there are some social groups whose 
existence cannot be ruled by the tension between regulation and emancipation, simply because they are not fully 
human. In Western modernity there is no humanity without subhumanities. At the root of the epistemological 
difference there is an ontological difference« (Santos 2018, pp. 19-20). 
 
The lived experiences of navigating within power structures, for example as BIPOC, means 
moving between these constitutive borders of humanity and subhumanity, slipping 
through the cracks, crossing and changing at the intersections (Sealey 2013, p. 228). The 
human subject’s ability to navigate through these boundaries highlights that they are not 
essential (ibid.). It is not their non-essentiality which causes suffering, it is rather the 
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constant essentialising of rather open and permeable concepts such as culture, nation or 
»Race« (ibid.). The notion of cultural, national or racial purity, which imply natural or God-
given closed-off boundaries, are then misused in order to implement racialised power 
structures (ibid.). Santos’ concept of epistemologies of the South, which I would expand to 
the epistemologies of those racialised and dehumanised gives new ways of conceptualising 
humanness as »[o]ne’s raced body may give rise to certain ways of knowing, thinking, and feeling, 
but […] one does not know ›what race will (or must) come to mean in the future‹ (Cusick 2007, p. 
3). In this sense, humanness must be approached as one’s living of an ethical relation, where it is 
›both impossible to cross the border/limit/condition and necessary to transcend it‹ (Wang 2005, p. 
46)« (Sinha 2015, pp. 131-132). 
 Crucial in de-essentialising the Global North’s notion of humanness, is also to 
perceive it not as given, but as an aspiration. Within the discursive world of the anti-racism 
and empowerment practitioners’ spirituality certainly is a theme that emanates from their 
narratives. I feel unsure, if this could be related to a form of de-secularisation, since 
spirituality is a very secular form of addressing the supernatural (Flanagan & Jupp 2007). 
Interestingly, it is an outspoken atheist, Nana, who brings up the term spirituality. 
Nevertheless, amongst the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners, there does not seem 
to be an apparent contradiction to believe in a superhuman order or realities that are 
invisible and very difficult to prove and to be an atheist. In The Invention of World Religions 
Tomoko Masuzawa (2005) argues that from the 19th century onwards, Western discourse 
on world religion(s) disguised its universalist understanding of religion in the veil of 
pluralist language. This discursive shift also led to a redefinition of religion »as a distinct 
sphere of human experience and practice, and the study of religion evolved gradually as an academic 
discipline independent of theology, philosophy, and philology« (Dressler 2013, p. 57). The secular 
removal from religion or spirituality from sciences and epistemologies of the Global North, 
was accompanied by a European self-understanding as modern, rational and free from the 
dictates of beliefs in the divine (Masuzawa 2005, p. 16). The construction of a modern 
European identity became apparent in the manufacturing of the racial »Other« as pre-
modern, irrational and trapped in primitive, ancient and antiquated religious belief systems 
(ibid.). Masuzawa concluded that with the emergence of sciences such as Oriental studies 
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and anthropology »every region of the non-modern non-West was presumed to be thoroughly in 
the grip of religion, as all aspects of life were supposedly determined and dictated by an archaic 
metaphysics of the magical and the supernatural...[T]he supposed predominance [...] of religious and 
supernatural elements was believed to mark tribal society as decisively different from modern 
European society« (Masuzawa 2005, pp. 16–17). If, as educational philosopher Shilpi Sinha 
argues, humanness should be »approached as one’s living of an ethical relation« (Sinha 2015, p. 
132) how does Western modern liberal humanism fit in there? Modern Western humanism, 
which has its roots in the Renaissance, obsessed around the »self-affirmation of the free 
personality« (Dawson 1931, p. 13), but ultimately failed to humanise sciences and 
epistemologies of the Global North (Dawson 1931, p. 25). In Discourse on Colonialism, which 
was first published in 1950 Aimé Césaire wrote »the West has never been further from being able 
to live a true humanism – a humanism made to the measure of the world« (Césaire 2000, p. 73), a 
statement that even 70 years later has lost little of its accuracy. 
 Ato Sekyi-Otu’s book Fanon’s Dialectic of Experience (1996) re-reads and analyses the 
works of Frantz Fanon in the context of Enlightenment theory, namely Hegel. Sekyi-Out’s 
book has proven to be a rich source for the exploration of the human condition in the 
colonial and neo-colonial setting. Sekyi-Otu’s re-reading of Fanon’s works concludes that 
the psychiatrist from Martinique, who became witness to and testifier particularly of the 
Algerian liberation struggle, argued in fact for a new form of humanism (Sekyi-Otu 1996, p. 
16). Whilst post-structuralist readings of Fanon (such as Homi Bhabha’s for example) often 
simply dismiss his humanistic ideas and ideals, Sekyi-Otu argues that particularly in the 
light of the neo-colonial liberation struggle, Fanon’s notion of the new humanism, could fill 
the void that post-modernists are unable to fill with their anti-humanism. Jürgen Habermas’ 
critique of post-modernist anti-humanism, is that it claims that the emancipatory and 
liberating humanistic project has failed without offering an alternative emancipatory and 
liberating project of its own (Fraser 1985). To a certain extent, similarly to Habermas, I agree 
with the post-modernist’s criticism of traditional humanism, however, I also agree with 
Habermas’, Fanon’s and Sekyi-Otu’s conclusions that humanism must be re-thought and 
revised rather than totally dismissed and superseded by an ethical void. 
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 How would this revision and rethinking of humanism progress? Fanon argued that 
this new humanism would evolve through the post-colonial struggle for liberation (Fanon 
1965, p. 246). Sekyi-Otu analyses how Fanon describes the historical colonial setting as a form 
of anti-dialectic, as a colonialist monologue that leaves no space for dialogue or negotiation. 
Within the colonial setting, the colonisers define themselves through defining what the 
colonised Others are and are not. The historian Christopher Fyfe describes this process as a 
»gigantic confidence trick« of the West aimed at shifting social power structures in their favour 
(Fyfe 1992, p. 27). Nevertheless, this »confidence trick« (ibid.) came at a price that resonates 
with my notion of suffering caused by racialisation. As Sekyi-Otu notes, the colonial 
confidence trick was »severely constricting the compass of human self-knowledge« (Sekyi-Otu 
1996, p. 100). The West defines Western culture as modernity, and I argue that the perceived 
cultural inability or unwillingness of the racial Other, (i.e., Muslims) to sign on to the project 
of Western style modernity is used as justification for enforcing racial power structures. This 
form of self-definition, of self-construction has, however, a severely alienating and 
dehumanising moment. This moment occurs when the human self is abandoned in favour 
of a powerful racialised self, which has lost its human empathy in order to assimilate the 
benefits of its Whiteness. Sekyi-Otu, therefore, in reference to Fanon, concludes that 
disalienation equals the deracialisation of thought (Sekyi-Otu 1996, pp. 185-191). In this 
way, a new humanism is seen to begin to emerge through the re-humanisation of the 
racialised subject. 
 How do we measure this re-humanisation? How might we measure the success of 
the new humanist project of liberation? In answering this question, Sekyi-Otu’s re-reading 
and analysis of Fanon takes an interesting twist: Sekyi-Otu argues that old humanism is 
flawed through it being bound to words, lacking implementation and enacting. In an 
exploration of the position of women within the Algerian independence struggle and how 
their role served to deconstruct both Whiteness and patriarchy, Seyki-Otu argues that new 
humanism should be measured along the strongest dividing structures of society: the 
gender division line (Sekyi-Otu 1996, pp. 211-215). In a way, I read this as masculinity 
studies, and their analysis of the alienation that men experience being constructed as those 
benefiting from gendered power structures, should be complementing Whiteness studies 
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and vice versa. Racial (and gender) subjugation limits the »independence of a person« and 
Fanon saw the dawn of a new humanism in the post-colonial struggle for self-determination 
(Sekyi-Otu 1996, p. 231). The yardstick against which new humanism’s success might be 
measured, therefore, is the deconstruction of gendered power structures.  
 So, what is this humanness in this new humanism? What does it look like and how 
does it manifest itself? In rare moments, Fanon spoke of »authentic love« (Sekyi-Otu 1996, p. 
68) or the »compassion for the excluded« (Sekyi-Otu 1996, p. 166) that would enable the 
overcoming of a racialised self. How can we, as Gilroy mentions, develop a planetary 
humanism, »a sense of the human that is derived from an explicit moral and political opposition to 
racism in order to project a different humanity, capable of interrupting the liberal, Cold War, and 
exclusionary humanisms that characterize most human-rights talk« (Gilroy 2004, p. xii)? Gilroy 
continues to argue for a culture of conviviality in which »local and specific interventions can 
contribute to a counterhistory of cultural relations and influences from which a new understanding 
of multicultural Europe will doubtless eventually emerge. This negative work can discover and 
explore some of the emancipatory possibilities that are implicitly at stake in convivial culture but do 
not announce themselves, preferring to remain hidden and unpredictable« (Gilroy 2004, p. 161). 
Similarly, Dre argues for a culture of understanding: 
 
Dre: »Basically, we want a culture of understanding, we want to experience it as often as possible now, but we 
also want to work to ensure that people who are aware that they are different, um, still meet at eye level. So, 
without suppressing the one, as is often done in the anti-racist scene: ›Oh, I don't see that you’re Black. I didn’t 
notice it at all.‹ Of course I see that, I see it every day, and yet we make every effort to ensure that the influence 
that racism has on our lives, affects us as little as possible in the way we interact with each other.« (Dre 
11/07/2012-3 # 00:34:59) 
 
For Dre, the basis to a culture of understanding or conviviality, is being aware of our 
differences and more. In Dre’s narrative, conviviality can only function if there is an 
awareness about how those differences are hierarchised in society, therefore being colour-
blind makes us ignorant towards what Fanon coined epidermalization, the link between 
skin colour and racial subjugation (Fanon 1952, pp. 9-10). Nevertheless, is it possible to 
interact with each other as racialised subjects, without our racialisation getting in the way 
of how we interact with each other? Or, as Gilroy states, how can we »find new courage to 
reflect on the history of political nationalism that has been entangled with the ideas of race, culture, 
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and civilization and to understand how Europe’s imperial and colonial dominance brought racisms 
and nationalisms together in ways that still affect present conditions« (Gilroy 2004, p. 162) and in 
addition, present racialised subjects? Colour-blind discourses tend to reproduce 
epistemological violence, as they often reflect demands of assimilation from the racialised 
BIPOC subject to a repressive form of humanness which is only granted to White subjects 
(Sinha 2015, p. 131). Sinha writes that »[i]n contrast, Fanon’s exhortation to be committed to the 
experiences of living in the world can be seen to reconfigure humanness as inextricably linked to 
materiality, a riveting to and suffering of one’s body« (Sinha 2015, p. 131). Fanon further believed 
that the suffering caused by the embodiment of »Race« in the racialised subject had to be 
acknowledged, albeit the suffering also inevitably had to be transcended (ibid.). Sinha 
concludes »[h]ence, Fanon’s thought could be seen to be resonant in many ways to Derridean and 
Levinasian thought, where the subject is positioned through the ethical relation, which is understood 
as the very opening of one’s vulnerability to the other, and the interplay of the singular and universal 
(Sinha 2015, p. 131). The acknowledgement of suffering and vulnerability also relates to 
C.L.’s statement: 
 
C.L .: »But one thing, which I find […] related to Liz, what you said, to understand yourself and the other person 
or the others, Ubuntu, very deeply. And to feel. And to make each other vulnerable. And to show yourself in pain. 
And Austen said that at some point. That was also a sentence that has been on my mind for a long time: ›It’s 
actually the best thing in the world to make yourself vulnerable to other people.‹ And I think, […] I mean it’s about 
racism. And Black and White and POC and etc., talking from different perspectives about crazy hurtful things, i.e. 
injuries that they had or have experienced. And also, in combination with really growing with love. Well, first of all 
to allow a loving connection, because I think White spaces are also very strongly marked, just to completely chop 
off such connections or to try to pack them in Excel sheets. (C.L., focus group 11/01/2015-4 #01:07:42) 
 
The concept of vulnerability crept into neo-liberal discourses mainly in regard to vulnerable 
communities, endangered by ecological disasters and human right violations. With the book 
Vulnerability in Resistance (2016) Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti and Leticia Sabsay (eds.) 
attempt a reformulation of both terms, vulnerability and resistance. The authors question, 
from a feminist standpoint, that in mainstream discourses in which »vulnerability is the 
opposite of resistance and cannot be conceived as part of that practice; … [it] supposes that 
vulnerability requires and implies the need for protection and the strengthening of paternalistic forms 
of power at the expense of collective forms of resistance and social transformation« (Butler et Al. 
2016, p. 1). The authors even go a step further and ask if vulnerability might be a prerequisite 
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for resistance. What if vulnerability actually became a source for resistive actions? How 
would it change the way we perceive the political agency of subjects, in particular where 
the binary of victimisation and perpetration is in question (Butler et Al. 2016, p. 1)? Similar 
to masculinities, Whiteness achieves its position of power through the assertion that it is 
invulnerable (Butler et Al. 2016, p. 4). Simultaneously, Whiteness will claim vulnerability in 
moments, when it constructs BIPOC as a threat, particularly within discourses of migration 
from pre-dominantly BIPOC countries to pre-dominantly White countries (ibid.). The 
vulnerability of Whiteness may also invoke the discourse of White fragility, a term made 
popular by US-American author and lecturer Robin DiAngelo (DiAngelo 2018). In 
DiAngelo’s writings, White fragility refers to a lack of resilience of the White subject, which 
was too pampered by White privilege (DiAngelo 2018, pp. 114-119). It also refers to the 
emotional defensiveness of White people, when the subject of racism appears in discussions, 
how the White subject derails discussions on »Race« in order to de-centre perspectives from 
BIPOC and re-centre it around discourses palatable to toxic Whiteness (DiAngelo 2018, pp. 
120-126). DiAngelo’s work has been criticised for oversimplifying complex social matters 
(Burke 2020), and I find myself agreeing more and more with this criticism. DiAngelo’s 
work caters for a questionable development in anti-racism, which has turned the struggle 
for social justice into a show of performativity and display (McWhorter 2018), where 
feelings are always right and reflection unnecessary. Furthermore, the literature which 
furthers these questionable discourses on Whiteness and »Race« such as »White Fragility 
has succeeded because we are in a unique historical moment in which our discourse of race-related 
issues has become so irrational that people can no longer tell the difference between scholarship and 
nonsense, or between antiracism and religion« (Burke 2018). How can anti-racism and 
empowerment return to become a genuine form of resistance against social injustices? 
Returning to Butler et. Al. argument that vulnerability precedes resistance, to what 
kind of vulnerability does C.L. refer to in her statement? In C.L.’s account, sharing personal 
narratives of racialisation within a semi-structured setting, without being judged, allows 
White subjects to recognise their own (authentic) vulnerability and thereby also their 
interdependency with other human beings. Toxic Whiteness, racialisation signifies also a 
suspension of connections in particular but not exclusively to BIPOC (Lewis & Hemmings 
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2019, pp. 418-419). Could one part of de-racialisation and re-humanisation be also to seek 
that human connection? 
 
Dre: »As a person who has been trying to deconstruct his White socialisation for over 20 years, as a person who 
is trying to develop a new White identity at the same time, I am aware of this, and I can, so to speak, counteract 
this reflex that I have. So, I can consciously oppose the inhuman or the reflex, which has to do with the removal 
of humanity, with something humane, and can say, just because I know this reflex, I stand by it and open myself. 
And I would say that opening up that people approach each other who are not 99.99 percent enemies, I would 
already see that as part of my definition of humanity, especially since I see it as a gain for me because the 
moment, I set up this fence, restrict my own, I limit my own opportunities for encounter. That’s what I perceive in 
my circle of friends, in my relatives, who are not in the anti-racist […] context. That means that they live in their 
little White world, and I feel this, viewed from the outside, i.e. from my White perspective, I also see it as a loss of 
life opportunities. It seems to me a little like in a zoo or something, but you mustn’t put it in my cage, but those 
who sit there in the cage, the cage, that would be the centre of the world« (Dre 11/07/2012-3 #00:18:29). 
 
Though Dre mentions the notion of the inhuman only fleetingly in his narrative, I believe it 
is worth taking a deeper look at it. In mainstream Western discourses, the inhuman is often 
understood as a concept in binary opposition to the human (Curtis 2006, p. 434). Being 
treated humanely is understood as being treated justly, ethically and with compassion, 
whilst being treated inhumanely is presumed to be treated unjustly, unethically and 
brutalised (ibid.). In this binary opposition, the human is dialectically constituted by the 
inhuman (ibid.), without the inhuman there can be no human and vice versa, a dialectic 
resembling Whiteness and BIPOCness. In The Inhuman: Reflections on Time (1993) the French 
philosopher and sociologist Jean-François Lyotard questioned this binary opposition and 
developed an alternative concept of the inhuman, one that whilst »the inhuman understood as 
evil reinforces our sense of self and secures our autonomy, this other inhuman, understood as that 
which escapes and yet animates us, is the moment of both radical disruption and radical dependence« 
(Curtis 2006, p. 434). In other words, the inhuman does not constitute the human, but rather 
disrupts and questions it. The binary of human/inhuman is very present in racialised and 
(neo-)colonialist discourses on migration, culture and the war on terror (Castro Varela & 
Mecheril 2016). Mechanisms of racism follow a certain script: through discursive practice 
the Other becomes racialised, stereotyped for example as firstly the Muslim, incapable of 
adapting to Western modernity, its democratic and Gender-equal society, therefore wanting 
to destroy it violently (Zerger 1997, pp. 130-134). Or secondly, the stereotype of the Jews, 
conspiring on taking down the Aryans with the power of the press and whole financial 
sector (ibid.). Or thirdly, the stereotype of the Black African, closer to its animalistic rather 
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than its human nature, threatening the racial purity and health with its disease-ridden 
wildness (ibid.). Or fourthly, more recently the stereotype of the yellow peril, the cunning 
Asian, driven by zealous nationalistic interests that they could even design a virus in the 
laboratory ready to disrupt flourishing Western economies (ibid.)47. This racialised Other 
becomes in the process of dehumanisation the inhuman, threatening (White) humanness 
and therefore is an evil that needs to be dominated or eradicated (ibid.). But I would, agree 
with Lyotard, who argues that the »inhumanity of the system which is currently being 
consolidated under the name of development (among others) must not be confused with the infinitely 
secret one of which the soul is hostage« (Lyotard 1991, p. 2). If according to Lyotard the soul is 
held hostage by the inhuman, an inhuman which is »the temporality of events, the happening 
of which we can never fully grasp, as well as our openness to them, an openness that first animates 
the soul« (Curtis 2006, p. 435), what is the human? Similarly, Lyotard asks »[w]hat shall we 
call human in humans, the initial misery of their childhood, or their capacity to acquire a ›second‹ 
nature which, thanks to language, makes them fit to share in communal life, adult consciousness and 
reason« (Lyotard 1993, p. 3)? In other words, is a child born as human or does the child 
signify the possibility of becoming a human? Is being a grown-up, being human or does 
being a grown-up, also – just like the child – signify the possibility of becoming a human? If 
humanness is only a possibility, who is a human being then (and what relevance would this 
have on human rights issues)? Is humanness something that just remains a possibility or is 
it something that can actually be achieved? What if we understood the inhuman as an 
integral part of the human, not as constitutive but as an element of the human? Could it be 
that as much as we carry the possibility to be human within us, we just as much carry the 
possibility to be inhuman? In other words, the inhuman is in the human and the human is 
in the inhuman. Dre describes dehumanisation of BIPOC, the process of becoming an 
inhuman as an inhumane reflex he has been conditioned to act upon as a child. I would 
argue that the inhumane reflex in the context of a racialised setting is perceiving the other as 
only the racialised Other and not as human, which is a very limited way of relating to a 
person which has many more subject identities than their racial one. This could also be 
 
47 The fact that White European colonial settlers killed Indigenous populations in the Global South on a genocidal scale 
with all the diseases the brought with them (see also Watts 1997), in this case falls under White amnesia (see also Bröcke 
1999) and could also explain the fears of diseases originating from the Global south as potential payback. 
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transferred to other contexts of subjugation, discrimination and oppression. In Dre’s 
narrative, opening up, approaching the other as a human other, assists Whiteness also to 
leave its own cage of racialisation where it will otherwise simply remain stuck as long as it 
understands the (racial) inhuman as a constitutive mirror image rather than a part of itself. 
So maybe it is not about being human but rather choosing if we want to nurture the possibility 
of being human or nurture the possibility of being inhuman? Again, I would argue that the 
inhuman choice limits us to simple, essentialising and oppressive racial narratives we 
internalise from early childhood onwards, the human choice resists these narratives and 
grants complexity, non-essentialism and (self-)empowerment. Humanness is choosing to 
gain a variety of life opportunities rather than limiting the human self. Even Lyotard who 
could be in way described as anti-humanist, thought that the essence of the human was »like 
a dissonance; it is a floating, aleatory anti-essence that is found at work in particular humans, 
undermining the nihilating-transcendent claims or agendas of the human, whether the latter is a 
robust, filled in concept or an idea conceived as a project to be fulfilled« (McLennan 2013, p. 47). 
Lyotard’s early writings heavily leaned on Marxist phenomenology, in this period the 
author understood the human being as a place of constant exploration and challenge of 
definitions and the past (ibid.). In the end the sociologist and philosopher concluded »the 
human is neither a fixed essence, nor a project achievable/to be achieved once and for all« (McLennan 
2013, p. 47). Lyotard’s thoughts resonate very much with Nana’s final words on the subject 
of humanness: 
 
Nana: »I would say, it is… I don’t think it has anything to do with acceptance. I nearly said: ›accepting how you 
are‹. But I would actually say the opportunity to be. To be so that the human being is simply what he is. And how 
he is. Without being forced to be anything other than what it is. And this being […], as I understand it, of course, 
as such a wide variation that there is no definition. Phoenix doesn’t say who you are. The starting point is: we 
know who we are. We know that or we are simply. We don’t need to know that. We are simply« (Nana 04/08/2012-
4 #00:05:52). 
 
The new narratives of the self created by the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners 
after their training experience, highlight a complexity of stories. Some narrated a new 
openness, a new openness towards emotions, knowledge but also humanity (C.L., Nana, 
Ryan). The majority, however, spoke of a more conscious relationality, where the research 
participants asked themselves how do I relate to others. The term authenticity was also 
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mentioned with the meaning to relate to each other as human beings and not as roles, 
positions or social constructs (Can, C.L., Eve, Milan, Nana, Ryan). Another common theme 
in the new narratives of the self was what I would coin as the impact through being (instead 
of missionising) or creating possibilities of empowerment for others, which meant (in 
particular to the White research participants) letting go of stigmatising and shaming 
Whiteness (C.L., Lena, Nana, Ryan). Some of the research participants also referred to this 
in their narratives as becoming more loving (Dina, C.L.). A much more common theme 
amongst the BIPOC research participants’ new narratives of the self, was the notion of self-
determination, a widened sense of freedom of choice, being more independent from 
emotional triggers of racialisation (Can, Kabera, Nana). 
The re-imagination of humanness was similarly complex and ranged from seeing 
humanness relationally, spiritually and reflexively (Milan, Can, Dre, Nana). Other elements 
of that re-imagination of humanness were narrated as seeing and acknowledging a person’s 
boundaries and each other’s vulnerability (C.L., Liz). Finally, there was mention of an 
inhuman reflex, which denies the other humanness, but which also, once it was overcome, 





In this chapter, I have argued that racialisation is a form of mis-recognition and that 
recognition (as conceptualised by Taylor 1994) plays a significant role in the process of de-
racialisation. The narratives of the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners highlight 
that Whiteness, seeing itself through the eyes of the racialised other, would not only grant 
subject status to the objectified racial other, but it would also re-establish a humanness, in 
which Whites are reflected in (Martinot 2010). The ways in which this recognition can evolve 
have been described and re-written by the research participants in a plethora of ways: either 
by describing love as a driver of personal and social change (Illouz 2012), by overcoming 
the stigma and shame that are very often related to Whiteness (Kowal 2011), or by re-
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discovering a form of self-recognition, which gives the subject an (albeit limited) sense of 
self-determination and freedom of choice (Frankl 2006). 
 Furthermore, the anti-racism and empowerment practitioners understand and re-
imagine humanness as relational (Derrida 2005; Sinha 2015), thereby vulnerability (Butler 
et Al. 2016) and critical reflexivity become crucial in the examination of how we relate to 
each other (Emirbayer & Desmond 2015). A planetary humanism, as conceptualised by 
Fanon (Sekyi-Out 1996) and Gilroy (2004), which openly resists all form of racialisation, is 
also a crucial element in the development of a culture of understanding and pluralism or a 
convivial culture. This planetary humanism could be informed by the concept of 
decoloniality, which questions the primacy of Western epistemologies and attempts to 
include epistemologies of the Global South in its explorations of what it means to be a 
human being (Santos 2018). Therewith, different aspects of the human pluriverse could be 
examined and negotiated, such as Ubuntu in which a person is understood to become a 
person through other persons (Tutu 1999), but also other forms of spirituality, which have 
been excluded from the project of modernity and the place of the human within it 
(Masuzawa 2005). And finally, in reference to Lyotard (1991), I have argued that if we 
understand humanness as a possibility of being everything that we can be, the inhuman 
should not be denied but rather perceived as a choice, just as much as the choice of being 
human. 
In the previous two chapters, I argued that the research participants experience their 
personal racialisation processes as a dehumanising form of suffering in their narratives. I 
also argued the research participants’ narratives of their first training experience highlight 
how subjectivities, through the cognitive and emotional confrontation of their personal 
racialisation processes, gain a sense of partial liberation. This chapter concludes that 
through new narratives of the self, inspired by anti-racism and empowerment training, the 
anti-racism and empowerment practitioners re-write their personal racial subjectivation in 
redemptive terms of (self-)recognition, relationality and critical reflexivity. If racialisation is 
understood as a dehumanising form of suffering, de-racialisation becomes a form of re-
humanisation. Thereby, one crucial element in this re-writing process is the question of what 
it means to be a human being, the re-imagination of humanness. Therein, I delved into an 
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existential reflection on Fanon’s appeal for a new humanism, and delineated the concept of 
decoloniality. We hereby move away from Western epistemologies towards an 
epistemological pluriverse. 
The following and final chapter discusses further the findings of this research project 
and concludes this dissertation.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion – Moving Beyond »Race« 
 
»Some say that suffering is only an illusion or that to live wisely we have to ›transcend‹ both suffering and joy. I 
say the opposite. The way to suffer well and be happy is to stay in touch with what is actually going on; in doing 
so, you will gain liberating insights into the true nature of suffering and of joy. [...] 
Both suffering and happiness are of an organic nature, which means they are both transitory; they are 
always changing. The flower, when it wilts, becomes the compost. The compost can help grow a flower again. 
Happiness is also organic and impermanent by nature. It can become suffering and suffering can become 
happiness again. [...] 
Everyone knows we need to have mud for lotuses to grow. The mud doesn’t smell so good, but the lotus 
flower smells very good. If you don’t have mud, the lotus won’t manifest. You can’t grow lotus flowers on marble. 
Without mud, there can be no lotus.  
It is possible of course to get stuck in the ›mud‹ of life. It’s easy enough to notice mud all over you at 
times. The hardest thing to practice is not allowing yourself to be overwhelmed by despair. When you’re 
overwhelmed by despair, all you can see is suffering everywhere you look. You feel as if the worst thing is 
happening to you. But we must remember that suffering is a kind of mud that we need in order to generate joy 
and happiness. Without suffering, there’s no happiness. So we shouldn’t discriminate against the mud. We have 
to learn how to embrace and cradle our own suffering and the suffering of the world, with a lot of tenderness« 
(Nhát Hanh 2014, pp. 12-13).  
 
Beginning this conclusion with a quote from the Vietnamese Buddhist Zen-Master Thích 
Nhát Hanh, might appear like a slippery slope in view of Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn’s (2001) 
criticism of the psychologisation and therapeutisation of anti-racism (and empowerment) 
as simply a Californian style way of finding your bliss or your true self; or of freeing the inner 
child through transcending racial subjectivation. Such tones are at times hauntingly close to 
the narratives of anti-racism and empowerment practitioners explored in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, a resemblance in discourses must not be equated with a telling of the same 
tale. 
 This thesis tells the story of racial identity development, dehumanisation and 
subjectivity. It galvanises these key processes in social, social psychological and 
psychological theories of racial subjectivation. This galvanisation of racialisation and 
psychosocial theories highlights in particular how White people might in general be posited 
as structurally, socially, economically and politically over-empowered, while being 
emotionally and psychologically scathed. In short, it highlights how restricted and limited 
in humaneness Whiteness becomes through the colonial construction of an essentially 
different racial Other. However, as the research participants’ narratives show: 
remembering, reflecting and feeling through personal histories of racial subjectivation is 





In Chapter 1 I began with drawing a picture of how “Race”, racism and racialisation are 
manifested, operationalised and negotiated in contemporary German society. By 
addressing the tension between (hierarchical) racialised structures and individuals 
operating within those structures, I briefly discuss the attempts (and failures) of anti-racism 
and empowerment training to illuminate this tension. I elaborate hereby the setting for the 
psycho-biographies (and thereby also psycho-histories) of racialisation in Germany, studied 
in this research project. After looking into the research questions and objectives, the thesis 
outlines some of the conceptual issues around generating a psycho-biography of 
racialisation (and as such contributes in a wider sense to the field of Critical Race theory). I 
also included an outline of Phoenix’ (and some of its founding figures’) history, which was 
at the heart of my case study. As this thesis highlighted, learning anti-racism as a White 
person or being empowered as a Black/Person of Colour is related to the very slow work of 
confronting one’s own racialisation. 
 In chapter 2 I built the theoretical framework of this study and located it in the 
interdisciplinary field of Critical Race Theory. In the literature review I arranged various 
ideas and existing studies on Relational Sociology, (Child) Development Theory, Memory 
Theory, Critical Whiteness, Post- & Decoloniality, around concepts of Narratology. This 
theoretical amalgam, though encompassing studies, research and theories within and 
beyond Germany, highlights how the global and the local, the structural and the individual 
engage with each other in regard to lived experiences of racialisation, anti-racism and 
empowerment activism mainly in the cities of Duisburg and Berlin. In chapter 2, I also 
highlighted the limits of this key literature: theories of racism, racialisation, dehumanisation 
and subjectivity are rarely amalgamated in psychosocial theories of racial identity 
construction processes. This study considers the contextualisation of these hypotheses to be 
vital as they can provide an imperative inspiration in particularly for the dominant culture 
to re-assess racial identity developments. Learning and acknowledging the single stories 
that shape the racialised subject paves the way for new narratives of diversity. Furthermore, 
literature on racialisation seldom centres on the impact mindfulness of racialisation 
processes can have on White and BIPOC individuals. 
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 In chapter 3 I outlined the research trajectory and the epistemological and 
methodological issues relevant to this seven-year research project. As a researcher who 
conducted fieldwork at home with multiple methods (such as interviews, participant 
observation), I initially discussed methodological debates about Feminist Standpoint 
theory, insider and outsider research, and positioned myself as an insider/believer of 
Phoenix, the organisation I investigated as a case study. Additionally, I concluded that 
accessing the voices of anti-racism and empowerment practitioners through insider 
research, Feminist Standpoint epistemology and Grounded Theory allows new 
opportunities of knowledge production which expand contemporary theories of 
racialisation in Germany.  
 In chapter 4 I explored key narratives, moments and elements in the psycho-
biography of anti-racism and empowerment practitioners in their personal racialisation 
processes. Drawing heavily on Elisian relational sociology and the notion of the second 
nature, I conclude that racial memories and racialisation are located in the nexus of mind, 
body and society, and imprint or inscribe themselves as a racial culture with Whiteness at 
its centre onto the human body. Through retrieving memories of racialisation processes and 
examining the feelings involved in this inscription process, the research participants work 
through the suffering they experienced as racialised subjects. In chapter 4, I conclude that 
the suffering of the racialised subject is caused by the process of racialisation, which can be 
considered a process of becoming dehumanised as BIPOC and White individuals. 
 In chapter 5 I explored briefly how anti-racism and empowerment training in the UK 
and Germany were developed and received. Reflecting the lived experiences of anti-racism 
and empowerment practitioners and their first personal training experiences, I explored the 
notion of (self-)empowerment and (self-)governmentality utilising the work of Nikolas 
Rose. In chapter 5 I concluded, by analysing the narratives of the anti-racism and 
empowerment practitioners’  first training experience, that understanding of individual 
racialisation processes cognitively and emotionally partially transforms and frees the 
racialised subject. This transformation or liberation allows the racialised subject to re-write 
and re-imagine their own story of racialisation and humanness and is further studied in the 
final empirical chapter. 
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 In chapters 4 and 5, I argued that narratives reveal that the research participants 
experience their personal racialisation as dehumanisation, which causes suffering in them. 
Through cognitively and emotionally working through their personal racialisation 
processes, they feel a sense of partial freedom. In chapter 6, I conclude that through new 
narratives of the self, anti-racism and empowerment practitioners re-write their personal 
racial subjectivation in redemptive terms of (self-)recognition, relationality and critical 
reflexivity, as inspired by anti-racism and empowerment training. If racialisation is 
conceptualised as dehumanisation, which causes suffering in the research participants, de-
racialisation can be understood as a process that re-humanises. I therefore explored in 
chapter 6 the research participants’ narratives or understanding of humanness. 
 Having 16 research participants mainly based in Berlin and Duisburg, and trainers, 
trainees and members of the same German anti-racism and empowerment non-
governmental organisation may raise certain questions about the scope and 
representativeness of this study. However, there were reasons for choosing a small sample, 
and for not doing an in-depth comparison with other organisations in Germany or 
elsewhere: I wanted to go in-depth, as deep as possible. I was interested in the details, 
crevasses and nuances of research participants’ narratives; I wanted to hear their stories of 
racialisation, of empowerment, of humanness in an unfiltered, raw and extensive fashion. 
 In addition, as already discussed in the methodology chapter, this thesis is not about 
making generic, universal truth claims, but rather about opening a small window onto 
discourses and narratives of a small group of people (in Germany), who address their own 
psycho-biography of racialisation (and thereby also the psycho-history of their society) in a 
particular way. As such, analysing a group of anti-racism and empowerment practitioners 
who not only continuously critically reflect their own racialisation, but who also live their 
practice, may offer us an opportunity to expand our understanding of the topics at hand. In 
their narratives of their lived experiences, the research participants show how they 
sometimes fail and sometimes succeed; that although painfully slow and with homeopathic 
dosages the impact their partially de-racialised subjectivities have on their work, friends 
and family environments is maybe comparable to those small needles used in acupuncture. 
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Herein lies the offering; the chance to take away significant elements from the narratives 
participants shared with us. 
 The direction of future research following this thesis consists of different possible 
routes. Following the conclusions from chapter 4, it would be fascinating to follow the 
narratives of the research participants’ personal racialisation experiences and (following the 
example of Troyna & Hatcher 1992 or Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001) through ethnographic 
research in Germany with children and young people, study how they experience, 
negotiate, and develop the racial material they are presented with by society. Following 
chapter 5, the bare minimum that we can take away from the narratives of the research 
participants’ training experience, is the question: How can anti-racism and empowerment 
training, but also other forms of racial teaching literacy become more personal and thereby 
more applicable to participants who actually want to be more anti-racist or empowered? 
This could be relevant for example within public bodies (but also many other areas of 
society) in Germany where there remains a need for more awareness of unconscious racial 
bias and thereby more inclusiveness. Following chapter 6, and as delineated in this 
conclusion, urgent questions around racism and racialisation remain and require further 
philosophical and sociological investigation: what does it mean to be a human being? What 
is humanness and how much of our humanity do we lose by being subjected to racial but 
also other forms of power relations - as those disadvantaged but also advantaged by these 
power dynamics? How can we develop a global, decolonial, pluriversal (not universal) 
humanism that allows us to tackle all of the growing global injustices and inequalities? This 




This research project began with an examination of how anti-racism and empowerment 
practitioners narrated memories of racialisation. White people generally assume that they 
are mostly unaffected by racial matters (McKinney 2003), or they assume that they solely 
benefit from racism and from White privilege (McIntosh 1989; Bhopal 2018; Sullivan 2019). 
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The assumption that White people are not raced hides Whiteness as a master signifier – an 
invisible norm from which the cultural or racial Other is constituted (Seshadri 2000; 
Wachendorfer 2001; Levin-Rasky 2012). In A contribution to the critique of political economy 
(1978) Karl Marx argues that »society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of 
interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand« (Marx 1978, p. 247). Norbert 
Elias similarly argued for a relational sociology, arguing that a child becomes an individual 
through going into dialogue with others (Elias 1991, p. 47). The concept of relationality has 
been picked up on by many other sociologists and has also been adapted towards a 
sociology of »Race« and racialisation (Emirbayer & Desmond 2015). Racism as an ideology 
that divides people into inferior and superior races or cultures, functions as a justification 
for privileging or de-privileging racialised groups in German society (van Dijk 1998; Attia 
2009). The fact that racial thinking often operates on an unconscious level (Emirbayer & 
Desmond 2015; Volkan et Al. 2014) disrupts the notion that racism and racial thinking works 
solely consciously and with intention. In fact, many social researchers argue that while a 
great many adults consciously and with intention hold liberal, sometimes even anti-racist 
values, because everyone becomes at some point in childhood racialised, this process of 
racialisation (being predicated on the basis of »Race«) affects the ways in which people 
relate to each other (Van Ausdale & Feagin 2001; Quintana & McKown 2008, Kahn 2018). In 
some cases, it is even possible for the subject to remember the very first moment of racial 
imprinting or initiation into a racial culture that has Whiteness at its centre (Frankenberg 
1993; Thandeka 1999). 
 One of the tasks I gave research participants in my role as a social researcher was to 
tell me their story, their personal memories of racialisation. Herewith ensued a painfully 
narrated journey into discovering how their racial habitus, their racial subjectivation, came 
into being. Memories and remembering are nonetheless not as straightforward as they may 
appear: 
 
»Making ›the past available for the self’s future‹ is the process we have seen at work – in very different ways […]. 
[…] [M]emory does not lie dormant in the past, awaiting resurrection, but holds the ›potential for creative 
collaboration‹ (Boyarin 1994: 22) between past and present. The work of ›memory‹ also involves a complex 
process of negotiation between remembering and forgetting, between the destruction and creation of the self. 
Individual memories of personal histories are constantly reworked and retranslated in the present; so traumatic 
historical events seem to demand re-representation and re-reading, to resist the memorialisation which is also a 




Whilst studying the research participants’ narratives of their racialisation, it became clear 
that »›remembering the self‹ is not a case of restoring an original identity, but a continuous process 
of ›re-membering‹, of putting together moment by moment, of provisional and partial 
reconstruction« [original emphasis] (King 2000, p. 175). This negotiation between the past self 
and the present self, I felt, was particularly present in »Racialisation – Narrating Memories 
of Childhoods and ›Race‹«, the fourth chapter of this thesis in which the research 
participants embark on an emotional journey to their past. The research participants 
remembered – sometimes with an uncanny precision – very personal moments of 
racialisation or being presented with societal racial material in the form of media or 
communist propaganda. For the BIPOC research participants, the personal racialising 
moments in their childhoods range from being treated unfairly due to the way their skin 
colour was perceived, to having to negotiate cultural stereotypes and projections, or 
exposing to everyone the story of how their Black body came to exist in Germany. The White 
research participants shared narratives of primarily discursively encountering a dangerous, 
less human, cultural or racial Other; or situations in the family where they were met with 
shameful silences, or even violence, if they dared to question the racial status quo. It was 
also very fascinating to discover in the research participants' narratives how »Race« and 
place were related to each other (Murji & Picker 2019), and how early children learned to 
perceive and negotiate racialised spaces. Very often, the research participants would cry 
during the interview whilst sharing those painful memories of racialisation. It remains 
unclear where exactly this suffering is located. Is it the past self, the child that expresses their 
suffering through racialisation with those tears; or is it the present self that empathises with 
the child for having been racialised and therefore suffers for or with them; or does the 
present self, in view of its current understanding of racialisation, assume that the past self 
must have suffered? Whatever the answer may be, BIPOC research participants suffered 
from not being seen as a subject, they suffered because they felt dehumanised; while White 
research participants suffered because in reflection, they saw their own inhumanity 
reflected in the other, and as such felt dehumanised. I argue that the suffering caused by 
racialisation and dehumanisation is a form of symbolic violence (Weber 2019 [1921-1922], 
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Bourdieu 2001) often reproduced and re-dramatised at home, in the family or in other 
political spaces mentioned in research participants' narratives. The memories of imprinting 
of Whiteness or BIPOCness accordingly were often accompanied by feelings of shame and 
shameful silences of the people present (Connerton 2004, 2008; Trouillot 1995).  
 Sometimes these memories are akin to trauma but do not constitute trauma 
themselves, they are a form of suffering caused by racialisation. Whiteness and BIPOCness 
are nonetheless not essential, monolithic identities, like other identities such as cis-/gender, 
class, sexuality, age, ability etc.; they are rather constructed, deconstructed and 
reconstructed in myriad ways (Renn 2012, Gergen 1991). The psyche of the racialised subject 
stores, mirrors, retrieves and shapes racial material from and within social racial structures 
and within a racial matrix in which complex unconscious, social and psychological 
processes and forces organise a racial (group) psyche (Dalal 2002). In view of my analysis of 
research participants’ narratives of their racial subjectivation, the main argument in chapter 
4 is moreover that racialisation constitutes a form of dehumanising suffering for the 
racialised subject. 
 The subject of memories was also relevant in the fifth chapter- »The Training – 
Empowering Racial Subjectivities«. This chapter saw research participants being given the 
task of telling me the story of their first anti-racism or empowerment training experience 
(with Phoenix). It is very likely that anti-racism and empowerment practitioners’ memories 
contain inaccuracies, gaps and conflations with other training memories. Here, research 
participants expressed strong feelings of shame and irritation, but also the realisation of 
being mis-informed by the German education system about the histories, roles and 
contributions of BIPOC and White people. This miseducation was understood as a negative 
side-effect of racialisation, as an adverse by-product which hinders the cognitive and 
emotional development of White people (Katz 1978). There was also the realisation that 
denying the suffering of racialisation hinders the transformation of the narratives of the self. 
Racial power structures inscribed, imprinted and embodied by the racial subject need 
emotional work in order to be addressed and, if so wished, also changed. 
 Most striking, however, was the research findings showing how close the research 
participants’ narratives of the training experience is to a language of self-governmentality, 
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as analysed by Nikolas Rose (1996, 1999). The language of self-governmentality is strongly 
related to psycho-therapeutical discourses associated with self-improvement and liberation. 
It was evident from the narratives that the anti-racism and empowerment training was not 
founded in being about racial etiquette or guilt tripping White participants through 
confronting them with BIPOC’s anger, something which has been strongly criticised in 
Lasch-Quinn’s work (2001). Research participants’ narratives of the training explore the 
very personal question of how participants relate to the phenomenon of racism individually. 
The practitioners share how they journeyed inside, analysing and examining how they 
became the racial being that they are and how they, as racialised subjects, relate to their 
environment. This analysis and examination of the participants’ racial subjectivation is not 
an exclusively cognitive approach but is rather described in the narratives of anti-racism 
and empowerment practitioners as a very emotional and sometimes even physical 
experience. Bringing an emotional dimension into the engagement with the phenomenon of 
racism bears the risk of triggering a variety of feelings in racialised subjects, such as White 
narcissism, which is counterproductive in the process of de-racialisation since it centres the 
White subject solely on itself (Matias 2016). Cheryl Matias suggests in order to counter the 
toxicity of White emotionality, White racialised subjects can learn to re-learn their emotions 
(Matias 2016, p. 5, p. 135), though the author leaves no suggestions what this re-learning 
process could look like. It would also mean that the subject of de-racialisation and critical 
reflexivity remains in the cosmos of self-governmentality. 
 Nevertheless, the emotional dimensions of political learning should not be dismissed 
too quickly, since feelings can play a significant role in (political) educational processes 
(Besand 2014). Emotions act as a frame through which we perceive the world and ourselves, 
since we relate to our environment not solely through cognition, but also through emotions 
(Mohseni 2020, p. 439). I therefore argue that knowing about racialisation is one matter while, 
personally feeling one’s racialisation is a very different position. Emotions constitute an 
essential part of who we are as human beings and being in denial of this flattens our human 
existence. Giving emotions weight does not mean that reason, evaluation and critical 
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reflexivity are displaced48 (ibid.). On the contrary, critical reflection benefits from including 
the multiple dimensions of how we relate to the world and to ourselves (ibid.). Emotions 
play a significant role in how we relate to theories of racialisation, not only through 
abstraction but also as persons. The narratives of anti-racism and empowerment 
practitioners reveal that working emotionally in the training through one’s own memories 
of racialisation processes made them feel more empowered. It instigated feelings of taking 
more ownership of their personal racial narrative and of wrestling back some freedom and 
autonomy from the racial subjectivation which they had not chosen to undergo as children. 
 The notion of the autonomous subject is anchored in modern Social Contract theory 
developed by early Enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, and Kant 
(Lessnoff 1990). The social contract was understood as a theory »which grounds the legitimacy 
of political authority, and the obligations of rulers and subjects (and the limits thereof), on a premised 
contract or contracts relating to these matters« (Lessnoff 1990, p. 3). Social Contract theory has 
been, however, heavily criticised by feminist (Pateman 1988) and critical »Race« scholars 
(Mills 1997) for having been mostly developed by and applied to White men, often 
excluding BPOC and further genders in this Western project of modernity. Nevertheless, 
the Phoenix training used as a case study in this research project is strongly based on 
systems psychology; and the discourses drawn upon in the research participants' narratives 
posit psychotherapeutic concepts as of great significance in the participants’ first training 
experience. The discourses applied in the narratives confirm the idea of a Western way of 
life that privileges convictions of mental freedom and self-acknowledgment. The outcome 
of this privileging is a limitation on being an individual, of being free or freed. This results 
in the subject being pushed into the compulsory contradiction of being compelled to be free. 
With regards to both, the anti-racism and empowerment training, this implies that racialised 
subjects are constrained in giving their lives some sense by, for example, deconstructing the 
racialised structures and thoughts that restrict them, their social relations and their access 
to cultural assets. Be that as it may, as delineated in the fifth chapter in which the narratives 
of anti-racism and empowerment practitioners’ first training experiences are analysed - 
 
48 It is important to note that the very idea that emotions are a lesser form of intelligence is a key component of White (and 
masculine) formations of self (Federici 2004) 
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cognitive and emotional understanding of personal racial subjectivation processes partially 
liberate the racialised subject. The subject can only be partially liberated since it exists within 
a contradictory simultaneity of identities. Racialisation is not something the subject can free 
themselves from in totality, they can, however, reconstruct certain elements of their racial 
subject identity and are thereby partially racialised and partially liberated. Nevertheless, the 
subject apart from being raced is also cis-/gendered, classed etc.; the project of liberation 
seems rather complex and impossible to complete, which does not mean that the subject 
should not attempt to liberate themselves. 
 Chapter 6, titled »After the training – re-writing racialised subjectivities, re-
imagining humanness« explores the new narratives of the self inspired by anti-racism and 
empowerment training. Here research participants share how the lack of insight into 
racialisation often leads to a violent re-production of racialisation processes. Participants 
also shared how they sometimes failed and sometimes succeeded in inspiring their 
surroundings to address or reflect on the phenomenon of racism. 
In addition to the examination of how anti-racism and empowerment practitioners 
re-write their racial subjectivation, I also explored how the research participants re-
imagined humanness. During the Enlightenment era and the period in which Western 
imperial powers racialised the globe (Banton 1977), White people were granted a status of 
full humanness. However, so I argue, this status during the European colonial expansion 
was based on systemic intentional subjection of its White and BPOC subjects through both 
violent and also non-physical acts against them, which dehumanised them both. The price 
that the White subject paid for positing itself as a superior racial self was the abandonment 
of an authentic human self; for humans that dehumanise others fail to understand or nurture 
their own humanness. Thereby, the humanness granted to White people is an empty status, 
a form of pseudo-humanness. After the end of the European colonial Empires, the systemic 
intentional subjection through physically violent but also non-physical acts against White 
and BIPOC subjects has turned into second nature (Elias 1994) in modern Western societies 
and has become a systemic mostly unintended subjection through mainly non-physical acts 
against White and BIPOC subjects. 
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If racial subjectivation can be seen as mis-recognition, then recognition (as 
conceptualised by Taylor 1994) could therefore be considered a form of de-racialisation. 
Anti-racism and empowerment professionals' accounts show that Whiteness, seeing itself 
through the eyes of the racialised other, would not just award subject status to the 
externalised racial other, it would likewise restore a humanness wherein White people can 
see themselves in (Martinot 2010). The manner by which this recognition can advance has 
been portrayed and re-composed by our research participants in plethora of ways: either by 
depicting love as a driver of individual and social change (Illouz 2012), by transcending the 
shame and stigmatisations that are regularly identified with Whiteness (Kowal 2011), or by 
finding a type of self-acknowledgment that gives the subject a (yet restricted) sense of liberty 
and self-determination (Frankl 2006). 
 Besides, anti-racism and empowerment experts comprehend and rethink humanness 
in terms of relationality (Derrida 2005; Sinha 2015). Within this relationality, vulnerability 
(Butler et Al. 2016) and critical reflexivity (Emirbayer & Desmond 2015) become relevant in 
assessing of how we identify and relate humanely with one another. Modern Western 
humanism rooted in Renaissance thought mainly revolved around the free subject and how 
it can affirm itself, yet it failed at humanising epistemologies of the Global North (Dawson 
1931). A planetary humanism, as conceptualised by Fanon (Sekyi-Out 1996) and Gilroy 
(2004), which explicitly opposes all types of racialisation but also other forms of 
dehumanisation, is an additional pivotal component in nurturing a culture of 
understanding, pluralism and conviviality. This planetary humanism could be educated by 
decoloniality, a concept that critically addresses the supremacy of Western epistemologies 
and endeavours to remember and build on epistemologies of the Global South in its search 
for ideas of what the human might be (Santos 2018). Various elements of the human 
pluriverse can thus be analysed and arranged. For example: Ubuntu. Ubuntu is a notion and 
a system in which an individual is perceived to become an individual through other 
individuals (Tutu 1999). This cultural practice of being is present in various forms of 
spiritualities and has been much avoided by the Western undertaking of modernity and the 
place of the human in it (Masuzawa 2005). Lastly, concerning Lyotard (1991), I have 
contended that if we comprehend humanness as a chance to be all that we can be, the 
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inhuman ought not to be denied, but is instead seen as a decision similar to the decision to 
be human. The inhuman reflex in the context of racialisation is to relate to the other as racial 
Other and little else. The inhuman choice limits us to simple, essentialising and oppressive 
narratives of the self, which become imprinted on us in early childhood (Elias 1994). The 
human choice is to resist simple, essentialising and oppressive narratives; thereby granting 
complexity, non-essentialisms, and self-empowerment in the form of Lebensmöglichkeiten 
(life chances or life opportunities). 
 Chapter 6 argues that through new narratives of the self, inspired by anti-racism and 
empowerment training, anti-racism and empowerment practitioners re-compose their own 
racial subjectivation in redemptive terms of recognition, relationality and critical reflexivity. 
In the event that racialisation is perceived as a dehumanising type of suffering, de-
racialisation turns into a type of re-humanisation. Subsequently, one critical component in 
the cycle of re-writing subjectivities is the question of what humanness and the re-
imagination of humanness means. In that, I dove into an existential reflection on Fanon's 
call for a new humanism and touched upon the idea of decoloniality. We herewith move 




Slow and weak… 
 
However, far from being a work of decolonial epistemology, since I still rely heavily on the 
methods and the writings of so many scholars from Europe and North America (some of 
them White, some of them BIPOC) my Anatolian Alevi upbringing still significantly informs 
some of the key questions of this thesis. Though I strongly hesitate to call this work a piece 
of Anatolian German Alevi epistemology, my spiritual ancestry is foundational in this 
thesis: 
 
»The Bektashi notions of the Spiritual Man and Perfect Man, the highest levels of the chain of emanation (after 
God/Truth and God/Universe), will be described here. The former refers to the fact that ›every human being on 
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earth is an emanation of an astral, shining, or spiritual self‹ (Cornell 2006: 16). The belief that God is already 
present within all human beings (Wakamatsu 2015: 784) is connected to the idea that the individual is a ›perfect 
embodiment‹ of the human whole (Rapport 2012: 5). The Perfect Man (Insan-ı kamil) is the ideal person, a mature 
human being who has managed to acquire spiritual access to the hidden and universal Truth – the higher degree 
of knowledge, the Hakikat (Cornell 2006: 19).  
The concept of ›Four Doors, Forty Levels‹ (dört kapı, kırk makam) is central to Alevi mysticism. This is 
the process through which an individual goes through all the necessary stages – şeriat (religious law), tarikat 
(spiritual path), marifet (spiritual knowledge) and hakikat (spiritual truth) – that characterize the path of inner, 
deeper spiritual insight (Gokalp 1980: 755). In the practical terms of everyday life, Alevis believe that a Perfect 
Human directs his or her heart towards humanity (Yaman and Erdemir 2006: 69): this requires the full moral 
control of one’s desires and treating everyone equally, with kindness, honesty and sincerity (Shindeldecker 1998). 
Salvation is reached through the emulation of perfect models such as Ali, Hacı Bektaş Veli and other saints« 
(Cusenza 2017, p. 301). 
 
While this paints a picture of Anatolian Alevis as akin to saints, they of course are not (I for 
one am certainly not a saint); Alevis (like saints) are humans with good and bad 
characteristics, who are bound to fail in their emulation of these perfect humans. This 
description of the Alevi is not about being perfect, but rather about attempting perfection. 
This centuries old belief system assumes that humanness is a direction, a compass that 
guides us through our relationships. The research participants’ narratives also reflected in 
ways that connected with and complemented the Anatolian Alevi belief system: the ways 
(in chapter 6) in which the anti-racism and empowerment trainers directed their hearts (or 
their perceptions) towards humanity, their own humanity, but also the humanity of the 
other. This became evident in the research participants’ narratives of claiming to attempt to 
relate to each other as human beings and not through the roles a person embodies. 
 At the same time, and I want to emphasise that this is not a story about triumph. This 
is not a story about how anti-racism and empowerment practitioners heroically and fully 
overcome their racialisation, free themselves or became absolute free subjects, freeing their 
surroundings and taking full control over racial narratives in society. If at all, the research 
participants’ narratives highlight how unspectacular, how slow and weak, the process of de-
racialisation and re-humanisation is. It is therefore important to understand that the 
narratives of anti-racism and empowerment practitioners cannot be narratives of a 
triumphant mastery over racial subjectivation, for the very notion of the subject becoming 
master over itself is informed by Western Romanticism and Enlightenment thinking (Singh 
2017, p. 11). The modern political subject and the idea of humanness therein, cannot be 




»For Locke, then, Man as the masterful modern subject is a privatization and appropriation of something else, 
something that precedes and perhaps always escapes or exceeds mastery— something within and around Man 
that, in fact, Man has to ›master‹ in order to become himself, which is to say, in order to become free. While 
mastery here becomes totalizing and inescapable (one is either mastered by another or is master of oneself), its 
very emergence presupposes that there is something outside of mastery, something that mastery feeds on but 
disavows. To unthink mastery therefore requires either a radically different understanding of what it could mean 
to be human or perhaps a thinking of the human that would not be human at all. Foucault reminds us, ›Man is an 
invention of recent date‹ (1994, 387), and as such I am keen to imagine a subject or person who would not be 
human in this way, in this style of masterful Man articulated through political philosophy« (Singh 2017, pp. 13-14). 
 
This critique of mastery in Western notions of humanness, remind us of the words of Alevi 
poet Kaygusuz Abdal, who challenging god wrote: »You've built a bridge from hair, so that 
Your servant comes and walks across it. We want to stay where we are, and if You're a hero, God, 
then walk across it Yourself!« (cited from Ritter 2003, p. 186). This line in Kaygusuz Abdal’s 
poem highlights two important factors: firstly, it questions the nature of god as a superior 
divine being, positing God as in fact similar to humans and as such placing the divine spirit 
as an essence of the inner self of the human being (Shankland 2003, p. 167); secondly, the 
bridge made from a single hair symbolises the bridge humans will cross on judgment day, 
the day on which their deeds as human beings will be judged (Ritter 2003, p. 186). Implied 
here is that living an ethical life in Alevi traditions is as easy as crossing an abyss on a string 
of hair. In other words: an ethical life is in fact impossible to master (even for a divine being). 
As Singh suggests, the human subject should not be about mastering humanness; neither is 
the aim that humanness should master all the subjectivations the human is subjected to. 
Rather, it is about familiarising ourselves with our racial subjectivation, at least in a way 
that it is less master over us. Perhaps if we cannot master living an ethical life, which in a 
racialised (but also gendered, classed etc.) world is as difficult as passing over an abyss on 
a piece of hair, it is time to befriend the suffering of dehumanisation, the deformations of 
power and the brokenness of oppression. Maybe it is simply not about crossing the abyss 
from above but falling into it: 
 
»As we stare at the abyss and as the abyss stares back at us, we lose ourselves for a creolized self yet to be 
created on the ever-unfolding horizon of the groundless middle. In the colonial abyss, passage implies plunging 
not only into the abyss of the self and the other but also in the abyss of becoming - sinking into the unknown 
mystery and thus the generosity of becoming, and of the other, that solicits a future; generosity that fosters the 
original (ex)change - an exchange that takes place at the very outset of being - which therefore exceeds the 
capitalist economy of exchange. A gift: the gift of becoming and creolization, the exchange before being; the 
sacred. Being Malabou teaches us, is a site of change and exchange. It points to nothing but its mutability: ›Being 
is from the outset changeable and changed. It substitutes for itself and is exchanged - in exchange for nothing; it 
loses its name.‹ It is perhaps here that the boundary between the human and the divine or between the spiritual 
and political dissolves, at this juncture of exile in the groundless middle, between absolute solitude and the 




Coloniality cannot exist without modernity, in the same way it does not make any sense to 
think about modernity without coloniality (Mignolo 2011, p. 3). In Western modernity, the 
human is constantly subjected to developing and growing the self, their life, their capital 
(which can only lead to an implosion). An alternative human narrative might therefore be 
about prosperity and dignity (Mignolo 2011, p. 304). Instead of a humanness that is master 
over the world and nature49, a humanness that begins to nurture the world and nature is 
called for (Mignolo 2011, p. 313). If we attempt to master our suffering caused by racial 
subjectivation, it will only master us. However, if we begin to befriend our suffering, it 
might lose some of the terror racialisation exerts on us and onto the world. 
 In applying the concept of imagination as used in the capability approach of Martha 
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen (1993) and by exploring a sociology of spirituality as done by 
Georg Simmel (1997) and Kieran Flanagan & Peter C. Jupp (2007), I argue that to become 
enchanted by the world again halts the attempts to master everything. Asad (2003) links 
modernity and romanticism to secularisation and disenchantment: 
 
»It is right to say that ›modernity‹ is neither a totally coherent object nor a clearly bounded one, and that many of 
its elements originate in relations with the histories of peoples outside Europe. Modernity is a project – or rather, 
a series of interlinked projects – that certain people in power seek to achieve. The project aims at institutionalizing 
a number of (sometimes conflicting, often evolving) principles: constitutionalism, moral autonomy, democracy, 
human rights, civil equality, industry, consumerism, freedom of the market – and secularism. It employs 
proliferating technologies (of production, warfare, travel, entertainment, medicine) that generate new experiences 
of space and time, of cruelty and health, of consumption and knowledge. The notion that these experiences 
constitute ›disenchantment‹ - implying a direct access to reality, a stripping away of myth, magic, and the sacred 
– is a salient feature of the modern epoch. It is, arguably, a product of nineteenth-century romanticism, partly 
linked to the growing habit of reading imaginative literature – being enclosed within and by it – so that images of 
a ›pre-modern‹ past acquire in retrospect a quality of enchantment« (Asad 2003, pp. 13-14).  
 
What is required for the present to become re-enchanted again? Spirituality could possibly 
be part of that process. Many religious minorities, such as Alevis have suffered centuries of 
religious persecution by movements that have used religions to justify genocide and many 
other forms of oppression and cruelty. As Asad (2003) describes in his book, secularism has 
also been used to create oppressive structures and processes. Spirituality might be assessed 
as belonging to the humans in much as the same way as emotions do (Flanagan 2007, p. 1). 
 
49 Probably a trait that modernity has inherited from the three major monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
(Toynbee 1972; Gottlieb 2006) 
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The spirituality of atheists are included here in this thesis understanding of what 
spirituality50 is. Spirituality in this model, like emotionality, does not equate dismissing 
reason, evaluation and critical reflexivity. Far from positioning this thinking within ethical 
relativism, it suggests rather a form of spirituality that confers with the ethics of a new 
humanism. Ayi Kwei Armah wrote in his book The Healers (1979) that the healer has the 
spiritual power to either inspire or to manipulate others, echoing the choice of the human 
or the inhuman. The power of inspiration heals brokenness, the power of manipulation 
divides only further and nurtures dehumanising suffering further. And yet, this thinking 
may be prone to what Lauren Berlant (2011) coined cruel optimism: 
 
»I love the idea of reparative reading insofar as it is a practice of meticulous curiosity. But I also resist idealizing, 
even implicitly, any program of better thought or reading. How would we know when the ›repair‹ we intend is not 
another form of narcissism or smothering will? Just because we sense it to be so? Those of us who think for a 
living are too well-positioned to characterize certain virtuous acts of thought as dramatically powerful and right, 
whether effective or futile; we are set up to overestimate the proper clarity and destiny of an idea’s effects and 
appropriate affects. […] [S]uch dramas can produce strange distortions in the ways we stage agency as a mode 
of heroic authorship, and vice versa: such dramas of inflation distract attention from the hesitancy and 
recessiveness in ordinary being. The distinction I’m making here is about an attitude toward what thinking (as 
écriture, as potentiality) can do. I’m suggesting that the overvaluation of reparative thought is both an occupational 
hazard and part of a larger overvaluation of a certain mode of virtuously intentional, self-reflective personhood« 
(Berlant 2011, p. 124). 
 
Similarly, Michael Rothberg argues in The Implicated subject (2019) »Self-reflexivity alone will 
not lead directly to a political movement that can dismantle the conditions of implication. The burden 
of history will not simply evaporate once we see our place in its long- and short-term legacies« 
(Rothberg 2019, p. 19). Further, Rothberg states that »the insights derived from the lens of 
implication outweigh the risks of narcissistic forms of self-reflexivity and that it is worth training our 
analytic powers on a terrain that too often remains invisible yet is central to the production of 
injustice« (ibid.). 
 On many occasions I find myself agreeing with Lasch-Quinn’s criticism of racial 
awareness training in the US (2001). In view of the fact that there are good training and bad 
 
50 What is spirituality? The »notion of spirituality is profoundly indefinite« Flanagan concludes (Flanagan 2007, p. 1). Is 
spirituality individual or does it solely belong to organised religions? Flanagan suggests: »Spirituality signifies an 
indispensable dimension of what it is to be human. In the spirit, the social actor finds ambition, animation and exultation 
that all move and mobilise the self to reach beyond itself, to find powers that make humans small divinities pursuing 
destinies that transcend the mundane necessities of the immediate and the temporal. In reaching to surpass, the limits of 
self-endeavour become horribly plain. The actor sees what to grasp but the reaching eludes. Spirituality is not only about 
what is beyond human limits; it is the sensibility of incompleteness in the journeying« (Flanagan 2007, p. 1).  
 
 244 
training, it is not helpful in our evaluation to vilify all training, as has often been done 
(Lasch-Quinn 2001; Petley 2019; Gurnah 1987; Sivanandan 1987). It would indeed be 
problematic if anti-racism and empowerment training were perceived as a panacea to all 
racial problems. The notion that training individuals to become less racist and more 
empowered would suffice in changing the racial order is erroneous. Anti-racism and 
empowerment training belongs to a set of social processes that include politics of self-
representation for BIPOC (in mass media for example) and a redistribution of wealth (in 
particular since the gap between the rich and poor is growing in Germany and globally). As 
Nancy Fraser argues, we need both: recognition and redistribution (Fraser & Honneth 2003, 
p. 8). Historical social change requires that both individuals and structures change. At a time 
when mass colonialism was seeing its end in many regions of the world, Fanon wrote almost 
60 years ago: 
 
»What counts today, the question which is looming on the horizon, is the need for a redistribution of wealth. 
Humanity must reply to this question, or be shaken to pieces by it« (Fanon 1965, p. 98). 
 
To Fanon’s call I would add another, more recent plight: 
 
»This is a moment in which human-induced ecological catastrophe is both in effect and imminent, in which human 
population displacement and species extinctions have become normative expectations. It is a moment, in other 
words, when human practices of mastery fold over onto themselves and collapse. Mastery as the logic of a certain 
form of human being needs urgently therefore to be unthought and replaced by new performances of humanity« 
(Singh 2017, p. 19). 
 
While I empathise with those, who feel despair in these difficult times; despair can also lead 
to our most inhuman reflexes to take over, the master. Nevertheless, nothing lasts forever, 
and everything is going to change eventually. The suffering caused by the inhumanness of 
racialisation rages through our internal and external worlds, it exists in us and the structures 
that we move in. I hope the participant narratives in this thesis with the slowness and 
weaknesses they reveal, highlight that suffering can be transformed into something else, into 
something more humane. 
 The humble suggestion here is that being human is the sum of our 
Lebensmöglichkeiten, our life chances or life possibilities - the more possibilities of living, of 
being, we have, the more human we can become. Lebensmöglichkeiten are however not 
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boundless - they are bound by the humanity of others and by nature, the global or cosmic 
ecosystem, which we are a part of. Lebensmöglichkeiten or notions of humanity that limit or 
destroy life possibilities of others and destroy nature are inhumane, because they are also a 
part of ourselves. Being human or inhuman is thus a choice, not a given. While this thesis 
explores some of the inhuman and human choices research participants made in relation to 
racialisation, it invites other scholars of humanness to continue negotiating and exploring, 
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